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SELECTED ESSAYS

ON

LANGUAGE, MYTHOLOGY AND RELIGION.

INTRODUCTION.

(WRITTEN 1867.)

MORE than twenty years have passed since my revered friend Bunsen called me one day into his library at Carlton House Terrace, and announced to me with beaming eyes that the publication of the Rig-veda was secure. He had spent many days in seeing the Directors of the East-India Company, and explaining to them the importance of this work, and the necessity of having it published in England. At last his efforts had been successful, the funds for printing my edition of the text and commentary of the Sacred Hymns of the Brahmans had been granted, and Bunsen was the first to announce to me the happy result of his literary diplomacy. 'Now,' he said, 'you have got a work for life—a large block that will take years to plane and polish.' 'But mind,' he added, 'let us have from time to time some chips from your workshop.'[1]

[1] This edition of the text and native commentary of the Rig-veda has since been published in six volumes, 4to: vol. i., 1849; vol. ii., 1853; vol. iii., 1856; vol. iv., 1862; vol. v., 1872; vol. vi., 1874.

I have tried to follow the advice of my departed friend, and I have published almost every year a few articles on such subjects as had engaged my attention, while prosecuting at the same time, as far as altered circumstances would allow, my edition of the Rig-veda, and of other Sanskrit works connected with it. These articles were chiefly published in the 'Edinburgh' and 'Quarterly' Reviews, in the 'Oxford Essays,' and 'Macmillan's' and 'Fraser's' Magazines, in the 'Saturday Review,' and in the 'Times.' In writing them my principal endeavour has been to bring out even in the most abstruse subjects the points of real interest that ought to engage the attention of the public at large, and never to leave a dark nook or corner without attempting to sweep away the cobwebs of false learning, and let in the light of real knowledge. Here, too, I owe much to Bunsen's advice, and when last year I saw in Cornwall the large heaps of copper ore piled up around the mines, like so many heaps of rubbish, while the poor people were asking for coppers to buy bread, I frequently thought of Bunsen's words, 'Your work is not finished when you have brought the ore from the mine: it must be sifted, smelted, refined, and coined before it can be of real use, and contribute towards the intellectual food of mankind.' I can hardly hope that in this my endeavour to be clear and plain, to follow the threads of every thought to the very ends, and to place the web of every argument clearly and fully before my readers, I have always been successful. Several of the subjects treated in these essays are, no doubt, obscure and difficult: but there is no subject, I believe, in the whole realm of human knowledge, that cannot be

rendered clear and intelligible, if we ourselves have perfectly mastered it. And now while the two last volumes of my edition of the Rig-veda are passing through the press, I thought the time had come for gathering up a few armfuls of these chips and splinters, throwing away what seemed worthless, and putting the rest into some kind of shape, in order to clear my workshop for other work.

The two volumes which I am now publishing contain a selection of essays on language, mythology, and religion, three subjects intimately connected with each other. There is to my mind no subject more absorbing than the tracing the origin and first growth of human thought;—not theoretically, or in accordance with the Hegelian laws of thought, or the Comptian epochs; but historically, and like an Indian trapper, spying for every footprint, every layer, every broken blade that might tell and testify of the former presence of man in his early wanderings and searchings after light and truth.

In the languages of mankind, in which everything new is old and everything old is new, an inexhaustible mine has been discovered for researches of this kind. Language still bears the impress of the earliest thoughts of man, obliterated, it may be, buried under new thoughts, yet here and there still recoverable in their sharp original outline. The growth of language is continuous, and by continuing our researches backward from the most modern to the most ancient strata, the very elements and roots of human speech have been reached, and with them the elements and roots of human thought. What lies beyond the beginnings of language, however interest-

ing it may be to the physiologist, does not yet belong to the history of man, in the true and original sense of that word. Man means the thinker, and the first manifestation of thought is speech.

But more surprising than the continuity in the growth of language, is the continuity in the growth of religion. Of religion, too, as of language, it may be said that in it everything new is old and everything old is new, and that there has been no entirely new religion since the beginning of the world. The elements and roots of religion were there, as far back as we can trace the history of man; and the history of religion, like the history of language, shows us throughout a succession of new combinations of the same radical elements. An intuition of God, a sense of human weakness and dependance, a belief in a Divine government of the world, a distinction between good and evil, and a hope of a better life, these are some of the radical elements of all religions. Though sometimes hidden, they rise again and again to the surface. Though frequently distorted, they tend again and again to their perfect form. Unless they had formed part of the oldest dowry of the human soul, religion would have remained an impossibility, and the tongues of angels would have been to human ears but as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. If we once understand this clearly, the words of St. Augustine, which have seemed startling to many of his admirers, become perfectly clear and intelligible, when he says [1]:

[1] August. Retr. 1, 13. 'Res ipsa, quæ nunc religio Christiana nuncupatur, erat apud antiquos, nec defuit ab initio generis humani, quousque Christus veniret in carnem, unde vera religio, quæ jam erat, cœpit appellari Christiana.'

'What is now called the Christian religion, has existed among the ancients, and was not absent from the beginning of the human race, until Christ came in the flesh: from which time the true religion, which existed already, began to be called Christian.' From this point of view the words of Christ, too, which startled the Jews, assume their true meaning, when He said to the centurion of Capernaum: 'Many shall come from the east and the west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven.'

During the last fifty years the accumulation of new and authentic materials for the study of the religions of the world, has been most extraordinary; but such are the difficulties in mastering these materials that I doubt whether the time has yet come for attempting to trace, after the model of the Science of Language, the definite outlines of the Science of Religion. By a succession of the most fortunate circumstances, the canonical books of three of the principal religions of the ancient world have lately been recovered, the Veda, the Zend-Avesta, and the Tripiṭaka. But not only have we thus gained access to the most authentic documents from which to study the ancient religion of the Brahmans, the Zoroastrians, and the Buddhists, but by discovering the real origin of Greek, Roman, and likewise of Teutonic, Sclavonic, and Celtic mythology, it has become possible to separate the truly religious elements in the sacred traditions of these nations from the mythological crust by which they are surrounded, and thus to gain a clearer insight into the real faith of the ancient Aryan world.

If we turn to the Semitic world, we find that although but few new materials have been discovered from which to study the ancient religion of the Jews, yet a new spirit of inquiry has brought new life into the study of the sacred records of Abraham, Moses, and the Prophets; and the recent researches of Biblical scholars, though starting from the most opposite points, have all helped to bring out the historical interest of the Old Testament, in a manner not dreamt of by former theologians. The same may be said of another Semitic religion, the religion of Mohammed, since the Koran and the literature connected with it were submitted to the searching criticism of real scholars and historians. Important materials for the study of the Semitic religions have come from the monuments of Babylon and Nineveh. The very images of Bel and Nisroch now stand before our eyes, and the inscriptions on the tablets may hereafter tell us even more than they do at present of the thoughts of those who bowed their knees before them. The religious worship of the Phenicians and Carthaginians has been illustrated by Movers from the ruins of their ancient temples, and from scattered notices in classical writers; nay, even the religious ideas of the Nomads of the Arabian peninsula, previous to the rise of Mohammedanism, have been brought to light by the patient researches of Oriental scholars.

There is no lack of idols among the ruined and buried temples of Egypt with which to reconstruct the pantheon of that primeval country: nor need we despair of recovering more and more of the thoughts which are buried under the hieroglyphics of the in-

scriptions, or preserved in hieratic and demotic MSS., if we watch the brilliant discoveries that have rewarded the patient researches of the disciples of Champollion.

Besides the Aryan and Semitic families of religion, we have in China three recognised forms of public worship, the religion of Confucius, that of Laotse, and that of Fo (Buddha); and here, too, recent publications have shed new light, and have rendered an access to the canonical works of these religions, and an understanding of their various purports, more easy, even to those who have not mastered the intricacies of the Chinese language.

Among the Turanian nations, a few only, such as the Finns and the Mongolians, have preserved some remnants of their ancient worship and mythology, and these too have lately been more carefully collected and explained by D'Ohson, Castrèn, and others.

In America the religions of Mexico and Peru had long attracted the attention of theologians; and of late years the impulse imparted to ethnological research has induced travellers and missionaries to record any traces of religious life that could be discovered among the savage inhabitants of Africa, America, and the Polynesian islands.

It will be seen from these few indications, that there is no lack of materials for the student of religion; but we shall also perceive how difficult it is to master such vast materials. To gain a full knowledge of the Veda, or the Zend-Avesta, or the Tripitaka, of the Old Testament, the Koran, or the sacred books of China, is the work of a whole life.

How then is one man to survey the whole field of religious thought, to classify the religions of the world according to definite and permanent criteria, and to describe their characteristic features with a sure and discriminating hand?

Nothing is more difficult to seize than the salient features, the traits that constitute the permanent expression and real character of a religion. Religion seems to be the common property of a large community, and yet it not only varies in numerous sects, as language does in its dialects, but it escapes our firm grasp till we can trace it to its real habitat, the heart of each true believer. We speak glibly of Buddhism and Brahmanism, forgetting that we are generalising on the most intimate convictions of millions and millions of human souls, divided by half the world and by thousands of years.

It may be said that at all events where a religion possesses canonical books, or a definite number of articles, the task of the student of religion becomes easier, and this, no doubt, is true to a certain extent. But even then we know that the interpretation of these canonical books varies, so much so that sects appealing to the same revealed authorities, as, for instance, the founders of the Vedânta and the Sânkhya systems, accuse each other of error, if not of wilful error or heresy. Articles too, though drawn up with a view to define the principal doctrines of a religion, lose much of their historical value by the treatment they receive from subsequent schools; and they are frequently silent on the very points which make religion what it is.

A few instances may serve to show what diffi-

culties the student of religion has to contend with, before he can hope firmly to grasp the facts on which theories may safely be based.

Roman Catholic missionaries who had spent their lives in China, who had every opportunity, while staying at the court of Pekin, of studying in the original the canonical works of Confucius and their commentaries, who could consult the greatest theologians then living, and converse with the crowds that thronged the temples of the capital, differed diametrically in their opinions as to the most vital points in the state-religion of China. Lecomte, Fouquet, Prémare, and Bouvet thought it undeniable that Confucius, his predecessors and his disciples, had entertained the noblest ideas on the constitution of the universe, and had sacrificed to the true God in the most ancient temple of the earth. According to Maigrot, Navarette, on the contrary, and even according to the Jesuit Longobardi, the adoration of the Chinese was addressed to inanimate tablets, meaningless inscriptions, or, in the best case, to coarse ancestral spirits and beings without intelligence.[1] If we believe the former, the ancient deism of China approached the purity of the Christian religion; if we listen to the latter, the absurd fetishism of the multitude degenerated amongst the educated into systematic materialism and atheism. In answer to the peremptory texts quoted by one party, the other adduced the glosses of accredited interpreters, and the dispute of the missionaries who had lived in China and knew Chinese, had to be settled in the last instance by a decision of the see of Rome.

[1] Abel Rémusat, *Mélanges*, p. 162.

There is hardly any religion that has been studied in its sacred literature, and watched in its external worship with greater care than the modern religion of the Hindus, and yet it would be extremely hard to give a faithful and intelligible description of it. Most people who have lived in India would maintain that the Indian religion, as believed in and practised at present by the mass of the people, is idol-worship and nothing else. But let us hear one of the mass of the people, a Hindu of Benares, who in a lecture delivered before an English and native audience defends his faith and the faith of his forefathers against such sweeping accusations. 'If by idolatry,' he says, 'is meant a system of worship which confines our ideas of the Deity to a mere image of clay or stone, which prevents our hearts from being expanded and elevated with lofty notions of the attributes of God, if this is what is meant by idolatry, we disclaim idolatry, we abhor idolatry, and deplore the ignorance or uncharitableness of those that charge us with this grovelling system of worship . . . . . But if, firmly believing, as we do, in the omnipresence of God, we behold, by the aid of our imagination, in the form of an image any of His glorious manifestations, ought we to be charged with identifying them with the matter of the image, whilst during those moments of sincere and fervent devotion, we do not even think of matter? If at the sight of a portrait of a beloved and venerated friend no longer existing in this world, our heart is filled with sentiments of love and reverence; if we fancy him present in the picture, still looking upon us with his wonted tenderness and affection,

and then indulge our feelings of love and gratitude, should we be charged with offering the grossest insult to him—that of fancying him to be no other than a piece of painted paper? . . . . We really lament the ignorance or uncharitableness of those who confound our representative worship with the Phenician, Grecian, or Roman idolatry as represented by European writers, and then charge us with polytheism in the teeth of thousands of texts in the Purâṇas, declaring in clear and unmistakeable terms that there is but one God who manifests Himself as Brahma, Vishṇu, and Rudra (Siva) in his functions of creation, preservation, and destruction.'[1]

In support of these statements, this eloquent advocate quotes numerous passages from the sacred literature of the Brahmans, and he sums up his view of the three manifestations of the Deity in the words of their great poet Kalidâsa, as translated by Mr. Griffith:

> In those Three Persons the One God was shown,
> Each First in place, each Last—not one alone;
> Of Śiva, Vishṇu, Brahma, each may be
> First, second, third, among the Blessed Three.

If such contradictory views can be held and defended with regard to religious systems still prevalent amongst us, where we can cross-examine living witnesses, and appeal to chapter and verse in

[1] The modern pandit's reply to the missionary who accuses him of polytheism is: 'Oh, these are only various manifestations of the one God; the same as, though the sun be one in the heavens, yet he appears in multiform reflections upon the lake. The various sects are only different entrances to the one city.'—See W. W. Hunter, *Annals of Rural Bengal*, p. 116; and Medhurst on Shins in China, in his 'Inquiry on the Proper Mode of Translating *Ruach*.'

their sacred writings, what must the difficulty be when we have to deal with the religions of the past? I do not wish to disguise these difficulties, which are inherent in a comparative study of the religions of the world. I rather dwell on them strongly, in order to show how much care and caution is required in so difficult a subject, and how much indulgence should be shown in judging of the shortcomings and errors that are unavoidable in so comprehensive a study. It was supposed at one time that a comparative analysis of the languages of mankind must transcend the powers of man: and yet by the combined and well-directed efforts of many scholars, great results have here been obtained, and the principles that must guide the student of the Science of Language are now firmly established. It will be the same with the Science of Religion. By a proper division of labour, the materials that are still wanting will be collected and published and translated, and when that is done, surely man will never rest till he has discovered the purpose that runs through the religions of mankind, and till he has reconstructed the true Civitas Dei on foundations as wide as the ends of the world. The Science of Religion may be the last of the sciences which man is destined to elaborate; but when it is elaborated, it will change the aspect of the world, and give a new life to Christianity itself.

The Fathers of the Church, though living in much more dangerous proximity to the ancient religions of the Gentiles, admitted freely that a comparison of Christianity and other religions was useful. 'If there is any agreement,' Basilius remarked, 'between

their [the Greeks'] doctrines and our own, it may benefit us to know them: if not, then to compare them, and to learn how they differ, will help not a little towards confirming that which is the better of the two.'[1]

But this is not the only advantage of a comparative study of religions. The Science of Religion will for the first time assign to Christianity its right place among the religions of the world; it will show for the first time fully what was meant by the fullness of time; it will restore to the whole history of the world, in its unconscious progress towards Christianity, its true and sacred character.

Not many years ago great offence was given by an eminent writer who remarked that the time had come when the history of Christianity should be treated in a truly historical spirit, in the same spirit in which we treat the history of other religions, such as Brahmanism, Buddhism, or Mohammedanism. And yet what can be truer? He must be a man of little faith who would fear to subject his own religion to the same critical tests to which the historian subjects all other religions. We need not surely crave a tender or merciful treatment for that faith which we hold to be the only true one. We should rather challenge for it the severest tests and trials, as the sailor would for the good ship to which he entrusts his own life, and the lives of those who are most dear to him. In the Science of Religion,

[1] Basilius, 'De legendis Græc. libris,' c. v. *Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστί τις οἰκειότης πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς λόγοις, προὔργου ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν ἡ γνῶσις γένοιτο. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ τό γε παράλληλα θέντας καταμαθεῖν τὸ διάφορον, οὐ μικρὸν εἰς βεβαίωσιν βελτίονος.*

we can decline no comparisons, nor claim any immunities for Christianity, as little as the missionary can, when wrestling with the subtle Brahman, or the fanatical Mussulman, or the plain-speaking Zulu. And if we send out our missionaries to every part of the world to face every kind of religion, to shrink from no contest, to be appalled by no objections, we must not give way at home or within our own hearts to any misgivings, lest a comparative study of the religions of the world should shake the firm foundations on which we must stand or fall.

To the missionary more particularly a comparative study of the religions of mankind will be, I believe, of the greatest assistance. Missionaries are apt to look upon all other religions as something totally distinct from their own, as formerly they used to describe the languages of barbarous nations as something more like the twittering of birds than the articulate speech of men. The Science of Language has taught us that there is order and wisdom in all languages, and that even the most degraded jargons contain the ruins of former greatness and beauty. The Science of Religion, I hope, will produce a similar change in our views of barbarous forms of faith and worship; and missionaries, instead of looking only for points of difference, will look out more anxiously for any common ground, any spark of the true light that may still be revived, any altar that may be dedicated afresh to the true God. [1]

[1] Joguth Chundra Gangooly, a native convert, says: 'I know from personal experience that the Hindu Scriptures have a great deal of truth. . . . If you go to India, and examine the common

And even to us at home, a wider view of the religious life of the world may teach many a useful lesson. Immense as is the difference between our own and all other religions of the world—and few can know that difference who have not honestly examined the foundations of their own as well as of other religions—the position which believers and unbelievers occupy with regard to their various forms of faith is very much the same all over the world. The difficulties which trouble us have troubled the hearts and minds of men as far back as we can trace the beginnings of religious life. The great problems touching the relation of the Finite to the Infinite, of the human mind as the recipient, and of the Divine Spirit as the source of truth, are old problems indeed: and while watching their appearance in different countries, and their treatment under varying circumstances, we shall be able, I believe, to profit ourselves, both by the errors which others committed before us, and by the truth which they discovered. We shall know the rocks that threaten every religion in this changing and shifting world of ours, and having watched many a storm of religious controversy and many a shipwreck in distant

sayings of the people, you will be surprised to see what a splendid religion the Hindu religion must be. Even the most ignorant women have proverbs that are full of the purest religion. Now I am not going to India to injure their feelings by saying, "Your Scripture is all nonsense, is good for nothing; anything outside the Old and New Testament is a humbug." No; I tell you I will appeal to the Hindu philosophers, and moralists, and poets, at the same time bringing to them my light, and reasoning with them in the spirit of Christ. That will be my work.'—'A Brief Account of Joguth Chundra Gangooly, a Brahmin and a Convert to Christianity.' *Christian Reformer*, August, 1860.

seas, we shall face with greater calmness and prudence the troubled waters at home.

If there is one thing which a comparative study of religions places in the clearest light, it is the inevitable decay to which every religion is exposed. It may seem almost like a truism, that no religion can continue to be what it was during the lifetime of its founder and its first apostles. Yet it is but seldom borne in mind that without constant reformation, i.e. without a constant return to its fountain-head, every religion, even the most perfect—nay the most perfect, on account of its very perfection, more even than others—suffers from its contact with the world, as the purest air suffers from the mere fact of its being breathed.

Whenever we can trace back a religion to its first beginnings, we find it free from many of the blemishes that offend us in its later phases. The founders of the ancient religions of the world, as far as we can judge, were minds of a high stamp, full of noble aspirations, yearning for truth, devoted to the welfare of their neighbours, examples of purity and unselfishness. What they desired to found upon earth was but seldom realised, and their sayings, if preserved in their original form, often offer a strange contrast to the practice of those who profess to be their disciples. As soon as a religion is established, and more particularly when it has become the religion of a powerful state, the foreign and worldly elements encroach more and more on the original foundation, and human interests mar the simplicity and purity of the plan which the founder had conceived in his own heart, and matured in his com-

munings with his God. Even those who lived with Buddha misunderstood his words, and at the Great Council which had to settle the Buddhist canon, Asoka, the Indian Constantine had to remind the assembled priests that 'what had been said by Buddha, that alone was well said.'[1] With every century, Buddhism, when it was accepted by nations differing so widely as Mongols and Hindus, when its sacred writings were translated into languages as far apart as Sanskrit and Chinese, assumed widely different aspects, till at last the Buddhism of the Shamans in the steppes of Tartary became as different from the teaching of the original Samana, as the Christianity of the leader of the Chinese rebels is from the teaching of Christ. If missionaries could show to the Brahmans, the Buddhists, the Zoroastrians, nay, even to the Mohammedans, how much their present faith differs from the faith of their forefathers and founders, if they could place in their hands and read with them in a kindly spirit the original documents on which these various religions profess to be founded, and enable them to distinguish between the doctrines of their own sacred books and the additions of later ages, an important advantage would be gained, and the choice between Christ and other Masters would be rendered far more easy to many a truth-seeking soul. But for that purpose it is necessary that we too should see the beam in our own eyes, and learn to distinguish between the Christianity of

[1] Second Bairat Inscription, in Cunningham, *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, p. 97: 'Bhagavatâ Budhena bhâsite save se subhâsite vâ.' Kern, *Indian Antiquary*, vol. v., p. 257. Oldenberg, Vinaya, introduction, p. xl. Burnouf, *Lotus de la bonne Loi*, Appendice, No. X., 54.

the nineteenth century and the religion of Christ. If we find that the Christianity of the nineteenth century does not win as many hearts in India and China as it ought, let us remember that it was the Christianity of the first century in all its dogmatic simplicity, but with its overpowering love of God and man, that conquered the world and superseded religions and philosophies, more difficult to conquer than the religious and philosophical systems of Hindus and Buddhists. If we can teach something to the Brahmans in reading with them their sacred hymns, they too can teach us something when reading with us the Gospel of Christ. Never shall I forget the deep despondency of a Hindu convert, a real martyr to his faith, who had pictured to himself from the pages of the New Testament what a Christian country must be, and who when he came to Europe found everything so different from what he had imagined in his lonely meditations at Benares! It was the Bible only that saved him from returning to his old religion, and helped him to discern beneath theological futilities, accumulated during nearly two thousand years, beneath pharisaical hypocrisy, infidelity, and want of charity, the buried, but still living seed, committed to the earth by Christ and His Apostles. How can a missionary in such circumstances meet the surprise and questionings of his pupils, unless he may point to that seed, and tell them what Christianity was meant to be; unless he may show that, like all other religions, Christianity, too, has had its history; that the Christianity of the nineteenth century is not the Christianity of the Middle Ages, that the Chris-

tianity of the Middle Ages was not that of the early Councils, that the Christianity of the early Councils was not that of the Apostles, and 'that what has been said by Christ, that alone was well said'?

The advantages, however, which missionaries and other defenders of the faith will gain from a comparative study of religions, though important hereafter, are not at present the chief object of these researches. In order to maintain their scientific character, they must be independent of all extraneous considerations: they must aim at truth, trusting that even unpalatable truths, like unpalatable medicine, will reinvigorate the system into which they enter. To those, no doubt, who value the tenets of their religion as the miser values his pearls and precious stones, thinking their value lessened if pearls and stones of the same kind are found in other parts of the world, the Science of Religion will bring many a rude shock; but to the true believer, truth wherever it appears is welcome, nor will any doctrine seem the less true or the less precious because it was seen, not only by Moses or Christ, but likewise by Buddha or Laotse. It should never be forgotten that while a comparison of ancient religions will certainly show that some of the most vital articles of faith are the common property of the whole of mankind, at least of all who seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him, and find Him, the same comparison alone can possibly teach us what is peculiar to Christianity, and what has secured to it that pre-eminent position which now it holds in spite of all obloquy. The gain will be greater than the

loss, if loss there be, which I, at least, shall never admit.

There is a strong feeling, I know, in the minds of all people against any attempt to treat their own religion as a member of a class, and in one sense that feeling is perfectly justified. To each individual, his own religion, if he really believes in it, is something quite inseparable from himself, something unique, that cannot be compared to anything else, or replaced by anything else. Our own religion is, in that respect, something like our own language. In its form it may be like other languages; in its essence and its relation to ourselves, it stands alone and admits of no peer or rival.

But in the history of the world, our religion, like our own language, is but one out of many; and in order to understand fully the position of Christianity in the history of the world, and its true place among the religions of mankind, we must compare it, not with Judaism only, but with the religious aspirations of the whole world, with all, in fact, that Christianity came either to destroy or to fulfil. From this point of view Christianity forms part, no doubt, of what people call profane history, but by that very fact, profane history ceases to be profane, and regains throughout that sacred character of which it had been deprived by a false distinction. The ancient Fathers of the Church spoke on these subjects with far greater freedom than we venture to use in these days. Justin Martyr, in his 'Apology' (A.D. 139), has this memorable passage (Apol. i. 46): 'One article of our faith then is, that Christ is the first-begotten of God, and we have already proved Him to be the very Logos (or universal Reason), of which man-

kind are all partakers; and therefore those who live according to the Logos are Christians, notwithstanding they may pass with you for Atheists; such among the Greeks were Sokrates and Herakleitos, and the like; and such among the Barbarians were Abraham, and Ananias, and Azarias, and Misael, and Elias, and many others, whose actions, nay whose very names, I know would be tedious to relate, and therefore shall pass them over. So, on the other side, those who have lived in former times in defiance of the Logos or Reason, were evil, and enemies to Christ and murderers of such as lived according to the Logos; but *they who have made or make the Logos or Reason the rule of their actions are Christians,* and men without fear and trembling.'[1]

'God,' says Clement (200 A.D.), 'is the cause of all that is good: only of some good gifts He is the primary cause, as of the Old and New Testaments, of others the secondary, as of (Greek) philosophy. But even philosophy may have been given primarily by Him to the Greeks, before the Lord had called the Greeks also. For that philosophy, like a schoolmaster, has guided the Greeks also, as the Law did Israel, towards Christ. Philosophy, therefore, prepares and opens the way to those who are made perfect by Christ.'[2]

[1] Τὸν Χριστὸν πρωτότοκον τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι ἐδιδάχθημεν, καὶ προεμηνύσαμεν Λόγον ὄντα, οὗ πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων μετέσχε· καὶ οἱ μετὰ Λόγου βιώσαντες Χριστιανοί εἰσι, κἂν ἄθεοι ἐνομίσθησαν, οἷον ἐν Ἕλλησι μὲν Σωκράτης καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ οἱ ὁμοῖοι αὐτοῖς, ἐν βαρβάροις δὲ Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἀνανίας καὶ Ἀζαρίας καὶ Μισαὴλ καὶ Ἠλίας καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, ὧν τὰς πράξεις ἢ τὰ ὀνόματα καταλέγειν μακρὸν εἶναι ἐπιστάμενοι, ταυτὶ παραιτούμεθα. ὥστε καὶ οἱ πρόγενόμενοι ἄνευ Λόγου βιώσαντες, ἄχρηστοι καὶ ἐχθροὶ τῷ Χριστῷ ἦσαν, καὶ φονεῖς τῶν μετὰ Λόγου βιούντων· οἱ δὲ μετὰ Λόγου βιώσαντες καὶ βιοῦντες Χριστιανοὶ καὶ ἄφοβοι καὶ ἀτάραχοι ὑπάρχουσιν.

[2] Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. I. cap. v. § 28. Πάντων μὲν γὰρ αἴτιος

And again: 'It is clear that the same God to whom we owe the Old and New Testaments, gave also to the Greeks their Greek philosophy by which the Almighty is glorified among the Greeks.'[1]

And Clement was by no means the only one who spoke thus freely and fearlessly, though, no doubt, his knowledge of Greek philosophy qualified him better than many of his contemporaries to speak with authority on such subjects.

St. Augustine writes: 'If the Gentiles also had possibly something divine and true in their doctrines, our Saints did not find fault with it, although for their superstition, idolatry, and pride, and other evil habits, they had to be detested, and, unless they improved, to be punished by divine judgment. For the apostle Paul, when he said something about God among the Athenians, quoted the testimony of some of the Greeks who had said something of the same kind: and this, if they came to Christ, would be acknowledged in them, and not blamed. Saint Cyprian, too, uses such witnesses against the Gentiles. For when he speaks of the Magians, he says that the chief among them, Hostanes, maintains that the true God is invisible, and that true angels sit at His throne; and that Plato agrees with this, and

τῶν καλῶν ὁ Θεὸς, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν κατὰ προηγούμενον, ὡς τῆς τε διαθήκης τῆς παλαιᾶς καὶ τῆς νέας, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐπακολούθημα, ὡς τῆς φιλοσοφίας· τάχα δὲ καὶ προηγουμένως τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐδόθη τότε πρὶν ἢ τὸν κύριον καλέσαι καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Ἐπαιδαγώγει γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ὡς ὁ νόμος τοὺς Ἑβραίους εἰς Χριστόν. προπαρασκευάζει τοίνυν ἡ φιλοσοφία προοδοποιοῦσα τὸν ὑπὸ Χριστοῦ τελειούμενον.

[1] Strom. lib. VI. cap. v. § 42. *Πρὸς δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς Θεὸς ἀμφοῖν ταῖν διαθήκαιν χορηγὸς, ὁ καὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φιλοσοφίας δοτὴρ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, δι' ἧς ὁ παντοκράτωρ παρ' Ἕλλησι δοξάζεται, παρέστησεν, δῆλον δὲ κἀνθένδε.*

believes in one God, considering the others to be angels or demons; and that Hermes Trismegistus also speaks of one God, and confesses that He is incomprehensible.' (Augustinus, 'De Baptismo contra Donatistas,' lib. VI. cap. xliv.)

Every religion, even the most imperfect and degraded, has something that ought to be sacred to us, for there is in all religions a secret yearning after the true, though unknown, God. Whether we see the Papua squatting in dumb meditation before his fetish, or whether we listen to Firdusi exclaiming: 'The height and the depth of the whole world have their centre in Thee, O my God! I do not know Thee what Thou art: but I know that Thou art what Thou alone canst be'—we ought to feel that the place whereon we stand is holy ground. There are philosophers, no doubt, to whom both Christianity and all other religions are exploded errors, things belonging to the past, and to be replaced by more positive knowledge. To them the study of the religions of the world could only have a pathological interest, and their hearts could never warm at the sparks of truth that light up, like stars, the dark yet glorious night of the ancient world. They tell us that the world has passed through the phases of religious and metaphysical errors, in order to arrive at the safe haven of positive knowledge of facts. But if they would but study positive facts, if they would but read, patiently and thoughtfully, the history of the world, as it is, not as it might have been: they would see that, as in geology, so in the history of human thought, theoretic uniformity does not exist, and that the past is never altogether lost.

The oldest formations of thought crop out everywhere, and if we dig but deep enough, we shall find that even the sandy desert in which we are asked to live rests everywhere on the firm foundation of that primeval, yet indestructible, granite of the human soul—religious faith.

There are other philosophers, again, who would fain narrow the limits of the Divine government of the world to the history of the Jewish and of the Christian nations, who would grudge the very name of religion to the ancient creeds of the world: nay, to whom the name of natural religion has almost become a term of reproach. To them, too, I should like to say that if they would but study positive facts, if they would but read their own Bible, they would find that the greatness of Divine Love cannot be measured by human standards, and that God has never forsaken a single human soul that has not first forsaken Him. 'He hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the earth; and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation; that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him, and find Him, though He be not far from every one of us.' If they would but dig deep enough, they, too, would find that what they contemptuously call natural religion is in reality the greatest gift that God has bestowed on the children of man, and that without it revealed religion itself would have no firm foundation, no living roots in the heart of man.

If by the essays here collected I should succeed in attracting more general attention towards an

independent, yet reverent, study of the ancient religions of the world, and in dispelling some of the prejudices with which so many have regarded the yearnings after truth embodied in the sacred writings of the Brahmans, the Zoroastrians, and the Buddhists, in the mythology of the Greeks and Romans, nay, even in the wild traditions and degraded customs of Polynesian savages, I shall consider myself amply rewarded for the labour which they have cost me. That they are not free from errors, in spite of a careful revision to which they have been submitted before I published them in this collection, I am fully aware, and I shall be grateful to anyone who will point them out, little concerned whether it is done in a seemly or unseemly manner, as long as some new truth is elicited, or some old error effectually exploded. Though I have thought it right in preparing these essays for publication, to alter what I could no longer defend as true, and also, though rarely, to add some new facts that seemed essential for the purpose of establishing what I wished to prove, yet in the main they have been left as they were originally published. I regret that, in consequence, certain statements of facts and opinions are repeated in different articles in almost the same words; but it will easily be seen that this could not have been avoided without either breaking the continuity of an argument, or rewriting large portions of certain essays. If what is contained in these repetitions is true and right, I may appeal to a high authority 'that in this country true things and right things require to be repeated a great many times.' If otherwise, the very repetition will provoke cri-

ticism and ensure refutation. I have added to all the articles the dates when they were written, these dates ranging over the last fifteen years, and I must beg my readers to bear these dates in mind when judging both of the form and the matter of these contributions towards a better knowledge of the creeds and prayers, the legends and customs, the languages and dialects of the ancient world.

I.

REDE LECTURE,

Delivered before the University of Cambridge the 29th of May, 1868.[1]

PART I.

ON THE STRATIFICATION OF LANGUAGE.

THERE are few sensations more pleasant than that of wondering. We have all experienced it in childhood, in youth, and in our manhood, and we may hope that even in our old age this affection of the mind will not entirely pass away. If we analyse this feeling of wonder carefully, we shall find that it consists of two elements. What we mean by wondering is not only that we are startled or stunned—that I should call the merely passive element of wonder. When we say 'I wonder,' we confess that we are taken aback, but there is a secret satisfaction mixed up with our feeling of surprise, a kind of hope, nay, almost of certainty, that sooner or later the wonder will cease, that our senses or our mind will recover, will grapple with these novel impressions or experiences, grasp them, it may be, throw

[1] This Lecture, translated by M. Louis Havet, forms the first fasciculus of the 'Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, publiée sous les auspices du Ministère de l'Instruction Publique.' Paris, 1869.

them, and finally triumph over them. In fact, we wonder at the riddles of nature, whether animate or inanimate, with a firm conviction that there is a solution to them all, even though we ourselves may not be able to find it.

Wonder, no doubt, arises from ignorance, but from a peculiar kind of ignorance; from what might be called a fertile ignorance; an ignorance which, if we look back at the history of most of our sciences, will be found to have been the mother of all human knowledge.[1] For thousands of years men have looked at the earth with its stratifications, in some places so clearly mapped out; for thousands of years they must have seen in their quarries and mines, as well as we ourselves, the imbedded petrifications of organic creatures; yet they looked and passed on without thinking more about it—they did not wonder. Not even an Aristotle had eyes to see; and the conception of a science of the earth, of Geology, was reserved for the eighteenth century.

Still more extraordinary is the listlessness with which during all the centuries that have elapsed since the first names were given to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field, men have passed by what was much nearer to them than even the gravel on which they trod—namely, the words of their own language. Here, too, the clearly marked lines of different strata seemed almost to challenge attention, and the pulses of former life were still throbbing in the petrified forms imbedded in grammars and dictionaries. Yet not even a Plato had eyes

[1] Διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν.—Arist. Met. A. 2.

to see, or ears to hear, and the conception of a science of language, of Glottology, was reserved for the nineteenth century.

I am far from saying that Plato and Aristotle knew nothing of the nature, the origin and the purpose of language, or that we have nothing to learn from their works. They, and their successors, and their predecessors too, beginning with Herakleitos and Demokritos, were startled and almost fascinated by the mysteries of human speech as much as by the mysteries of human thought; and what we call grammar and the laws of language, nay, all the technical terms which are still current in our schools, such as *noun* and *verb*, *case* and *number*, *infinitive* and *participle*, all this was first discovered and named by the philosophers and grammarians of Greece, to whom, in spite of all our new discoveries, I believe we are still beholden, whether consciously or unconsciously, for more than half of our intellectual life.

But the interest which those ancient Greek philosophers took in language was purely philosophical. It was the form, far more than the matter of speech which seemed to them a subject worthy of philosophical speculation. The idea that there was, even in their days, an immense mass of accumulated speech, to be sifted, to be analysed, and to be accounted for somehow, before any theories on the nature of language could be safely started, hardly ever entered their minds; or, when it did, as we see here and there in Plato's Kratylos, it soon vanished, without leaving any permanent impression. Each nation and each generation has its own problems to solve. The problem that occupied Plato in his Kratylos was,

if I understand him rightly, the possibility of a perfect language, a correct, true, or ideal language, a language founded on his own philosophy, his own system of types or ideas. He was too wise a man to attempt, like Bishop Wilkins, the actual construction of a philosophical language. But, like Liebniz, he just lets us see that a perfect language is conceivable, and that the chief reason of the imperfections of real language must be found in the fact that its original framers were ignorant of the true nature of things, ignorant of dialectic philosophy, and therefore incapable of naming rightly what they had failed to apprehend correctly. Plato's view of actual language, as far as it can be made out from the critical and negative rather than didactic and positive dialogue of Kratylos, seems to have been very much the same as his view of actual government. Both fall short of the ideal, and both are to be tolerated only in so far as they participate in the perfections of an ideal state and an ideal language.[1] Plato's Kratylos is full of suggestive wisdom. It is one of those books which, as we read them again from time to time, seem every time like new books: so little do we perceive at first all that is pre-supposed in them—the accumulated mould of thought, if I may say so, in which alone a philosophy like that of Plato could strike its roots and draw its support.

But while Plato shows a deeper insight into the mysteries of language than almost any philosopher that has come after him, he has no eyes for that marvellous harvest of words garnered up in our

[1] See Benfey, 'Ueber die Aufgabe des Kratylos.' Göttingen, 1868.

dictionaries, and in the dictionaries of all the races of the earth. With him language is almost synonymous with Greek, and though in one passage of the Kratylos he suggests that certain Greek words might have been borrowed from the Barbarians, and, more particularly, from the Phrygians, yet that remark, as coming from Plato, seems to be purely ironical, and though it contains, as we know, a germ of truth that has proved most fruitful in our modern science of language, it struck no roots in the minds of Greek philosophers. How much our new science of language differs from the linguistic studies of the Greeks; how entirely the interest which Plato took in language is now supplanted by new interests, is strikingly brought home to us when we see how the *Société de Linguistique*, lately founded at Paris, and including the names of the most distinguished scholars of France, declares in one of its first statutes that 'it will receive no communication concerning the origin of language or the formation of a universal language,' the very subjects which, in the time of Herakleitos and Plato, rendered linguistic studies worthy of the consideration of a philosopher.

It may be that the world was too young in the days of Plato, and that the means of communication were wanting to enable the ancient philosopher to see very far beyond the narrow horizon of Greece. With us it is different. The world has grown older, and has left to us in the annals of its various literatures the monuments of growing and decaying speech. The world has grown larger, and we have before us, not only the relics of ancient civilisation in Asia, Africa, and America, but living languages in such

number and variety that we draw back almost aghast at the mere list of their names. The world has grown wiser too, and where Plato could only see imperfections, the failures of the founders of human speech, we see, as everywhere else in human life, a natural progress from the imperfect towards the perfect, unceasing attempts at realising the ideal, and the frequent triumphs of the human mind over the inevitable difficulties of this earthly condition—difficulties, not of man's own making, but, as I firmly believe, prepared for him, and not without a purpose, as toils and tasks, by a higher Power and by the highest Wisdom.

Let us look, then, abroad and behold the materials which the student of language has now to face. Beginning with the language of the Western Isles, we have, at the present day, at least 100,000 words, arranged as on the shelves of a Museum, in the pages of Johnson and Webster. But these 100,000 words represent only the best grains that have remained in the sieve, while clouds of chaff have been winnowed off, and while many a valuable grain too has been lost by mere carelessness. If we counted the wealth of English dialects, and if we added the treasures of the ancient language from Alfred to Wycliffe, we should easily double the herbarium of the linguistic flora of England. And what are these Western Isles as compared to Europe; and what is Europe, a mere promontory, as compared to the vast continent of Asia; and what again is Asia, as compared to the whole inhabitable world? But there is no corner of that world that is not full of language; the very desert and the isles of the sea teem with dialects, and the

more we recede from the centres of civilisation, the larger the number of independent languages, springing up in every valley, and overshadowing the smallest island.

Ἴδαν ἐς πολύδενδρον ἀνὴρ ὑλατόμος ἐνθὼν
Παπταίνει, παρέοντος ἄδην, πόθεν ἄρξεται ἔργω.[1]

We are bewildered by the variety of plants, of birds, and fishes, and insects, scattered with lavish prodigality over land and sea; but what is the living wealth of that Fauna as compared to the winged words which fill the air with unceasing music! What are the scanty relics of fossil plants and animals, compared to the storehouse of what we call the dead languages! How then can we explain it that for centuries and centuries, while collecting beasts, and birds, and fishes, and insects, while studying their forms, from the largest down to the smallest and almost invisible creatures, man has passed by this forest of speech, without seeing the forest, as we say in German, for the very number of its trees (*Man sah den Wald vor lauter Bäumen nicht*), without once asking how this vast currency could have been coined, what inexhaustible mines could have supplied the metal, what cunning hands could have devised the image and superscription—without once wondering at the countless treasure inherited by him from the fathers of the human race?

Let us now turn our attention in a different direction. After it had been discovered that there was this great mass of material to be collected, to be classified, to be explained, what has the Science

[1] Theokritos, xvii. 9.

of Language, as yet, really accomplished? It has achieved much, considering that real work only began about fifty years ago; it has achieved little, if we look at what still remains to be done.

The first discovery was that languages admit of classification. Now, this was a very great discovery, and it at once changed and raised the whole character of linguistic studies. Languages might have been, for all we know, the result of individual fancy or poetry; words might have been created here and there at random, or been fixed by a convention, more or less arbitrary. In that case a scientific classification would have been as impossible as it is if applied to the changing fashions of the day. Nothing can be classified, nothing can be scientifically ruled and ordered, except what has grown up in natural order and according to rational rule.

Out of the great mass of speech that is now accessible to the student of language, a number of so-called families have been separated, such as the *Aryan*, the *Semitic*, the *Ural-Altaic*, the *Indo-Chinese*, the *Dravidian*, the *Malayo-Polynesian*, the *Kafir* or *Bá-ntu* in Africa, and the *Polysynthetic* dialects of America. The only classes, however, which have been carefully examined, and which alone have hitherto supplied the materials for what we might call the Philosophy of Language, are the Aryan and the Semitic, the former comprising the languages of India, Persia, Armenia, Greece, and Italy, and of the Celtic, Teutonic, and Slavonic races; the latter consisting of the languages of the Babylonians, the Syrians, the Jews, the Ethiopians, the Arabs.

These two classes include, no doubt, the most important languages of the world, if we measure the importance of languages by the amount of influence exercised on the political and literary history of the world by those who speak them. But considered by themselves, and placed in their proper place in the vast realm of human speech, they describe but a very small segment of the entire circle. The completeness of the evidence which they place before us in the long series of their literary treasures points them out in an eminent degree as the most useful subjects on which to study the anatomy of speech, and nearly all the discoveries that have been made as to the laws of language, the process of composition, derivation, and inflexion, have been gained by Aryan and Semitic scholars.

Far be it from me, therefore, to underrate the value of Aryan and Semitic scholarship for a successful prosecution of the Science of Language. But while doing full justice to the method adopted by Semitic and Aryan scholars in the discovery of the laws that regulate the growth and decay of language, we must not shut our eyes to the fact that our field of observation has been thus far extremely limited, and that we should act in defiance of the simplest rules of sound induction, were we to generalise on such scanty evidence. Let us but clearly see what place these two so-called families, the Aryan and Semitic, occupy in the great kingdom of speech. They are in reality but two centres, two small settlements of speech, and all we know of them is their period of decay, not their period of growth, their descending, not their ascending career, their being,

as we say in German, not their becoming (*ihr Gewordensein, nicht ihr Werden*). Even in the earliest literary documents both the Aryan and Semitic speech appear before us as fixed and petrified. They had left for ever that stage during which language grows and expands, before it is arrested in its exuberant fertility by means of religious or political concentration, by means of oral tradition, or finally by means of a written literature. In the natural history of speech, writing, or, what in early times takes the place of writing, oral tradition, is something merely accidental. It represents a foreign influence which, in natural history, can only be compared to the influence exercised by domestication on plants and animals. Language would be language still, nay, would be more truly language, if the idea of a literature, whether oral or written, had never entered men's minds; and however important the effects produced by this artificial domestication of language may be, it is clear that our ideas of what language is in a natural state, and therefore what Sanskrit and Hebrew, too, must have been before they were tamed and fixed by literary cultivation, ought not to be formed from an exclusive study of Aryan and Semitic speech. I maintain that all we call Aryan and Semitic speech, wonderful as its literary representatives may be, consists of neither more nor less than so many varieties which all owe their origin to only two historical concentrations of wild unbounded speech; nay, however perfect, however powerful, however glorious in the history of the world—in the eyes of the student of language, Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, Hebrew,

Arabic, and Syriac, are what a student of natural history would not hesitate to call '*monstra*,' unnatural, exceptional formations which can never disclose to us the real character of language left to itself to follow out its own laws without let or hindrance.

For that purpose a study of Chinese and the Turanian dialects, a study even of the jargons of the savages of Africa, Polynesia, and Melanesia, is far more instructive than the most minute analysis of Sanskrit and Hebrew. The impression which a study of Greek and Latin and Sanskrit leaves on our minds is, that language is a work of art, most complicated, most wonderful, most perfect. We have given so many names to its outward features, its genders and cases, its tenses and moods, its participles, gerunds, and supines, that at last we are frightened at our own devices. Who can read through all the so-called irregular verbs, or look at the thousands and thousands of words in a Greek Dictionary without feeling that he moves about in a perfect labyrinth? How then, we ask, was this labyrinth erected? How did all this come to be? We ourselves, speaking the language which we speak, move about, as it were, in the innermost chambers, in the darkest recesses of that primeval palace, but we cannot tell by what steps and through what passages we arrived there, and we look in vain for the thread of Ariadne which in leading us out of the enchanted castle of our language, would disclose to us the way by which we ourselves, or our fathers and forefathers before us, have entered into it.

The question how language came to be what it is has been asked again and again. Even a schoolboy,

if he possesses but a grain of the gift of wondering, must ask himself why *mensa* means one table, and *mensæ* many tables; why I love should be *amo*, I am loved *amor*, I shall love *amabo*, I have loved *amavi*, I should have loved *amavissem*. Until very lately two answers only could have been given to such questions. Both sound to us almost absurd, yet in their time they were supported by the highest authorities. Either, it was said, language, and particularly the grammatical framework of language, was made by *convention*, by agreeing to call one table *mensa*, and many tables *mensæ*; or, and this was Schlegel's view, language was declared to possess an organic life, and its terminations, prefixes, and suffixes were supposed to have sprouted forth from the radicals and stems and branches of language, like so many buds and flowers. To us it seems almost incredible that such theories should have been seriously maintained, and maintained by men of learning and genius. But what better answer could they have given? What better answer has been given even now? We have learnt something, chiefly from a study of the modern dialects, which often repeat the processes of ancient speech, and thus betray the secrets of the family. We have learnt that in some of the dialects of modern Sanskrit, in Bengali for instance,[1] the plural is formed,

[1] In my essay 'On the Relation of Bengali to the Aryan and Aboriginal Languages of India,' published in 1847, I tried to explain these plural suffixes, such as dig, gaṇa, *g*âti, varga, dala. I had translated the last word by *band*, supposing from Wilson's Dictionary, and from the *S*abda-kalpa-druma that dala could be used in the sense of band or multitude. I doubt, however, whether dala is ever used in Sanskrit in that sense, and I feel certain

as it is in Chinese, Mongolian, Turkish, Finnish, Burmese, and Siamese, also in the Dravidian and Malayo-Polynesian dialects, by adding a word expressive of plurality, and then appending again the terminations of the singular. We have learnt from French how a future, *je parlerai*, can be formed by an auxiliary verb: 'I to speak have' coming to mean, I shall speak. We have learnt from our own language, whether English or German, that suffixes, such as *head* in *godhead*, *ship* in *ladyship*, *dom* in *kingdom*, were originally substantives, having the meaning of quality, shape, and state. But I doubt

that it was not used in that sense with sufficient frequency to account for its adoption in Bengali. Dr. Friedrich Müller, in his useful abstracts of some of the grammars discovered by the 'Novara' in her journey round the earth (1857–59), has likewise referred dal to the Sanskrit dala, but he renders what I had in English rendered by *band*, by the German word *Band*. This can only be an accident. I meant *band* in the sense of a band of robbers, which in German would be *Bande*. He seems to have misunderstood me, and to have taken *band* for the German *Band*, which means a ribbon. Might dala in Bengali be the Dravidian ta*l*a or da*l*a, a host, a crowd, which Dr. Caldwell (p. 197) mentions as a possible etymon of the pluralising suffix in the Dravidian languages? Bengali certainly took the idea of forming its plurals by composition with words expressive of plurality from its Dravidian neighbours, and it is not impossible that in some cases it might have transferred the very word da*l*a, crowd. This da*l*a or ta*l*a appears in Tamil as kala and gala, and as Sanskrit *k* may in Sinhalese be represented by *v* (loka=lova), I thought that the plural termination used in Sinhalese after inanimate nouns might possibly be a corruption of the Tamil kala. Mr. Childers, however, in his able 'Essay on the Formation of the Plural of Neuter Nouns in Sinhalese' (J. R. A. S. 1874, p. 40), thinks that the Sinhalese vala is a corruption of the Sanskrit vana, forest, an opinion which seems likewise to be held by Mr. D'Alwis (*l. c.* p. 48). As a case in point, in support of my own opinion, Mr. Childers mentioned to me the Sinhalese mal-varu, Sanskrit mâlâ-kâra, a wreath-maker, a gardener.

whether even thus we should have arrived at a thorough understanding of the real antecedents of language, unless what happened in the study of the stratification of the earth had happened in the study of language. If the formation of the crust of the earth had been throughout regular and uniform, and if none of the lower strata had been tilted up, so that even those who run might read, no shaft from the surface could have been sunk deep enough to bring the geologist from the tertiary strata down to the Silurian rocks. The same in language. Unless some languages had been arrested in their growth during their earlier stages, and had remained on the surface in this primitive state, exposed only to the decomposing influence of atmospheric action, and to the ill-treatment of literary cultivation, I doubt whether any scholar would have had the courage to say that at one time Sanskrit was like unto Chinese, and Hebrew no better than Malay. In the successive strata of language thus exposed to our view, we have in fact, as in Geology, the very thread of Ariadne, which, if we will but trust to it, will lead us out of the dark labyrinth of language in which we live, by the same road by which we and those who came before us first entered into it. The more we retrace our steps, the more we advance from stratum to stratum, from story to story, the more shall we feel almost dazzled by the daylight that breaks in upon us; the more shall we be struck, no longer by the intricacy of Greek or Sanskrit grammar, but by the marvellous simplicity of the original warp of human speech, as preserved, for instance, in Chinese; by the childlike contrivances, that are at

the bottom of Paulo-post Futures and Conditional Moods.

Let no one be frightened at the idea of studying a Chinese grammar. Those who can take an interest in the secret springs of the mind, in the elements of pure reason, in the laws of thought, will find a Chinese grammar most instructive, most fascinating. It is the faithful photograph of man in his leading-strings, trying the muscles of his mind, groping his way, and so delighted with his first successful grasps that he repeats them again and again. It is child's play, if you like, but it displays, like all child's play, that wisdom and strength which are perfect in the mouth of babes and sucklings. Every shade of thought that finds expression in the highly finished and nicely balanced system of Greek tenses, moods, and particles can be expressed, and has been expressed, in that infant language by words that have neither prefix nor suffix, no terminations to indicate number, case, tense, mood, or person. Every word in Chinese is monosyllabic, and the same word, without any change of form, may be used as a noun or verb, an adjective, an adverb, or a particle. Thus ta, according to its position in a sentence, may mean great, greatness, to grow, very much, very.[1]

And here a very important observation has been made by Chinese grammarians, an observation which, after a very slight modification and expansion, contains indeed the secret of the whole growth of language from Chinese to English. If a word in Chinese is used with the *boná fide* signification of a noun or a verb, it is called a *full word* (shi-tsé); if

[1] Stanislas Julien, *Exercises Pratiques*, p. 14.

it is used as a particle or with a merely determinative or formal character, it is called an *empty word* (hiu-tsé[1]). There is as yet no outward difference between full and empty words in Chinese, and this renders it all the more creditable to the grammarians of China that they should have perceived the inward distinction, even in the absence of any outward signs.

Let us learn then from Chinese grammarians this great lesson, that words may become empty, and without restricting the meaning of empty words as they do, let us use that term in the most general sense, as expressive of the fact that words may lose something of their full original meaning.

Let us add to this another observation, which the Chinese could not well have made, but which we shall see confirmed again and again in the history of language, viz., that empty words, or, as we may also call them, dead words, are most exposed to phonetic decay.

It is clear then that, with these two preliminary observations, we can imagine three conditions of language:—

1. There may be languages in which all words,

[1] Endlicher, *Chinesische Grammatik*, § 122. Wade, *Progressive Course*: 'On the Parts of Speech,' p. 102. A different division of words adopted by Chinese grammarians is that into *dead* and *live words*, ssè-tsé and sing-tsé, the former comprising nouns, the latter verbs. The same classes are sometimes called tsing-tsé and ho-tsé, unmoved and moved words. This shows how purposeless it would be to try to find out whether language began with nouns or verbs. In the earliest phase of speech the same word was both noun and verb, according to the use that was made of it, and it is so still to a great extent in Chinese. See Endlicher, *Chinesische Grammatik*, § 219.

both empty and full, retain their independent form. Even words which are used when we should use mere suffixes or terminations, retain their outward integrity in Chinese. Thus in Chinese, *gin* means man, tu means crowd, *gin-tu*, man-crowd. In this compound both *gin* and tu continue to be felt as independent words, more so than in our own compound *man-kind*; but nevertheless tu has become empty, it only serves to determine the preceding word *gin*, man, and tells us the quantity or number in which *gin* shall be taken. The compound answers in intention to our plural, but in form it is wide apart from *men*, the plural of *man*.

2. Empty words may lose their independence, may suffer phonetic decay, and dwindle down to mere suffixes and terminations. Thus in Burmese the plural is formed by *to*, in Finnish, Mordvinian, and Ostiakian by *t*. As soon as *to* ceases to be used as an independent word in the sense of number, it becomes an empty, or, if you like, an obsolete word, that has no meaning except as the exponent of plurality; nay, at last, it may dwindle down to a mere letter, which is then called by grammarians the termination of the plural. In this second stage phonetic decay may well-nigh destroy the whole body of an empty word, but—and this is important—no full words, no radicals are as yet attacked by that disintegrating process.

3. Phonetic decay may advance, and does advance still further. Full words also may lose their independence, and be attacked by the same disease that had destroyed the original features of suffixes and prefixes. In this state it is frequently impos-

sible to distinguish any longer between the radical and formative elements of words.

If we wished to represent these three stages of language algebraically, we might represent the first by RR, using R as the symbol of a root which has suffered no phonetic decay; the second, by $R+\rho$, or $\rho+R$, or $\rho+R+\rho$, representing by ρ an empty word that has suffered phonetic change; the third by $r\rho$, or ρr, or $\rho r\rho$, when both full and empty words have been changed, and have become welded together into one indistinguishable mass through the intense heat of thought, and by the constant hammering of the tongue.

Those who are acquainted with the works of Humboldt will easily recognise, in these three stages or strata, a classification of language first suggested by that eminent philosopher. According to him languages can be classified as *isolating*, *agglutinative*,[1] and *inflectional*, and his definition of these three classes agrees in the main with the description just given of the three strata or stages of language.

But what is curious is that this threefold classification, and the consequences to which it leads, should not at once have been fully reasoned out; nay, that a system most palpably erroneous should have been founded upon it. We find it repeated again and again in most works on Comparative Philology, that Chinese belongs to the *isolating* class, the Turanian languages to the *combinatory*, the Aryan and Semitic

[1] *Agglutinative* seems an unnecessarily uncouth word, and as implying a something which glues two words together, a kind of *Bindevocal*, it is objectionable as a technical term. *Combinatory* is technically more correct, and less strange than agglutinative.

to the *inflectional*; nay, Professor Pott[1] and his school seem convinced that no evolution can ever take place from *isolating* to *combinatory* and from *combinatory* to *inflectional* speech. We should thus be forced to believe that by some inexplicable grammatical instinct, or by some kind of inherent necessity, languages were from the beginning created as *isolating*, or *combinatory*, or *inflectional*, and must remain so to the end.

[1] Professor Pott in his article, entitled 'Max Müller und die Kennzeichen der Sprachverwandtschaft,' published in 1855 in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. ix. p. 412, says, in confutation of Bunsen's view of a real historical progress of language from the lowest to the highest stage: 'So cautious an inquirer as W. von Humboldt declines expressly in the last chapter of his work on the *Diversity of the Structure of Human Language* (p. 414) any conclusions as to a real historical progress from one stage of language to another, or at least does not commit himself to any definite opinion. This is surely something very different from that gradual progress, and it would be a question whether by admitting such an historical progress from stage to stage, we should not commit an absurdity hardly less palpable than by trying to raise infusoria into horses or still further into men. (What was an absurdity in 1855 does not seem to be so in 1875.) Mr. Bunsen, it is true, does not hesitate to call the monosyllabic idiom of the Chinese an inorganic formation. But how can we get from an inorganic to an organic language? In nature such a thing would be impossible. No stone becomes a plant, no plant a tree, by however wonderful a metamorphosis, except, in a different sense, by the process of nutrition, *i.e.* by regeneration. The former question, which Mr. Bunsen answers in the affirmative, is disposed of by him with the short dictum: "The question whether a language can be supposed to begin with inflections, appears to us simply an absurdity"—but unfortunately he does not condescend by a clear illustration to make that absurdity palpable. Why in inflectional languages should the grammatical form always have added itself to the matter subsequently and *ab extra*? Why should it not partially from the beginning have been created with it and in it, as having a meaning with something else, but not having antecedently a meaning of its own?'

It is strange that those scholars who hold that no transition is possible from one form of language to another should not have seen that there is really no language that can be strictly called either isolating, or combinatory, or inflectional, and that the transition from one stage to another is in fact constantly taking place under our very noses. Even Chinese is not free from combinatory forms, and the more highly developed among the combinatory languages show the clearest traces of incipient inflection. The difficulty is, not to show the transition of one stratum of speech into another, but rather to draw a sharp line between the different strata. The same difficulty was felt in Geology, and led Sir Charles Lyell to invent such pliant names as *Eocene*, *Meiocene*, and *Pleiocene*, names which indicate a mere dawn, a minority, or a majority of new formations, but do not draw a fast and hard line, cutting off one stratum from the other. Natural growth, and even merely mechanical accumulation and accretion, here as elsewhere, are so minute and almost imperceptible that they defy all strict scientific terminology, and force upon us the lesson that we must be satisfied with an approximate accuracy. For practical purposes Humboldt's classification of languages may be quite sufficient, and we have no difficulty in classing any given language, according to the prevailing character of its formation, as either isolating, or combinatory, or inflectional. But when we analyse each language more carefully we find there is not one exclusively isolating, or exclusively combinatory, or exclusively inflectional. The power of composition, which is retained unimpaired through every stratum, can at any moment

place an inflectional on a level with an isolating and a combinatory language. A compound such as the Sanskrit go-duh, cow-milking, differs little, if at all, from the Chinese nieu-gu, *vaccæ lac*, or in the patois of Canton, ngau ü, cow-milk, before it takes the terminations of the nominative, which is, of course, impossible in Chinese.

So again in English *New-town*, in Greek *Nea-polis*, would be simply combinatory compounds. Even *Newton* would still belong to the combinatory stratum; but *Naples* would have to be classed as belonging to the inflectional stage.

Finnish, Hungarian, Turkish, and the Dravidian languages belong in the main to the combinatory stratum; but having received a considerable amount of literary cultivation, they all alike exhibit forms which in every sense of the word are inflectional. If in Finnish, for instance, we find *käsi*, in the singular, hand, and *kädet*, in the plural, hands, we see that phonetic corruption has clearly reached the very core of the noun and given rise to a plural more decidedly inflectional than the Greek χεῖρ-ες, or the English *hand-s*. In Tamil, where the suffix of the plural is ga*l*, we have indeed a regular combinatory form in kei-ga*l*, hands; but if the same plural suffix ga*l* is added to kal, stone, the euphonic rules of Tamil require, not only a change in the suffix, which becomes ka*l*, but likewise a modification in the body of the word, kal being changed to kar. We thus get the plural karka*l*, which in every sense of the word is an inflectional form. In this plural suffix ga*l*, Dr. Caldwell has recognised the Dravidian ta*l*a or da*l*a, a host, a

crowd; and though, as he admits himself in the second edition (p. 143), the evidence in support of this etymology may not be entirely satisfactory, the steps by which the learned author of the Grammar of the Dravidian languages has traced the plural termination lu in Telugu back to the same original suffix ka*l* admit of little doubt.

Evidence of a similar kind may easily be found in any grammar, whether of an isolating, combinatory, or inflectional language, wherever there is evidence as to the ascending or descending progress of any particular form of speech. Everywhere amalgamation points back to combination, and combination back to juxtaposition; everywhere isolating speech tends towards terminational forms, and terminational forms become inflectional.

I may best be able to explain the view commonly held with regard to the strata of language by a reference to the strata of the earth. Here, too, where different strata have been tilted up, it might seem at first sight as if they were arranged perpendicularly and side by side, none underlying the other, none presupposing the other. But as the geologist, on the strength of more general evidence, has to reverse this perpendicular position, and to rearrange his strata in their natural order, and as they followed each other horizontally, the student of language too is irresistibly driven to the same conclusion. No language can by any possibility be inflectional without having passed through the combinatory and isolating stratum; no language can by any possibility be combinatory without clinging with its roots to the underlying stratum of isolation. Unless

Sanskrit and Greek and Hebrew had passed through the combinatory stratum, nay, unless, at some time or other, they had been no better than Chinese, their present form would be as great a miracle as the existence of chalk (and the strata associated with it) without an underlying stratum of oolite (and the strata associated with it); or a stratum of oolite unsupported by the trias or the system of new red sandstone. Bunsen's dictum, that 'the question whether a language can begin with inflections implies an absurdity,' may have seemed too strongly worded; but if he took inflections in the commonly received meaning, in the sense of something that may be added or removed from a base in order to define or to modify its meaning, then surely the simple argument *ex nihilo nihil fit* is sufficient to prove that the inflections must have been something by themselves, before they became inflections relatively to the base, and that the base too must have existed by itself, before it could be defined and modified by the addition of such inflections.

But we need not depend on purely logical arguments, when we have historical evidence to appeal to. As far as we know the history of language, we see it everywhere confined within those three great strata or zones which we have just described. There are inflectional changes, no doubt, which cannot as yet be explained, such as the *m* in the accusative singular of masculine, feminine, and in the nominative and accusative of neuter nouns; or the change of vowels between the Hebrew *Piel* and *Pual, Hiphil* and *Hophal*, where we might certainly feel tempted to admit formative agencies different from juxtaposi-

tion and combination. But if we consider how in Sanskrit the Vedic instrumental plural asvebhis (Lat. *equobus*) becomes before our very eyes asvais (Lat. *equis*), and how such changes as *Bruder*, brother, and *Brüder*, brethren, *Ich weiss*, I know, A.S. *wât*, and *Wir wissen*, we know, A.S. *wit-on*, have been explained as the results of purely mechanical, *i.e.* combinatory proceedings, we need not despair of further progress in the same direction. One thing is certain, that wherever inflection has yielded to a rational analysis, it has invariably been recognised as the result of a previous combination, and wherever combination has been traced back to an earlier stage, that earlier stage has been simple juxtaposition. The primitive blocks of Chinese and the most perplexing agglomerates of Greek can be explained as the result of one continuous formative process, whatever the material elements may be on which it was exercised; nor is it possible even to imagine in the formation of language more than these three strata through which hitherto all human speech has passed.

All we can do is to subdivide each stratum, and thus, for instance, distinguish in the second stratum the suffixing (R+ρ) from the prefixing (ρ+R), and from the affixing (ρ+R+ρ) languages.

A fourth class, the infixing or incapsulating languages, are but a variety of the affixing class, for what in Bask or in the polysynthetic dialects of America has the appearance of actual insertion of formative elements into the body of a base, can be explained more rationally by the former existence of simpler bases to which modifying suffixes or pre-

fixes have once been added, but not so firmly as to exclude the addition of new suffixes at the end of the base, instead of, as with us, at the end of the compound. If we could say in Greek δεικ-μι-νυ, instead of δεικ-νυ-μι, or in Sanskrit yu-mi-na-g, instead of yu-na-*g*-mi, we should have a real beginning of so-called incapsulating formations.[1]

A few instances will place the normal progress of language from stratum to stratum more clearly before our eyes. We have seen that in the most ancient Chinese every word is monosyllabic, every word tells, and there are, as yet, no suffixes by which one word is derived from another, no case-terminations by which the relation of one word to another could be indicated. How, then, does Chinese distinguish between the son of the father, and the father of the son? Simply by position. Fú is father, tzé, son; therefore in the oldest Chinese fú tzé might be son of the father, tzé fú, father of the son. This rule admits of no exception but one. If a Chinese wants to say *a wine glass*, he puts *wine* first and *glass* last, as in English. If he wants to say *a glass of wine*, he puts *glass* first and *wine* last. Thus i-pei thsieu, a cup of wine; thsieu pei, a wine-cup. When it was felt to be desirable to mark the word which is in the genitive more distinctly, the word *ki* was placed after it, and people said, fú *ki* tzé, the son of the father. In the Mandarin dialect this *ki* is represented by ti, and is added so constantly to the governed word that, to all intents and purposes, it may be treated as what we call the

[1] Cf. D. G. Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*, p. 6, note.

termination of the genitive. Originally this *ki* was a relative, or rather a demonstrative, pronoun, and it continues to be used as such in the ancient Chinese.[1]

It is perfectly true that Chinese possesses no derivative suffixes; that it cannot derive, for instance, *kingly* from a noun, such as *king*, or adjectives like *visible* and *invisible* from a verb *videre*, to see. Yet the same idea which we express by invisible is expressed without difficulty in Chinese, only in a different way. They say khan-pu-kien, 'I-behold-and-do-not-see,' and this to them conveys the same idea as the English *invisible*, though more exactly *invisible* might be rendered by kien, to see, pou-te, one cannot, tí, which.

We cannot in Chinese derive from *ferrum*, iron, a new substantive *ferrarius*, a man who works in iron, a blacksmith; *ferraria*, an iron mine, and again *ferrariarius*, a man who works in an iron mine. All this is possible in an inflectional language only. But it is not to be supposed that in Chinese there is an independent expression for every single conception, even for those which are clearly secondary and derivative. If an arrow in Chinese is shi, then a maker of arrows (in Old French *fléchier*, in English *fletcher*) is called an arrow-man, shi-gin. Shui means water, fu, man; hence shui-fu, a water-man, a water-carrier. The same word shui, water,

[1] Julien, *Exercises Pratiques*, p. 120. Endlicher, *Chinesische Grammatik*, § 161. See also Nöldeke, *Orient und Occident*, vol. i. p. 759. *Grammar of the Bornu Language* (London, 1853), p. 55, 'In the Treaty the genitive is supplied by the relative pronoun *agu*, singularly corroborative of the Rev. R. Garnett's theory of the genitive case.'

if followed by sheu, hand, stands for steersman, literally, water-hand. Kin means gold, tsiang, maker; hence kin-tsiang, a gold-smith. Shu means writing, sheu, hand; hence shu-sheu, a writer, a copyist; literally, a writing-hand.

A transition from such compounds to really combinatory speech is extremely easy. Let sheu, in the sense of hand, become obsolete, and be replaced in the ordinary language by another word for hand; and let such names as shu-sheu, author, or shui-sheu, boatsman, be retained, and the people who speak this language will soon accustom themselves to look upon sheu as a mere derivative, and use it by a kind of false analogy, even where the original meaning of sheu, hand, would not have been applicable.[1]

We can watch the same process even in comparatively modern languages. In Anglo-Saxon, for instance, *hâd* means state, order. It is used as an independent word, and continued to be so used as late as Spenser, who wrote:—

> 'Cuddie, I wote thou kenst little good,
> So vainly t' advaunce thy headlesse hood.'

[1] 'Time changes the meaning of words as it does their sound. Thus, many old words are retained in compounds, but have lost their original signification. *E.g.* 'k'eu, mouth, has been replaced in colloquial usage by 'tsui, but it is still employed extensively in compound terms and in derived senses. Thus, k'wai' 'k'eu, a rapid talker, .men 'k'eu, door, ,kwan 'k'eu, custom house. So also muh, the original word for eye, has given place to 'yen, tsing, or 'yen alone. It is, however, employed with other words in derived senses. *E. g.* muh hia', at present; muh luh, table of contents.' 'The primitive word for head, 'sheu, has been replaced by .t'eu, but is retained with various words in combination. *E.g.* tseh 'sheu, robber chief.' Edkins, *Grammar of the Chinese Colloquial Language*, 2nd edition, 1864, p. 100.

After a time, however, *hâd*, as an independent word, was lost, and its place taken by more classical expressions, such as *habit*, *nature*, or *disposition*. But there remained such compounds as *man-hâd*, the state of man, *God-hâd*, the nature of God; and in these words the last element, being an empty word and no longer understood, was soon looked upon as a mere suffix. Having lost its vitality, it was all the more exposed to phonetic decay, and became both *hood* and *head*.

Or, let us take another instance. The name given to the fox in ancient German poetry was *Regin-hart*. *Regin* in Old High German means thought or cunning, *hart*, the Gothic *hardu*, means strong. This *hart*[1] corresponds to the Greek κράτος, which, in its adjectival form of κρατης, forms as many proper names in Greek as *hart* in German. In Sanskrit the same word exists as kratu, meaning intellectual rather than bodily strength, a shade of meaning which is still perceivable even in the German *hart*, and in the English *hard* and *hardy*. *Reginhart*, therefore, was originally a compound, meaning 'thought-strong,' strong in cunning. Other words formed in the same or a very similar manner are:—*Peranhart* and *Bernhart*, literally, bear-minded, or bold like a bear; *Eburhart*, boar-minded; *Engil-hart*, angel-minded; *Gothart*, god-minded; *Egin-hart*, fierce-minded; *Hugihart*, wise-minded or strong in thought, the English *Hogarth*. In Low German the second element, *hart*, lost its *h* and became *ard*. This *ard* ceased to convey any definite meaning, and though in some of the words which are formed by *ard* we

[1] Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, ii. 339.

may still discover its original power, it soon became a mere derivative, and was added promiscuously to form new words. In the Low German name for the fox, *Reinaert*, neither the first nor the second word tells us any longer anything, and the two words together have become a mere proper name. In other words the first portion retains its meaning, but the second, *ard*, is nothing but a suffix. Thus we find the Low German *dronk-ard*, a drunkard; *dick-ard*, a thick fellow; *rik-ard*, a rich fellow; *gérard*, a miser. In English *sweet-ard*, originally a very sweet person, has been changed and resuscitated as *sweet-heart*,[1] by the same process which changed *shamefast* into *shamefaced*. But, still more curious, this suffix *ard*, which had lost all life and meaning in Low German, was taken over as a convenient derivative by the Romance languages. After having borrowed a number of words such as *renard*, fox, and proper names like *Bernard*, *Richard*, *Gerard*, the framers of

[1] Cf. the German Liebhart, mignon, in Anshelm, 1, 335. Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, iii. 707. I feel more doubtful now as to *sweetard*. Dr. Morris mentions it in his *Historical Outlines of English Grammar*, p. 219; but Koch, when discussing the same derivations in his *English Grammar*, does not give the word. Mr. Skeat writes to me: 'The form really used in Middle English is *sweeting*. Three examples are given in Stratmann. One of the best is in my edition of William of Palerne, where, however, it occurs not *once* only (as given by Stratmann), but *four times*: viz. in lines 916, 1537, 2799, 3088. The lines are:

"Nai, sertes, *sweting*, he seide· that schal I neuer:"	916
"& seide aswithe· *sweting*, welcome!"	1537
"Sertes, *sweting*, thæt is soth. seide william thanne."	2799
"treuli, *sweting*, that is soth· seide william thane."	3088

The date of this poem is about A.D. 1360. Shakespeare has both forms: viz. *sweeting* and *sweet-heart*. Chaucer has *swete herte*, just as we should use *sweet-heart*.'

the new Romance dialects used the same termination even at the end of Latin words. Thus they formed not only many proper names, like *Abeillard*, *Bayard*, *Brossard*, but appellatives like *leccardo*, a gourmand, *linguardo*, a talker, *criard*, a crier, *codardo*, Prov. *coart*, Fr. *couard*, a coward.[1] That a German word *hart*, meaning strong, and originally strength, should become a Roman suffix may seem strange; yet we no longer hesitate to use even Hindustani words as English suffixes. In Hindustani vâlâ is used to form many substantives. If Dilli is Delhi, then Dillvâlâ is a man of Delhi. Go is cow, go-vâlâ a cow-herd, contracted into gvâlá. Innumerable words can thus be formed, and as the derivative seemed handy and useful, it was at last added even to English words, for instance in 'Competition wallah.'

These may seem isolated cases, but the principles on which they rest pervade the whole structure of language. It is surprising to see how much may be achieved by an application of those principles, how large results may be obtained by the smallest and simplest means. By means of the single radical î or yâ (originally ya), which in the Aryan languages means to go or to send, the almost unconscious framers of Aryan grammar formed not only their neuter, denominative, and causative verbs, but their passives, their optatives, their futures, and a considerable number of substantives and adjectives. Every one of these formations, in Sanskrit as well as in Greek, can be explained, and has been ex-

[1] Diez, *Grammatik*, ii. 358. Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, i. p. 340, 706.

plained as the result of a combination between any given verbal root and the radical *î* or yâ.

There is, for instance, a root nak, expressive of perishing or destruction. We have it in nak, night; Latin *nox*, Greek *νύξ*, meaning originally the waning, the disappearing, the death of day. We have the same root in composition, as for instance, *g*îva-nak, life-destroying; and by means of suffixes Greek has formed from it *νεκ-ρός*, a dead body, *νέκ-υς*, dead, and *νέκ-υ-ες*, in the plural, the departed. In Sanskrit this root is turned into a simple verb, na*s*-a-ti, he perishes. But in order to give to it a more distinctly neuter meaning, a new verbal base is formed by composition with ya, na*s*-ya-ti, he goes to destruction, he perishes.

By the same or a very similar process denominative verbs are formed in Sanskrit to a very large extent. From râ*g*an, king, we form râ*g*â-ya-te, he behaves like a king, literally, he goes the king, he acts the king, *il a l'allure d'un roi*. From kumârî, girl, kûmârâ-ya-te, he behaves like a girl, etc.[1]

After raising nas to nâ*s*a, and adding the same radical ya, Sanskrit produces a causative verb, nâ*s*a-ya-ti, he sends to destruction, the Latin *nécare*.

In close analogy to the neuter verb na*s*yati, the regular passive is formed in Sanskrit by composition with ya, but by adding, at the same time, a different set of personal terminations. Thus nás-ya-ti means he perishes, while na*s*-yá-te means he is destroyed.

[1] See my *Sanskrit Grammar*, § 497. I doubt whether in Greek ἀγγέλλω is a denominative verb and stands for ἀγγελ(ο)ϳω (Curtius, *Chronologie*, p. 58). I should prefer to explain it as ἀνα-γαρ-ίω, to proclaim, as a verb of the fourth class.

The usual terminations of the Optative in Sanskrit are:

yâm, yâs, yât, yâma, yâta, yus,

or, after bases ending in vowels:

iyam, is, it, ima, ita, iyus.

In Greek:

ιην, ιης, ιη, ιημεν, ιητε, ιεν,

or, after bases ending in o:

ιμι, ις, ι, ιμεν, ιτε, ιεν.

In Latin:

iêm	iês	iet	—	—	ient,
îm,	îs,	it,	îmus,	îtis,	int.

If we add these terminations to the root AS, to be, we get the Sanskrit s-y-âm for as-yâm:

syâm, syâs, syât, syâma, syâta, syus.

Greek *ἐσ-ίην*, contracted to *εἴην*:

εἴην, εἴης, εἴη, εἴημεν, εἴητε, εἶεν,

Latin *es-iem*, changed to *siêm*, *sîm*, and *erîm*:

siêm,	siês,	siet,[1]	—	—	sient,
sîm,	sîs,	sit,[2]	sîmus,	sîtis,	sint.
erîm,	erîs,	erit,	erîmus,	erîtis,	erint.

If we add the other termination to a verbal base ending in certain vowels, we get the Sanskrit bharaiyam, contracted to bháreyam:

bharêyam, bharês, bharêt, bharêma, bharêta, bharêyus,

[1] Lex Repetund., 'ceivis romanus ex hace lege fiet, nepotesque—ceiveis romanei justei sunto.' Cf. Egger, *Lat. Serm. Vetust. Reliq.* p. 245. Meunier, in *Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique de Paris*, vol. i. p. 34.

[2] Still used as long by Plautus; cf. Neue, *Formenlehre*, ii. p. 340.

in Greek *φέρο-ιμι*:

φέρο-ιμι, φέρο-ις, φέρο-ι, φέρο-ιμεν, φέρο-ιτε, φέρο-ιεν,

in Latin *fere-im*, changed to *ferem*, used in the sense of a future, but replaced[1] in the first person by *feram*, the subjunctive of the present:

feram, ferês, feret, ferêmus, ferêtis, ferent,

Perfect Subjunctive:

tul-erîm, tul-erîs, tul-erit, tul-erimus, tul-eritis[2], tul-erint.

Here we have clearly the same auxiliary verb, i or ya, again, and we are driven to admit that what we now call an optative or potential mood, was originally a kind of future, formed by ya, to go, very much like the French *je vais dire*, I am going to say, I shall say, or like the Zulu ngi[1]-ya[2]-ku[3]-tanda[4], I[1] go[2] to[3] love[4], I shall love.[3] The future would afterwards assume the character of a civil command, as 'thou wilt go' may be used even by us in the sense of 'go'; and the imperative would dwindle away into a potential, as we may say: 'go and you will see,' in the same sense as, 'if you go, you will see.'

[1] In old Latin the termination of the first person singular was *em*, and Bergk restores forms in *em* instead of *am* in Plautus. Thus Quintilian, i. 7. 23, says: 'Quid? non Cato Censorius *dicam* et *faciam*, *dicem* et *faciem* scripsit, eundemque in ceteris, quae similiter cadunt, modum tenuit? quod et ex veteribus ejus libris manifestum est, et a Messala in libro de s. littera positum.' Neue, *Formenlehre*, ii. p. 348. The introduction of *feram*, originally a subjunctive, to express the future in the first person, reminds us of the distinction in English between *I shall* and *thou wilt*, though the analogy fails in the first person plural. In Homer the use of the subjunctive for the future is well known. See Curtius, *Chronologie*, p. 50.

[2] Historically the *i* in *tuleritis* should be long in the subjunctive of the perfect, short in the future.

[3] Bleek, *On the Concord*, p. lxvi.

The terminations of the future are:

Sanskrit:

syâmi, syasi, syati, syâmas, syâtha, syanti;

Greek:

σω, σεις, σει, σομεν. σετε, σοντι;

Latin:

ero, eris, erit, erimus, eritis, erunt.

In these terminations we have really two auxiliary verbs, the verb as, to be, and ya, to go, and by adding them to any given root, as, for instance, DA, to give, we have the Sanskrit (dâ-as-yâ-mi):

dâ-s-yâ-mi, dâ-s-ya-si, dâ-s-ya-ti, dâ-s-yâ-mas, dâ-s-ya-tha, dâ-s-ya-nti;

Greek (δω-εσ-ιω):

δώ-σ-ω,[1] δώ-σ-εις, δώ-σ-ει, δώ-σ-ομεν, δώ-σ-ετε. δώ-σ-ουσι.

Latin:

pot-ero, pot-eris, pot-erit, pot-erimus, pot-eritis, pot-erunt.

A verbal form of very frequent occurrence in Sanskrit is the so-called gerundive participle which signifies that a thing is necessary or proper to be done. Thus from budh, to know, is formed bodh-ya-s, one who is to be known, *cognoscendus*; from guh, to hide, gûh-ya-s, or goh-ya-s, one who is to be hidden, literally, one who goes to a state of hiding

[1] In δώ-σω, for δωσίω, the *i* or *y* is lost in Greek as usual. In other verbs *s* and *y* are both lost. Hence τενεσίω becomes τενέσω, and τενῶ, the so-called Attic future. Bopp, *Vergleich. Grammatik*, first ed. p. 903. In Latin we have traces of a similar future in forms like *fac-so*, *cap-so*, etc. See Neue, *Formenlehre*, ii. p. 421. The Epic dialect sometimes doubles the σ when the vowel is short, αἰδέσσομαι. But this can hardly be considered a relic of the original σι, because the same reduplication takes place sometimes in the Aorist, ἐγέλασσα.

or being hidden; from yag, to sacrifice, yâg-ya-s, one who is or ought to be worshipped. Here, again, what is going to be becomes gradually what will be, and lastly, what shall be. In Greek we find but few analogous forms, such as ἅγιος, holy, στύγ-ι-ος, to be hated; in Latin, *ex-im-i-us*, to be taken out; in Gothic *anda-nêm-ja*, to be taken on, to be accepted, agreeable, German *angenehm*.[1]

While the gerundive participles in ya are formed on the same principle as the verbal bases in ya of the passive, a number of substantives in ya seem to have been formed in close analogy to the bases of denominative verbs, or the bases of neuter verbs, in all of which the derivative ya expresses originally the act of going, behaving, and at last of simple being. Thus from vid, to know, we find in Sanskrit vid-yâ, knowing, knowledge; from *si*, to lie down, sayyâ, resting. Analogous forms in Latin are *gaud-i-um*, *stud-i-um*, or, with feminine terminations, *in-ed-i-a*, *in-vid-i-a*, *per-nic-i-es*, *scab-i-es*; in Greek, μαν-ι-α, ἀμαρτ-ί-α or ἀμάρτ-ι-ον; in German, numerous abstract nouns in *i* and *e*.[2]

This shows how much can be achieved, and has been achieved, in language with the simplest mate-

[1] See Bopp, *Vergleichende Grammatik*, §§ 897, 898. These verbal adjectives should be carefully distinguished from nominal adjectives, such as Sanskrit div-yá-s, divinus, originally div-i-a-s, *i.e.* divi-bhavas, being in heaven; οἰκεῖος, domesticus, originally οἴκει-ο-ς, being in the house. These are adjectives formed, it would seem, from old locatives, just as in Bask we can form from *etche*, house, *etche-tic*, of the house, and *etche-tic-acoa*, he who is of the house; or from *seme*, son, *semea-ren*, of the son, and *semea-ren-a*, he who is of the son. See W. J. van Eys, *Essai de Grammaire de la Langue Basque*, 1867, p. 16.

[2] Bopp, *Vergleichende Grammatik*, §§ 888–898.

rials. Neuter, denominative, causative, passive verbs, optatives and futures, gerundives, adjectives, and substantives, all are formed by one and the same process, by means of one and the same root. It is no inconsiderable portion of grammar which has thus been explained by this one root ya, to go, and we learn again and again how simple and yet how wonderful are the ways of language, if we follow them up from stratum to stratum to their original starting-point.

Now, what has happened in these cases has happened over and over again in the history of language. Everything that is now formal, not only derivative suffixes, but everything that constitutes the grammatical framework and articulation of language, was originally material. What we now call the terminations of cases were mostly local adverbs; what we call the personal endings of verbs were personal pronouns. Suffixes and affixes were mostly independent words, nominal, verbal, or pronominal; there is, in fact, nothing in language that is now empty, or dead, or formal, that was not originally full, and alive, and material. It is the object of Comparative Grammar to trace every formal or dead element back to its life-like form; and though this resuscitating process is by no means complete, nay, though in several cases it seems hopeless to try to discover the living type from which proceeded the petrified fragments which we call terminations or suffixes, enough evidence has been brought together to establish on the firmest basis this general maxim, that *Nothing is dead in any language that was not originally alive*; that nothing exists in a tertiary stratum that does not

find its antecedents and its explanation in the secondary or primary stratum of human speech.

After having explained, as far as it was possible in so short a time, what I consider to be the right view of the stratification of human speech, I should have wished to be able to show to you how the aspect of some of the most difficult and most interesting problems of our science is changed if we look at them again with the new light which we have gained regarding the necessary antecedents of all language. Let me only call your attention to one of the most contested points in the Science of Language. The question whether we may assign a common origin to the Aryan and Semitic languages has been discussed over and over again. No one thinks now of deriving Sanskrit from Hebrew, or Hebrew from Sanskrit; the only question is whether at some time or other the two languages could ever have formed part of one and the same body of speech. There are scholars, and very eminent scholars, who deny all similarity between the two; while others have collected materials that would seem to make it difficult to assign such numerous coincidences to mere chance. Nowhere, in fact, has Bacon's observation on this radical distinction between different men's dispositions for philosophy and the sciences been more fully verified than among the students of the Science of Language:—*Maximum et velut radicale discrimen ingeniorum, quoad philosophiam et scientias, illud est, quod alia ingenia sint fortiora et aptiora ad notandas rerum differentias; alia ad notandas rerum similitudines. . . . . Utrumque autem ingenium facile labitur in excessum, prensando aut gradus rerum, aut um-*

bras.[1] Before, however, we enter upon an examination of the evidence brought forward by different scholars in support of their conflicting theories, it is our first duty to ask a preliminary question, viz. What kind of evidence have we any right to expect, considering that both Sanskrit and Hebrew belong, in the state in which we know them, to the inflectional stratum of speech?

Now, it is quite true that Sanskrit and Hebrew had a separate existence long before they reached the tertiary stratum, before they became thoroughly inflectional; and that consequently they can share nothing in common that is peculiar to the inflectional stratum in each, nothing that is the result of phonetic decay, which sets in after combinatory formations have become unintelligible and traditional. I mean, supposing that the pronoun of the first person had been originally the same in the Semitic and Aryan languages, supposing that in the Hebrew an-oki (Assyrian an-aku, Phen. anak) the last portion, oki, was originally identical with the Sanskrit ah in aham, the Greek ἐγ in ἐγ-ώ, it would still be useless to attempt to derive the termination of the first person singular, whether in kâtal-ti or in ektôl, from the same type which in Sanskrit appears as mi or am, or a, in tudâ-mi, atud-am, tutod-a. There cannot be between Hebrew and Sanskrit the same relationship as between Sanskrit and Greek, if indeed the term of relationship is applicable even to Sanskrit and Greek, which are really mere dialectic varieties of one and the same type of speech.

The question then arises, Could the Semitic and

[1] Bacon, *Novum Organum*, i. 55.

Aryan languages have been identical during the second or *combinatory* period? Here, as before, the answer must be, I believe, decidedly negative, for not only are the empty words which are used for derivative purposes different in each, but, what is far more characteristic, the manner in which they are added to the stems is different too. In the Aryan languages formative elements are attached to the ends of words only; in the Semitic languages they are found both at the end and at the beginning. In the Aryan languages grammatical compounds are all according to the formula $r\rho$; in the Semitic we have formations after the formulas $r\rho$, ρr, and $\rho r\rho$.

There remains, therefore, the first or isolating stage only in which Semitic and Aryan speech might have been identical. But even here we must make a distinction. All Aryan roots are monosyllabic, all Semitic roots have been raised to a triliteral form. Therefore it is only previous to the time when the Semitic roots assumed this secondary triliteral form that any community could possibly be admitted between these two streams of language. Supposing we knew as an historical fact that at this early period—a period which transcends the limits of everything we are accustomed to call historical—Semitic and Aryan speech had been identical, what evidence of this union could we expect to find in the actual Semitic and Aryan languages, such as we know them in their inflectional period? Let us recollect that the 100,000 words of English, nay, the many hundred thousands of words in all the dictionaries of the other Aryan languages, have been reduced to about 500 roots, and that this small number of roots admits of still

further reduction. Let us, then, bear in mind that the same holds good with regard to the Semitic languages, particularly if we accept the reduction of all triliteral to biliteral roots. What, then, could we expect in our comparison of Hebrew and Sanskrit but a small number of radical coincidences, a similarity in the form and meaning of about 500 radical syllables, everything else in Hebrew and Sanskrit being an after-growth, which could not begin before the two branches of speech were severed once and for ever.

But more, if we look at these roots we shall find that their predicative power is throughout very general, and therefore liable to an infinite amount of specification. A root that means to fall (Sk. pat, πί-πτ-ω) comes to mean to fly (Sk. ut-pat, πέτομαι). The root dâ, which means to give, assumes, after the preposition â, the sense of taking. The root yu, which means to join, means to separate, if preceded by the preposition vi. The root ghar, which expresses brightness, may supply, and does supply in different Aryan languages, derivations expressive of brightness (gleam), warmth (Sk. gharma, heat), joy (χαίρειν), love (χάρις), of the colours of green (Sk. hari), yellow (*gilvus*, *flavus*), and red (Sk. harit, *fulvus*), and of the conception of growing (*ger-men*). In the Semitic languages this vagueness of meaning in the radical elements forms one of the principal difficulties of the student, for according as a root is used in its different conjugations, it may convey the most startling variety of conception. It is also to be taken into account that out of the very limited number of roots which at that early time were used

in common by the ancestors of the Aryan and Semitic races, a certain portion may have been lost by each, so that the fact that there are roots in Hebrew of which no trace exists in Sanskrit, and *vice versâ*, would again be perfectly natural and intelligible.

It is right and most essential that we should see all this clearly, that we should understand how little evidence we are justified in expecting in support of a common origin of the Semitic and Aryan languages, before we commit ourselves to any opinion on this important subject. I have by no means exhausted all the influences that would naturally, nay, necessarily, have contributed towards producing the differences between the radical elements of Aryan and Semitic speech, always supposing that the two sprang originally from the same source. Even if we excluded the ravages of phonetic decay from that early period of speech, we should have to make ample allowance for the influence of dialectic variety. We know in the Aryan languages the constant play between gutturals, dentals, and labials (*quinque*, Sk. *pañka*, πέντε, Aeol. πέμπε, Goth. *fimf*). We know the dialectic interchange of Aspirate, Media, and Tenuis, which, from the very beginning, has imparted to the principal channels of Aryan speech their individual character (τρεῖς, Goth. *threis*, High German *drei*).[1] If this and

[1] Until a rational account of these changes, comprehended under the name of *Lautverschiebung*, is given, we must continue to look upon them, not as the result of phonetic decay, but of dialectic growth. I am glad to find that this is more and more admitted by those who think for themselves instead of simply repeating the opinions of others. Grimm's Law stands no longer alone, as peculiar to the Teutonic languages, but analogous changes have been

much more could happen within the dialectic limits of one more or less settled body of speech, what must have been the chances beyond those limits? Considering how fatal to the identity of a word the change of a single consonant would be in monosyllabic languages, we might expect that monosyllabic roots, if their meaning was so general, vague, and changeable, would all the more carefully have preserved their consonantal outline. But this is by no means the case. Monosyllabic languages have their dialects no less than polysyllabic ones; and from the rapid and decisive divergence of such dialects we may learn how rapid and decisive the divergence of language must have been during the isolating period. Mr. Edkins, who has paid particular attention to the dialects of Chinese, states that in the northern provinces the greatest changes have taken place, eight initial and one final consonant having

pointed out in the South-African, the Chinese, the Polynesian dialects, showing that these changes are everywhere collateral, not successive. I agree with Professor Curtius and other scholars that the impulse to what we call *Lautverschiebung* was given by the third modification in each series of consonants, by the *gh, dh, bh* in Sanskrit, the χ, θ, ϕ in Greek. I differ from him because I consider the changes of *Lautverschiebung* as the result of dialectic variety, while he sees their motive power in phonetic corruption. But whether we take the one view or the other, I do not see that Dr. Scherer has removed any of our difficulties. See Curtius, *Grundzüge*, 4th ed. p. 426, note. Dr. Scherer, in his thoughtful work, *Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache*, has very nearly, though not quite, apprehended the meaning of my explanation as to the effects of dialectic change contrasted with those of phonetic decay. If it is allowable to use a more homely illustration, one might say no doubt with perfect truth, that each dialect chooses its own phonetic garment, as people choose the coats and trousers which best fit them. The simile, however, like most similes, is imperfect, though it is far more exact than to compare the ravages of phonetic decay, as is frequently done, to the wear and tear of these phonetic suits.

been exchanged for others, and three finals lost. Along the southern bank of the Yang-tsi-kiang, and a little to the north of it, the old initials are all preserved, as also through Chekiang to Fuh-kien. But among the finals, *m* is exchanged for *n*; *t* and *p* are lost, and also *k*, except in some country districts. Some words have two forms, one used colloquially, and one appropriated to reading. The former is the older pronunciation, and the latter more near to Mandarin. The cities of Su-cheu, Hang-cheu, Ningpo, and Wen-cheu, with the surrounding country, may be considered as having one dialect, spoken probably by thirty millions of people, *i.e.* by more than the whole population of Great Britain and Ireland. The city of Hwei-cheu has a dialect of its own, in which the soft initial consonants are exchanged for hard and aspirated ones, a process analogous to what we call *Lautverschiebung* in the Aryan languages. At Fu-cheu-fu, in the eastern part of the province of Kiang-si, the soft initials have likewise been replaced by aspirates. In many parts of the province of Hunan the soft initials still linger on; but in the city of Chang-sha the spoken dialect has the five tones of Mandarin, and the aspirated and other initials distributed in the same manner. In the island of Hai-nan there is a distinct approach to the form which Chinese words assume in the language of Annam. Many of the hard consonants are softened, instead of the reverse taking place as in many other parts of China. Thus *ti*, *di*, both *ti* in Mandarin, are both pronounced *di* in Hai-nan. *B* and *p* are both used for many words whose initials are *w* and *f* in Mandarin. In the dialects of the province of

Fuh-kien the following changes take place in initial consonants: *k* is used for *h*; *p* for *f*; *m*, *b*, for *w*; *j* for *y*; *t* for *k*; *k* for *s*; *ng* for *i*, *y*, *w*; *n* for *g*.[1] When we have clearly realised to ourselves what such changes mean in words consisting of one consonant and one vowel, we shall be more competent to act as judges, and to determine what right we have to call for more ample and more definite evidence in support of the common origin of languages which became separated during their monosyllabic or isolating stages, and which are not known to us before they are well advanced in the inflectional stage.

It might be said:—why, if we make allowance for all this, the evidence really comes to nothing, and is hardly deserving of the attention of the scholar. I do not deny that this is, and always has been, my own opinion. All I wish to put clearly before other scholars is, that this is not our fault. We see why there can be no evidence, and we find there is no evidence, or very little, in support of a common origin of Semitic and Aryan speech. But that is very different from dogmatic assertions, so often and so confidently repeated, that there can be no kind of relationship between Sanskrit and Hebrew, that they must have had different beginnings, that they represent, in fact, two independent species of human speech. All this is pure dogmatism, and no true scholar will be satisfied with it, or turn away contemptuously from the tentative researches of scholars like Ewald, Raumer and Ascoli. These scholars, particularly Raumer and Ascoli, have given

[1] Edkins, *Grammar*, p. 84.

us, as far as I can judge, far more evidence in support of a radical relationship between Hebrew and Sanskrit than, from my point of view, we are entitled to expect. I mean this as a caution in both directions. If, on one side, we ought not to demand more than we have a right to demand, we ought, on the other, not to look for, nor attempt to bring forward, more evidence than the nature of the case admits of. We know that words which have identically the same sound and meaning in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and German, cannot be the same words, because they would contravene those phonetic laws that made these languages to differ from each other. *To doom* cannot have any connection with the Latin *damnare*; *to call* cannot be the Greek καλεῖν, the Latin *calare*; nor Greek φαῦλος the German *faul*; the English *care* cannot be identified with Latin *cura*, nor the German *Auge* with the Greek αὐγή. The same applies, only with a hundredfold greater force, to words in Hebrew and Sanskrit. If any triliteral root in Hebrew were to agree with a triliteral word in Sanskrit, we should feel certain, at once, that they are not the same, or that their similarity is purely accidental. Pronouns, numerals, and a few imitative rather than predicative names for father and mother, etc., may have been preserved from the earliest stage by the Aryan and Semitic speakers; but if scholars go beyond, and compare such words as Hebrew *barak*, to bless, and Latin *precari*; Hebrew *lab*, heart, and the English *liver*; Hebrew *melech*, king, and the Latin *mulcere*, to smoothe, to quiet, to subdue, they are in great danger, I believe, of proving too much.

Attempts have lately been made to point out a number of roots which Chinese shares in common with Sanskrit. Far it be from me to stigmatise even such researches as unscientific, though it requires an effort for one brought up in the very straitest school of Bopp, to approach such inquiries without prejudice. Yet, if conducted with care and sobriety, and particularly with a clear perception of the limits within which such inquiries must be confined, they are perfectly legitimate; far more so than the learned dogmatism with which some of our most eminent scholars have declared a common origin of Sanskrit and Chinese as out of the question. I cannot bring myself to say that the method which Mr. Chalmers adopts in his interesting work on the 'Origin of Chinese' is likely to carry conviction to the mind of the *bonâ fide* sceptic. I believe, before we compare the words of Chinese with those of any other language, every effort should be made to trace Chinese words back to their most primitive form. Here Mr. Edkins has pointed out the road that ought to be followed, and has clearly shown the great advantage to be derived from an accurate study of Chinese dialects. The same scholar has done still more by pointing out how Chinese should at first be compared with its nearest relatives, the Mongolian of the North-Turanian, and the Tibetan of the South-Turanian class, before any comparisons are attempted with more distant colonies that started during the monosyllable period of speech. 'I am now seeking to compare,' he writes, 'the Mongolian and Tibetan with the Chinese, and have already obtained some interesting results:

'1. A large proportion of Mongol words are Chinese. Perhaps a fifth are so. The identity is in the first syllable of the Mongol words, that being the root. The correspondence is most striking in the adjectives, of which perhaps one half of the most common are the same radically as in Chinese. *E.g.* sain, good; begen, low; ic'hi, right; sologai, left; c'hihe, straight; gadan, outside; c'hohon, few; logon, green; hunggun, light (not heavy). But the identity is also extensive in other parts of speech, and this identity of common roots seems to extend into the Turkish, Tatar, etc.; *e.g.* su, water, tenri, heaven.

'2. To compare Mongol with Chinese it is necessary to go back at least six centuries in the development of the Chinese language. For we find in common roots final letters peculiar to the old Chinese, *e.g.* final *m*. The initial letters also need to be considered from another standpoint than the Mandarin pronunciation. If a large number of words are common to Chinese, Mongol and Tatar, we must go back at least twelve centuries to obtain a convenient epoch of comparison.

'3. While the Mongol has no traces of tones, they are very distinctly developed in Tibetan. Csoma de Körös and Schmidt do not mention the existence of tones, but they plainly occur in the pronunciation of native Tibetans resident in Peking.

'4. As in the case of the comparison with Mongol, it is necessary in examining the connection of Tibetan with Chinese to adopt the old form of the Chinese with its more numerous final consonants, and its full system of soft, hard, and aspirated

initials. The Tibetan numerals exemplify this with sufficient clearness.

'5. While the Mongol is near the Chinese in the extensive prevalence of words common to the two languages, the Tibetan is near in phonal structure, as being tonic and monosyllabic. This being so, it is less remarkable that there are many words common to Chinese and Tibetan, for it might have been expected; but that there should be perhaps as many in the Mongol with its long untoned polysyllables, is a curious circumstance.' [1]

[1] Having stated this on the authority of Mr. Edkins, one of our best living Chinese scholars, it is but fair that I should give the opinion of another Chinese scholar, the late Stanislas Julien, whose competence to give an opinion on this subject Mr. Edkins would probably be the first to acknowledge. All that we really want is the truth, not a momentary triumph of our own opinions. M. Julien wrote to me in July, 1868:

'Je ne suis pas du tout de l'avis d'Edkins qui dit qu'un grand nombre de mots mongols sont chinois; c'est faux, archifaux.

Sain est mandchou et veut dire bon, en chinois *chen.*
begen, low; en chinois *hia.*
itchi, droit; en chinois *yeou.*
sologaï, left, gauche; en chinois *tso.*
c'hihe, straight; en chinois *tchi* (rectus).
gadan, outside; en chinois *waï.*
logon, green; en chinois *tsing.*
c'hohon, few; en chinois *chao.*
hungun, light (not heavy); en chinois *king.*

'Je voudrais bien savoir comment M. Edkins prouve que les mots qu'il cite sont chinois.

'Foucaux a échoué également en voulant prouver, autrefois, que 200 mots thibétains qu'il avait choisis ressemblaient aux mots chinois correspondants.'

M. Stanislas Julien wrote again to me on the 21st of July:

'J'ai peur que vous ne soyez fâché du jugement sevère que j'ai porté sur les identifications faites par Edkins du mongol avec le chinois. J'ai d'abord pris dans votre savant article les mots mon-

This is no doubt the right spirit in which researches into the early history of language should

gols qu'il cite et je vous ai montré qu'ils ne ressemblent pas le moins du monde au chinois.

'Je vais vous en citer d'autres tirés du Dictionnaire de Khien-lung, chinois-mandchou-mongol.

Mongol.	Chinois.
tegri, ciel	*thien.*
naran, soleil	*ji.*
naran barimoni, éclipse de soleil	*ji-chi.*
saran, lune	*youeï.*
oudoun, étoile	*sing.*
egoulé, nuages	*yun.*
ayounga, le tonnerre . . .	*louï.*
tchagilgan, éclair	*tien.*
borogan, la pluie	*yu.*
sigouderi, la rosée	*lou.*
kirago, la gelée	*choang.*
lapsa, la neige	*sioue.*
salgin, le vent	*fong.*
ousoun, l'eau	*chouï.*
gal, le feu	*ho.*
siroi, la terre	*thou.*
aisin, l'or	*altan.*

'Je vous donnerai, si vous le désirez, 1000 mots mongols avec leurs synonymes chinois, et je défie M. Edkins de trouver dans les 1000 mots mongols un seul qui ressemble au mot chinois synonyme.

'Comme j'ai fait assez de thibétain, je puis vous fournir aussi une multitude de mots thibétains avec leurs correspondants en chinois, et je défierai également M. Edkins de trouver un seul mot thibétain dans mille qui ressemble au mot chinois qui a le même sens.'

My old friend, M. Stanislas Julien, wrote to me once more on this subject, the 6th of August, 1868:

'Depuis une quinzaine d'années, j'ai l'avantage d'entretenir les meilleures relations avec M. Edkins. J'ai lu anciennement dans un journal que publie M. Léon de Rosny (actuellement professeur titulaire de la langue Japanaise) le travail où M. Edkins a tâché de rapprocher et d'identifier, par les sons, des mots mongols et chinois ayant la même signification. Son systême m'a paru mal fondé. Quelques mots chinois peuvent être entrés dans la langue mongole par suite du contact des deux peuples, comme cela est arrivé pour

be conducted, and I hope that Mr. Edkins, Mr. Chalmers, and others, will not allow themselves to

le mandchou, dont beaucoup de mots sont entrés dans la langue mongole en en prenant les terminaisons ; mais il ne faudrait pas se servir de ces exemples pour montrer l'identité ou les ressemblances des deux langues.

'Quand les mandchous ont voulu traduire les livres chinois, ils ont rencontré un grand nombre de mots dont les synonymes n'existaient pas dans leur langue. Ils se sont alors emparé des mots chinois en leur donnant des terminaisons mandchoues, mais cette quasi-ressemblance de certains mots mandchous ne prouve point le moins du monde l'identité des deux langues. Par exemple, un préfet se dit en chinois tchi-fou, et un sous-préfet tchi-hien; les mandchous, qui ne possédaient point ces fonctionnaires, se sont contentés de transcrire les sons chinois dchhifou, dchhikhiyan.

'Le tafetas se dit en chinois tcheou-tse; les mandchous, n'ayant point de mots pour dire tafetas, ont transcrit les sons chinois par tchousé. Le bambou se dit tchou-tze; ils ont écrit l'arbre (moo) tchousé. Un titre de noblesse écrit sur du papier doré s'appelle tsë ; les mandchous écrivent tche. Je pourrais vous citer un nombre considérable de mots du même genre, qui ne prouvent pas du tout l'identité du mandchou et du chinois.

'L'ambre s'appelle hou-pe; les mandchous écrivent khôba. La barbe s'appelle hou-tse ; ils écrivent khôsé.

'Voici de quelle manière les mandchous ont fait certains verbes. Une balance s'appelle en chinois thien p'ing, ils écrivent p'ingsé; puis pour dire peser avec une balance, ils ont fait le verbe p'ingse-lembi; lembi est une terminaison commune à beaucoup de verbes.

'Pour dire faire peser, ordonner de peser avec une balance, ils écrivent p'ingseleboumbi; boumbi est la forme factive ou causative; cette terminaison sert aussi pour le passif ; de sorte que ce verbe peut signifier aussi *être pesé avec une balance.*

'Je pourrais citer aussi des mots mandchous auxquels on a donné la terminaison mongole, et *vice versâ.*'

These remarks, made by one who, during his lifetime, was recognised by friend and foe as the first Chinese scholar in Europe, ought to have their proper weight. They ought certainly to make us cautious before persuading ourselves that the connection between the Northern and Southern branches of the Turanian languages has been found in Chinese. On the other hand, I am quite aware that all that M. Stanislas Julien says against Mr. Edkins may be true, and that nevertheless Chinese may have been the central language

be discouraged by the ordinary objections that are brought against all tentative studies. Even if their researches should only lead to negative results, they would be of the highest importance. The criterion by which we test the relationship of inflectional languages, such as Sanskrit and Greek, Hebrew and Arabic, cannot, from the nature of the case, be applied to languages which are still in the combinatory or isolating stratum, nor would they answer any purpose, if we tried by them to determine whether certain languages, separated during their inflectional growth, had been united during their combinatory stage, or whether languages, separated during their combinatory progress, had started from a common centre in their monosyllabic age. Bopp's attempt to work with his Aryan tools on the Malayo-Polynesian languages, and to discover in them traces of Aryan forms, ought to serve as a warning example.

However, there are dangers also, and even greater dangers, on the opposite shore, and if Mr. Chalmers in his interesting work on the 'Origin of Chinese,' compares, for instance, the Chinese tzé, child, with the Bohemian *tsi*, daughter, I know that the indignation of the Aryan scholars will be roused to a very

from which Mongolian in the north and Tibetan in the south branched off. A language, such as Chinese, with a small number of sounds and an immense number of meanings, can easily give birth to dialects which, in their later development, might branch off in totally different directions. Even with languages so closely connected as Sanskrit and Latin, it would be easy to make out a list of a thousand words in Latin which could not be matched in Sanskrit. The question, therefore, is not decided. What is wanted are researches carried on by competent scholars in an unprejudiced and at the same time a thoroughly scientific spirit.

high pitch, considering how they have proved most minutely that *tsi* or *dci* in Bohemian is the regular modification of *dugte*, and that *dugte* is the Sanskrit duhitar, the Greek θυγάτηρ, daughter, originally a pet-name, meaning a milk-maid, and given by the Aryan shepherds, and by them only, to the daughters of their house. Such accidents[1] will happen in so comprehensive a subject as the Science of Language. They have happened to scholars like Bopp, Grimm, and Burnouf, and they will happen again. I do not defend haste or inaccuracy: I only say, we must venture on, and not imagine that all is done, and that nothing remains to conquer in our science. Our watchword, here as elsewhere, should be Festina lente! but, by all means, Festina! Festina! Festina!

[1] If Mr. Chalmers' comparison of the Chinese and Bohemian names for daughter is so unpardonable, what shall we say of Bopp's comparison of the Bengali and Sanskrit names for sister? Sister in Bengali is bohinî, the Hindi bahin and bhân, the Prakrit bahiṇî, the Sanskrit bhaginî. Yet Bopp, in the most elaborate way, derives bohinî from the Sanskrit svasṛ́, sister. Bopp, *Vergleichende Grammatik*, Vorrede zur vierten Abtheilung, p. x.

PART II.

ON CURTIUS' CHRONOLOGY OF THE INDO-GERMANIC LANGUAGES.

In a former Lecture on the 'Stratification of Language' I ventured to assert that wherever *inflection* has yielded to a rational analysis, it has invariably been recognised as the result of a previous *combination*, and wherever *combination* has been traced back to an earlier stage, that earlier stage has been simply *juxtaposition*.

Professor Pott in his 'Etymologische Forschungen' (1871, p. 16), a work which worthily holds its place by the side of Bopp's 'Comparative Grammar,' questions the correctness of that statement; but in doing so he seems to me to have overlooked the restrictions which I myself had introduced, in order to avoid the danger of committing myself to what might seem too general a statement. I did not say that every form of inflection had been proved to spring from a previous combination, but I spoke of those cases only where we have succeeded in a rational analysis of inflectional forms, and it was in these that I maintained that inflection had always been found to be the result of previous combination. What is the object of the analysis of grammatical inflections, or of Comparative Grammar in general, if not to find out what terminations originally were, before they

had assumed a purely formal character? If we take the French adverb *sincèrement*, sincerely, and trace it back to the Latin *sincerâ mente*, we have for a second time the three stages of juxtaposition, combination, and, to a certain extent, inflection, repeated before our eyes. I say inflection, for *ment*, though originally an independent word, soon becomes a mere adverbial suffix, the speakers so little thinking of its original purport that we may say of a stone that it falls *lourdement*, heavily, without wishing to imply that it falls *luridâ mente*, with a heavy, lit. with a lurid mind.

If we take the nom. sing. of a noun in Sanskrit, Greek, or Latin, we find that masculine nouns end frequently in *s*. We have, for instance, Sk. vesa-s, Gr. *οἶκο-ς*, Lat. *vîcu-s*. These three words are identical in their termination, in their base, and in their root. The root is the Sk. vis, to settle down, to enter upon or into a thing. This root, without undergoing any further change, may answer the purpose both of a verbal and a nominal base. In the precative, for instance, we have vis-yâ-t, he may enter, which yields to a rational analysis into vis, the root yâ, to go, and the old pronominal stem of the third person, *t*, he. We reduplicate the root, and we get the perfect vi-vis-us, they have entered. Here I can understand that objections might be raised against accepting us as a mere phonetic corruption of ant and anti; but if, as in Greek, we find as the termination of the third pers. plur. of the perfect *âσι*, we know that this is a merely phonetic change of the original anti,[1] and this anti has been

[1] Curtius, *Verbum*, p. 72.

traced back by Pott himself (whether rightly or wrongly, we need not here inquire) to the pronominal stems ana, that, and ti, he. These two stems, when joined together, become anti,[1] meaning *those and he*, and are gradually reduced to ἅσι, and in Sanskrit to us for ant. What we call reduplication has likewise been traced back by Pott himself to an original repetition of the whole root, so that vi-vis stands for an original or intentional vis-vis; thus showing again the succession of the three stages, juxtaposition, vis-vis, combination, vi-vis, inflection, the same, vi-vis, though liable to further phonetic modification.

Used as a nominal base the same root vis appears, without any change, in the nom. plur. vis-as, the settlers, the clans, the people. Now, here again Professor Pott himself has endeavoured to explain the inflection as by tracing it back to the pronominal base as, in asau, *ille*. He therefore takes the plural vis-as as a compound, meaning 'man and that': that is to say, he traces the inflection back to a combinatory origin.

By raising the simple base vis to visa, we arrive at new verbal forms, such as vis-â-mi, I enter, vis-a-si, thou enterest, vis-a-ti, he enters. In all these inflectional forms, the antecedent combinatory stage is still more or less visible, for mi, si, ti, whatever their exact history may have been, are clearly varieties of the pronominal bases of the first, second, and third persons, ma, tva, ta.

Lastly, by raising vis to vesa, we arrive at a new

[1] Pott, *E. F.* 1871, p. 21.

nominal base, and by adding to it the stem of a demonstrative pronoun *s*, we form the so-called nom. sing. ves*a*-s, *οἶκος*, *vicu-s*, from which we started, meaning originally house-here, this house, the house.

In all this Professor Pott would fully agree, but where he would differ would be when we proceed to generalise, and to lay it down as an axiom that all inflectional forms *must* have had the same combinatory origin. He may be right in thus guarding against too hasty generalisation, to which we are but too prone in all inductive sciences. I am well aware that there are many inflections which have not yielded, as yet, to any rational analysis, but, with that reservation, I thought, and I still think, it right to say that, until some other process of forming those inflections has been pointed out, inflection may be considered as the invariable result of combination.

It is impossible in writing, always to repeat such qualifications and reservations. They must be taken as understood. Take for instance the augment in Greek and Sanskrit. Some scholars have explained it as a negative particle, others as a demonstrative pronoun; others, again, took it as a mere symbol of differentiation. If the last explanation could be established by more general analogies, then, no doubt, we should have here an inflection that cannot be referred to combination. Again, it would be difficult to say what independent element was added to the pronoun sa, he, in order to make it sâ, she. This, too, may, for all we know, be a case of phonetic symbolism, and, if so, it should be treated on its own merits. The lengthening of the vowel in the subjunctive mood was formerly represented by Professor

Curtius as a symbolic expression of hesitation, but he has lately recalled that explanation as untenable. I pointed out that when in Hebrew we meet with such forms as *Piel* and *Pual*, *Hiphil* and *Hophal*, we feel tempted to admit formative agencies, different from mere juxtaposition and combination. But before we admit this purely phonetic symbolism, we should bear in mind that the changes of *bruder*, brother, into *brüder*, brethren, *ich weiss*, I know, into *wir wissen*, we know, which seem at first sight purely phonetic, have after all been proved to be the indirect result of juxtaposition and combination, so that we ought to be extremely careful, and first exhaust every possible rational explanation, before we have recourse to phonetic symbolism as an element in the production of inflectional forms.

The chief object, however, of my lecture on the 'Stratification of Language' was not so much to show that inflection everywhere presupposes combination, and combination juxtaposition, but rather to call attention to a fact that had not been noticed before, viz. that there is hardly any language which is not at the same time *isolating*, *combinatory* and *inflectional*.

It had been the custom in classifying languages morphologically to represent some languages, for instance Chinese, as *isolating*; others, such as Turkish or Finnish, as *combinatory*; others, such as Sanskrit or Hebrew, as *inflectional*. Without contesting the value of this classification for certain purposes, I pointed out that even Chinese, the very type of the isolating class, is not free from combinatory forms, and that the more highly developed

among the combinatory languages, such as Hungarian, Finnish, Tamil, etc., show the clearest traces of incipient inflection. 'The difficulty is not,' as I said, 'to show the transition of one stratum of speech into another, but rather to draw a sharp line between the different strata. The same difficulty was felt in Geology, and led Sir Charles Lyell to invent such pliant names as *Eocene*, *Meiocene*, and *Pleiocene*, names which indicate a mere dawn, a minority, or a majority of new formations, but do not draw a fast and hard line, cutting off one stratum from the other. Natural growth and even merely mechanical accumulation and accretion, here, as elsewhere, are so minute and almost imperceptible that they defy all strict scientific terminology, and force upon us the lesson that we must be satisfied with an approximate accuracy.'

Holding these opinions, and having established them by an amount of evidence which, though it might easily be increased, seemed to me sufficient, I did not think it safe to assign to the three stages in the history of the Aryan languages, the *juxtapositional*, the *combinatory*, and the *inflectional*, a strictly successive character, still less to admit in the growth of the Aryan languages a number of definite stages which should be sharply separated from each other and assume an almost chronological character. I fully admit that wherever *inflectional* forms in the Aryan languages have yielded to a rational analysis, we see that they are preceded chronologically by *combinatory* formations; nor should I deny for one moment that *combinatory* forms presuppose an antecedent, and therefore chronologically more ancient, stage of mere juxtaposition. What I doubt is

whether, as soon as combination sets in, juxtaposition ceases, and whether the first appearance of inflection puts an end to the continued working of combination.

It seems to me, even if we argue only on *à priori* grounds, that there must have been at least a period of transition during which both principles were at work together, and I hardly can understand what certain scholars mean if they represent the principle of inflection as a sudden psychological change which, as soon as it has taken place, makes a return to combination altogether impossible. If, instead of arguing *à priori*, we look the facts of language in the face, we cannot help seeing that, even after that period during which it is supposed that the united Aryan language had attained its full development—I mean at a time when Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin had become completely separated, as so many national dialects, each with its own fully developed inflectional grammar—the power of combination was by no means extinct. The free power of composition, which is so manifest in Sanskrit and Greek, testifies to the continued working of combination in strictly historical times. I see no real distinction between the transition of *Néa pólis, i.e.* new town, into *Neápolis*, and into *Naples*, and the most primitive combination in Chinese, and I maintain that as long as a language retains that unbounded faculty of composition which we see in Sanskrit, in Greek, and in German, the growth of new inflectional forms from combinatory germs must be admitted as possible. Forms such as the passive aorist in Greek, *ἐτέθην*, or the weak preterite in Gothic, *nas-i-da*, *nas-i-dédjau*, need not

have been formed before the Aryan family broke up into national languages; and forms such as Italian *meco*, *fratelmo*, or the future *avro*, I shall have, though not exactly of the same workmanship, show at all events that analogous powers are at work even in the latest periods of linguistic growth.

Holding these opinions, which, as far as I know, have never been controverted, I ought perhaps, when I came to publish the preceding Lecture, to have defended my position against the powerful arguments advanced in the mean time by my old friend Professor G. Curtius, in support of a diametrically opposite opinion, in his classical essay, 'On the Chronology of the Indo-Germanic Languages,' published in 1867, new edition, 1873. While I had endeavoured to show that juxtaposition, combination, and inflection, though following each other in succession, do not represent chronological periods, but represent phases, strongly developed, it is true, in certain languages, but extending their influence far beyond the limits commonly assigned to them, Professor Curtius tried to establish the chronological character not only of these three, but of four other phases or periods in the history of Aryan speech. Confining himself to what he considers the undivided Aryan language to have been before it was broken up into national dialects, such as Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, he proceeds to subdivide the antecedent periods of its growth into *seven* definite stages, each marked by a definite character, and each representing a sum of years in the chronology of the Aryan language. As I had found it difficult to treat Chinese as entirely *juxtapositional*, or Turkish as entirely *combinatory*,

or Sanskrit as entirely *inflectional*, it was perhaps not to be wondered at that not even the persuasive pleading of my learned friend could convince me of the truth of the more minute chronological division proposed by him in his learned essay. But it would hardly have been fair if, on the present occasion, I had reprinted my 'Rede Lecture' without explaining why I had altered nothing in my theory of linguistic growth, why I retained these three phases and no more, and why I treated even these, not as chronological periods, in the strict sense of the word, but as preponderating tendencies, giving an individual character to certain classes of language, without being totally absent in others. Professor Curtius is one of the few scholars with whom it is pleasant to differ. He has shown again and again that what he cares for is truth, not victory, and when he has defended his position against attacks not always courteous, he has invariably done so, not with hard words, but with hard arguments. I therefore feel no hesitation in stating plainly to him where his theories seem to me either not fully supported or even contradicted by the facts of language, and I trust that this free exchange of ideas, though in public, will be as pleasant as our conversations in private used to be, now more than thirty years ago.

Let us begin with the *First Period*, which Professor Curtius calls the *Root-Period*. There must have been, as I have tried to explain before, a period for the Aryan languages, during which they stood on a level with Chinese, using nothing but roots, or radical words, without having reduced any of them to a purely formal character, without having gone through

the process of changing what Chinese grammarians call *full* words into *empty* words. I have always held that to speak of roots as mere abstractions, as the result of grammatical theory, is self-contradictory. Roots which never had any real or historical existence may have been invented both in modern and ancient collections or Dhâtupâ*th*as; but that is simply the fault of our etymological analysis, and in no way affects the fact that the Aryan, like all other languages we know, began with roots. We may doubt the legitimacy of certain chemical elements, but not the reality of chemical elements in general. Language, in the sense in which we use the word, begins with roots, which are not only the ultimate facts for the Science of Language, but real facts in the history of human speech. To deny their historical reality would be tantamount to denying cause and effect.

Logically, no doubt, it is possible to distinguish between a root as a mere postulate, and a root used as an actual word. That distinction has been carefully elaborated by Indian grammarians and philosophers, but it does in no way concern us in purely historical researches. What I mean by a root used in real language is this: when we analyse a cluster of Sanskrit words, such as yodha-s, a fighter, yodhaka-s, a fighter, yoddhâ, a fighter, yodhana-m, fighting, yuddhi-s, a fight, yuyutsu-s, wishing to fight, â-yudha-m, a weapon, we easily see that they presuppose an element yudh, to fight, and that they are all derived from that element by well-known grammatical suffixes. Now, is this yudh, which we call the root of all these words, a mere

abstraction? Far from it. We find it as yudh used in the Veda either as a nominal or as a verbal base, according to suffixes by which it is followed. Thus yudh by itself would be a fighter, only that dh when final has to be changed into t. We have goshu-yúdh-am, an accusative, the fighter among cows. In the plural we have yúdh-as, fighters; in the locative yudh-i, in the fight; in the instrumental, yudh-â, with the weapon. That is to say, we find that as a nominal base, yudh, without any determinative suffixes, may express fighting, the place of fighting, the instrument of fighting, and a fighter. If our grammatical analysis is right, we should have yudh as a nominal base in yúdh-ya-ti, lit. he goes to fighting, yudh-yá-te, pass.; (a)-yut-smahi, aor., either we were to fight, or we were fighters; yú-yut-sa-ti, he is to fight-fight; yudh-ya-s, to be fought (p. 60), etc. As a verbal base we find yudh, for instance, or yu-yudh-e, I have fought; in a-yud-dha, for a-yudh-ta, he fought. In the other Aryan languages this root has left hardly any traces; yet the Greek ὑσμῖν, and ὑσμίνη, would be impossible without the root yudh.

The only difference between Chinese and these Sanskrit forms which we have just examined is that while in Chinese such a form as yudh-i, in the battle, would have for its last element a word clearly meaning middle, and having an independent accent, Sanskrit has lost the consciousness of the original material meaning of the *i* of the locative, and uses it traditionally as an empty word, as a formal element, as a mere termination.

I also agree with Curtius that during the earliest

stage, not of Sanskrit, but of Aryan speech in general, we have to admit two classes of roots, the *predicative* and *demonstrative*, and that what we now call the plural of yudh, yudh-as, fighters, was, or may have been, originally a compound consisting of the predicative root yudh, and the demonstrative root, as or sa, possibly repeated twice, meaning 'fight-he-he,' or 'fight-there-there' *i.e.* fighters.

There is another point with regard to the character of this earliest radical stage of the Aryan language, on which formerly I should have agreed with Curtius, but where now I begin to feel more doubtful—I mean the necessarily monosyllabic form of all original roots. There is, no doubt, much to be said for this view. We always like to begin with what is simple. We imagine, as it has been said, that 'the simple idea must break forth, like lightning, in a simple body of sound, to be perceived in one single moment.' But, on the other hand, the simple, so far as it is the general, is frequently, to us at least, the last result of repeated complex conceptions, and therefore there is at all events no *à priori* argument against treating the simplest roots as the latest rather than the earliest products of language. Languages in a low state of development are rich in words expressive of the most minute differences: they are poor in general expressions—a fact which ought to be taken into account as an important qualification of a remark made by Curtius that language supplies necessaries first, luxuries afterwards (p. 32). I quote the following excellent remarks from Mr. Sayce's 'Principles of Comparative Philology' (p. 208): 'Among modern

savages the individual objects of sense have names enough, while general terms are very rare. The Mohicans have words for cutting various objects, but none to signify cutting simple.'[1] In taking this view, we certainly are better able to explain the actual forms of the Aryan roots, viz. by *elimination* rather than by *composition*. If we look for instance, as I did myself formerly, on such roots as yudh, yug, and yaut, as developed from the simpler root yu, or on mardh, marg, mark, marp, mard, smar, as developed from mar, then we are bound to account for the modificatory elements, such as *dh*, *g*, *k*, *p*, *d*, *s*, *n*, *t*, *r*, as remnants of other roots, whether predicative or demonstrative. Thus Curtius compares tar or tra, with tras, tram, trak, trap; tri and tru with trup, trib, taking the final consonants as modificatory letters. But what are these modificatory letters? Every attempt to account for them has failed. If it could be proved that these modificatory elements, which Curtius calls *Determinatives*, produced always the *same* modification of meaning, they might then be classed with the verbal suffixes which change simple verbs into causative, desiderative, or intensive verbs. But this is not the

[1] Dr. Callaway in his *Remarks on the Zulu Language* (1870), p. 2, says: 'The Zulu language contains upwards of 20,000 words in *bonâ fide* use among the people. Those curious appellations for different coloured cattle, or for different maize cobs, to express certain minute peculiarities of colour or arrangement of colour, which it is difficult for us to grasp, are not synonymous, but instances in which a new noun or name is used instead of adding adjectives to one name to express the various conditions of an object. Neither are these various verbs used to express varieties of the same action synonyms, such as *ukupata*, to carry in the hand, *ukwetshata*, to carry on the shoulder, *ukubeleta*, to carry on the back.'

case. On the other hand, it would be perfectly intelligible that such roots as mark, marg, mard, mardh, expressing different kinds of crushing, became fixed side by side, that by a process of elimination their distinguishing features were gradually removed, and the root mar left as the simplest form, expressive of the most general meaning. Without entering here on that process of mutual friction by which, I believe, the development of roots can best be explained, we may say at least so much, that whatever process will account for the root yu, will likewise account for the root yug: nay, that roots like mark or mard are more graphic, expressive, and more easily intelligible than the root mar.

However, if this view of the origin of roots has to be adopted, it need not altogether exclude the other view. In the process of simplification, certain final letters may have become typical, may have seemed invested with a certain function or determinative power, and may therefore have been added independently to other roots, by that powerful imitative tendency which asserts itself again and again through the whole working of language. But however that may be, the sharp line of distinction which Curtius draws between the First Period, represented by simple, and the Second Period, represented by derivative, roots, seems certainly no longer tenable, least of all as dividing *chronologically* two distinct periods in the growth of language.

When we approach the Third Period, it might seem that here, at least, there could be no difference of opinion between Professor Curtius and myself. That Third Period represents simply what I called

the first setting in of *combination*, following after the *isolating* stage. Curtius calls it the *primary verbal period*, and ascribes to it the origin of such combinatory forms as dấ-ma, give-I, dâ-tva, give-thou, dấ-ta, give-he; dâ-ma-tvi, give-we, dâ-tva-tvi, give you, dâ-(a)nti, give-they. These verbal forms he considers as much earlier than any attempts at declension in nouns. No one who has read Curtius' arguments in support of this chronological arrangement would deny their extreme plausibility; but there are grave difficulties which made me hesitate in adopting this hypothetical framework of linguistic chronology. I shall only mention one, which seemed to me insurmountable. We know that during what we called the First Radical Period the sway of phonetic laws was already so firmly established that, from that period onward to the present day, we can say, with perfect certainty, which phonetic changes are possible, and which are not. It is through these phonetic laws that the most distant past in the history of the Aryan language is connected with the present. It is on them that the whole science of etymology is founded. Only because a certain root has a tenuis, a media, an aspirate, or a sibilant, is it possible to keep it distinct from other roots. If t and s could be interchanged, then the root tar, to cross, would not be distinct from the root sar, to go. If d and dh could vary, then dar, to tear, would run together with dhar, to hold. These phonetic distinctions were firmly established in the radical period, and continue to be maintained, both in the undivided Aryan speech, and in the divided national dialects, such as Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and Gothic. How then can

we allow an intervening period, during which ma-tvi could become masi, tva-tvi, thas, and the same tva-tvi appear also as sai? Such changes, always most startling, may have been possible in earlier periods; but when phonetic order had once been established, as it was in what Curtius calls his first and second periods, to admit them as possible would be, as far as I can judge, to admit a complete anachronism. Of two things one: either we must altogether surrender those chaotic changes which are required for identifying Sanskrit e with Greek μαι, and Greek μαι with mâ-ma, etc., or we must throw them back to a period anterior to the final settlement of the Aryan roots.

I now proceed to point out a second difficulty. If Curtius uses these same personal terminations, masi, tvasi, and anti, as proof positive that they must have been compounded out of ma+tva, and tva-tva, before there were any case-terminations, I do not think his argument is quite stringent. Curtius says: 'If plural suffixes had existed before the coining of these terminations, we should expect them here, as well as in the noun' (p. 33). But the plural of the pronoun *I* could never have been formed by a plural suffix, like the plural of *horse*. *I* admits of no plural, as little as *thou*, and hence the plural of these very pronouns in the Aryan language is not formed by the mere addition of a plural termination, but by a new base. We say *I*, but *we*; *thou*, but *you*, and so through all the Aryan languages. According to Curtius himself, masi, the termination of the plural, is not formed by repeating ma, by saying, I and I, and by ma and tva, I and thou, the most primitive

way, he thinks, of expressing *we*. The termination of the second person plural might be expressed by repeating *thou*. 'You did it' might have been rendered by 'thou and thou did it;' but hardly by treating *thou* like a noun, and adding to it a plural termination. The absence of plural terminations, therefore, at the end of the personal suffixes of the verbs, does not prove, as far as I can see, that plurals of nouns were unknown when the first, second, and third persons plural of the Aryan verbs were called into existence.

Again, what Curtius says, that 'what language has once learnt it does not forget again, and that therefore if the plural had once found expression in nouns, the verb would have claimed the same distinction,' is true, no doubt, in many cases, but not so generally true as to supply a safe footing for a deductive argument. In so late a formation as the periphrastic future in Sanskrit, we say dâtâ-smah, as it were *dator sumus*, not dâtâraḥ smaḥ; and in the second person plural of the passive in Latin *amamini*, though the plural is marked, the gender is always disregarded.

Further, even if we admit with Bopp and Curtius that the terminations of the medium are composed of two pronouns, that the *ta* of the third person singular stands for *ta-ti*, to-him-he, that καλύπτεται in fact meant originally hide-himself-he, it does not follow that in such a compound one pronominal element should have taken the termination of the accusative, any more than the other takes the termination of the nominative. The first element in every composition takes necessarily its Pada or Thematic form; the

second or final element has suffered so much, according to Bopp's own explanation, that nothing would be easier to explain than the disappearance of a final consonant, if it had existed. The absence of case-terminations in such compounds cannot therefore be used as a proof of the non-existence of case-terminations at a time when the medial and other personal endings took their origin. On the contrary, these terminations seem to me to indicate, though I do not say to prove, that the conception of a subjective, as distinct from an objective case, had been fully realised by those who framed them. I do not myself venture to speak very positively of such minute processes of analysis as that which discovers in the Sk. first pers. sing. ind. pres. of the middle, tude, I strike, an original tuda+a+i, tuda+ma+i, tuda+ma+mi, tuda+mâ+ma; but, admitting that the middle was formed in that way, and that it meant originally *strike-to-me-I*, then surely we have in the first mâ an oblique case, and in the compound itself the clearest indication that the distinction between a nominative and an oblique case, whether dative or accusative, was no longer a mystery. Anyhow—and this is the real point at issue—the presence of such compounds as mâ-ma, to-me-I, is in no way a proof that at the time of their formation people could not distinguish between yudh(s) nom. a fighter, and yudh(am), acc. a fighter; and we must wait for more irrefragable evidence before admitting, what would under all circumstances be a most startling conclusion, viz. that the Aryan language was spoken for a long time without case-terminations, but with a complete set of personal terminations, both in the

singular and the plural. For though it is quite true that the want of cases could only be felt in a sentence, the same seems to me to apply to personal terminations of the verb. The one, in most languages we know, implies the other, and the very question whether conjugation or declension came first is one of those dangerous questions which take something for granted which has never been proved.

During all this time, according to Curtius, our Aryan language would have consisted of nothing but roots, used for nominal and verbal purposes, but without any purely derivative suffixes, whether verbal or nominal, and without declension. The only advance, in fact, made beyond the purely Chinese standard, would have consisted in a few combinations of personal pronouns with verbal stems, which combinations assumed rapidly a typical character, and led to the formation of a skeleton of conjugation, containing a *present*, an *aorist* with an augment, and a *reduplicated perfect*. Why, during the same period, nominal bases should not have assumed at least some case-terminations, does not appear; and it certainly seems strange that people who could say vak-ti, speak-he, vak-anti, speak-this-he, should not have been able to say vâk-s, whether in the sense of speak-there, *i.e.* speech, or speak-there, *i.e.* speaker.

The next step which, according to Curtius, the Aryan language had to make, in order to emerge from its purely radical phase, was the creation of bases, both verbal and nominal, by the addition of verbal and nominal suffixes to roots, both primary and secondary. Curtius calls this fourth the Period

of the *Formation of Themes*. These suffixes are very numerous, and it is by them that the Aryan languages have been able to make their limited number of roots supply the vast materials of their dictionary. From bhar, to carry, they formed bhar-a, a carrier, but sometimes also a burden. In addition to bharti, carry-he, they formed bhara-ti, meaning possibly carrying-he. The growth of these early themes may have been very luxuriant, and, as Professor Curtius expresses it, chiefly *paraschematic*. It may have been left to a later age to assign to that large number of possible synonyms more definite meanings. Thus, from φέρω, I carry, we have φορά, the act of carrying, used also in the sense of *impetus* (being carried away), and of *provectus*, *i.e.* what is brought in. Φορός means carrying, but also violent, and lucrative; φέρετρον, an instrument of carrying, means a bier; φαρέτρα, a quiver, for carrying arrows. Φορμός comes to mean a basket; φορτός, a burden; φορός, tribute.

All this is perfectly intelligible, both with regard to nominal and verbal themes. Curtius admits four kinds of verbal themes as the outcome of his Fourth Period. He had assigned to his Third Period the simple verbal themes εσ-τί, and the reduplicated themes such as δίδω-σι. To these were added, in the Fourth Period, the following four secondary themes:

(1)	πλέκ-ε-(τ)-ι	Sanskrit lipa-ti
(2)	ἀλείφ-ε-(τ)-ι	,, laipa-ti
(3)	δείκ-νῦ-σι	,, lip-nau-ti
(4)	δάμ-νη-σι	,, lip-nâ-ti.

He also explains the formation of the subjunctive in analogy with bases such as lipa-ti, as derived from lip-ti.

Some scholars would probably feel inclined to add one or two of the more primitive verbal themes, such as

limpa-ti	*rumpo*
limpana-ti	λαμ-βάνε(τ)ι,

but all would probably agree with Curtius in placing the formation of these themes, both verbal and nominal, between the radical and the latest inflectional period. One point, however, on which there would probably be considerable difference of opinion is this, whether it is credible that, at a time when so many nominal themes were formed—for Curtius ascribes to this Fourth Period the formation of such nominal bases as

λόγ-ο, intellect,	=	lipa-ti
λοίπ-ο, left,	=	laipa-ti
λιγ-νύ, smoke,	=	lip-nau-ti
δάφ-νη, laurel,	=	lip-nâ-ti—

the simplest nominal compounds, which we now call nominative and accusative, singular and plural, were still unknown; that people could say dh*r*ish-nu-más, we dare, but not dh*r*ish-nú-s, daring-he; that they had an imperative, dh*r*ish*n*uhí, dare, but not a vocative, dh*r*ish*n*o. Curtius strongly holds to that opinion, but with regard to this period too, he does not seem to me to establish it by a regular and complete argument. Some arguments which he refers to occasionally have been answered before. Another, which he brings in incidentally when discussing the abbreviation of certain suffixes, can hardly be said to carry conviction. After tracing the suffixes ant and tar back to what he supposes

to have been their more primitive forms, an-ta and ta-ra, he remarks that the dropping of the final vowel would hardly be conceivable at a time when there existed case-terminations. Still this dropping of the vowel is very common, in late historical times, in Latin, for instance, and other Italian dialects, where it causes frequent confusion and heteroclitism.[1] Thus the Augustan *innocua* was shortened in common pronunciation to *innoca*, and this dwindles down in Christian inscriptions to *innox*. In Greek, too, *διάκτορος* is older than *διάκτωρ*; *φύλακος* older than *φύλαξ*.

Nor can it be admitted that the nominal suffixes have suffered less from phonetic corruption than the terminations of the verb, and that therefore they must belong to a more modern period (pp. 39, 40). In spite of all the changes which the personal terminations are supposed to have undergone, their connection with the personal pronouns has always been apparent, while the tracing back of the nominal suffixes, and, still more, of the case-terminations to their typical elements, forms still one of the greatest difficulties of comparative grammarians.[2]

Professor Curtius is so much impressed with the later origin of declension that he establishes one more period, the fifth, to which he assigns the growth of all compound verbal forms, compound stems, compound tenses, and compound moods, before he allows the first beginnings of declension, and the formation even of such simple forms as the nominative and accusative. It is difficult, no doubt, to dis-

[1] Bruppacher, *Lautlehre der Oskischen Sprache*, p. 48. Büchler, *Grundriss der Lateinischen Declination*, p. 1.

[2] 'Die Entstehung der Casus ist noch das allerdunkelste im weiten Bereich des indogermanischen Formensystems.' Curtius, *Chronologie* p. 71.

prove such an opinion by facts or dates, because there are none to be found on either side: but we have a right to expect very strong arguments indeed before we can admit that at a time when an aorist, like ἔδεικ-σα, Sanskrit a-d i k-s h a-t, was possible; that is to say, at a time when the verb a s, which meant originally to breathe, had by constant use been reduced to the meaning of being; at a time when that verb, as a mere auxiliary, was joined to a verbal base in order to impart to it a general historical power; when the persons of the verb were distinguished by pronominal elements, and when the augment, no longer purely demonstrative, had become the symbol of time past—that at such a time people were still unable to distinguish, except by a kind of Chinese law of position, between 'the father struck the child,' and 'the child struck the father.' Before we can admit this, we want much stronger proofs than any adduced by Curtius. He says, for instance, that compound verbal bases formed with yâ, to go, and afterwards fixed as causatives, would be inconceivable during a period in which accusatives existed. From n a s, to perish, we form in Sanskrit n â s a-y â m i, I make perish. This, according to Curtius, would have meant originally, I send to perishing. Therefore n â s a, would have been in the accusative, n â s a m, and the causative would have been n â s a m y â m i, if the accusative had then been known. But we have in Latin[1] *pessum dare*, *venum ire*, and no one would say that compounds like *calefacio*, *liquefacio*, *putrefacio*, were impossible after the first Aryan separation, or after that still earlier period to which Curtius assigns the formation of the

[1] Corssen, ii. 888.

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Aryan case-terminations. Does Professor Curtius hold that compound forms like Gothic *nasi-da* were formed not only before the Aryan separation, but before the introduction of case-terminations? I hold, on the contrary, that such really old compositions never required, nay never admitted, the accusative. We say in Sanskrit, dyu-gat, going to the sky, dyu-ksha, dwelling in the sky, without any case-terminations at the end of the first part of the compound. We say in Greek, *σακέσ-παλος*, not *σάκοσ-παλος*, *παιδοφόνος*, not *παιδαφόνος*, *ὀρεσ-κῷος*, mountain-bred, and also *ὀρεσί-τροφος*, mountain-fed. We say in Latin, *agri-cola*, not *agrum-cola*, *fratri-cīda*, not *fratrem-cīda*, *rēgĭ-fugium*, not *regis-fugium*. Are we to suppose that all these words were formed before there was an outward mark of distinction between nominative and accusative in the primitive Aryan language? Such compounds, we know, can be formed at pleasure, and they continued to be formed long after the full development of the Aryan declension, and the same would apply to the compound stems of causal verbs. To say, as Curtius does, that composition was possible only before the development of declension, because when cases had once sprung up, the people would no longer have known the bases of nouns, is far too strong an assertion. In Sanskrit[1] the really difficult bases are generally sufficiently visible in the so-called Pada-cases, *i.e.* before certain terminations beginning with consonants, and there is besides a strong feeling of analogy in language, which would generally, though not always (for compounds are fre-

[1] Cf. Clemm, *Die neusten Forschungen auf dem Gebiet der Griechischen Composita*, p. 9.

quently framed by false analogy), guide the framers of new compounds rightly in the selection of the proper nominal base. It seems to me that even with us there is still a kind of instinctive feeling against using nouns, articulated with case-terminations, for purposes of composition, although there are exceptions to that rule in ancient, and many more in modern languages. We can hardly realise to ourselves a Latin *pontemfex*, or *pontisfex*, still less *ponsfex* instead of *pontifex*, and when the Romans drove away their kings, they did not speak of a *regisfugium* or a *regumfugium*, but they took, by habit or by instinct, the base *regi*, though none of them, if they had been asked, knew what a base was. Composition, we ought not to forget, is after all only another name for combination, and the very essence of combination consists in joining together words which are not yet articulated grammatically. Whenever we form compounds, such as *railway*, we are still moving in the combinatory stage, and we have here the strongest proof that the life of language is not capable of chronological division. There was a period in the growth of the Aryan language when the principle of combination preponderated, when inflection was as yet unknown. But inflection itself was the result of combination, and unless combination had continued long after inflection set in, the very life of language would have become extinct.

I have thus tried to explain why I cannot accept the fundamental fact on which the seven-fold division of the history of the Aryan language is founded, viz. that the combinatory process which led to the Aryan system of conjugation would have been impossible,

if at the time nominal bases had already been articulated with terminations of case and number. I see no reason why the earliest case-formations—I mean particularly the nominative and accusative in the singular, plural, and dual—should not date from the same time as the earliest formations of conjugation. The same process that leads to the formation of vak-ti, speak-he, would account for the formation of vak-s, speak-there, *i.e.* speaker. Necessity, which after all is the mother of all inventions, would much sooner have required the clear distinction of singular and plural, of nominative and accusative, than of the three persons of the verb. It is far more important to be able to distinguish the subject and the object in such sentences as 'the son has killed the father,' or 'the father has killed the son,' than to be able to indicate the person and tense of the verb. Of course we may say that in Chinese the two cases are distinguished without any outward signs, and by mere position; but we have no evidence that the law of position was preserved in the Aryan languages, after verbal inflection had once set in. Chinese dispenses with verbal inflection as well as with nominal, and an appeal to it wuuld therefore prove either too much or too little.

At the end of the five periods which we have examined, but still before the Aryan separation, Curtius places the sixth, which he calls the Period of the Formation of Cases, and the seventh, the Period of Adverbs. Why I cannot bring myself to accept the late date here assigned to declension, I have tried to explain before. That adverbs existed before the great branches of Aryan speech became definitely

separated has been fully proved by Professor Curtius. I only doubt whether the adverbial period can be separated chronologically from the case period. I should say, on the contrary, that some of the adverbs in Sanskrit and the other Aryan languages exhibit the most primitive and obsolete case-terminations, and that they existed probably long before the system of case-terminations assumed its completeness.

If we look back at the results at which we have arrived in examining the attempt of Professor Curtius to establish seven distinct chronological periods in the history of the Aryan speech, previous to its separation into Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Slavonic, Teutonic, and Celtic, I think we shall find two principles clearly established:

1. That it is impossible to distinguish more than *three* successive phases in the growth of the Aryan language. In the first phase or period the only materials were roots, not yet compounded, still less articulated grammatically, a form of language to us almost inconceivable, yet even at present preserved in the literature and conversation of millions of human beings, the Chinese. In that stage of language, 'king rule man heap law instrument,' would mean, the king rules men legally.

The *second* phase is characterised by the combination of roots, by which process one loses its independence and its accent, and is changed from a full and material into an empty or formal element. That phase comprehends the formation of compound roots, of certain nominal and verbal stems, and of the most necessary forms of declension and conjugation. What distinguishes this phase from the inflectional

is the consciousness of the speaker that one part of his word is the stem or the body, and all the rest its environment, a feeling analogous to that which we have when we speak of *man*-hood, *man*-ly, *man*-ful, *man*-kind, but which fails us when we speak of *man* and *men*, or if we speak of *wo-man*, instead of *wif-man*. The principle of combination preponderated when inflection was as yet unknown. But inflection itself was the result of combination, and I repeat that unless it had continued long after inflection set in, the very life of language would have become extinct.

The *third* phase is the inflectional, when the base and the modificatory elements of words coalesce, lose their independence in the mind of the speaker, and simply produce the impression of modification taking place in the body of words, but without any intelligible reason. This is the feeling which we have throughout nearly the whole of our own language, and it is only by means of scientific reflection that we distinguish between the root, the base, the suffix, and the termination. To attempt more than this three-fold division seems to me impossible.

2. The second principle which I tried to establish was that the growth of language does not lend itself to a chronological division, in the strict sense of the word. Whatever forces are at work in the formation of languages, none of them ceases suddenly to make room for another, but they work on with a certain continuity from beginning to end, only on a larger or smaller scale. Inflection does not put a sudden end to combination, nor combination to juxtaposition. When even in so modern a language as English we

can form by mere combination such words as *man-like*, and reduce them to *manly*, the power of combination cannot be said to be extinct, although it may no longer be sufficiently strong to produce new cases or new personal terminations. We may admit, in the development of the Aryan language, previous to its division, three successive strata of formation, a *juxtapositional*, a *combinatory*, and an *inflectional*; but we shall have to confess that these strata are not regularly superimposed, but tilted, broken up, and convulsed. They are very prominent each for a time, but even after that time is over, they may be traced at different points, pervading the very latest formations of tertiary speech. The true motive power in the progress of all language is combination, and that power is not extinct even in our own time.

II.

INAUGURAL LECTURE

ON THE VALUE OF COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY AS A BRANCH OF ACADEMIC STUDY.

Delivered before the University of Oxford, the 27th of October, 1868.

THE foundation of a professorial chair in the University of Oxford marks an important epoch in the history of every new science.[1] There are other

[1] The following statute was approved by the University of Oxford in 1868 ('Statuta Universitatis Oxoniensis,' IV. i. 37, §§ 1–3):—

'1. Professor philologiæ comparativæ a Vice-Cancellario, et professoribus linguarum Hebraicæ, Sanskriticæ, Græcæ, Latinæ, et Anglo-Saxonicæ eligatur. In æqualitate suffragantium rem decidat Vice-Cancellarius.

'Proviso tamen ut si vir cl. M. Müller, M.A., hodie linguarum modernarum Europæ professor Taylorianus, eam professionem intra mensem post hoc statutum sancitum resignaverit, seque professoris philologiæ comparativæ munus suscipere paratum esse scripto Vice-Cancellarium certiorem fecerit, is primus admittatur professor.

'2. Professor quotannis per sex menses in Universitate incolat et commoretur inter decimum diem Octobris et primum diem Julii sequentis.

'3. Professor duas lectionum series in duobus discretis terminis legat, terminis Paschatis et S. Trinitatis pro uno reputatis; scilicet per sex septimanas in utroque termino, et bis ad minimum in unaquaque septimana: atque insuper per sex septimanas unius alicujus termini bis ad minimum in unaquaqe septimana per unius horæ spatium vacet instruendis auditoribus in iis quæ melius sine solen-

universities far more ready to confer this academical recognition on new branches of scientific research, and it would be easy to mention several subjects, and no doubt important subjects, which have long had their accredited representatives in the universities of France and Germany, but which at Oxford have not yet received this well-merited recognition.

If we take into account the study of ancient languages only, we see that as soon as Champollion's discoveries had given to the study of hieroglyphics and Egyptian antiquities a truly scientific character, the French Government thought it its duty to found a chair for this promising branch of Oriental scholarship. Italy soon followed this generous example; nor was the Prussian Government long behindhand in doing honour to the new-born science, as soon as in Professor Lepsius it had found a scholar worthy to occupy a chair of Egyptology at Berlin.

If France had possessed the brilliant genius to whom so much is due in the deciphering of the cuneiform inscriptions, I have little doubt that long ago a chair would have been founded at the *Collège de France* expressly for Sir Henry Rawlinson.

England possesses some of the best, if not the best, of Persian scholars (alas! he who was here in my mind, Lord Strangford, is no longer among us), yet there is no chair for Persian at Oxford or Cambridge, in spite of the charms of its modern literature, and the vast importance of the ancient language of Persia

nitate tradi possunt. Unam porro ad minimum lectionem quotannis publice habeat ab academicis quibuscunque sine mercede audiendam. De die hora et loco quibus hæc lectio solennis habenda sit academiam modo consueto certiorem faciat.'

and Bactria, the Zend, a language full of interest, not only to the comparative philologist, but also to the student of Comparative Theology.

There are few of the great universities of Europe without a chair for that language which, from the very beginning of history, as far as it is known to us, seems always to have been spoken by the largest number of human beings—I mean Chinese. In Paris we find not one, but two chairs for Chinese; one for the ancient, another for the modern language of that wonderful empire; and if we consider the light which a study of that curious form of human speech is intended to throw on the nature and growth of language, if we measure the importance of its enormous literature by the materials which it supplies to the student of ancient religions, and likewise to the historian who wishes to observe the earliest rise of the principal sciences and arts in countries beyond the influence of Aryan and Semitic civilisation — if, lastly, we take into account the important evidence which the Chinese language, reflecting, like a never-failing photograph, the earliest workings of the human mind, is able to supply to the student of psychology, and to the careful analyser of the elements and laws of thought, we should feel less inclined to ignore or ridicule the claims of such a language to a chair in our ancient university.[1]

I could go on and mention several other subjects, well worthy of the same distinction. If the study of Celtic languages and Celtic antiquities deserves to be encouraged anywhere, it is surely in England—not, as

[1] A Chair of Chinese has since been founded at Oxford, and Dr. Legge was appointed Professor of Chinese in 1876.

has been suggested, in order to keep English literature from falling into the abyss of German platitudes, nor to put Aneurin and Taliesin in the place of Shakespeare and Burns, and to counteract by their 'suavity and brilliancy' the Philistine tendencies of the Saxon and the Northman, but in order to supply sound materials and guiding principles to the critical student of the ancient history and the ancient language of Britain, to excite an interest in what still remains of Celtic antiquities, whether in manuscripts or in genuine stone monuments, and thus to preserve such national heirlooms from neglect or utter destruction. If we consider that Oxford possesses a Welsh College, and that England possesses the best of Celtic scholars, it is surely a pity that he should have to publish the results of his studies in the short intervals of official work at Calcutta, and not in the more congenial atmosphere of Rytichin.[1]

For those who know the history of the ancient universities of England, it is not difficult to find out why they should have been less inclined than their Continental sisters to make timely provision for the encouragement of these and other important branches of linguistic research. Oxford and Cambridge, as independent corporations, withdrawn alike from the support and from the control of the state, have always looked upon the instruction of the youth of England as their proper work; and nowhere has the tradition of classical learning been handed down more faithfully from one generation to another than in England —nowhere has its generous spirit more thoroughly

[1] A Chair of Celtic has since been founded at Oxford, and Mr. John Rhys was appointed Professor of Celtic in 1877.

pervaded the minds of statesmen, poets, artists, and moulded the character of that large and important class of independent and cultivated men, without which this country would cease to be what it has been for the last two centuries, a *res publica*, a commonwealth, in the best sense of the word. Oxford and Cambridge have supplied what England expected and demanded, and as English parents did not send their sons to learn Chinese or to study Cornish, there was naturally no supply where there was no demand. The professorial element in the university, the true representative of higher learning and independent research, withered away; the tutorial assumed the vastest proportions during this and the last centuries.

But looking back to the earlier history of the English universities, I believe it is a mistake to suppose that Oxford, one of the most celebrated universities during the middle ages and in the modern history of Europe, could ever have ignored the duty, so fully recognised by other European universities, of not only handing down intact, and laid up, as it were, in a napkin, the traditional stock of human knowledge, but of constantly adding to it, and increasing it fivefold and tenfold. Nay, unless I am much mistaken, there was really no university in which more ample provision had been made by founders and benefactors than at Oxford, for the support and encouragement of a class of students who should follow up new lines of study, devote their energies to work which, from its very nature could not be lucrative or even self-supporting, and maintain the fame of English learn-

ing, English industry, and English genius in that great and time-honoured republic of learning which claims the allegiance of the whole of Europe, nay of the whole civilised world. That work was meant to be done at Oxford and Cambridge by the Fellows of Colleges. In times, no doubt, when every kind of learning was in the hands of the clergy, these fellowships might seem to have been intended exclusively for the support of theological students. But when other studies, once mere germs and shoots on the tree of knowledge, separated from the old stem and assumed an independent growth, whether under the name of natural science, or history, or scholarship, or jurisprudence, a fair division ought to have been made at once of the funds which, in accordance with the letter, it may be, but certainly not with the spirit of the ancient statutes, have remained for so many years appropriated to the exclusive support of theological learning, if learning it could be called. Fortunately, that mistake has now been remedied, and the funds originally intended without distinction for the support of 'true religion and useful learning' are now again more equally apportioned among those who, in the age in which we live, have divided and subdivded the vast intellectual inheritance of the middle ages, in order to cultivate the more thoroughly every nook and every corner in the boundless field of human knowledge.

Something, however, remains still to be done in order to restore these fellowships more fully and more efficiently to their original purpose, and thus to secure to the university not only a staff of zealous teachers, which it certainly possesses, but likewise a

class of independent workers, of men who by original research, by critical editions of the classics, by an acquisition of a scholarlike knowledge of other languages besides Greek and Latin, by an honest devotion to one or the other among the numerous branches of physical science, by fearless researches into the ancient history of mankind, by a careful collection or revision of the materials for the history of politics, jurisprudence, medicine, literature, and arts, by a life-long occupation with the problems of philosophy, and last, not least, by a real study of theology, or the science of religion, should perform again those duties which, in the stillness of the middle ages, were performed by learned friars within the walls of our colleges. Those duties have remained in abeyance for several generations, and they must now be performed with increased vigour, in order to retain for Oxford that high position which it once held, not simply as a place of education, but as a seat of learning, amid the most celebrated universities of Europe.

'*Noblesse oblige*' is an old saying that is sometimes addressed to those who have inherited an illustrious name, and who are proud of their ancestors. But what are the ancestors of the oldest and proudest of families compared with the ancestors of this university! '*Noblesse oblige*' applies to Oxford at the present moment more than ever, when knowledge for its own sake, and a chivalrous devotion to studies which command no price in the fair of the world, and lead to no places of emolument in Church or State, are looked down upon and ridiculed by almost everybody.

There is no career in England at the present moment for scholars and students. No father could honestly advise his son, whatever talent he might display, to devote himself exclusively to classical, historical, or physical studies. The few men who still keep up the fair name of England by independent research and new discoveries in the fields of political and natural history, do not always come from our universities; and unless they possess independent means, they cannot devote more than the leisure hours, left by their official duties in Church or State, to the prosecution of their favourite studies. This ought not to be, nor need it be so. If only twenty men in Oxford and Cambridge had the will, everything is ready for a reform—that is, for a restoration of the ancient glory of Oxford. The funds which are now frittered away in so-called prize-fellowships, would enable the universities to-morrow to invite the best talent of England back to its legitimate home. And what should we lose if we had no longer that long retinue of non-resident fellows? It is true, no doubt, that a fellowship has been a help in the early career of many a poor and hard-working man, and how could it be otherwise? But in many cases I know that it has proved a drag rather than a spur for further efforts. Students at English universities belong, as a rule, to the wealthier classes, and England is the wealthiest country in Europe. Yet in no country in the world would a young man, after his education is finished, expect assistance from public sources. Other countries tax themselves to the utmost in order to enable the largest possible number of young men to enjoy

the best possible education in schools and universities. But when that is done, the community feels that it has fulfilled its duty, and it says to the young generation, Now swim or drown. A manly struggle against poverty, it may be even against actual hunger, will form a stronger and sounder metal than a lotus-eating club-life in London or Paris. Whatever fellowships were intended to be, they were never intended to be mere sinecures, as most of them are at present. It is a national blessing that the two ancient universities of England should have saved such large funds from the shipwreck that swallowed up the corporate funds of the Continental universities. But, in order to secure their safety for the future, it is absolutely necessary that these funds should be utilised again for the advancement of learning. Why should not a fellowship be made into a career for life, beginning with little, but rising like the incomes of other professions? Why should the grotesque condition of celibacy be imposed on a fellowship, instead of the really salutary condition of—No work, no pay? Why should not some special literary or scientific work be assigned to each fellow, whether resident in Oxford or sent abroad on scientific missions? Why, instead of having fifty young men scattered about in England, should we not have ten of the best workers in every branch of human knowledge resident at Oxford, whether as teachers, or as guides, or as examples? The very presence of such men would have a stimulating and elevating effect: *ipso nutu, vultu, incessu prosunt.* They would show to the young men that there are higher objects of human ambition than the bâton of a field-marshal,

the mitre of a bishop, the ermine of a judge, or the money-bags of a merchant; they would create for the future a supply of new workers as soon as there was for them, if not an avenue to wealth and power, at least a fair opening for hard work and proper pay. All this might be done to-morrow, without any injury to anybody, and with every chance of producing results of the greatest value to the universities, to the country, and to the world at large. Let the university continue to do the excellent work which it does at present as a body of teachers, but let it not forget the equally important duty of a university, that of a body of workers. Our century has inherited the intellectual wealth of former centuries, and with it the duty, not only to preserve it or to dole it out in schools and universities, but to increase it far beyond the limits which it has reached at present. Where there is no advance, there is retrogression: rest is impossible for the human mind.

Much of the work, therefore, which in other universities falls to the lot of the professors, ought in Oxford to be performed by a staff of student-fellows, whose labours should be properly organised, as they are in the Institute of France or in the Academy of Berlin. With or without teaching, they could perform the work which no university can safely neglect, the work of constantly testing the soundness of our intellectual food, and of steadily expanding the realms of knowledge. We want pioneers, explorers, conquerors, and we could have them in abundance, if we cared to have them. What other universities do by founding new chairs for new sciences, the colleges of Oxford could do to-morrow by applying

the funds which are not required for teaching purposes, and which are now spent on sinecure fellowships, for making either temporary or permanent provision for the endowment of original research.

It is true that new chairs have from time to time been founded in Oxford also; but if we inquire into the circumstances under which provision was made for the teaching of new subjects, we shall find that it generally took place, not so much for the encouragement of any new branch of scientific research, however interesting to the philosopher and the historian, as in order to satisfy some practical wants that could no longer be ignored, whether in Church or State, or in the university itself.

Confining ourselves to the chairs of languages, or as they used to be called, 'the readerships of tongues,' we find that as early as 1311, while the crusades were still fresh in the memory of the people of Europe, an appeal was made by Pope Clement V., at the Council of Vienne, calling upon the principal universities in Christendom to appoint lecturers for the study of Hebrew, Arabic, and Chaldaic. It was considered at the time a great honour for Oxford to be mentioned by name, together with Paris, Bologna, and Salamanca, as one of the four great seats of learning in which the Pope and the Council of Vienne desired that provision should be made for the teaching of these languages. It is quite clear, however, from the wording of the resolution of the Council,[1]

[1] *Liber Sextus Decretalium* (Lugduni, 1572), p. 1027: 'Ut igitur peritia linguarum hujusmodi possit habiliter per instructionem efficaciam obtinere, hoc sacro approbante concilio scholas in subscriptarum linguarum generibus ubicunque Romanam curiam residere contigerit, necnon in Parisiensi, et Oxoniensi, Bononiensi, et

that the chief object in the foundation of these readerships was to supply men capable of defending the interests of the Church, of taking an active part in the controversies with Jews and Mohammedans, who were then considered dangerous, and of propagating the faith among unbelievers.

Nor does it seem that this papal exhortation produced much effect, for we find that Henry VIII. in 1540 had to make new provision in order to secure efficient teachers of Hebrew and Greek in the University of Oxford. At that time these two languages, but more particularly Greek, had assumed not only a theological, but a political importance, and it was but natural that the king should do all in his power to foster and spread a knowledge of a language which had been one of the most powerful weapons in the hands of the Reformers. At Oxford itself this new chair was by no means popular: on the contrary, those who studied Greek were for a long time looked upon with great suspicion and dislike.[1]

Henry VIII. did nothing for the support of Arabic; but a century later (1636) we find Archbishop Laud, whose attention had been attracted by Eastern questions, full of anxiety to resuscitate the study of Arabic at Oxford, partly by collecting Arabic MSS. in the East and depositing them in the Bodleian Library,

Salmantino studiis providimus erigendas; statuentes ut in quolibet locorum ipsorum teneantur viri catholici, sufficienter habentes Hebraicæ, Arabicæ, et Chaldææ linguarum notitiam.'

[1] Greaves, *Oratio Oxonii habita*, 1637, p. 19: 'Paucos ultra centum annos numeramus ex quo Græcæ primum literæ oras hasce appulerunt, antea ignotæ prorsus, nonnullis exosæ etiam et invisæ, indoctissimis scilicet fraterculis, quibus religio erat græce scire, et levissimus Atticæ eruditionis gustus hæresin sapiebat.'

partly by founding a new chair of Arabic, inaugurated by Pococke, and rendered illustrious by such names as Greaves, Thomas Hyde, John Wallis, and Thomas Hunt.

The foundation of a chair of Anglo-Saxon, too, was due, not so much to a patriotic interest excited by the ancient national literature of the Saxons, still less to the importance of that ancient language for philological studies, but it received its first impulse from the divines of the sixteenth century, who wished to strengthen the position of the English Church in its controversy with the Church of Rome. Under the auspices of Archbishop Parker, Anglo-Saxon MSS. were first collected, and the Anglo-Saxon translations of the Bible, as well as Anglo-Saxon homilies, and treatises on theological and ecclesiastical subjects were studied by Fox, the martyrologist, and others,[1] to be quoted as witnesses to the purity and simplicity of the primitive Church founded in this realm, free in its origin from the later faults and fancies of the Church of Rome. Without this practical object, Anglo-Saxon would hardly have excited so much interest in the sixteenth century, and Oxford would probably have remained much longer without its professorial chair of the ancient national language of England, which was founded by Rawlinson, but was not inaugurated before the end of the last century (1795).

Of the two remaining chairs of languages, of Sanskrit and of Latin, the former owes its origin, not to an admiration for the classical literature of

[1] See *Biographia Britannica Literaria*, vol. i. p. 110.

India, nor to a recognition of the importance of Sanskrit for the purposes of Comparative Philology, but to an express desire on the part of its founder to provide efficient missionaries for India; while the creation of a chair of Latin, though long delayed, was at last rendered imperative by the urgent wants of the university.

Nor does the chair of Comparative Philology, just founded by the university, form altogether an exception to this general rule. It is curious to remark that while Comparative Philology has for more than half a century excited the deepest interest, not only among Continental, but likewise among English scholars, and while chairs of this new science have been founded long ago in almost every university of France, Germany, and Italy, the foundation of a new chair of Comparative Philology at Oxford should coincide very closely with a decided change that has taken place in the treatment of that science, and which has given to its results a more practical importance for the study of Greek and Latin, such as could hardly be claimed for it during the first fifty years of its growth.

We may date the origin of Comparative Philology, as distinct from the Science of Language, from the foundation of the Asiatic Society of Calcutta in 1784. From that time dates the study of Sanskrit, and it was the study of Sanskrit which formed the foundation of Comparative Philology.

It is perfectly true that Sanskrit had been studied before by Italian, German, and French missionaries; it is likewise perfectly true that several of these missionaries were fully aware of the close relation-

ship between Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin. A man must be blind who, after looking at a Sanskrit grammar, does not see at once the striking coincidences between the declensions and conjugations of the classical language of India and those of Greece and Italy.[1]

Filippo Sassetti, who spent some time at Goa, between 1581 and 1588, had only acquired a very slight knowledge of Sanskrit before he wrote home to his friends 'that it has many words in common with Italian, particularly in the numerals, in the names for God, serpent, and many others.' This was in the sixteenth century.

Some of the Jesuit missionaries, however, went far beyond this. A few among them had acquired a real and comprehensive knowledge of the ancient language and literature of India, and we see them anticipate in their letters several of the most brilliant discoveries of Sir W. Jones and Professor Bopp. The Père Cœurdoux,[2] a French Jesuit, writes in 1767 from Pondicherry to the French Academy, asking that learned society for a solution of the question, '*How is it that Sanskrit has so many words in common with Greek and Latin?*' He not only presents long lists of words, but he calls attention to the still more curious fact that the grammatical forms in Sanskrit show the most startling similarity with Greek and Latin. After him almost everybody who had looked at Sanskrit, and who knew Greek and Latin, made the same remark and asked the same question.

[1] M. M.'s *Lectures on the Science of Language*, vol. i. p. 171.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 176.

But the fire only smouldered on; it would not burn up, it would not light, it would not warm. At last, owing to the exertions of the founders of the Asiatic Society at Calcutta, the necessary materials for a real study of Sanskrit became accessible to the students of Europe. The voice of Frederick Schlegel roused the attention of the world at large to the startling problem that had been thrown into the arena of the intellectual chivalry of the world, and at last the glove was taken up, and men like Bopp, and Burnouf, and Pott, and Grimm, did not rest till some answer could be returned, and some account rendered of Sanskrit, that strange intruder, and great disturber of the peace of classical scholarship.

The work which then began was incessant. It was not enough that some words in Greek and Latin should be traced in Sanskrit. A kind of silent conviction began to spread that there must be in Sanskrit a remedy for all evils; people could not rest till every word in Greek and Latin had, in some disguise or other, been discovered in Sanskrit. Nor were Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit enough to satisfy the thirst of the new discoverers. The Teutonic languages were soon annexed, the Celtic languages yielded to some gentle pressure, the Slavonic languages clamoured for incorporation, the sacred idiom of ancient Persia, the Zend, demanded its place by the side of Sanskrit, the Armenian followed in its wake; and when even the Ossetic from the valleys of Mount Caucasus, and the Albanian from the ancient hills of Epirus, had proved their birthright, the whole family, the Aryan family of language, seemed complete, and an historical fact, the original

unity of all these languages, was established on a basis which even the most sceptical could not touch or shake. Scholars rushed in as diggers rush into a new gold-field, picking up whatever is within reach, and trying to carry off more than they could carry, so that they might be the foremost in the race, and claim as their own all that they had been the first to look at or to touch. There was a rush, and now and then an ugly rush, and when the armfuls of nuggets that were thrown down before the world in articles, pamphlets, essays, and ponderous volumes, came to be more carefully sifted, it was but natural that not everything that glittered should turn out to be gold. Even in the works of more critical scholars, such as Bopp, Burnouf, Pott, and Benfey—at least in those which were published in the first enthusiasm of discovery—many things may now be pointed out which no assayer would venture to pass. It was the great merit of Bopp that he called the attention away from this tempting field to the more laborious work of grammatical analysis, though even in his 'Comparative Grammar,' in that comprehensive survey of the grammatical outlines of the Aryan languages, the spirit of conquest and centralisation still predominates. All languages are, if possible, to submit to the same laws; what is common to all of them is welcome, what is peculiar to each is treated as anomalous, or explained as the result of later corruption.

This period in the history of Comparative Philology has sometimes been characterised as *syncretistic*, and to a certain extent that name and the censure implied in it are justified. But to a very

small extent only. It was in the nature of things that a comparative study of languages should at first be directed to what is common to all: nay, without having first become thoroughly acquainted with the general features of the whole family, it would have been impossible to discover and fully to appreciate what is peculiar to each of its members.

Nor was it long before a reaction set in. One scholar from the very first, and almost contemporaneously with Bopp's first essays on Comparative Grammar, devoted himself to the study of one branch of languages only, availing himself, as far as he was able, of the new light which a knowledge of Sanskrit had thrown on the secret history of the whole Aryan family of speech, but concentrating his energies on the Teutonic: I mean, of course, Jacob Grimm, the author of the great historical grammar of the German language; a work which will live and last long after other works of that early period shall have been forgotten, or replaced, at least, by better books.

After a time Grimm's example was followed by others. Zeuss, in his 'Grammatica Celtica,' established the study of the Celtic languages on the broad foundations of Comparative Grammar. Miklosich and Schleicher achieved similar results by adopting the same method for the study of the Slavonic dialects. Curtius, by devoting himself to an elucidation of Greek, opened the eyes of classical scholars to the immense advantages of this new treatment of grammar and etymology; while Corssen, in his more recent works on Latin, has struck a mine which may well tempt the curiosity of every

student of the ancient dialects of Italy. At the present moment the reaction is complete; and there is certainly some danger lest what was called a *syncretistic* spirit should now be replaced by an *isolating* spirit in the science of language.

It cannot be denied, however, that this isolating, or rather discriminating, tendency has produced already the most valuable results, and I believe that it is chiefly due to the works of Curtius and Corssen, if Greek and Latin scholars have been roused at last from their apathy and been made aware of the absolute necessity of Comparative Philology, as a subject to be taught, not only in every university, but in every school. I believe it is due to their works that a conviction has gradually been gaining ground among the best scholars at Oxford also, that Comparative Philology could no longer be ignored as an important ingredient in the teaching of Greek and Latin; and while a comparative analysis of Sanskrit, Zend, Armenian, Greek, Latin, Gothic, High-German, Lithuanian, Slavonic, and Celtic, such as we find it in Bopp's 'Comparative Grammar,' would hardly be considered as a subject of practical utility even in a school of philology, it was recognised at last that, not only for sound principles of etymology, not only for a rational treatment of Greek and Latin grammar, not only for a right understanding of classical mythology, but even for a critical restoration of the very texts of Homer and Plautus, a knowledge of Comparative Philology, as applied to Greek and Latin, had become indispensable.

My chief object, therefore, as Professor of Comparative Philology at Oxford, will be to treat the

classical languages under that new aspect which they have assumed, as viewed by the microscope of Curtius and Corssen rather than by the telescope of Bopp, Pott, and Benfey. I shall try not only to give results, but to explain what is far more important, the method by which these results were obtained, so far as this is possible without, for the present at least, presupposing among my hearers a knowledge of Sanskrit. Sanskrit certainly forms the only sound foundation of Comparative Philology, and it will always remain the only safe guide through all its intricacies. A comparative philologist without a knowledge of Sanskrit is like an astronomer without a knowledge of mathematics. He may admire, he may observe, he may discover, but he will never feel satisfied, he will never feel certain, he will never feel quite at home.

I hope, therefore, that, besides those who attend my public lectures, there will be at least a few to form a private class for the study of the elements of Sanskrit. Sanskrit, no doubt, is a very difficult language, and it requires the study of a whole life to master its enormous literature. Its grammar, too, has been elaborated with such incredible minuteness by native grammarians, that I am not surprised if many scholars who begin the study of Sanskrit turn back from it in dismay. But it is quite possible to learn the rules of Sanskrit declension and conjugation, and to gain an insight into the grammatical organisation of that language, without burdening one's memory with all the phonetic rules which generally form the first chapter of every Sanskrit grammar, or without devoting years of study to the

unravelling of the intricacies of the greatest of Indian, if not of all, grammarians—Pân*i*ni. There are but few among our very best comparative philologists who are able to understand Pân*i*ni. Professor Benfey, whose powers of work are truly astounding, stands almost alone in his minute knowledge of that greatest of all grammarians. Neither Bopp, nor Pott, nor Curtius, nor Corssen, ever attempted to master Pân*i*ni's wonderful system. But a study of Sanskrit, as taught by European grammarians, cannot be recommended too strongly to all students of language. A good sailor may for a time steer without a compass, but even he feels safer when he knows that he may consult it, if necessary; and whenever he comes near the rocks—and there are many in the Aryan sea—he will hardly escape shipwreck without this magnetic needle.[1]

It will be asked, no doubt, by Greek and Latin scholars who have never as yet devoted themselves seriously to a study of Comparative Philology, what is to be gained after all the trouble of learning Sanskrit, and after mastering the works of Bopp, and Benfey, and Curtius? Would a man be a better Greek and Latin scholar for knowing Sanskrit? Would he write better Latin and Greek verse? Would he be better able to read and compare Greek and Latin MSS., and to prepare a critical edition of classical authors? To all these questions I reply both *No* and *Yes*.

If there is one branch of classical philology where the advantages derived from Comparative Philology have been most readily admitted, it is etymology.

[1] See Notes A and B, pp. 152, 154.

More than fifty years ago, Otfried Müller told classical scholars that that province at least must be surrendered. And yet it is strange to see how long it takes before old erroneous derivations are exploded and finally expelled from our dictionaries; and how, in spite of all warnings, similarity of sound and similarity of meaning are still considered the chief criteria of Greek and Latin etymologies. I do not address this reproach to classical scholars only; it applies equally to many comparative philologists who, for the sake of some striking similarity of sound and meaning, will now and then break the phonetic laws which they themselves have helped to establish.

If we go back to earlier days, we find, for instance, that Sanskrit scholars who had discovered that one of the names of the god of love in Bengali was *Dipuc, i.e.* the inflamer, derived from it by inversion the name of the god of love in Latin, *Cupid*. Sir William Jones identified *Janus* with the Sanskrit Ganesa, *i.e.* lord of hosts,[1] and even later scholars allowed themselves to be tempted to see the Indian prototype of *Ganymedes* in the Kanva-medhâtithi or Kanva-mesha of the Veda.[2]

After the phonetic laws of each language had been more carefully elaborated, it was but too frequently forgotten that words have a history as well as a growth, and that the history of a word must be explored first, before an attempt is made to unravel its growth. Thus it was extremely tempting to derive *paradise* from the Sanskrit paradesa.

[1] See M. M., *Science of Religion*, 1873, p. 293.
[2] See Weber, *Indische Studien*, vol. i. p. 38.

The compound para-ḍesa was supposed to mean the highest or a distant country, and all the rest seemed so evident as to require no further elucidation. Paraḍesa, however, does not mean the highest or a distant country in Sanskrit, but is always used in the sense of a foreign country, an enemy's country. Further, as early as the Song of Solomon (iv. 13), the word occurs in Hebrew as *pardés*, and how it could have got there straight from Sanskrit requires at all events some historical explanation. In Hebrew the word might have been borrowed from Persian, but the Sanskrit word paradesa, if it existed at all in Persian, would have been *paradaesa*, the *s* being a guttural, not a dental sibilant. Such a compound, however, does not exist in Persian, and therefore the Sanskrit word paradesa could not have reached Hebrew *viâ* Persia.

It is true, nevertheless, that the ancient Hebrew word *pardés* is borrowed from Persian, viz. from the Zend *pairidaéza*, which means *circumvallatio*, a piece of ground enclosed by high walls, afterwards a park, a garden.[1] The root in Sanskrit is DIH or DHIH (for Sanskrit *h* is Zend *z*), and means originally to knead, to squeeze together, to shape. From it we have the Sanskrit dehî, a wall, while in Greek the same root, according to the strictest phonetic rules, yielded τοῖχος, wall. In Latin our root is regularly changed into *fig*, and gives us *figulus*, a potter, *figura*, form or shape, and *fingere*. In Gothic it could only appear as *deig-an*, to knead, to form anything out of soft substances; hence *daig-s*, the English *dough*, German *Deich*.

[1] See Haug, in Ewald's *Biblische Jahrbücher*, vol. vi. p. 162.

But the Greek παράδεισος did not come from Hebrew, because here again there is no historical bridge between the two languages. In Greek we trace the word to Xenophon, who brought it back from his repeated journeys in Persia, and who uses it in the sense of pleasure ground, or deer park.[1]

Lastly, we find the same word used in the LXX, as the name given to the garden of Eden, the word having been borrowed either a third time from Persia, or taken from the Greek, and indirectly from the works of Xenophon.

This is the real history of the word. It is an Aryan word, but it does not exist in Sanskrit. It was first formed in Zend, transferred from thence as a foreign word into Hebrew, and again into Greek. Its modern Persian form is *firdaus*.

All this is matter of history rather than philology. Yet we read in one of the best classical dictionaries: 'The root of παράδεισος appears to be Semitic, Arab. *firdaus*, Hebr. *pardês*: borrowed also in Sanskrit paradêsa.'[2] Nearly every word is wrong.

From the same root DIH springs the Sanskrit word deha, body; body, like figure, being conceived as that which is formed or shaped. Bopp identified this deha with Gothic *leik*, body, particularly dead body, the modern German *Leiche* and *Leichnam*, the English *lich* in *lich-gate*. In this case the master of Comparative Philology disregarded the phonetic

[1] Anab. i. 2, 7: Ἐνταῦθα Κύρῳ βασίλεια ἦν καὶ παράδεισος μέγας, ἀγρίων θηρίων πλήρης, ἃ ἐκεῖνος ἐθήρευεν ἀπὸ ἵππου, ὁπότε γυμνάσαι βούλοιτο ἑαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἵππους. Διὰ μέσου δὲ τοῦ παραδείσου ῥεῖ ὁ Μαίανδρος ποταμός κ. τ. λ. Hell. iv. 1, 15: Ἐν περιειργμένοις παραδείσοις κ.τ.λ.

[2] See *Indian Antiquary*, 1874, p. 332.

laws which he had himself helped to establish. The transition of *d* into *l* is no doubt common enough as between Sanskrit, Latin, and Greek, but it has never been established as yet on good evidence as taking place between Sanskrit and Gothic. Besides, the Sanskrit *h* ought in Gothic to appear as *g*, as we have it in *deig-s*, dough, and not as a tenuis.

Another Sanskrit word for body is kalevara, and this proved again a stumbling-block to Bopp, who compares it with the Latin *cadaver*. Here one might plead that *l* and *d* are frequently interchanged in Sanskrit and Latin words, but, as far as our evidence goes at present, we have no doubt many cases where an original Sanskrit *d* is represented in Latin by *l*, but no really trustworthy instance in which an original Sanskrit *l* appears in Latin as *d*. Besides, the Sanskrit diphthong *e* cannot, as a rule, in Latin be represented by long *á*.

If such things could happen to Bopp, we must not be too severe on similar breaches of the peace committed by classical scholars. What classical scholars seem to find most difficult to learn is that there are various degrees of certainty in etymologies, even in those proposed by our best comparative scholars, and that not everything that is mentioned by Bopp, or Pott, or Benfey as possible, as plausible, as probable, and even as more than probable, ought therefore to be set down, for instance, in a grammar or dictionary, as simply a matter of fact. With certain qualifications, an etymology may have a scientific value; without those qualifications, it may become not only unscientific, but mischievous. Again, nothing seems a more difficult lesson for an etymologist to learn

than to say, I do not know. Yet, to my mind, nothing shows, for instance, the truly scholarlike mind of Professor Curtius better than the very fact for which he has been so often blamed, viz. his passing over in silence the words about which he has nothing certain to say.

Let us take an instance. If we open our best Greek dictionaries, we find that the Greek *αὐγή*, light, splendour, is compared with the German word for eye, *Auge*. No doubt every letter in the two words is the same, and the meaning of the Greek word could easily be supposed to have been specialised or localised in German. Sophocles (Aj. 70) speaks of the *ὀμμάτων αὐγαί*, the lights of the eyes, and Euripides (Andr. 1180) uses *αὐγαί* by itself for eyes, like the Latin *lumina*. The verb *αὐγάζω*, too, is used in Greek in the sense of seeing or viewing. Why, then, it was asked, should *αὐγή* not be referred to the same source as the German *Auge*, and why should not both be traced back to the same root that yielded the Latin *oc-ulus?* As long as we trust to our ears, or to what is complacently called common sense, it would seem mere fastidiousness to reject so evident an etymology. But as soon as we know the real chemistry of vowels and consonants, we shrink instinctively from such combinations. If a German word has the same sound as a Greek word, the two words cannot be the same, unless we ignore that independent process of phonetic growth which made Greek Greek, and German German. Whenever we find in Greek a media, a *g*, we expect in Gothic the corresponding tenuis. Thus the root *gan*, which we have in Greek *γιγνώσκω*, is in Gothic *kann*. The

Greek *γόνυ*, Lat. *genu*, is in Gothic *kniu*. If, therefore, *αὐγή* existed in Gothic it would be *auko*, and not *augo*. Secondly, the diphthong *au* in *augo* would be different from the Greek diphthong. Grimm supposed that the Gothic *augo* came from the same etymon which yields the Latin *oc-ulus*, the Sanskrit ak-sh-i, eye, the Greek *ὄσσε* for *ὄκι-ε*, and likewise the Greek stem *ὀπ* in *ὄπ-ωπ-α*, *ὄμμα*, and *ὀφ-θ-αλμός*. It is true that the short radical vowel *a* in Sanskrit, *o* in Greek, *u* in Latin, sinks down to *u* in Gothic, and it is equally true, as Grimm has shown, that, according to a phonetic law peculiar to Gothic, *u* before *h* and *r* is changed to *aú*. Grimm therefore takes the Gothic *aúgô* for **aúhô*, and this for **uhô*, which, as he shows, would be a proper representative in Gothic of the Sanskrit ak-an, or aksh-an.

But here Grimm seems wrong. If the *au* of *augô* were this peculiar Gothic *aú*, which represents an original short *a*, changed to *u*, and then raised to a diphthong by the insertion of a short *a*, then that diphthong would be restricted to Gothic; and the other Teutonic dialects would have their own representatives for an original short *a*. But in Anglo-Saxon we find *eáge*, in Old High German *augâ*, both pointing to a labial diphthong, *i.e.* to a radical *u* raised to *au*.[1]

Professor Ebel,[2] in order to avoid this difficulty, proposed a different explanation. He supposed that the *k* of the root *ak* was softened to *kv*, and that *augô* represents an original *agvâ* or *ahvâ*, the *v* of *hvâ* being inserted before the *h* and changed to *u*. As

[1] Grassmann, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. ix. p. 23.
[2] Ebel, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 242.

an analogous case he quoted the Sanskrit enclitic particle *ka*, Latin *que*, Gothic **hva*, which **hva* appears always under the form of *uh*. Leo Meyer takes the same view, and quotes, as an analogon, *haubida* as possibly identical with *caput*, originally **kapvat*.

These cases, however, are not quite analogous. The enclitic particle *ka*, in Gothic **hva*, had to lose its final vowel. It thus became unpronounceable, and the short vowel *u* was added simply to facilitate its pronunciation.[1] There was no such difficulty in pronouncing **ah* or **uh* in Gothic, still less the derivative form **ahvô*, if such a form had ever existed.

Another explanation was therefore attempted by the late Dr. Lottner.[2] He supposed that the root *ak* existed also with a nasal as *ank*, and that *ankô* could be changed to *aukô*, and *aukô* to *augô*. In reply to this we must remark that in the Teutonic dialects the root *ak* never appears as *ank*, and that the transition of *an* into *au*, though possible under certain conditions, is not a phonetic process of frequent occurrence.

Besides, in all these derivations there is a difficulty, though not a serious one, viz. that an original tenuis, the *k*, is supposed irregularly to have been changed into *g*, instead of what it ought to be, an *h*. Although this is not altogether anomalous,[3] yet it has to be taken into account. Professor Curtius, therefore, though he admits a possible connection between Gothic *augô* and the root *ak*, speaks cau-

[1] Schleicher, *Compendium*, § 112.
[2] Lottner, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. ix. p. 319.
[3] Leo Meyer, *Die Gothische Sprache*, § 31.

tiously on the subject.[1] He speaks of *augô* as more distantly connected with that root, but he simply refers to the attempts of Ebel, Grassmann, and Lottner to explain the diphthong *au*, without himself expressing any decided opinion. Nor does he commit himself to any opinion as to the origin of *αὐγή*, though, of course, he never thinks of connecting the two words, Gothic *augô* and Greek *αὐγή*, as coming from the same root.

The etymology of the Greek *αὐγή*, in the sense of light or splendour, is, in fact, unknown, unless we connect it with the Sanskrit ogas, which, however, means vigour rather than splendour. The etymology of *oculus*, on the contrary, is clear; it comes from a root *ak*, to be sharp, to point, to fix, and it is closely connected with the Sanskrit word for eye, akshi, and with the Greek *ὄσσε*. The etymology of the German word *Auge* is, as yet, unknown. All we may safely assert is, that, in spite of the most favourable appearances, it cannot for the present be traced back to the same source as either the Greek *αὐγή* or the Latin *oculus*.

If we simply transliterated the Gothic *augô* into Sanskrit, we should expect some word like ohan, nom. ohâ. The question is, may we take the liberty, which many of the most eminent comparative philologists allow themselves, of deriving Gothic, Greek, and Latin words from roots which occur in Sanskrit only, but which have left no trace of their former presence in any other language? If so, then there would be little difficulty in finding an etymology for the Gothic *augo*. There is in Sanskrit a root ûh,

[1] Curtius, *Grundzüge*, pp. 99, 457.

which means to watch, to spy, to look. It occurs frequently in the Veda, and from it we have likewise a substantive, ọha-s, look or appearance. If in Sanskrit itself this root had yielded a name for eye, such as ọhan, the instrument of looking, I should not hesitate for a moment to identify this Sanskrit word ohan with the Gothic *augô*. No objection could be raised on phonetic grounds. Phonetically the two words would be one and the same. But as in Sanskrit such a derivation has not been found, and as in Gothic the root ûh never occurs, such an etymology would not be satisfactory. The number of words of unknown origin is very considerable as yet in Sanskrit, in Greek, in Latin, and in every one of the Aryan languages; and it is far better to acknowledge this fact, than to sanction the smallest violation of any of those phonetic laws, which some have called the straight jacket, but which are in reality, the leading strings of all true etymology.

If we now turn to grammar, properly so called, and ask what Comparative Philology has done for it, we must distinguish between two kinds of grammatical knowledge. Grammar may be looked upon as a mere art, and as taught at present in most schools, it is nothing but an art. We learn to play on a foreign language as we learn to play on a musical instrument, and we may arrive at the highest perfection in performing on any instrument, without having a notion of thorough bass or the laws of harmony. For practical purposes this purely empirical knowledge is all that is required. But though it would be a mistake to attempt in our elementary schools to replace an empirical by a scientific know-

ledge of grammar, that empirical knowledge of grammar ought in time to be raised to a real, rational, and satisfying knowledge, a knowledge not only of facts, but of reasons; a knowledge that teaches us not only what grammar is, but how it came to be what it is. To know grammar is very well, but to speak all one's life of gerunds and supines and infinitives, without having an idea what these formations really are, is a kind of knowledge not quite worthy of a scholar.

We laugh at people who still believe in ghosts and witches, but a belief in infinitives and supines is not only tolerated, but inculcated in our best schools and universities. Now, what do we really mean if we speak of an infinitive? It is a time-honoured name, no doubt, handed down to us from the middle ages; it has its distant roots in Rome, Alexandria, and Athens—but has it any real kernel? Has it any more body or substance than such names as Satyrs and Lamias?

Let us look at the history of the name before we look at the mischief which it, like many other names, has caused by making people believe that whenever there is a name, there must be something behind it. The name was invented by Greek philosophers who, in their first attempts at classifying and giving names to the various forms of language, did not know whether to class such forms as *γράφειν*, *γράψειν*, *γράψαι*, *γεγραφέναι*, *γράφεσθαι*, *γράψεσθαι*, *γέγραφθαι*, *γράψασθαι*, *γραφθῆναι*, *γραφθήσεσθαι*, as nouns or as verbs. They had established for their own satisfaction the broad distinction between nouns (*ὀνόματα*) and verbs (*ῥήματα*); they had assigned

to each a definition, but after having done so, they found that forms like γράφειν would not fit their definition either of noun or verb.[1] What could they do? Some (the Stoics) represented the forms in ειν, etc. as a subdivision of the verb, and introduced for them the name ῥῆμα ἀπαρέμφατον or γενικώτατον. Others recognised them as a separate part of speech, raising their number from eight to nine or ten. Others again classed them under the adverb (ἐπίρρημα) as one of the eight recognised parts of speech. The Stoics, taking their stand on Aristotle's definition of ῥῆμα, could not but regard the infinitive as ῥῆμα; because it implied time, past, present, or future, which was with them recognised as the specific characteristic of the verb (*Zeitwort*). But they went further, and called forms such as γράφειν, etc. ῥῆμα, in the highest or most general sense, distinguishing other verbal forms, such as γράφει, etc. by the names of κατηγόρημα or σύμβαμα. Afterwards, in the progress of grammatical science, the definition of ῥῆμα became more explicit and complete. It was pointed out that a verb, besides its predicative meaning (ἔμφασις), is able to express[2] several additional meanings (παρακολουθήματα or παρεμφάσεις), viz., not only time, as already pointed out by Aristotle, but also person and number. The two latter meanings, however, being absent in γράφειν, this was now called ῥῆμα ἀπαρέμφατον (without by-meanings), or γενικώτατον, and, for practical pur-

[1] Chœroboscus, B.A., p. 1274, 29: Τὰ ἀπαρέμφατα ἀμφιβάλλεται εἰ ἄρα εἰσὶ ῥήματα ἢ οὐχί. Schoemann, 'Redetheile,' p. 49.

[2] Apollonius, De Constr. i. c. 8, p. 32: Δυνάμει αὐτὸ τὸ ῥῆμα οὔτε πρόσωπα ἐπιδέχεται οὔτε ἀριθμούς, ἀλλὰ ἐγγενόμενον ἐν προσώποις τότε καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα διέστειλεν . . . καὶ ψυχικὴν διάθεσιν. Schoemann, *l. c.* p. 19.

poses, this *ῥῆμα ἀπαρέμφατον* soon became the prototype of conjugation.

So far there was only confusion, arising from a want of precision in classifying the different forms of the verb. But when the Greek terminology was transplanted to Rome, real mischief began. Instead of *ῥῆμα γενικώτατον*, we now find the erroneous, or at all events inaccurate, translation, *modus infinitus*, and *infinitivus* by itself. What was originally meant as an adjective belonging to *ῥῆμα*, became a substantive, 'the infinitive,' and though the question arose again and again what this infinitive really was, whether a noun, or a verb, or an adverb; whether a mood or not a mood; the real existence of such a thing as an infinitive could no longer be doubted. One can hardly trust one's eyes in reading the extraordinary discussions on the nature of the infinitive in grammatical works of successive centuries up to the nineteenth. Suffice it to say that Gottfried Hermann, the great reformer of classical grammars, treated the infinitive again as an adverb, and therefore, as a part of speech, belonging to the particles. We ourselves were brought up to believe in infinitives; and to doubt the existence of this grammatical entity would have been considered in our younger days a most dangerous heresy.

And yet, how much confused thought, and how much controversy might have been avoided, if this grammatical term of infinitive had never been invented.[1] The fact is that what we call infinitives are nothing more or less than cases of verbal nouns,

[1] Note C, p. 157.

and not till they are treated as what they are, shall we ever gain an insight into the nature and the historical development of these grammatical monsters.

Take the old Homeric infinitive in *μεναι*, and you find its explanation in the Sanskrit termination mane, *i.e.* manai, the dative of the suffix man (not, as others suppose, the locative of a suffix mana), by which a large number of nouns are formed in Sanskrit. From gnâ, to know, we have (g)nâman, Latin (*g*)*nomen*, that by which a thing is known, its name; from gan to be born, gán-man, birth. In Greek this suffix man is chiefly used for forming masculine nouns, such as *γνώ-μων*, *γνώ-μονος*, literally a knower; *τλή-μων*, a sufferer; or as *μην* in *ποι-μήν* a shepherd, literally a feeder. In Latin, on the contrary, *men* occurs frequently at the end of abstract nouns in the neuter gender, such as *teg-men*, the covering, or *tegu-men* or *tegi-men*; *sola-men*, consolation; *voca-men*, an appellation; *certa-men*, a contest; and many more, particularly in ancient Latin; while in classical Latin the fuller suffix *mentum* predominates. If, then, we read in Homer, *κύνας ἔτευξε δῶμα φυλασσέμεναι*, we may call *φυλασσέμεναι* an infinitive, if we like, and translate 'he made dogs to protect the house;' but the form which we have before us is simply a dative of an old abstract noun in *μεν*, and the original meaning was 'for the protection of the house,' or 'for protecting the house;' as if we said in Latin, *tutamini domum*.

The infinitives in *μεν* may be corruptions of those in *μεναι*, unless we take *μεν* as an archaic accusative which, though without analogy in Greek, would correspond to Latin accusatives like *tegmen*, and express

the general object of certain acts or movements. In Sanskrit, at least in the Veda, infinitives in mane occur, such as dấ-mane, to give, Greek δό-μεναι; vid-máne, to know, Greek ϝίδ-μεναι.[1]

The question next arises,—if this is a satisfactory explanation of the infinitives in μεναι, how are we to explain the infinitives in εναι? We find in Homer, not only ἴμεναι, to go; but also ἰέναι; not only ἔμμεναι, to be, but also εἶναι, *i.e.* ἔσ-εναι. Bopp simply says that the *m* is lost, but he brings no evidence that in Greek an *m* can thus be lost without any provocation. The real explanation, here as elsewhere, is supplied by the *Beieinander* (the collateral growth), not by the *Nacheinander* (the successive growth) of language. Besides the suffix *man*, the Aryan languages possessed two other suffixes, *van* and *an*, which were added to verbal bases just like *man*. By the side of dâman, the act of giving, we find in the Veda dâ-van, the act of giving, and a dative dâ-váne, with the accent on the suffix, meaning for the giving, *i.e.* to give. Now, in Greek this *v* would necessarily disappear, though its former presence might be indicated by the *digamma æolicum*. Thus, instead of Sanskrit dâváne, we should have in Greek δοϝέναι, δοέναι, and contracted δοῦναι, the regular form of the infinitive of the aorist, a form in which the diphthong ου would remain inexplicable, except for the former presence of the lost syllable ϝε. In the same manner εἶναι stands for ἐσ-ϝέναι, ἐσ-έναι, ἔέναι, εἶναι. Hence ἰέναι stands for ἰϝέναι, and even the accent remains on the suffix *van*, just as it did in Sanskrit.

[1] Benfey, *Orient und Occident*, vol. i. p. 606; vol. ii. pp. 98, 137.

As the infinitives in *μεναι* were traced back to the suffix *man*, and those in *ϝεναι* to a suffix *van*, the regular infinitives in *εναι* after consonants, and *ναι* after vowels, must be referred to the suffix *an*, dat. *ane*. Here, too, we find analogous forms in the Veda. From dhûrv, to hurt, we have dhûrv-ane, for the purpose of hurting, in order to hurt; in Rv. IX. 61, 30, we find, vibhv-áne, Rv. VI, 61, 13, in order to conquer, and by the same suffix the Greeks formed their infinitives of the perfect, *λελοιπ-έναι*, and the infinitives of the verbs in *μι*, *τιθέ-ναι*, *διδό-ναι*, *ἱστά-ναι*, etc.

In order to explain, after these antecedents, the origin of the infinitive in *ειν*, as *τύπτειν*, we must admit either the shortening of *ναι* to *νι*, which is difficult; or the existence of a locative in *ι* by the side of a dative in *αι*. That the locative can take the place of the dative we see clearly in the Sanskrit forms of the aorist, parsháni, to cross, neshání, to lead, which, as far as their form, not their origin, is concerned, would well match Greek forms like *λύσειν* in the future. In either case, *τύπτε-νι* in Greek would have become *τύπτειν*, just as *τύπτε-σι* became *τύπτεις*. In the Doric dialect this throwing back of the final *ι* is omitted in the second person singular, where the Dorians may say *ἀμέλγες* for *ἀμέλγεις*; and in the same Doric dialect the infinitive, too, occurs in *εν*, instead of *ειν*; *e.g.* *ἀείδεν* instead of *ἀείδειν*. (Buttman, Gr. Gr. § 103, 10. 11.)

In this manner the growth of grammatical forms can be made as clear as the sequence of any historical events in the history of the world, nay I should say, far clearer, far more intelligible; and I

should think that even the first learning of these grammatical forms might be somewhat seasoned and rendered more really instructive by allowing the pupil, from time to time, a glimpse into the past history of the Greek and Latin languages. In English what we call the infinitive is clearly a dative; *to speak* shows by its very preposition what it was intended for. How easy, then, to explain to a beginner that if he translates 'able to speak' by *ἱκανὸς εἰπεῖν*, the Greek infinitive is really the same as the English, and that *εἰπεῖν* stands for *εἴπενι*, and this for *εἴπεναι*, which to a certain extent answers the same purpose as the Greek *ἔπει*, the dative of *ἔπος*, and therefore originally *ἔπεσ-ι*.

And remark, these very datives or locatives of nouns formed by the suffix *os* in Greek, *as* in Sanskrit, *es* in Latin, though they yield no infinitives in Greek, yield the most common form of the infinitive in Latin, and may be traced also in Sanskrit. As from *genus* we form a dative *generi*, and a locative *genere*, which stands for *genese*, so from *gigno* an abstract noun would be formed, *gignus*, and from it a dative, *gigneri*, and a locative, *gignere*. I do not say that the intermediate form *gignus* existed in the spoken Latin, I only maintain that such a form would be analogous to *gen-us*, *op-us*, *fœd-us*, and that in Sanskrit the process is exactly the same. We form in Sanskrit a substantive *ákshas*, sight, *ákshus*, eye; and we find the dative of *ákshas*, *i.e.* *ákshase*, used as what we should call an infinitive, meaning 'in order to see.' But we also find another so-called infinitive, *gîváse*, in order to live, although there is no noun, *gîvas*, life; we find *áyase*, to

go, although there is no noun áyas, going. This Sanskrit áyase explains the Latin *i-re*, as *i-vane explained the Greek *ἰέναι*. The intention of the old framers of language is throughout the same. They differ only in the means which they use, one might almost say, at random; and the differences between Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin are often due to the simple fact that out of many possible forms that might be used and had been used before the Aryan languages became traditional, settled and national, one family or clan or nation fancied one, another another. While this one became fixed and classical, all others became useless, remained perhaps here and there in proverbial sayings or in sacred songs, but were given up at last completely, as strange, obsolete, and unintelligible.

And even then, after a grammatical form has become obsolete and unintelligible, it by no means loses its power of further development. Though the Greeks did not themselves, we still imagine that we feel the infinitive as the case of an abstract noun in many constructions. Thus *χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν*, difficult to find, was originally, difficult in the finding, or, difficult for the act of finding; *δεινὸς λέγειν*, meant literally, powerful in speaking; *ἄρχομαι λέγειν*, I begin to speak, *i.e.* I direct myself to the act of speaking; *κέλεαί με μυθήσασθαι*, you bid me to speak, *i.e.* you order me towards the act of speaking; *φοβοῦμαι διελέγχειν σε*, I am afraid of refuting you, *i.e.* I fear in the act, or, I shrink when brought towards the act, of refuting you; *σὸν ἔργον λέγειν*, your business is in or towards speaking, you have to speak; *πᾶσιν ἁδεῖν χαλεπόν*, there is something diffi-

cult in pleasing everybody, or, in our endeavour after pleasing everybody. In all these cases the so-called infinitive can, with an effort, still be felt as a noun in an oblique case. But in course of time expressions such as *χαλεπὸν ἀδεῖν*, it is difficult to please, *ἀγαθὸν λέγειν*, it is good to speak, left in the mind of the speaker the impression that *ἀδεῖν* and *λέγειν* were subjects in the nominative, the pleasing is difficult, the speaking is good; and by adding the article, these oblique cases of verbal nouns actually became nominatives—*τὸ ἀδεῖν*, the act of pleasing, *τὸ λέγειν*, the act of speaking—capable of being used in every case, *e.g. ἐπιθυμία τοῦ πιεῖν, desiderium bibendi.* This regeneration, this process of creating new words out of decaying and decayed materials, may seem at first sight incredible, yet it is as certain as the change with which we began our discussion of the infinitive, I mean the change of the conception of a *ῥῆμα γενικώτατον*, a *verbum generalissimum*, into a *generalissimus* or *infinitivus.* Nor is the process without analogy in modern languages. The French *l'avenir*, the future (*Zukunft*), is hardly the Latin *advenire.* That would mean the arriving, the coming, but not what is to comé. I believe *l'avenir* was (*quod est*) *ad venire*, what is to come, contracted to *l'avenir.* In Low-German *to come* assumes even the character of an adjective, and we can speak not only of a year to come, but of a to-come year, *de tokum Jahr.*[1]

This process of grammatical vivisection may be painful in the eyes of classical scholars, yet even they must see how great a difference there is in the

[1] Chips, vol. iii. p. 141.

quality of knowledge imparted by our Greek and Latin grammars, and by comparative grammar. I do not deny that at first children must learn Greek and Latin mechanically, but it is not right that they should remain satisfied with mere paradigms and technical terms, without knowing the real nature and origin of so-called infinitives, gerunds, and supines. Every child will learn the construction of the accusative with the infinitive, but I well remember my utter amazement when I first was taught to say *Miror te ad me nihil scribere*, I am surprised that you write nothing to me. How easy would it have been to explain that *scribere* was originally a locative of a verbal noun, and that there was nothing strange or irrational in saying, I wonder at thee in the act of not writing to me. This first step once taken, everything else followed by slow degrees, but even in phrases like *Spero te mihi ignoscere*, we can still see the first steps which led from 'I hope or I desire thee, toward the act of forgiving me,' to 'I trust thee to forgive me.' It is the object of the comparative philologist to gather up the scattered fragments, to arrange them and fit them, and thus to show that language is something rational, human, intelligible, the very embodiment of the mind of man in its growth from the lowest to the highest stage, and with capabilities for further growth far beyond what we can at present conceive or imagine.

As to writing Greek and Latin verse, I do not maintain that a knowledge of Comparative Philology will help us much. It is simply an art that must be acquired by practice, if in these our busy days it is still worth acquiring. A good memory will no

doubt enable us to say at a moment's notice whether certain syllables are long or short. But is it not far more interesting to know why certain vowels are long and others short, than to be able to string longs and shorts together in imitation of Greek and Latin hexameters? Now, in many cases the reason why certain vowels are long or short can be supplied by Comparative Philology alone. We may learn from Latin grammar that the *i* in *fīdus*, trusty, and in *fīdo*, I trust, is long, and that it is short in *fides*, trust, and *perfidus*, faithless; but as all these words are derived from the same root, why should some have a long, others a short vowel? A comparison of Sanskrit at once supplies an answer. Certain derivatives, not only in Latin but in Sanskrit and Greek too, require what is called Guna of the radical vowel. In *fīdus* and *fīdo*, the *i* is really a diphthong, and represents a more ancient *ei* or *oi*, the former appearing in Greek πείθω, the latter in Latin *fœdus*, a truce.

We learn from our Greek grammars that the second syllable in δείκνῡμι is long, but in the plural, δείκνῠμεν, it is short. This cannot be by accident, and we may observe the same change in δάμνημι and δάμναμεν, and similar words. Nothing, however, but a study of Sanskrit would have enabled us to discover the reason of this change, which is really the accent in its most primitive working, such as we can watch it in the Vedic Sanskrit, where it produces exactly the same change, only with far greater regularity and perspicuity.

Why, again, do we say in Greek, οἶδα, I know, but ἴσ-μεν, we know? Why τέτληκα, but τέτλαμεν?

Why *μέμονα*, but *μέμαμεν*? There is no recollection in the minds of the Greeks of the motive power that was once at work, and left its traces in these grammatical convulsions: but in Sanskrit we still see, as it were, a lower stratum of grammatical growth, and we can there watch the regular working of laws which required these changes, and which have left their impress not only on Greek, but on Sanskrit, and even on German. The same necessity which made Homer say *οἶδα* and *ἴδμεν*, and the Vedic poet véda and vidmás, still holds good, and makes us say in German, *Ich weiss*, I know, but *wir wissen*, we know.

All this becomes clear and intelligible by the light of Comparative Grammar; anomalies vanish, exceptions prove the rule, and we perceive more plainly every day how in language, as elsewhere, the conflict between the freedom claimed by each individual and the resistance offered by the community at large, establishes in the end a reign of law most wonderful, yet perfectly rational and intelligible.

These are but a few small specimens to show you what Comparative Philology can do for Greek and Latin; and how it has given a new life to the study of languages by discovering, so to say, and laying bare, the traces of that old life, that prehistoric growth, which made language what we find it in the oldest literary monuments, and which still supplies the vigour of the language of our own time. A knowledge of the mere facts of language is interesting enough; nay, if you ask yourself what grammars really are — those very Greek and Latin grammars which we hated so much in our schoolboy

days—you will find that they are storehouses, richer than the richest museums of plants or minerals, more carefully classified and labelled than the productions of any of the great kingdoms of nature. Every form of declension and conjugation, every genitive and every so-called infinitive and gerund, is the result of a long succession of efforts, and of intelligent efforts. There is nothing accidental, nothing irregular, nothing without a purpose and meaning in any part of Greek or Latin grammar. No one who has once discovered this hidden life of language, no one who has once found out that what seemed to be merely anomalous and whimsical in language is but, as it were, a petrification of thought, of deep, curious, poetical, philosophical thought, will ever rest again till he has descended as far as he can descend into the ancient shafts of human speech, exploring level after level, and testing every successive foundation which supports the surface of each spoken language.

One of the great charms of this new science is that there is still so much to explore, so much to sift, so much to arrange. I shall not, therefore, be satisfied with merely lecturing on Comparative Philology, but I hope I shall be able to form a small philological society of more advanced students, who will come and work with me, and bring the results of their special studies as materials for the advancement of our science. If there are scholars here who have devoted their attention to the study of Homer, Comparative Philology will place in their hands a light with which to explore the dark crypt on which the temple of the Homeric language was erected. If there are scholars who know their Plautus or

Lucretius, Comparative Philology will give them a key to grammatical forms in ancient Latin, which, even if supported by an Ambrosian palimpsest, might still seem hazardous and problematical. As there is no field and no garden that has not its geological antecedents, there is no language and no dialect which does not receive light from a study of Comparative Philology, and reflect light in return on more general problems. As in geology, again, so in Comparative Philology, no progress is possible without a division of labour, and without the most general co-operation. The most experienced geologist may learn something from a miner or from a ploughboy; the most experienced comparative philologist may learn something from a schoolboy or from a child.

I have thus explained to you what, if you will but assist me, I should like to do as the first occupant of this new chair of Comparative Philology. In my public lectures I must be satisfied with teaching. In my private lectures, I hope I shall not only teach, but also learn, and receive back as much as I have to give.

NOTES.

NOTE A.

On the Final Dental of the Pronominal Stem *tad*.[1]

One or two instances may here suffice to show how compassless even the best comparative philologists find themselves if, without a knowledge of Sanskrit, they venture into the deep waters of grammatical research. What can be clearer at first sight than that the demonstrative pronoun *that* has the same base in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and German? Bopp places together (§ 349) the following forms of the neuter:

Sanskrit	Zend	Greek	Latin	Gothic
t a t	*taḍ*	*τό*	*is-tud*	*thata*

and he draws from them the following conclusions:—

In the Sanskrit t a-t we have the same pronominal element repeated twice, and this repeated pronominal element became afterwards the general sign of the neuter after other pronominal stems, such as y a-t, k a-t.

Such a conclusion seems extremely probable, particularly when we compare the masculine form s a-s, the old nom. sing., instead of the ordinary s a. But the first question that has to be answered is, whether this is phonetically possible, and how.

If t a t in Sanskrit is t a + t a, then we expect in Gothic *tha* + *tha*, instead of which we find *tha* + *ta*. We expect in Latin *is-tut*, not *istud*, *illut*, not *illud*, *it*, not *id*; for Latin represents final *t* in Sanskrit by *t*, not by *d*. The old Latin ablative in *d* is not a case in point, as we shall see afterwards.

Both Gothic *tha-ta*, therefore, and Latin *istud*, postulate a Sanskrit t a d, while Zend and Greek at all events do not

[1] See Bréal, *Mémoires de la Société de linguistique*, vol. i.

conflict with an original final media. Everything, therefore, depends on what was the original form in Sanskrit; and here no Sanskrit scholar would hesitate for one moment between tat and tad. Whatever the origin of tat may have been, it is quite certain that Sanskrit knows only of tad, never of tat. There are various ways of testing the original surd or sonant nature of final consonants in Sanskrit. One of the safest seems to me to see how those consonants behave before taddhita or secondary suffixes, which require no change in the final consonant of the base. Thus before the suffix îya (called *kha* by Pâṇini) the final consonant is never changed, yet we find tad-îya, like mad-îya, tvad-îya, asmad-îya, yushmad-îya, &c. Again, before the possessive suffix vat final consonants of nominal bases suffer no change. This is distinctly stated by Pâṇini I. 4, 19. Hence we have vidyut-vân, from vidyut, lightning, from the root dyut; we have uda*s*vit-vân, from uda-*s*vi-t. In both cases the original final tenuis remains unchanged. Hence, if we find tad-vân, kad-vân, our test shows us again that the final consonant in tad and kad is a media, and that the *d* of these words is not a modification of *t*.

Taking our stand therefore on the undoubted facts of Sanskrit grammar, we cannot recognise *t* as the termination of the neuter of pronominal stems, but only *d*[1]; nor can we accept Bopp's explanation of tad as a compound of ta+t, unless the transition of an original *t* into a Sanskrit and Latin *d* can be established by sufficient evidence. Even then that transition would have to be referred to a time before Sanskrit and Gothic became distinct languages, for

[1] Dr. Kielhorn in his grammar gives correctly tad as base, tat as nom. and acc. sing., because in the latter case phonetic rules either require or allow the change of *d* into *t*. Boehtlingk, Roth, and Benfey also give the right forms. Curtius, like Bopp, gives yat, Schleicher tat, which he supposes to have been changed at an early time into tad (§ 203).

the Gothic *tha-ta* is the counterpart of the Sanskrit tad, and not of tat.

Bopp endeavours to defend the transition of an original *t* into Latin *d* by the termination of the old ablatives, such as *gnaivod*, &c. But here again it is certain that the original termination was *d*, and not *t*. It is so in Latin, it may be so in Zend, where, as Justi points out, the *d* of the ablative is probably a media.[1] In Sanskrit it is certainly a media in such forms as mad, tvad, asmad, which Bopp considers as old ablatives, and which in madîya, &c., show the original media. In other cases it is impossible in Sanskrit to test the nature of the final dental in the ablative, because *d* is always determined by its position in a sentence. But under no circumstances could we appeal to Latin *gnaivod* in order to prove a transition of an original *t* into *d*; while on the contrary all the evidence at present is in favour of a media, as the final letter both of the ablative and of the neuter bases of pronouns, such as tad and yad.

These may seem *minutiæ*, but the whole of Comparative Grammar is made up of *minutiæ*, which, nevertheless, if carefully joined together and cemented, lead to conclusions of unexpected magnitude.

NOTE B.

Did Feminine Bases in *â* take *s* in the Nominative Singular?

I add one other instance to show how a more accurate knowledge of Sanskrit would have guarded comparative philologists against rash conclusions. With regard to the nominative singular of feminine bases ending in derivative

[1] Weich ist es (*t* oder *d*) wohl im abl. sing. gafnât (gafnâdha). Justi, *Handbuch der Zendsprache*, p. 362.

â, the question arose, whether words like *bona* in Latin, *ἀγαθά* in Greek, *śivâ* in Sanskrit, had originally an *s* as the sign of the nom. sing., which was afterwards lost, or whether they never took that termination. Bopp (§ 136), Schleicher (§ 246), and others seem to believe in the loss of the *s*, chiefly, it would seem, because the *s* is added to feminine bases ending in *î* and *û*. Benfey[1] takes the opposite view, viz. that feminines in *â* never took the *s* of the nom. sing. But he adds one exception, the Vedic gnâ-s. This remark has caused much mischief. Without verifying Benfey's statements, Schleicher (*l. c.*) quotes the same exception, though cautiously referring to the Sanskrit dictionary of Boehtlingk and Roth as his authority. Later writers, for instance Merguet,[2] leave out all restrictions, simply appealing to this Vedic form gnâ-s in support of the theory that feminine bases in *â*, too, took originally *s* as sign of the nom. sing., and afterwards dropped it. Even so careful a scholar as Büchler[3] speaks of the *s* as lost.

There is, first of all, no reason whatever why the *s* should have been added[4]; secondly, there is none why it should have been lost. But, whatever opinion we may hold in this respect, the appeal to the Vedic gnâ-s cannot certainly be sustained, and the word should at all events be obelised till there is better evidence for it than we possess at present.[5]

[1] *Orient und Occident*, vol. i. p. 298.

[2] *Entwickelung der Lateinischen Formenlehre*, 1870, p. 20.

[3] *Grundriss der Lateinischen Declination*, 1866, p. 9.

[4] See Benfey, *l. c.* p. 298.

[5] In the dictionary of Boehtlingk and Roth we read *s.v.* gnâ, 'scarce in the singular; nom. sing. seems to be gnâs, according to the passage Rv. IV. 9, 4, and Naigh. I. 11, in one text, while the other text gives the form gnâ.' Against that it should be remarked that it would make no difference whether the MSS. of the Naighaṇṭuka give gnâ or gnâs. Gnâ would be the nom. sing., gnâs would be the form in which the word occurs most frequently in the Veda. It is easy to see that the collector of the Naighaṇṭuka allowed himself to quote words according to either principle.

The passage which is always quoted from the Rv. IV. 9, 4, as showing gnâ-s to be a nom. sing. in *s*, is extremely difficult, and, as it stands at present, most likely corrupt:

Utá gnā́*h* agní*h* adhvaré utó g*ri*há-pati*h* dáme, utá brahmā́ ní sîdati.

This could only be translated:

'Agni sits down at the sacrifice as a woman, as lord in the house, and as priest.'

Devarâ*g*a in his commentary on gnâ explains it: Gamer dhâtor dhâp*rî*vasya*g*yatibhyo na*h* (U. S. III. 6) iti bahulakân napratyayo bhavati *t*ilopa*s* *k*a; *t*ap. Gatyarthâ buddhyarthâ*h*; *g*ânanti karmeti gnâ*h*. Yadvâ ga*kkh*ati yag*ñ*eshu; abhí ya*gñ*ám g*ri*nîhi no gnâva*h* (patnîva*h*). Rv. I. 15, 3. *Kh*andâ*m*si vai gnâ iti brâhma*n*am iti Mâdhava*h*. Asmā́ îd u gnā́*s* *k*id (Rv. I. 61, 8) ity api; gâyatryâdyâ devapatnya iti sa eva. Tasmâ*k* *kh*andasâ*m* gâyatryâdînâ*m* vâgrûpatvâd gnâvyapade*s*a*h*.

In his remarks on Nigh. III. 29, it is quite clear that Devarâ*g*a takes gnâ*h* as a nom. plur., not as a nom. sing. He says: Menâ gnâ iti strî*n*am; ubhâv api *s*abdau vyâkhyâtau vâṅnâmasu. Mânayanti hi tâ*h* pati*s*va*s*uramátulâdaya*h*, pû*g*yâ bhûshayitavyâ*s* *k*eti smara*n*ât. Ga*kkh*anty enâ*h* patayo patnyârthina*h*. The passage quoted in the Nirukta III. 29, gnâs tvâk*ri*ntann apaso 'tanvata vayitryo 'vayan, is taken from the Tâ*nd*ya-brâhma*n*a I. 8, 9: 'O dress! the women cut thee out, the workers stretched thee out, the weavers wove thee.'

Thus every support which the Nigha*n*tu or the Nirukta was supposed to give to the form gnâ*h* as a nom. sing. vanishes. And if it is said *s. v.* gnâ-spati, that in this compound gnâh might be taken as a nom. sing., and that the Pada-text separates gnâ*h*-pati*h*, it has been overlooked that the separation in Rv. II. 38, 10, is a mere misprint. See Prâti*s*âkhya, 738. The compound gnâspati*h* has been correctly explained as standing for gnâyâspati*h*, and the same old genitive is also found in *g*âspati*h* and *g*âspatyam. See also Vâ*g*asan. Prâti*s*âkhya IV. 39. It is important to observe that the metre requires us to pronounce gnâspati either as gnăāspătĭ*h* or as gănāspătĭ*h*.

There is, as far as I know, no passage where gnâ*h* in the Veda can be taken as a nom. sing., and it should be observed that gnâ*h* as nom. plur. is almost always disyllabic in the Rig-veda, excepting the tenth Ma*nd*ala; that the acc. sing. (V. 43, 6) is, however, disyllabic, but the acc. plur. monosyllabic (I. 22, 10). In V. 43, 13, we must either read gnă*h* or ōshădhĭ*h*.

This, however, is impossible, for Agni, the god of fire, is never represented in the Veda as a woman. If we took gnâḥ as a genitive, we might translate, 'Agni sits down in the sacrifice of the lady of the house,' but this again would be utterly incongruous in Vedic poetry.

I believe the verse is corrupt, and I should propose to read:—

Utá agnâv agníḥ adhvaré.

'Agni sits down at the sacrifice in the fire, as lord in the house, and as a priest.'

The ideas that Agni, the god of fire, sits down in the fire, or that Agni is lighted by Agni, or that Agni is both the sacrificial fire and the priest, are familiar to every reader of the Veda. Thus we read I. 12, 6, agnínâ agníḥ sám idhyate, Agni is lighted by Agni; X. 88, 1, we find Agni invoked as â-hutam agnáu, &c.

But whether this emendation be right or wrong, it must be quite clear how unsafe it would be to support the theory that feminine bases in *â* ended originally in *s* by this solitary passage from the Veda.[1]

NOTE C.

Grammatical Forms in Sanskrit corresponding to so-called Infinitives in Greek and Latin.

There is no trace of such a term as infinitive in Sanskrit, and yet exactly the same forms, or, at all events, forms strictly analogous to those which we call infinitives in Greek and Latin, exist in Sanskrit. Here, however, they are treated in the simplest way.

Sanskrit grammarians, when giving the rules according to which nouns and adjectives are derived from verbal roots by means of primary suffixes (*Kṛit*), mention among the rest the suffixes tum (*Pân.* III. 3, 10), se, ase, adhyai,

[1] Se Havet, *Mémoires de la Société de linguistique*, vol. ii. p. 27.

tavai, tave, shyai, e, am, tos, as (IV. 4, 9–17), defining their meaning in general by that of tum (III. 3, 10). This tum is said to express immediate futurity in a verb, if governed by another word conveying an intention. An example will make this clearer. In order to say he goes to cook, where 'he goes' expresses an intention, and 'to cook' is the object of that intention which is to follow immediately, we place the suffix tum at the end of the verb pak, to cook, and say in Sanskrit vra*g*ati pak-tum. We might also say pâ*k*ako vra*g*ati, he goes as one who means to cook, or vra*g*ati pâkâya, he goes to the act of cooking, placing the abstract noun in the dative; and all these constructions are mentioned together by Sanskrit grammarians. The same takes place after verbs which express a wish (III. 3, 158); *e.g.* i*kkh*ati paktum, he wishes to cook, and after such words as kâla, time, samaya, opportunity, velâ, right moment (III. 3, 167); *e.g.* kâla*h* paktum, it is time to cook, &c. Other verbs which govern forms in tum are (III. 4, 65) sak, to be able; dh*r*ish, to dare; *g*ñâ, to know; glai, to be weary; gha*t*, to endeavour; ârabh, to begin; labh, to get; prakram, to begin; utsah, to endure; arh, to deserve; and words like asti, there is; *e.g.* asti bhoktum, it is (possible) to eat; not, it is (necessary) to eat. The forms in tum are also enjoined (III. 4, 66) after words like alam, expressing fitness; *e.g.* paryâpto bhoktum, alam bhoktum, kusalo bhoktum, fit or able to eat.

Here we have everything that is given by Sanskrit grammarians in place of what we should call the Chapter on the Infinitive in Greek and Latin. The only thing that has to be added is the provision, understood in Pâ*n*ini's grammar, that such suffixes as tum, &c., are indeclinable.

And why are they indeclinable? For the simple reason that they are themselves case-terminations. Whether Pâ*n*ini was aware of this, we cannot tell with certainty. From some of his remarks it would seem to be so. When

treating of the cases, Pâṇini (I. 4, 32) explains what we should call the dative by Sampradâna. Sampradâna means giving (δοτική), but Pâṇini uses it here as a technical term, and assigns to it the definite meaning of 'he whom one looks to by any act' (not only the act of giving, as the commentators imply). It is therefore what we should call the 'remote object.' Ex. Brâhmaṇâya dhanam dadâti, he gives wealth to the Brâhman. This is afterwards extended by several rules, explaining that the Sampradâna comes in after verbs expressive of pleasure caused to somebody (I. 4, 33); after *s*lagh, to applaud, hnu, to dissemble, to conceal, sthâ,[1] to reveal, *s*ap, to curse (I. 4, 34); after dhâray, to owe (I. 4, 35); spṛih, to long for (I. 4, 36); after verbs expressive of anger, ill-will, envy, detraction (I. 4, 37); after râdh and îksh, if they mean to consider concerning a person (I. 4, 39); after pratiṣru and âṣru, in the sense of according (I. 4, 40); anugṛi and pratigṛi, in the sense of acting in accordance with (I. 4, 41); after parikrî, to buy, to hire (I. 4, 44). Other cases of Sampradâna are mentioned after such words as namaḥ, salutation to, svasti, hail, svâhâ, salutation to the gods, svadhâ, salutation to the manes, alam, sufficient for, vashaṭ, offered to, a sacrificial invocation, &c. (II. 3, 16); and in such expressions as na tvâṃ triṇâya manye, I do not value thee a straw (II. 3, 17); grâmâya gaḳkhati, he goes to the village (II. 2, 12); where, however, the accusative, too, is equally admissible. Some other cases of Sampradâna are mentioned in the Vârttikas; *e.g.* I. 4, 44, muktaye harim bhajati, for the sake of liberation he worships Hari; vâtâya kapilâ vidyut, a dark red lightning indicates wind. Very interesting, too, is the construction

[1] Sthâ, svâbhiprâyabodhanânukûlasthiti, to reveal by gestures, a meaning not found in our dictionaries. Wilson renders it wrongly by to stay with, which would govern the instrumental. *S*ap, cursing, means to use curses in order to convey some meaning or intention to another person.

with the prohibitive mâ; *e.g.* mâ *k*âpalâya, lit. not for unsteadiness, *i.e.* do not act unsteadily.[1]

In all these cases we easily recognise the identity of Sampradâna with the dative in Greek and Latin. If, therefore, we see that Pâ*n*ini in some of his rules states that Sampradâna takes the place of tum, the so-called infinitive, we can hardly doubt that he had perceived the similarity in the functions of what we call dative and infinitive. Thus, he says, that instead of phalâny âhar*tum* yâti, he goes to take the fruits, we may use the dative and say phalebhyo yâti, he goes for the fruits; instead of yash*tum* yâti, he goes to sacrifice, yâgâya yâti, he goes to the act of sacrificing (II. 3, 14–15).

But whether Pâ*n*ini recognised this fact or not, certain it is that we have only to look at the forms which in the Veda take the place of tum, in order to convince ourselves that most of them are datives of verbal nouns. As far as Sanskrit grammar is concerned, we may safely cancel the name of infinitive altogether, and speak instead boldly of datives and other cases of verbal nouns. Whether these verbal nouns admit of the dative case only, and whether some of those dativa1 terminations have become obsolete, are become questions which do not concern the grammarian, and nothing would be more unphilosophical than to make such points the specific characteristic of a new grammatical category, the infinitive. The very idea that every noun must possess a complete set of cases, is contrary to all the lessons of the history of language; and though the fact that some of these forms belong to an antiquated phase of language has undoubtedly contributed towards their being used more readily for certain syntactical purposes, the fact remains that in their origin and their original intention they were datives and nothing else. Neither could the fact that these datives of verbal nouns may

[1] Wilson, *Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 390.

govern the same case which is governed by the verb be used as a specific mark, because it is well known that, in Sanskrit more particularly, many nouns retain the power of governing the accusative. We shall now examine some of these so-called infinitives in Sanskrit.

Datives in *e*.

The simplest dative is that in *e*, after verbal bases ending in consonants or *â*, *e.g.* d*risé*, for the sake of seeing, to see; vid-é, to know; paribhvẽ,[1] to overcome; *sraddhé kám*, to believe.

Datives in *ai*.

After some verbs ending in *â*, the dative is irregularly (Grammar, §§ 239, 240) formed in *ai*; Rv. VII. 19, 7, parâdái, to surrender; III. 60, 4, pratimái, to compare; and the important form vayodhái, of which more by and by.

Accusatives in *am*. Genitives and Ablatives in *as*. Locatives in *i*.

By the side of these datives we have analogous accusatives in *am*, genitives and ablatives is *as*, locatives in *i*.

Accusative: I. 73, 10, *sakéma* yámam, May we be able to get. I. 94, 3, *sakéma* tvâ samídhan, May we be able to light thee. This may be the Oscan and Umbrian infinitive in *um*, *om* (*u*, *o*), if we take yama as a base in *a*, and *m* as the sign of the accusative. In Sanskrit it is impossible to determine this question, for that bases in *a* are also used for similar purposes is clearly seen in datives like dábhâya; *e.g.* Rv. V. 44, 2, ná dábhâya, not to conquer; VIII. 96, 1, *nṛ́bhyaḥ* tárâya sîndhava*ḥ* su-pârâ*ḥ*, the rivers easy to cross for men. Whether the Vedic imperatives in âya

[1] In verbs compounded with prepositions the accent is on the penultimate: *e.g.* samidhe, atikráme, etc.

(*sâyak*) admit of a similar explanation is doubtful on account of the accent.

Genitive: vilikha*h*, in îsvaro vilikha*h*, cognisant of drawing; and possibly X. 108, 2, atiskáda*h* bhiyásâ, from fear of crossing.

Ablative: Rv. VIII. 1, 12, purâ â*trida*h, before striking.

Locative: Rv. V. 52, 12, d*risí* tvishé, to shine in glancing (?).

Datives in *s-e*.

The same termination of the dative is added to verbal bases which have taken the increment of the aorist, the s. Thus from *gi*, to conquer, we have *g*i-sh, and *g*e-sh, and from both dativalforms with infinitival function. I. 111, 4, té na*h* hinvantu sâtáye dhiyé *g*ishé, May they bring us to wealth, wisdom, victory!

I. 100, 11, apâm tokásya tánayasya *g*eshé, May Indra help us for getting water, children and descendants. *Cf.* VI. 44, 18.

Or, after bases ending in consonants, upaprakshé; V. 47, 6, upa-prakshé vrísha*nah*---vadhvâ*h* yanti áklkha, the men go towards their wives to embrace.

These forms correspond to Greek infinitives like λῦσαι and τύψαι, possibly to Latin infinitives like *ferre*, for *fer-se*, *velle* for *vel-se*, and *voluis-se*; for *se*, following immediately on a consonant, can never represent the Sanskrit ase. With regard to infinitives like *fac-se*, *dic-se*, I do not venture to decide whether they are primitive forms, or contracted, though *fac-se* could hardly be called a contraction of *fecisse*. The 2nd pers. sing. of the imperative of the 1st aorist middle, λῦσαι, is identical with the infinitive in form, and the transition of meaning from the infinitive to the imperative is well known in Greek and other languages, *e.g.* Παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λῦσαί τε φίλην τά τ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι, Deliver up my dear child and accept the ransom. Several of these aoristic forms are very perplexing in Vedic Sanskrit. If we find, for instance, stushé, we cannot at

once tell whether it is the infinitive (λῦσαι); or the 1st pers. sing. of the aor. Âtmanep. in the subjunctive (for stushai), let me praise (λύσωμαι); or lastly, the 2nd pers. sing. Âtmanep. in the indicative (λύῃ). If stushe has no accent, we know, of course, that it cannot be the infinitive, as in X. 93, 9; but when it has the accent on the last, it may, in certain constructions, be either infinitive, or 1st pers. sing. aor. Âtm. subj. Here we want far more careful grammatical studies on the language of the Veda before we can venture to translate with certainty. In places, for instance, where, as in I. 122, 7, we have a nominative with stushé, it is clear that it must be taken as an infinitive, stushé sâ vâm---râtíḥ, your gift, Varuṇa and Mitra, is to be praised; but in other places, such as VIII. 5, 4, the choice is difficult. In VIII. 65, 5, índra grṇîshé u stushé, I should propose to translate, Indra, thou longest for praising, thou desirest to be praised, *cf.* VIII. 71, 15; while in II. 20, 4, tám u stushe índram tám gṛṇîshe, I translate, Let me praise Indra, let me laud him, admitting here the irregular retention of Vikaraṇa in the aorist, which can be defended by analogous forms such as gṛí-nî-sh-áni, stṛí-nî-sh-áni, of which more hereafter. However, all these translations, as every real scholar knows, are, and can for the present be, tentative only. Nothing but a complete Vedic grammar, such as we may soon expect from Professor Benfey, will give us safe ground to stand on.

Datives in *âyai*.

Feminine bases in â form their dative in âyai, and thus we find karâyai used in the Veda, VII. 77, 1, as what we should call an infinitive, in the sense of to go. No other cases of karâ have as yet been met with. A similar form is garâyai, to praise, I. 38, 13.

Datives in *aye*.

We have next to consider bases in *i*, forming their

dative in áye. Here, whenever we are acquainted with the word in other cases, we naturally take aye as a simple dative of a noun. Thus in I. 31, 8, we should translate sanáye dhánânâm, for the acquisition of treasures, because we are accustomed to other cases, such as I. 100, 13, sanáyas, acquisitions, V. 27, 3, sanîm, wealth. But if we find, V. 80, 5, drisáye nah asthât, she stood to be seen by us, lit. for our seeing, then we prefer, though wrongly, to look upon such datives as infinitives, simply because we have not met with other cases of drisi-s.

Datives in *taye.*

What applies to datives of nouns in *i*, applies with still greater force to datives of nouns in *ti*. There is no reason why in IX. 96, 4 we should call áhataye, to be without hurt, an infinitive, simply because no other case of áhati-s occurs in the Rig-Veda; while ágîtaye, not to fail, in the same line, is called a dative of ágîti-s, because it occurs again in the accusative ágîti-m.

Datives in *tyai.*

In ityái to go, I. 113, 6; 124, 1, we have a dative of iti-s, the act of going, of which the instrumental ityâ occurs likewise, I. 167, 5. This tyâ, shortened to tya, became afterwards the regular termination of the gerund of compound verbs in tya (Grammar, § 446), while ya (§ 445) points to an original yâ or yai.

Datives in *as-e.*

Next follow datives from bases in as, partly with accent on the first syllable, like neuter nouns in as, partly with the accent on as; partly with Guna, partly without. With regard to them it becomes still clearer how impossible it would be to distinguish between datives of abstract nouns, and other grammatical forms, to be called infinitives. Thus Rv. I. 7, 3 we read, dîrghâyam kákshase, Indra made the

sun rise for long glancing, *i.e.* that it might glance far and wide. It is quite true that no other cases of *kakshas*, seeing, occur, on which ground modern grammarians would probably class it as an infinitive; but the qualifying dative dîrghăya clearly shows that the poet felt *kákshase* as the dative of a noun, and did not trouble himself whether that noun was defective in other cases or not.

These datives of verbal nouns in as correspond exactly to Latin infinitives in *ĕre*, like *vivere* (*gîváse*), and explain likewise infinitives in *âre*, *êre*, and *îre*, forms which cannot be separated. It has been thought that the nearest approach to an infinitive is to be found in such forms as *gîváse*, bhiyáse, to fear (V. 29, 4), because in such cases the ordinary nominal form would be bháyas-e. There is, however, the instrumental bhiyásâ, X. 108, 2, which shows that we must admit a nominal base bhíyas.

Datives in *mane*.

Next follow datives from nouns in man, van, and an. The suffix man is very common in Sanskrit, for forming verbal nouns, such as kar-man, doing, deed, from kar. Van is almost restricted to forming *nomina agentis*, such as druh-van, hating; but we find also substantives like pat-van, still used in the sense of flying. An also is generally used like van, but we can see traces of its employment to form *nomina actionis* in Greek *ἀγών*, Lat *turbo*, etc.

Datives of nouns in man, used with infinitival functions, are very common in the Veda; *e. g.* I. 164, 6 *prikkhâmi* vidmáne, I ask to know; VIII. 93, 8, dâmane *kritáh*, made to give. We find also the instrumental case vidmánâ, *e.g.* VI. 14, 5, vidmánâ urushyáti, he protects by his knowledge. These correspond to Homeric infinitives, like *ἰδμεναι*, *δόμεναι*, etc., old datives, and not locatives, as Schleicher and Curtius supposed; while forms like *δόμεν* are to be explained either as abbreviated, or as obsolete accusatives.

Datives in *vane.*

Of datives in váne I only know dâváne, a most valuable grammatical relic, by which Professor Benfey was enabled to explain the Greek δοῦναι, *i. e.* δοϝέναι.[1]

Datives in *ane.*

Of datives in áne I pointed out (l. *c.*) dhŭrv-ane and vibhv-áne, VI. 61, 13, taking the latter as synonymous with vibhvē, and translating, 'Sarasvatî, the great, made to conquer, like a chariot.' Professor Roth, *s. v.* vibhván, takes the dative for an instrumental, and translates 'made by an artificer.' It is, however, not the chariot that is spoken of, but Sarasvatî, and of her it could hardly be said that she was made either by or for an artificer.

Locatives in *sani.*

As we saw before that aoristic bases in s take the dativaI e, so that we had prák-sh-e by the side of prík-e, we shall have to consider here aoristic bases in *s*, taking the suffix an, not, however, with the termination of the dative, but with that of the locative *i*. Thus we read X. 126, 3, náyishthâh u nah neshání párshishthâh u nah parshání áti dvísha*h*, they who are the best leaders to lead us, the best helpers to help us to overcome our enemies, lit. in leading us, in helping us. In VIII. 12, 19, grinîsháni, *i. e.* gri-nî-shán-i, stands parallel with turv-án-e, thus showing how both cases can answer nearly the same purpose. If these forms existed in Greek, they would, after consonantal bases, be identical with the infinitives of the future.

Cases of verbal nouns in *tu.*

We next come to a large number of datives, ablatives, or genitives, and accusatives of verbal nouns in tu. This

[1] See M. M.'s *Translation of the Rig-Veda*, I. p. 34.

tu occurs in Sanskrit in abstract nouns such as gâtú, going, way, etc., in Latin in *adven-tus*, etc. As these forms have been often treated, and as some of them occur frequently in later Sanskrit also, it will suffice to give one example of each:

Dative in tave: gántave, to go, I. 46, 7.

Old form in tavai: gántavái, X. 95, 14.

Genitive in toh: dâtoh, governed by îse, VII. 4, 6.

Ablative in toh: gántoh, I. 89, 9.

Accusative in tum: gántum. This is the supine in *tum* in Latin.

Cases of verbal nouns in *tva*.

Next follow cases of verbal nouns in tvá, the accent being on the suffix.

Datives in tvâya: hatvâya, X. 84, 2.

Instrumentals in tvâ: hatvâ, I. 100, 18.

Older form in tvî: hatvî, II. 17, 6; gatvî, IV. 41. 5.

Datives in *dhai* and *dhyai*.

I have left to the end datives in dhai and dhyai, which properly belong to the datives in ai, treated before, but differ from them as being datives of compound nouns. As from máyah, delight, we have mayaskará, delight-making, mayobhú, delight-causing, and constructions like máyo dádhe, so from váyas, life, vigour, we have vayaskrít, life-giving, and constructions like váyo dhât. From dhâ we can frame two substantival forms, dhâ and dhi-s, *e. g.* puro-dhâ, and puro-dhis, like vi-dhi-s. As an ordinary substantive, purodhâ takes the feminine termination *â*, and is declined like *sivâ*. But if the verbal base remains at the end of a compound without the feminine suffix, a compound like vayodhâ would form its dative vayodhe (Grammar, § 239); and as in analogous cases we found old datives in ai, instead of *e*, *e. g.* parâdai, nothing can be said against vayodhai, as a

Vedic dative of vayodhâ. The dative of purodhi would be purodhaye, but here again, as, besides forms like dṛisaye, we met with datives such as ityai, rohishyai, there is no difficulty in admitting an analogous dative of purodhi, viz. purodhyai.

The old dative dhai has been preserved to us in one form only, which for that reason is all the more valuable and important, offering the key to the mysterious Greek infinitives in θαι, I mean vayodhái, which occurs twice in the Rig-Veda, X. 55, 1, and X. 67, 11. The importance of this relic would have been perceived long ago, if there had not been some uncertainty as to whether such a form really existed in the Veda. By some accident or other, Professor Aufrecht had printed in both passages vayodhaiḥ, instead of vayodhai. But for this, no one, I believe, would have doubted that in this form vayodhai we have not only the most valuable prototype of the Greek infinitives in (σ)θαι, but at the same time their full explanation. Vayodhai stands for vayas-dhai, in which composition the first part vayas is a neuter base in as, the second a dative of the auxiliary verb dhâ, used as a substantive. If, therefore, we find corresponding to vayodhai a Greek infinitive βέεσθαι, we must divide it into βέες-θαι, as we divide ψεύδεσθαι into ψεύδες-θαι, and translate it literally by 'to do lying.'

It has been common to identify Greek infinitives in σθαι with corresponding Sanskrit forms ending in dhyai. No doubt these forms in dhyai are much more frequent than forms in dhai, but as we can only take them as old datives of substantives in dhi, it would be difficult to identify the two. The Sanskrit dhy appears, no doubt, in Greek as σσ, dh being represented by the surd θ, and then assibilated by y; but we could hardly attempt to explain σθ=θy, because σδ=ζ=δy. Therefore, unless we are prepared to see with Bopp in the σ before θ, in this and similar forms, a remnant of the reflexive pronoun,

nothing remains but to accept the explanation offered by the Vedic v a y o d h a i, and to separate ψεύδεσθαι into ψεύδες-θαι, lying to do. That this grammatical compound, if once found successful, should have been repeated in other tenses, giving us not only γράφεσ-θαι, but γράψεσ-θαι, γράψασ-θαι, and even γραφθήσεσ-θαι, is no more than what we may see again and again in the grammatical development of ancient and modern languages. Some scholars have objected on the same ground to Bopp's explanation of *ama-mini*, as the nom. plur. of a participle, because they think it impossible to look upon *amemini*, *amabámini*, *amaremini*, *amabimini* as participial formations. But if a mould is once made in language, it is used again and again, and little account is taken of its original intention. If we object to γράψεσ-θαι, why not to κελευ-σέ-μεναι, or τεθνά-μεναι, or μιχθή-μεναι? In Sanskrit, too, we should hesitate to form a compound of a modified verbal base, such as p*rí*na, with dhi, doing: yet as the Sanskrit ear was accustomed to y*á*gadhyai from y*á*ga, gamadhyai from gama, it did not protest against p*rí*nadhyai, vâv*ri*dhadhyai, etc.

Historical Importance of these Grammatical Forms.

And while these ancient grammatical forms which supply the foundation of what in Greek, Latin, and other languages we are accustomed to call infinitives, are of the highest interest to the grammarian and the logician, their importance is hardly less in the eyes of the historian. Every honest student of antiquity, whether his special field be India, Persia, Assyria, or Egypt, knows how often he is filled with fear and trembling when he meets with thoughts and expressions which, as he is apt to say, cannot be ancient. I have frequently confessed to that feeling with regard to some of the hymns of the Rig-Veda, and I well remember the time when I felt inclined to throw up the whole work as modern and unworthy of the time and labour

bestowed upon it. At that time I was always comforted by these so-called infinitives and other relics of ancient language. They could not have been fabricated in India. They are unknown in ordinary Sanskrit, they are unintelligible as far as their origin is concerned in Greek and Latin, and yet in the Vedic language we find these forms, not only identical with Greek and Latin forms, but furnishing the key to their formation in Greece and Italy. The Vedic vayás-dhái compared with Greek *βέεσ-θαι*, the Vedic stushe compared with *λῦσαι* are to my mind evidence in support of the antiquity and genuineness of the Veda that cannot be shaken by any arguments.

The Infinitive in English.

I add a few words on the infinitive in English, though it has been well treated by Dr. March in his 'Grammar of the Anglo-Saxon Language,' by Dr. Morris, and others. We find in Anglo-Saxon two forms, one generally called the infinitive, *nim-an*, to take, the other the gerund, *to nim-anne*, to take. Dr. March explains the first as identical with Greek *νέμ-ειν* and *νέμ-εν-αι*, *i.e.* as an oblique case, probably the dative, of a verbal noun in *an*. He himself quotes only the dative of nominal bases in *a*, *e.g.* namanâya, because he was probably unacquainted with the nearer forms in *an-e* supplied by the Veda. This infinitive exists in Gothic as *nim-an*, in Old Saxon as *nim-an*, in Old Norse as *nem-a*, in Old High German as *nem-an*. The so-called gerund, *to nimanne*, is rightly traced back by Dr. March to Old Saxon *nim-annia*, but he can hardly be right in identifying these old dativa forms with the Sanskrit base naman îya. In the Second Period of English (1100–1250)[1] the termination of the infinitive became *en*, and frequently dropped the final *n*, as *smelle=smellen*; while the termination of the gerund at the same time became *enne* (*ende*),

[1] Morris, *Historic Outlines of English Accidence*, p. 52.

ene, *en*, or *e*, so that outwarldy the two forms appeared to be identical as early as the 12th century.[1] Still later, towards the end of the 14th century, the terminations were entirely lost, though Spenser and Shakespeare have occasionally *to killen*, *passen*, *delven*, when they wish to impart an archaic character to their language. In modern English the infinitive with *to* is used as a verbal substantive. When we say, 'I wish you to do this,' 'you are able to do this,' we can still perceive the dativel function of the infinitive. Likewise in such phrases as 'it is time,' 'it is proper,' 'it is wrong to do that,' *to do* may still be felt as an oblique case. But we have only to invert these sentences, and say, 'to do this is wrong,' and we have a new substantive in the nom. sing., just as in the Greek τὸ λέγειν. Expressions like *for to do*, show that the simple *to* was not always felt to be sufficiently expressive to convey the meaning of an original dative.

Works on the Infinitive.

The infinitive has formed the subject of many learned treatises. I divide them into two classes, those which appeared before and those which appeared after Wilhelm's excellent essay, written in Latin, 'De infinitivi vi et natura,' 1868; and in a new and improved edition, 'De infinitivo linguarum Sanscritæ Bactricæ Persicæ Græcæ Oscæ Umbricæ Latinæ Goticæ forma et usu,' Isenaci, 1873. In this essay the evidence supplied by the Veda was for the first time fully collected, and the whole question of the nature of the infinitive placed in its true historical light. Before Wilhelm the more important works were Höfer's book, 'Vom Infinitiv, besonders im Sanskrit,' Berlin, 1840; Bopp's paragraphs in his 'Comparative Grammar'; Humboldt's paper, in Schlegel's 'Indische Bibliothek' (II. 74), 1824; and his posthumous paper in Kuhn's 'Zeitschrift' (II. 245), 1853; some dissertations by L. Meyer, Merguet, and Golenski. Benfey's

[1] Morris, *l. c.* p. 177.

'Sanskrit Grammar' (1852), too, ought to be mentioned, as having laid the first solid foundations for this and all other branches of grammatical research, as far as Sanskrit is concerned. After Wilhelm the same subject has been treated with great independence by Ludwig, 'Der Infinitif im Veda,' 1871, and again 'Agglutination oder Adaptation,' 1873; and also by Jolly, 'Geschichte des Infinitivs,' 1873. I have just time to add the title of a very careful paper, by Brunnhofer, 'Über Dialectspuren im Vedischen Gebrauch der Infinitivformen,' in Kuhn's 'Zeitschrift,' 1880.

I had myself discussed some questions connected with the nature of the infinitive in my 'Lectures on the Science of Language,' vol. ii. p. 15 *seq.*, and I had pointed out in Kuhn's 'Zeitschrift,' XV. 215 (1866), the great importance of the Vedic vayodhai for unravelling the formation of Greek infinitives in σ-θαι.

The Infinitive in Bengali.

At a still earlier time, in 1847, in my 'Essay on Bengali,' I said: 'As the infinitives of the Indo-Germanic languages must be regarded as the absolute cases of a verbal noun, it is probable that in Bengali the infinitive in ite was also originally a locative, which expressed not only local situation, but also movement towards some object, as an end, whether real or imaginary. Thus the Bengali infinitive corresponds exactly with the English, where the relation of case is expressed by the preposition *to*. Ex. tâhâke mârite âmi âsiyâchi, means, I came to the state of beating him, or, I came to beat him; âmâke mârite deo, give me (permission), let me (go) to the action of beating, *i.e.* allow me to beat. Now, as the form of the participle is the same as that of the infinitive, it may be doubted if there is really a distinction between these two forms as to their origin. For instance, the phrase âpan putrake mârite âmi tâhâka dekhilâm can be translated, I saw him beating his own son; but

it can be explained also as what is commonly called in Latin grammar *accusativus cum infinitivo* : that is to say, the infinitive can be taken for a locative of the verbal noun, and the whole phrase be translated, I saw him in the action of beating his own son, (*vidi patrem cœdere ipsius filium*). As in every Bengali phrase the participle in ite can be understood in this manner, I think it admissible to ascribe this origin to it, and instead of taking it for a nominative of a verbal adjective, to consider it as a locative of a verbal noun.'

The Infinitive in the Dravidian Languages.

I also tried to show that the infinitive in the Dravidian languages is a verbal noun with or without a case suffix. This view has been confirmed by Dr. Caldwell, but, in deference to him, I gladly withdraw the explanation which I proposed in reference to the infinitive in Tamil. I quote from Dr. Caldwell's 'Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages,' 2nd ed. p. 423 : 'Professor Max Müller, noticing that the majority of Tamil infinitives terminate in ka, supposed this ka to be identical in origin with kô, the dative-accusative case-sign of the Hindi, and concluded that the Dravidian infinitive was the accusative of a verbal noun. It is true that the Sanskrit infinitive and Latin supine in *tum* are correctly regarded as an accusative, and that our English infinitive *to do*, is the dative of a verbal noun ; it is also true that the Dravidian infinitive is a verbal noun in origin, and never altogether loses that character ; nevertheless, the supposition that the final ka of most Tamil infinitives is in any manner connected with ku, the sign of the Dravidian dative, or of kô, the Hindi dative-accusative, is inadmissible. A comparison of various classes of verbs and of the various dialects shows that the kâ in question proceeds from a totally different source.'

III.

INAUGURAL LECTURE.

ON THE RESULTS OF THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE.

Delivered before the Imperial University of Strassburg, the 23rd of May, 1872.

YOU will easily understand that, in giving my first lecture in a German University, I feel some difficulty in mastering and repressing the feelings which stir within my heart. I wish to speak to you as it becomes a teacher, with perfect calmness, thinking of nothing but of the subject which I have to treat. But here where we are gathered together to-day, in this old free imperial town, in this University, full of the brightest recollections of Alsatian history and German literature, even a somewhat grey-headed German professor may be pardoned if, for some moments at least, he gives free vent to the thoughts that are foremost in his mind. You will see, at least, that he feels and thinks as you all feel and think, and that in living away from Germany he has not forgotten his German language, or lost his German heart.

The times in which we live are great, so great that we can hardly conceive them great enough; so great that we, old and young, cannot be great

and good and brave and hardworking enough ourselves, if we do not wish to appear quite unworthy of the times in which our lot has been cast.

We older people have lived through darker times, when to a German learning was the only refuge, the only comfort, the only pride; times when there was no Germany except in our recollection, and perhaps in our secret hopes. And those who have lived through those sadder days feel all the more deeply the blessings of the present. We have a Germany again, a united, great, and strong country; and I call this a blessing, not only in a material sense, as giving at last to our homes a real and lasting security against the inroads of our powerful neighbours, but also in a moral sense, as placing every German under a greater responsibility, as reminding us of our higher duties, as inspiring us with courage and energy for the battle of the mind even more than for the battle of the arm.

That blessing has cost us dear, fearfully dear, dearer than the friends of humanity had hoped; for, proud as we may be of our victories and our victors, let us not deceive ourselves in this, that there is in the history of humanity nothing so inhuman, nothing that makes us so entirely despair of the genius of mankind, nothing that bows us so low to the very dust, as war—unless even war becomes ennobled and sanctified, as it was with us, by the sense of duty, duty towards our country, duty towards our town, duty towards our home, towards our fathers and mothers, our wives and children. Thus, and thus only, can even war become the highest and brightest of sacrifices; thus,

and thus only, may we look history straight in the face, and ask, 'Who would have acted differently?'

I do not speak here of politics in the ordinary sense of the word—nay, I gladly leave the groping for the petty causes of the late war to the scrutiny of those foreign statesmen who have eyes only for the infinitesimally small, but cannot or will not see the powerful handiwork of Divine justice that reveals itself in the history of nations as in the lives of individuals. I speak of politics in their true and original meaning, as a branch of ethics, as Kant has proved them to be; and from this point of view, politics become a duty from which no one may shrink, be he young or old. Every nation must have a conscience, like every individual; a nation must be able to give to itself an account of the moral justification of a war in which it is to sacrifice everything that is most dear to man. And that is the greatest blessing of the late war, that every German, however deep he may delve in his heart, can say without a qualm or a quiver, 'The German people did not wish for war, nor for conquest. We wanted peace and freedom in our internal development. Another nation, or rather its rulers, claimed the right to draw for us lines of the Main, if not new frontiers of the Rhine; they wished to prevent the accomplishment of that German union for which our fathers had worked and suffered. The German nation would gladly have waited longer still, if thereby war could have been averted. We knew that the union of Germany was inevitable, and the inevitable is in no hurry. But when the gauntlet was thrown in our

face, and, be it remembered, with the acclamation of the whole French nation, then we knew what, under Napoleonic sway, we might expect from our powerful neighbour, and the whole German people rose as one man for defence, not for defiance. The object of our war was peace, and a lasting peace, and therefore now, after peace has been won, after our often menaced, often violated, western frontier has been made secure for ever by bastions such as nature only can build, it becomes our duty to prove to the world that we Germans are the same after as before the war, that military glory has nothing intoxicating to us, and that we want peace with all the world.'

You know that the world at large does not prophesy well for us. We are told that the old and simple German manners will go, that the ideal interests of our life will be forgotten, that, as in other countries, so with us, our love for the True and the Beautiful will be replaced by love of pleasure, enjoyment, and vanities. It rests with us with all our might to confound such evil prophecies, and to carry the banner of the German mind higher than ever. Germany can remain great only by what has made her great—by simplicity of manners, contentment, industry, honesty, high ideals, contempt of luxury, of display, and of vain-glory. '*Non propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*'—'Not for the sake of life to lose the real objects of life,' this must be our watchword for ever, and the *causæ vitæ*, the highest objects of life, are for us to-day, and will, I trust, remain for coming generations too, the same as they were in the days of Lessing, of Kant, of Schiller, and of Humboldt.

And nowhere, methinks, can this return to the work of peace be better inaugurated than here in this very place, in Strassburg. It was a bold conception to begin the building of the new temple of learning in the very midst of the old German frontier fortress. We are summoned here, as in the days of Nehemiah, when 'the builders everyone had his sword girded by his side, and so builded.' It rests with us, the young as well as the old, that this bold conception shall not fail. And therefore I could not resist the voice of my heart, or gainsay the wish of my friends who believed that I, too, might bring a stone, however small, to the building of this new temple of German science. And here I am among you to try and do my best. Though I have lived long abroad, and pitched my workshop for nearly twenty-five years on English soil, you know that I have always remained German in heart and mind. And this I must say for my English friends, that they esteem a German who remains German far more highly than one who wishes to pass himself off as English. An Englishman wishes every man to be what he is. I am, and I always have been, a German living and working in England. The work of my life, the edition of the Rig-Veda, the oldest book of the Indian, ay, of the whole Aryan world, could be carried out satisfactorily nowhere but in England, where the rich collections of Oriental MSS., and the easy communications with India, offer to an Oriental scholar advantages such as no other country can offer. That by living and working in England I have made some sacrifices, that I have lost many advantages which the free intercourse with German scholars in a German

university so richly offers, no one knows better than myself. Whatever I have seen of life, I know of no life more perfect than that of a German professor in a German school or university. You know what Niebuhr thought of such a life, even though he was a Prussian minister and ambassador at Rome. I must read you some of his words, they sound so honest and sincere: 'There is no more grateful, more serene life than that of a German teacher or professor, none that, through the nature of its duties and its work, secures so well the peace of our heart and our conscience. How many times have I deplored it with a sad heart, that I should ever have left that path of life to enter upon a life of trouble which, even at the approach of old age, will probably never give me lasting peace. The office of a schoolmaster, in particular, is one of the most honourable, and despite of all the evils which now and then disturb its ideal beauty, it is for a truly noble heart the happiest path of life. It was the path which I had once chosen for myself, and how I wish I had been allowed to follow it!'

I could quote to you the words of another Prussian ambassador, Bunsen. He, too, often complained with sadness that he had missed his true path in life. He, too, would gladly have exchanged the noisy hotel of the ambassador for the quiet home of a German professor.

From my earliest youth it has been the goal of my life to act as a professor in a German university, and if this dream of my youth was not to be fulfilled in its entirety, I feel all the more grateful that, through the kindness of my friends and German

colleagues, I have been allowed, at least once in my life, to act during the present spring and summer as a real German professor in a German university.

This was in my heart, and I wanted to say it, in order that you might know with what purpose I have come, and with what real joy I begin the work which has brought us together to-day.

I shall lecture during the present term on 'The Results of the Science of Language'; but you will easily understand that to sum up in one course of lectures the results of researches which have been carried on with unflagging industry by three generations of scholars, would be a sheer impossibility. Besides, a mere detailing of results, though it is possible, is hardly calculated to subserve the real objects of academic teaching. You would not be satisfied with mere results; you want to know and to understand the method by which they have been obtained. You want to follow step by step that glorious progress of discovery which has led us to where we stand now. What is the use of knowing the Pythagorean problem, if we cannot prove it? What would be the use of knowing that the French *larme* is the same as the German *Zähre* (tear), if we could not with mathematical exactness trace every step by which these two words have diverged till they became what they are?

The results of the Science of Language are enormous. There is no sphere of intellectual activity which has not felt more or less the influence of this new science. Nor is this to be wondered at. Language is the organ of all knowledge, and though we flatter ourselves that we are the lords of language,

that we handle it as a useful tool, and no more, believe me there are but few who can maintain their complete independence with respect to language, few who can say of her, Ἔχω Λαΐδα οὐκ ἔχομαι. To know language historically and genetically, to be able more particularly to follow up the growth of our technical terms to their very roots, this is in every science the best means to keep up a living connection between the past and the present, the only way to make us feel the ground on which we stand.

Let us begin with what is nearest to us, *Philology*. Its whole character has been changed as if by magic. The two classical languages, Greek and Latin, which looked as if they had fallen from the sky or been found behind a hedge, have now recovered their title-deeds, and have taken their legitimate place in that old and noble family which we call the Indo-European, the Indo-Germanic, or by a shorter if not a better name, the Aryan.[1] In this way not only have their antecedents been cleared up, but their mutual relationship, too, has for the first time been placed in its proper light. The idea that Latin was derived from Greek, an idea excusable in scholars of the Scipionic period, or that Latin was a language made up of Italic, Greek, and Pelasgic elements, a view that had maintained itself to the time of Niebuhr, all this has now been shown to be a physical impossibility. Greek and Latin stand together on terms of perfect equality; they are sisters, like French and Italian:

'Facies non omnibus una,
Nec diversa tamen qualem decet esse sororum.'

[1] Note A, p. 204.

If it could be a scientific question which of the two is the elder sister, Greek or Latin, Latin, I believe, could produce better claims of seniority than Greek. Now, as in the modern history of language we are able to explain many things that are obscure in French and Italian by calling in the Provençal, the Spanish, the Portuguese, nay, even the Wallachian and the Churwälsch, we can do the same in the ancient history of language, and get light for many things which are difficult and unintelligible in Greek and Latin, by consulting Sanskrit, Zend, Gothic, Irish, and even Old Bulgarian. We can hardly form an idea of the surprise which was occasioned among the scholars of Europe by the discovery of the Aryan family of languages, reaching with its branches from the Himalayan mountains to the Pyrenees. Not that scholars of any eminence believed at the end of the last century that Greek and Latin were derived from Hebrew: that prejudice had been disposed of once for all, in Germany at least, by Leibniz. But after that theory had been given up, no new truly scientific theory had taken its place. The languages of the world, with the exception of the Semitic, the family type of which was not to be mistaken, lay scattered about as *disjecta membra poëtæ*, and no one thought of uniting them again into one organic whole. It was the discovery of Sanskrit which led to the re-union of the Aryan languages, and if Sanskrit had taught us nothing else, this alone would establish its claim to a place among the academic sciences of our century.

When Greek and Latin had once been restored to their true place in the natural system of the Aryan

languages, their special treatment, too, became necessarily a different one. In grammar, for instance, scholars were no longer satisfied to give forms and rules, and to place what was irregular by the side of what was regular. They wished to know the reasons of the rules as well as of the exceptions; they asked why the forms were such as they were, and not otherwise; they required not only a logical, but also an historical foundation of grammar. People asked themselves for the first time, why so small a change as *mensa* and *mensæ* could express the difference between one and many tables; why a single letter, like *r*, could possess the charm of changing I love, *amo*, into I am loved, *amor*. Instead of indulging in general speculations on the logic of grammar, the riddles of grammar received their solution from a study of the historical development of language. For every language there was to be an historical grammar, and in this way a revolution was produced in philological studies to be compared only to the revolution produced in chemistry by the discoveries of Lavoisier, or in geology by the theories of Lyell. For instance, instead of attempting an explanation why the genitive singular and the ablative plural of the first and second declensions could express rest in a place—*Romæ*, at Rome; *Tarenti*, at Tarentum; *Athenis*, at Athens; *Gabiis*, at Gabii —one glance at the past history of these languages showed that these so-called genitives were not and never had been genitives, but corresponded to the old locatives in *i* and *su* in Sanskrit. No doubt, a pupil can be made to learn anything that stands in a grammar; but I do not believe that it can conduce

to a sound development of his intellectual powers if he first learns at school the real meaning of the genitive and ablative, and then has to accept on trust that, somehow or other, the same cases may express rest in a place. A well-known English divine, opposed to reform in spelling, as in everything else, once declared that the fearful orthography of English formed the best psychological foundation of English orthodoxy, because a child that had once been brought to believe that t-h-r-o-u-g-h sounded like 'through,' t-h-o-u-g-h like 'though,' r-o-u-g-h like 'rough,' would afterwards believe anything. Be that as it may, I do not consider that grammatical rules like those just quoted on the genitive and ablative assuming the power of the locative, are likely to strengthen the reasoning powers of any schoolboy.

Even more pernicious to the growth of sound ideas was the study of etymology, as formerly carried on in schools and universities. Everything here was left to chance or to authority, and it was not unusual that two or three etymologies of the same word had to be learnt, as if the same word might have had more than one parent. Yet it is many years since Otfried Müller told classical scholars that they must either surrender the whole subject of the historical growth of language, etymology, and grammatical morphology, or trust in these matters entirely to the guidance of Comparative Philology. As a student at Leipzig, I lived to see old Gottfried Hermann quoting the paradigms of Sanskrit grammar in one of his last *Programs*; and Boeckh declared in 1850, at the eleventh meeting of German philologists, that, in the present state of the science

of language, the grammar of the classical languages cannot dispense with the co-operation of comparative grammar. And yet there are scholars even now who would exclude the Science of Language from schools and universities. What gigantic steps truly scientific etymology has made in Greek and Latin, every scholar may see in the excellent works of Curtius and Corssen. The essential difference between the old and the new systems consists here, too, in this, that while formerly people were satisfied if they knew, or imagined they knew, from what source a certain word was derived, little value is now attached to the mere etymology of a word, unless at the same time it is possible to account, according to fixed phonetic laws, for all the changes which a word has undergone in its passage through Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit. How far this conscientiousness may be carried is shown by the fact that the best comparative philologists decline to admit, on phonetic grounds, the identity of such words as the Latin *Deus* and the Greek Θεός, although the strongest internal arguments may be urged in favour of the identity of these words.[1]

Let us go on to *Mythology*. If mythology is an old dialect, outliving itself, and, on the strength of its sacred character, carried on to a new period of language, it is easy to perceive that the historical method of the Science of Language would naturally lead here to most important results. Take only the one fact, which no one at present would dare to question, that the name of the highest deity among the Greeks and Romans, Ζεύς and *Jupiter*, is the

[1] See note B, p. 215.

same as the Vedic Dyaus, the sky, and the old German *Zio*, Old Norse *Týr*, whose name survives in the modern names of *Dienstag*, or *Tuesday*. Does not this one word prove the union of those ancient races? Does it not show us, at the earliest dawn of history, the fathers of the Aryan race, the fathers of our own race, gathered together in the great temple of nature, like brothers of the same house, and looking up in adoration to the sky as the emblem of what they yearned for, a father and a God? Nay, can we not hear in that old name of *Jupiter*, *i.e.* Heaven-Father, the true key-note which still sounds on in our own prayer, 'Our Father which art in heaven,' and which imparts to these words their deepest tone and their fullest import? By an accurate study of these words we are able to draw the bonds of language and belief even more closely together. You know that the nom. sing. of *Ζεύς* has the acute, and so has the nom. sing. of Dyaus; but the vocative of *Ζεύς* has the circumflex, and so has likewise the vocative of Dyaus in the Veda.[1] Formerly the accent might have been considered as something late, artificial, and purely grammatical; the Science of Language has shown that it is as old as language itself, and it has rightly called it the very soul of words. Thus even in these faint pulsations of language, in the changes of accent in Greek and Sanskrit, may we feel the common blood that runs in the veins of the old Aryan dialects.

History, too, particularly the most ancient history, has received new light and life from a comparative study of languages. Nations and languages were in

[1] Note C, p. 220.

ancient times almost synonymous, and what constitutes the ideal unity of a nation lies far more in the intellectual factors, in religion and language, than in common descent and common blood. But for that very reason we must here be most cautious. It is but too easily forgotten that if we speak of Aryan and Semitic families, the ground of classification is language, and language only. There are Aryan and Semitic languages, but it is against all rules of logic to speak, without an expressed or implied qualification, of an Aryan race, of Aryan blood, of Aryan skulls, and to attempt ethnological classification on purely linguistic grounds. These two sciences, the Science of language and the Science of man, cannot, at least for the present, be kept too much asunder; and many misunderstandings, many controversies, would have been avoided, if scholars had not attempted to draw conclusions from language to blood, or from blood to language. When each of these sciences shall have carried out independently its own classification of men and of languages, then, and then only, will it be time to compare their results; but even then, I must repeat, what I have said many times before, it would be as wrong to speak of Aryan blood as of dolichocephalic grammar.[1]

We have all accustomed ourselves to look for the cradle of the Aryan languages in Asia, and to imagine these dialects flowing like streams from the centre of Asia to the South, the West, and the

[1] See M. M.'s *Letter to Chevalier Bunsen, On the Turanian Languages*, 1854, second chapter, second section, 'Ethnology versus Phonology.'

North. I must confess that Professor Benfey's protest against this theory seems to be very opportune, and his arguments in favour of a more northern, if not European, origin of the whole Aryan family of speech, deserve, at all events, far more attention than they have hitherto received.

For the same reasons it seems to me at least a premature undertaking to use the greater or smaller number of coincidences between two or more of the Aryan languages as arguments in support of an earlier or later separation of the people who spoke them. First of all, there are few points on which the opinions of competent judges differ more decidedly than when the exact degrees of relationship between the single Aryan languages have to be settled. There is agreement on one point only, viz. that Sanskrit and Zend are more closely united than any other languages. But though on this point there can hardly be any doubt, no satisfactory explanation of this extraordinary agreement has as yet been given. In fact, it has been doubted whether what I called the 'Southern Division' of the Aryan family could properly be called a division at all, as it consisted only of varieties of one and the same type of Aryan speech. As soon as we go beyond Sanskrit and Zend, the best authorities are found to be in open conflict. Bopp maintained that the Slavonic languages were most closely allied to Sanskrit, an opinion shared by Pott. Grimm, on the contrary, maintained a closer relationship between Slavonic and German. In this view he was supported by Lottner, Schleicher, and others, while Bopp to the last opposed it. After this Schleicher

(as, before him, Newman in England) endeavoured to prove a closer contact between Celtic and Latin and, accepting Greek as most closely united with Latin, he proceeded to establish a South-Western European division, consisting of Celtic, Latin, and Greek, and running parallel with the North-Western division, consisting of Teutonic and Slavonic; or, according to Ebel, of Celtic, Teutonic, and Slavonic.

But while these scholars classed Greek with Latin, others, such as Grassmann and Sonne, pointed out striking peculiarities which Greek shares with Sanskrit, and with Sanskrit only, as, for instance, the augment, the voiceless aspirates, the *alpha privativum* (a, not an), the mâ and *μή prohibitivum*, the tara and *τερο* as the suffix of the comparative, and some others. A most decided divergence of opinion manifested itself as touching the real relation of Greek and Latin. While some regarded these languages not only as sisters, but as twins, others were not inclined to concede to them any closer relationship than that which unites all the members of the Aryan family. While this conflict of opinions lasts (and they are not mere assertions, but opinions supported by arguments), it is clear that it would be premature to establish any historical conclusions, such, for instance, as that the Slaves remained longer united with the Indians and Persians than the Greeks, Romans, Germans, and Celts; or, if we follow Professor Sonne, that the Greeks remained longer united with the Indians than the other Aryan nations.

I must confess that I doubt whether the whole problem admits of a scientific solution. If in a

large family of languages we discover closer coincidences between some languages than between others, this is no more than what we should expect, according to the working of what I call the Dialectic Process. All these languages sprang up and grew and diverged, before they were finally separated; some retained one form, others another, so that even the apparently most distant members of the same family might, on certain points, preserve relics in common which were lost in all the other dialects, and *vice versâ*. No two languages, not even Lithuanian and Old Slavonic, are so closely united as Sanskrit and Zend, which share together even technical terms connected with a complicated sacrificial ceremonial. Yet there are words occurring in Zend, and absent in Sanskrit, which crop up again sometimes in Greek, sometimes in Latin, sometimes in German.[1] As soon as we attempt to draw from such coincidences and divergences historical conclusions as to the earlier or later separation of the nations who developed these languages, we fall into contradictions like those which I pointed out just now between Bopp, Grimm, Schleicher, Ebel, Grassmann, Sonne, and others. Much depends, in all scientific researches, on seeing that the question is properly put. To me the question whether the closer relations between certain independent dialects furnish evidence as to the successive times of their separation seems, by its very nature, fruitless. Nor have the answers been at all satisfactory. After a number of coincidences between the various members of the Aryan family have been carefully collected, we know

[1] Note D, p. 225.

no more in the end than what we knew at first, viz. that all the Aryan dialects are closely connected with each other. We know—

1. That Slavonic is most closely united with German (Grimm, Schleicher);

2. That German is most closely united with Celtic (Ebel, Lottner);

3. That Celtic is most closely united with Latin (Newman, Schleicher);

4. That Latin is most closely united with Greek (Mommsen, Curtius);

5. That Greek is most closely united with Sanskrit (Grassman, Sonne, Kern);

6. That Sanskrit is most closely united with Zend (Burnouf).

Let a mathematician draw out the result, and it will be seen that we know in the end no more than we knew at the beginning. Far be it from me to use a mere trick in arguing, and to say that none of these conclusions can be right, because each is contradicted by others. Quite the contrary. I admit that there is some truth in every one of these conclusions, and I maintain, for that very reason, that the only way to reconcile them all is to admit that the single dialects of the Aryan family did not break off in regular succession, but that, after a long-continued community, they separated slowly, and, in some cases, contemporaneously, from their family-circle, till they established at last, under varying circumstances, their complete national independence. This seems to me all that at present one may say with a good conscience, and all that is really in keeping with the law of development in all dialects.

If now we turn away from the purely philological results of the Science of Language, in order to glance at the advantages which other sciences have derived from it, we shall find that they consist mostly in the light that has been shed on obscure words and old customs. This advantage is greater than, at first sight, it might seem to be. Every word has its history, and the beginning of this history, which is brought to light by etymology, leads us back far beyond its first historical appearance. Every word, as we know, had originally a predicative meaning, and that predicative meaning differs often very considerably from the later traditional or technical meaning. This predicative meaning, however, being the most original meaning of the word, allows us an insight into the most primitive ideas of a nation.

Let us take an instance from jurisprudence. *Pœna*, in classical Latin, means simply punishment, particularly what is either paid or suffered in order to atone for an injury. (*Si injuriam faxit alteri, viginti quinque æris pœnæ sunto:* Fragm. XII. Tab.) The word agrees so remarkably, both in form and meaning, with the Greek ποινή, that Mommsen assigned to it a place in what he calls Græco-Italic ideas.[1] We might suppose, therefore, that the ancient Italians took *pœna* originally in the sense of ransom, simply as a civil act, by which he who had inflicted injury on another was, as far as he and the injured person were concerned, restored *in integrum*. The etymology of the word, however, leads us back into a far

[1] 'Judgment (*crimen*, κρίνειν), penance (*pœna*, ποινή), retribution (*talio*, ταλάω, τλῆναι), are Græco-Italic conceptions.'—Mommsen, *Röm. Geschichte*, vol. i. p. 25.

more distant past, and shows us that when the word *pœna* was first framed, punishment was conceived from a higher moral and religious point of view, as a purification from sin; for *pœna*, as first shown by Professor Pott (and what has he not been the first to show?), is closely connected with the root pu, to purify. Thus we read in the 'Atharva-veda,' xix. 33, 3:

'Tvám bhûmim átyeshi ógasâ
Tvám védyâm sîdasi kârur adhvaré
Tvâm pavítram ríshayo bhárantas
Tvám punîhi durităni asmát,'

'Thou, O God of Fire, goest mightily across the earth; thou sittest brilliantly on the altar at the sacrifice. The prophets carry Thee as the Purifier: purify us from all misdeeds.'

From this root pu we have, in Latin, *pūrus* and *pūtus*, as in *argentum purum putum*, fine silver, or in *purus putus est ipse*, Plaut. Ps. 4, 2, 31. From it we also have the verb *purgare*, for *purigare*, to purge, used particularly with reference to purification from crime by means of religious observances. If this transition from the idea of purging to that of punishing should seem strange, we have only to think of *castigare*, meaning originally to purify, but afterwards in such expressions as *verbis et verberibus castigare*, to chide and to chasten.[1]

[1] Sophus Bugge (Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, 1870, p. 406) derives *pœna* and ποινή from Zend *kaêna*, and this from a root *ki*, Greek τι, in τίνω, etc. If we adopt this etymology, as Curtius does (*Grundzüge*, 5th ed. p. 472), then we must, with Curtius and Pott, take *pœna* as borrowed from Greek, because Latin allows labialisation of *k* under certain restrictions only. In that case, however, we should have to separate *punio* and *pœnitet* from *pœna*; while, if we retain the derivation of all these words from root pu, to purify, all

I cannot convince myself that the Latin *crimen* has anything in common with *κρίνειν*. The Greek *κρίνειν* is no doubt connected with Latin *cer-no*, from which *cri-brum*, sieve. It means to separate, to sift, so that *κριτής* may well signify a judge, and *κρῖμα* a judgment, lit. a sifting, but never a crime or misdeed. *Crīmen*, as every scholar knows or ought to know, meant originally an accusation, not a crime, and, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, has nothing whatever in common with *dis-crīmen*, which means what separates two things, a difference, a critical point. *In crimen venire* means to get into bad repute, to be calumniated; *in discrimine esse* means to be in a critical and dangerous position.

It is one of the fundamental laws of etymology that in tracing words back to their roots, we have to show that their primary, not their secondary meanings agree with the meaning of the root. Therefore even if *crīmen* had assumed in later times the meaning of judgment, yet its derivation from the Greek *κρίνειν* would have to be rejected, because it would explain the secondary only, but not the primary meaning of *crīmen*. Nothing is clearer than the historical development of the meanings of *crīmen*, beginning with accusation, and ending with guilt, while no possible transition of meaning has yet been shown from *cerno*, to separate, to *crīmen*, bad repute.

these difficulties disappear. Possibly, however, *ποινη* may have been originally unconnected with Lat. *pœna*. In Greek, labialisation would be free from objection, and, dialectically at least, *πείσει* occurs in Cyprus instead of *τίσει* (Curtius, p. 472). The Homeric *ἄποινα*, if for *ἀπο-ποινα*, would find an easy explanation in Sk. apa*kiti*. See also Corssen, *Ital. Sprachk.* p. 140.

I believe I have proved that *crīmen* is really and truly the same word as the German *Verleumdung*, calumny.[1] *Verleumdung* comes from *Leumund*, the Old High-German *hliumunt*, and this *hliumunt* is the exact representative of the Vedic sromata, derived from the root sru, to hear, *cluere*, and signifying good report, glory, the Greek κλέος, the Old High-German *hruom*. The German word *Leumund* can be used in a good and a bad sense, as good or evil report, while the Latin *crī-men*, for *croe-men*, like *liber* (for *loeber*) is used *in malam partem* only. It meant originally what is heard, report, *on dit*, gossip, accusation; lastly, the object of an accusation, a crime, but never judgment, in the technical sense of the word.

The only important objection that could be raised against tracing *crīmen* back to the root sru, is that this root has in the North-Western branch of the Aryan family assumed the form clu, instead of cru, as in κλέος, *cliens*, *gloria*, O. Sl. *slovo*, A.S. *hlúd*, loud, *in-clutus*. I myself hesitated for a long time on account of this phonetic difficulty, nor do I think it is quite removed by the fact that Bopp ('Comp. Gr.' § 20) identified the German *scrir-u-més*, we cry (instead of *scriw-u-més*), with Sk. srâv-ayâ-mas, we make hear; nor by the *r* in *in-cre-p-are*, in κράζω, as compared with κλάζω, nor even by the *r* in ἀ-κροά-ομαι, which Curtius seems inclined to derive from sru. The question is whether this phonetic difficulty is such as to force us to surrender the common origin of sromata, *hliumunt*, and *crīmen*; but even if

[1] See my article in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xix. p. 46.

this should be the case, the derivation of *crīmen* from *cerno* or *κρίνειν* would remain as impossible as ever.

This will give you an idea in what manner the Science of Language can open before our eyes a period in the history of law, customs, and manners, which hitherto was either entirely closed, or reached only by devious paths. Formerly, for instance, it was supposed that the Latin word *lex*, law, was connected with the Greek λόγος. This is wrong, for λόγος never means law in the sense in which *lex* does. Λόγος, from λέγειν, to collect, to gather, signifies, like *κατάλογος*, a gathering, a collection, an ordering, be it of words or thoughts. The idea that there is a λόγος, an order or law, for instance, in nature, is not classical, but purely modern. It is not improbable that *lex* is connected with the English word *law*, only not by way of the Norman *loi*. English *law* is A.S. *lagu* (as *saw* corresponds both to the German *Sage* and *Säge*), and it meant originally what was laid down or settled, with exactly the same conception as the German *Gesetz*. It has been attempted to derive the Latin *lex*, too, from the same root, though there is this difficulty, that the root of *liegen* and *legen* does not elsewhere occur in Latin. The mere disappearance of the aspiration would be no serious obstacle. If, however, the Latin *lex* cannot be derived from that root, we must, with Corssen, refer it to the same cluster of words to which *ligare*, to bind, *obligatio*, binding, and the Oscan ablative *lig-ud* belong, and assign to it the original meaning of *bond*. On no account can it be derived from *legere*, to read, as if it meant a bill first read before the people, and afterwards receiving legal sanction by their approval.

From these considerations we gain at least this negative result, that, before their separation, the Aryan languages had no settled word for law; and even such negative results have their importance. The Sanskrit word for law is dharma, derived from dhar, to hold fast. The Greek word is *νόμος*, derived from *νέμειν*, to dispense, from which *Nemesis*, the dispensing deity, and perhaps even *Numa*, the name of the fabulous king and lawgiver of Rome.[1]

Other words might easily be added which, by the disclosure of their original meaning, give us interesting hints as to the development of legal conceptions and customs, such as marriage, inheritance, ordeals, and the like. But it is time to cast a glance at theology, which, more even than jurisprudence, has experienced the influence of the Science of Language. What was said with regard to mythology applies with equal force to theology. Here, too, words harden, and remain unchanged longer even than in other spheres of intellectual life; nay, their influence often becomes greater the more they harden, and the more their original meaning is forgotten. Here it is most important that an intelligent theologian should be able to follow up the historical development of the *termini technici* and *sacrosancti* of his science. Not only words like *priest*, *bishop*, *sacrament*, or *testament*, have to be correctly apprehended in that meaning which they had in the first century, but expressions like *λόγος*, *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*, *δικαιοσύνη* have to be traced historically to the beginnings of Christianity, and beyond, if we wish to gain a conception of their full purport.

[1] On *ṛita* as an old name of law and order, see M.M., *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 237 *seq.*

In addition to this, the philosophy of religion, which must always form the true foundation of theological science, owes it to the Science of Language that the deepest germs of the consciousness of God among the different nations of the world have for the first time been laid open. We know now with perfect certainty that the names—that is, the most original conceptions—of the Deity among the Aryan nations are as widely removed from coarse fetishism as from abstract idealism. The Aryans, as far as the annals of their language allow us to see, recognised the presence of the Divine in the bright and sunny aspects of nature, and they, therefore, called the blue sky, the fertile earth, the genial fire, the bright day, the golden dawn their Devas—that is, their bright ones. The same word, Deva in Sanskrit, *Deus* in Latin, remained unchanged in all their prayers, their rites, their superstitions, their philosophies, and even to-day it rises up to heaven from thousands of churches and cathedrals—a word which, before there were Brahmans or Germans, had been framed in the dark workshop of the Aryan mind.

That the natural sciences, too, should have felt the electric shock of our new science is not surprising, considering that man is the crown of nature, the apex to which all other forces of nature point and tend. But that which makes man man, is language. *Homo animal rationale, quia orationale* as Hobbes said. Buffon called the plant a sleeping animal; living philosophers speak of the animal as a dumb man. Both, however, forget that the plant would cease to be a plant if it awoke, and that the brute would cease to be a brute the moment it began to

speak. There is, no doubt, in language a transition from the material to the spiritual: the raw material of language belongs to nature, but the form of language, that which really makes language, belongs to the spirit. Were it possible to trace human language *directly* back to natural sounds, to interjections or imitations, the question whether the Science of Language belongs to the sphere of the natural or the historical sciences would at once be solved. But I doubt whether this crude view of the origin of language counts one single supporter in Germany. With one foot language stands, no doubt, in the realm of nature, but with the other it stands in the realm of spirit. Some years ago, when I thought it necessary to bring out as clearly as possible the much-neglected natural element in language, I tried to explain in what sense the Science of Language had a right to be called the last and the highest of the natural sciences. But I need hardly say that I did not lose sight, therefore, of the intellectual and historical character of language; and I may here express my conviction that the Science of Language will yet enable us to withstand the extreme theories of the evolutionists, and to draw a hard and fast line between spirit and matter, between man and brute.

This short survey must suffice to show you how omnipresent the Science of Language has become in all spheres of human knowledge, and how far its limits have been extended, so that it often seems impossible for one man to embrace the whole of its vast domain. From this I wish, in conclusion, to draw some necessary advice.

Whoever devotes himself to the study of so com-

prehensive a science must try never to lose sight of two virtues: conscientiousness and modesty. The older we grow, the more we feel the limits of human knowledge. 'Good care is taken,' as Goethe said, 'that trees should not grow into the sky.' Every one of us can make himself real master of a small field of knowledge only, and what we gain in extent, we inevitably lose in depth. It was impossible that Bopp should know Sanskrit like Colebrooke, Zend like Burnouf, Greek like Hermann, Latin like Lachmann, German like Grimm, Slavonic like Miklosich, Celtic like Zeuss. That drawback lies in the nature of all comparative studies. But it follows by no means that, as the French proverb says, *qui trop embrasse, mal étreint.* Bopp's 'Comparative Grammar' will always mark an epoch in linguistic studies, and no one has accused the old master of superficiality. There are, in fact, two kinds of knowledge: the one which we take in as real nourishment, which we convert *in succum et sanguinem*, which is always present, which we can never lose; the other which, if I may say so, we put into our pockets, in order to find it there whenever it is wanted. For comparative studies the second kind of knowledge is as important as the first, but in order to use it properly, the greatest conscientiousness is required. Not only ought we, whenever we have to use it, to go back to the original sources, to accept nothing on trust, to quote nothing at second-hand, and to verify every single point before we rely on it for comparative purposes, but, even after we have done everything to guard against error, we ought to proceed with the greatest caution and modesty. I consider, for in-

stance, that an accurate knowledge of Sanskrit is a *conditio sine quâ non* in the study of Comparative Philology. According to my conviction, though I know it is not shared by others, Sanskrit must for ever remain the central point of our studies. But it is clearly impossible for us, while engaged in a scholarlike study of Sanskrit, to follow at the same time the gigantic strides of Latin, Greek, German, Slavonic, and Celtic philology. Here we must learn to be satisfied with what is possible, and apply for advice, whenever we want it, to those who are masters in these different departments of philology. Much has of late been said of the antagonism between comparative and classical philology. To me it seems that these two depend so much on each other for help and advice that their representatives ought to be united by the closest ties of fellowship. We must work on side by side, and accept counsel as readily as we give it. Without the help of Comparative Philology, for instance, Greek scholars would never have arrived at a correct understanding of the digamma—nay, a freer intercourse with his colleague, Bopp, would have preserved Bekker from several mistakes in his restoration of the digamma in Homer. Latin scholars would have felt far more hesitation in introducing the old *d* of the ablative in Plautus,[1] if the analogy of Sanskrit had not so clearly proved its legitimacy.

On the other hand, we, comparative philologists, should readily ask and gladly accept the advice and help of our classical colleagues. Without their

[1] Note E, p. 228.

guidance, we can never advance securely: their warnings are to us of the greatest advantage, their approval our best reward. We are often too bold, we do not see all the difficulties that stand in the way of our speculations, we are too apt to forget that, in addition to its general Aryan character, every language has its own peculiar genius. Let us all be on our guard against omniscience and infallibility. Only through a frank, honest, and truly brotherly co-operation can we hope for a true advancement of knowledge. We all want the same thing; we all are *etymologists*—that is, lovers of truth. For this, before all things, the spirit of truth, which is the living spirit of all science, must dwell within us. Whoever cannot yield to the voice of truth, whoever cannot say, 'I was wrong,' knows little as yet of the true spirit of science.

Allow me, in conclusion, to recall to your remembrance another passage from Niebuhr. He belongs to the good old race of German scholars. 'Above all things,' he writes, 'we must in all scientific pursuits preserve our truthfulness so pure that we thoroughly eschew every false appearance; that we represent not even the smallest thing as certain of which we are not completely convinced; that if we have to propose a conjecture, we spare no effort in representing the exact degree of its probability. If we do not ourselves, when it is possible, indicate our errors, even such as no one else is likely to discover; if, in laying down our pen, we cannot say in the sight of God, "Upon strict examination, I have knowingly written nothing that is not true;" and if, without deceiving either ourselves or others,

we have not presented even our most odious opponents in such a light only that we could justify it upon our death-beds—if we cannot do this, study and literature serve only to make us unrighteous and sinful.'

Few, I fear, could add, with Niebuhr: 'In this I am convinced that I do not require from others anything of which a higher spirit, if he could read my soul, could convict me of having done the contrary.' But all of us, young as well as old, should keep these words before our eyes and in our hearts. Thus, and thus only, will our studies not miss their highest goal: thus, and thus only, may we hope to become true etymologists—*i.e.* true lovers, seekers, and, I trust, finders of truth.

NOTES.

NOTE A.

Aryan as a Technical Term.

As I am chiefly responsible for the use of the term Aryan in the technical sense of Indo-European, and as that term has not yet been so generally received in Germany as in England and France, I subjoin some remarks in justification of it, which were published some years ago in the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

Friedrich Schlegel, who first recognised the family relationship of the Aryan languages (*Die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, 1808), assigned to them the name of *Indo-Germanic*, a name still used by preference by Pott, Benfey, and other German scholars. Bopp (*Vergleichende Grammatik*, vol. i. p. xxiv.) decided in favour of *Indo-European* as a more appropriate name for that large family of speech. Other scholars have used the names *Japhetic*, *Sanskritic* (W. von Humboldt), and *Mediterranean* (Ewald).

The objection to *Indo-Germanic* as the technical name of the whole family is that it is too long, and yet not sufficiently extensive. If the family is to be distinguished by the names of its two extreme members, the name ought to be *Indo-Celtic*, rather than Indo-Germanic; if by its most important members, then, as remarked by Bopp, the name should be *Indo-Classic*. *Indo-European* is an equally cumbersome name, and less correct even than Indo-Germanic, considering that there are many languages spoken

both in India and Europe which do not belong to the Aryan family. *Sanskritic* would be a misleading name, as countenancing the idea that all the members of this family are derived from Sanskrit. *Japhetic* seems to revive the Jewish conception of the three ancestors of the human race, *Shem*, *Ham*, and *Japhet*, and would, from the strictly Hebrew point of view, comprehend many tribes in the north of Asia and Europe who speak Turanian languages. Ewald, who suggested the name of *Mediterranean*, distinguishes, besides the Mediterranean, three other families of speech, the *Northern*, commonly called North Turanian or Altaic, the *Semitic*, and the *Copto-African*. He explains the name of Mediterranean by saying, that 'the races speaking these languages inhabited the large central circle, surrounded by Semitic, South-Indian, Chinese, Turko-Tartaric, and Bask languages' (*Lehrbuch der Hebräischen Sprache*, p. 17, note). The reason why this name has not been accepted seems to be that locality has little to do with the essential character of languages, and that the central position once occupied by the people who spoke these tongues, belongs to them no longer.

Aryan, as a name for a whole family of languages, has the advantage of being short, and, being a word of foreign origin, of lending itself more easily to any technical definition that may be assigned to it. It has been accepted by many writers in England, France, and India. In Germany, too, it is used in this wide sense by Lassen and others. Some scholars have used the term in the more restricted sense of *Indo-Iranian—i.e.* as comprehending the languages of India and Persia, which constitute the south-eastern as distinct from the north-western (Greek, Latin, Celtic, Teutonic, Slavonic) branch of the family; while *Eranian* has, through Spiegel, become the recognised name for Persian, as distinguished from Indian.

Origin of the Word.—Aryan, as a technical term, has been borrowed from the Sanskrit arya or ârya, the Zend

airya. In the later Sanskrit ârya means, of a good family, and is used as a complimentary title. Originally, however, it was used as a national name, and even as late as the time of the Laws of Manu, India is still called Âryâvarta, *i.e.* the abode of the Âryas. In the Veda, Ârya is the name by which the believers in the gods of the Veda call themselves in opposition to their enemies, who are called Dâsas or Dasyus. The distinction appears in passages such as the following:—

I. 51, 8. 'Distinguish, Indra, the Âryâs and those who are Dasyus' (ví *g*ânîhi ấryân yé *k*a dásyava*h*).

X. 86, 19. 'I, Indra, distinguishing the Dâsa and the Arya' (vi*k*inván dấsam ấryam).

We frequently read of the gods protecting the Ârya and destroying his enemies.

III. 34, 9. 'Indra, having killed the Dasyus, protected the Âryan colour' (hatví dásyûn prá ấryam vár*n*am âvat). This looks like an ethnological distinction of colour between Âryas and Dasyus.

X. 49, 3. 'I (Indra) who do not give over the Âryan name to the Dasyu' (ná yá*h* raré ấryam nấma dasyáve).

In X. 11, 4, we read of Âryan clans, âryâ*h* v*í*sa*h*.

I. 103, 3. 'Indra, increase the Âryan power' (ấryam sáha*h* vardhaya).

VIII. 103, 1. 'Agni, the increaser of the Arya' (Âryasya várdhanam).

VII. 18, 7. 'Indra, the companion of the Ârya' (sadhamấ*h* ấryasya).

I. 130, 8. 'Indra protected in battles the Âryan sacrificer' (Índra*h* samátsu yá*g*amânam ấryam prá âvat).

The gods, it is said, bring light for the Ârya.

I. 59, 2. 'Agni is made a light for the Ârya' (tám tvâ devấsa*h* a*g*anayanta devám vai*s*vánara *g*yóti*h* ít ấryâya); or, 'Agni creates broad light for the Ârya, driving the Dasyus from the house' (VII. 5, 6).

II. 11, 18. 'Thou (Indra) uncoveredst the light for the

Arya, the Dasyu was left on the left hand' (ápa avrinoḥ gyótiḥ ấryâya ní savyatáḥ sâdi dásyuḥ indra).

IV. 26, 2. 'I gave the earth to the Ârya, and rain to the liberal mortal' (Ahám bhûmim adadâm ấryâya ahám vrishtím dâsúshe mártyâya).

I. 117, 21. 'The two Asvins have made the light wide for the Ârya' (urú gyótiḥ kakrathuḥ ấryâya).

That light itself, the light of the day or the daily light and life, are called the Âryan light, X. 43, 4; and some of the gods, too, are addressed by the name of Ârya. In V. 34, 6, we read of Indra, 'that he, the Ârya, leads the Dâsa, according to his will' (yathâvasám nayati dấsam ấryaḥ). In X. 138, 3, too, Indra seems to be called by that name.

Most frequently, no doubt, the Ârya is conceived as the worshipper of the gods. He was called so in I. 130, 8; again in I. 156, 5, Ârya and Yagamâna, sacrificer, are mentioned together.

In IX. 63, 5, the Ârya is opposed to the árâvân, the enemy, the man who offers no sacrifices; and I. 51, 8, the same distinction is drawn between the barhíshmat, the sacrificer or Ârya, and the avratá, the lawless, the Dasyu.

But the enemies of the poets and their friends are not only among the Dasyus, but also among the Âryas, and in their tribal feuds one Ârya speaks of the other as adeva, godless, in the original sense of the word. Thus we read:—

X. 102, 3. 'Turn away the weapon of the Dâsa or the Ârya' (dấsasya vâ maghavan ấryasya vâ sanutáḥ yavaya vadhám).

X. 83, 1. 'Let us withstand the Dâsa, the Ârya, with thee as helper' (sahyấma dấsam ấryam tváyâ yugâ).

VI. 33, 3. 'Thou, O hero, struckest these two enemies, the Dâsa fiends and the Ârya' (tvám tấn indra ubháyân amítrân dấsâ vritrấṇi ấryâ ka sûra vádhîḥ).

VI. 60, 6. 'They (Indra and Agni) kill the Ârya fiends, they kill the Dâsa fiends, they strike off all haters (fem.)' (hatáḥ *vritrâṇi* âryâ hatáḥ dâsâṇi sátpatî hatáḥ *vi*svâḥ ápa dvisha*ḥ*).

Similar passages, mentioning Ârya and Dâsa enemies, occur, VI. 22, 10; VII. 83, 1; X. 69, 6, &c. In VIII. 24, 27, the Ârya enemy is contrasted with the *ri*ksha, literally, the bear.

The Ârya enemy is called godless in X. 38, 3, 'Whatever Dâsa or godless Ârya means to fight us' (yáḥ naḥ dâsa*ḥ* ârya*ḥ* vâ purustuta ádeva*ḥ* indra yudháye *kí*ketati).

Lastly, Ârya means in some passages what befits or belongs to an Ârya, what is proper and right.

X. 65, 11. 'The gods spread all over the earth the Âryan laws' (sudânava*ḥ*, âryâ *vratâ* vi *srigán*ta*ḥ* ádhi kshámi).

In IX. 63, 14, the sacred receptacles of the Soma are called ârya (eté dhâmâni âryâ *sukrâ*ḥ *ri*tásya dhârayâ *vâg*am gómantam aksharan).

It is clear from these passages that Ârya is one of the oldest names by which people belonging to this great family of speech called themselves in distinct opposition to their enemies. It is admitted also that the Veda, in which this name occurs, surpasses in antiquity every other literary document belonging to the same race, and it would be difficult, therefore, to find another name better adapted to serve as a technical term for the whole Aryan family of languages.

As Ârya had become a proper name as early as the poems of the Veda, its original and etymological meaning would be of little consequence, had it not been used as an additional argument both in favour of and against the technical use of Ârya. Professor Bopp derived âryа from the root ar, to go, or even from ar*k*, to venerate. The former etymology would give no adequate sense: the latter is impossible. Lassen explains âryа as adeundus, like

âkârya, teacher. But in explaining ărya, it must be remembered that it cannot be separated from árya, with a short a, and that, in consequence, no etymology of ărya can be entertained which does not at the same time account for árya. This word is used in the Yagurveda in exactly the same sense as ărya in the Rig-veda. Thus we read, Vâgasaneyi-Samhitâ, XX. 17, 'Whatever sin we have committed against an Arya, or against a Sûdra' (yák khûdré yád árye yád énas kakrimâ vayám).

Here Arya is used in opposition to Sûdra, as Ârya was used in the Rig-Veda in opposition to Dâsa. In the Rig-veda, too, we find at least some traces of arya, used in the sense of ârya, and in opposition to dâsa, viz. in the compound aryá-patnî, having an Arya as husband, as opposed to dâsá-patnî, having a Dâsa as husband.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that ărya, the word which, as soon as the system of the four castes became more firmly established, took the technical meaning of 'belonging to the three upper castes,' viz. the Brâhmanas, Kshatriyas, and Vaisyas, came from ărya, and that in ărya must be discovered the original etymological meaning of the word.

Here it is of great importance to observe, that ărya is not only used as a comprehensive title of the three upper castes, but also as the special name of one of them, viz. the third caste, the householders or cultivators of the soil.

In Vâg.-Samhitâ, XXVI. 2, it can mean nothing but Vaiśya, a man of the third class, for it is used together with Brahman, Râganya, and Sûdra. It is therefore not the commentator only, as Dr. Roth says, who here gives the meaning of Vaiśya to the word árya, but the context itself demands that meaning. This meaning is still clearer in a passage from the Lâtyâyana Sûtras, IV. 3, 6. Here it is said that some sacrificial act should be performed, primarily by an Ărya, but if no Ărya is forthcoming, then by any Ârya, *i.e.* either by a Brâhmana or

Kshatriya (Aryâbhâve ya*h* kas *k*âryo var*n*a*h*. Comment, yadi vai*s*yo na labhyate ya*h* kas *k*âryo va*r*na*h* syât, brâhma*n*o vâ kshatriyo vâ).

Pâ*n*ini (III. 1, 103) distinctly ascribes to árya the meaning of Vai*s*ya and master; in IV. 1, 49, the 7th Vârttika distinguishes between Arya and Kshatriya; and what is still more important, both the author of a Vârttika to Pâ*n*., III. 1, 103, and the author of the Phit-sûtras, state that when árya means Vai*s*ya, it has the accent on the first syllable, like ấrya.

Having thus traced the connection of ấrya and árya, both in form and meaning, we have now to consider how árya came to mean Vai*s*ya. Vaí*s*ya is formed from vi*s*, house, settlement, like ấrya and árya, from ar. We have also ve*s*yã*m* in the Veda, meaning, as it seems, family or clan. Vai*s*ya meant a householder, and vi*s* also, plural vi*s*a*h*, is frequently used in the Veda as a name for people. Other old names for people in the Veda are kshiti, a dwelling and a dweller, from kshi, to dwell; Greek, κτι in ἀμφι-κτίονες; or k*r*i*s*hti, ploughing or ploughers.

If, therefore, there was a Sanskrit word AR, meaning earth, then árya, in the sense of landholder, or country-man, would have been formed regularly like kshámya, χθόνιος, from kshám, χθών, earth; like gávya, from go, cow, nárya, from nár, man. It is true that AR, in the sense of earth, does not occur in Sanskrit; but that such a word once existed is proved by its derivatives. The Greek ἔρα in ἔραζε would correspond to a Sanskrit irâ, which irâ, again, stands to ir, like kshudhâ, hunger, to kshudh. Finally, ir must be traced back to a radical ar, the change of a to i being analogous to that of Sk. pitar, father, as compared with πατήρ, *pater*, Goth. *fadar*.

The question now arises, whether irâ or ir ever occurs in Sanskrit as a name of earth. The native dictionaries, such as the Amarakosha, assign that meaning to irâ, and

to ilâ, and the latter form occurs in the famous name of Ilâvṛita (explained as ilâ pṛithivî vṛitâ yena), the district of *Ilâ*, the centre of Gambudvîpa or India, Gambudvîpa itself being the centre of the seven great continents of the world (Vishṇu-Purâṇa, B. II. cap. 2).

In the Rig-veda irâ occurs but once, and there, V. 83, 4, it has the meaning of food springing from the earth. 'Food is produced for every being, when Parganya quickens the earth with seed' (irâ viśvasmai bhúvanâya gâyate yát pargányaḥ pṛithivîm rétasâ ávati).

Here irâ cannot mean simply 'a liquid, a draught, feast, particularly a draught of milk;' for the simile shows that the rain is taken as seed, and that from it the food (irâ) is supposed to spring (gâyate).

In another passage in the Atharva-veda, IV. 11, 10, irâ may mean earth, but the sense is doubtful. If it be asked how irâ, originally meaning earth, could take the meaning of food, we must remember the tendency of ancient language to mix up cause and effect, the producer and the produced. Irâ, meaning originally earth, would be used in many circumstances as the food and sustenance supplied by the earth, just as gauḥ, cow, in the Veda is used, not only for milk, but even for leather.

The adjective irâvat means possessed of nourishment, nourishing. Anira means without food, and anirâ amîvâ seems to be a name for famine. In one place Rig-veda, IX. 97, 17, ílâvat stands for írâvat; vṛishṭím naḥ arsha divyâm gigatnúm ílâvatîm, 'Give us the heavenly, streaming, fruitful rain.'

Considering the antiquity of the name arya, we may refer its origin to a period in the history of the Aryan language, when the primitive substantive ar was still used instead of the later *arâ, irâ, ἐρα. As from χαμᾶζε we should be justified in postulating the former existence, not only of χαμᾶ, earth, but even of a more primitive substantive χαμ, which is actually preserved in χθών, so from

ἔραζε, we conclude the former existence not only of ἔρα, but also of a substantive ἐρ, Sk. ar.

Whether ărya means born of the earth, or holding, cultivating, possessing the earth, in either case such a name finds ample analogies in the names by which the early dwellers on the earth spoke of themselves. It is not in modern languages only that people call those of their own country *Landsmann*, countryman, but in Greek, too, γηίτης is used in that sense, while γείτ-ων, equally derived from γῆ, means neighbour. The Latin *vicinus*, neighbour, is derived from *vicus*, the Greek, οἶκος, the Sanskrit, vesa; all connected with the Sanskrit vis, dwelling or dweller, the synonym of ărya in Sanskrit. In Gothic, *gaujan*, a countryman, is derived from *gauja*, land, probably connected with χαμ in χαμ-ᾶ-ζε. Connected with this same χαμ (χθών, χθαμαλός) is the Gothic guma(n), man; Lithuanian, *zmón-es*, plur., men; and the Latin, *hemōnes* (*ne-hemo=nemo*), and *homines*, men, a word not derived from *humus*, but from an older nominal base, *ham*, *hem*, or *hom*.

Mythology also supplies several instances showing that man was conceived as born of the earth, the son and then the lord of the earth, made of dust, and meant to 'till the ground from whence he was taken.' Erechtheus or Erichthonios (both chtheus and chthonios point to χαμ), the national hero of the Athenians, worshipped in the oldest shrine on the Acropolis, was represented as γηγενής or αὐτόχθων (Her. VIII. 55), while Homer (Il. II. 548) says of him that the Earth bore him (τέκε δὲ ζείδωρος ἄρουρα). Hellen is the son of Pyrrha, and Pyrrha, the red, was the oldest name of Thessaly. The Germans derive their race from Mannus, who was the son of Tuisco, the heavenly, who was the son of the Earth.

The root AR, which as a substantive supplied the oldest names for the ploughed earth, expresses in its verbal application the meaning of ploughing, at least among the mem-

bers of the north-western branch, Gr., ἄρο-τρον, ἀρο-τήρ, ἀρό-ω; Lat., *ar-ā-re*, *ar-ā-trum*, *ar-ā-tor*; Goth., *ar-jan*, to ear; Lith., *ar-ti*, to plough; Old Slav., *oralo*, plough; Irish, *airim*, I plough, *arathar*, plough. In the south-eastern branch it took the technical meaning of ploughing the sea, Sanskrit, ari-tram, meaning rudder, never plough (*cf.* κύματα τέμνειν and ἄρουραν τέμνειν). The original meaning of the root AR was probably that of moving, stirring up, and though we ought not to derive *ar, *arā, irā, ἔρα, from a root AR, restricted to the definite meaning of to plough, as little as *homo* should be derived from *humus*, we may well understand how AR, as the broken, reclaimed, arable land, could be used, even before the Aryan separation, as one of the names of earth.

The common etymology which would assign to ā́rya the meaning of 'belonging to the faithful' (Roth) is untenable, because aryá, with the short a and accent on the last syllable, never means faithful or devoted, and it is extremely doubtful whether arí, from which aryá is said to be derived, occurs anywhere in the Veda with the meaning of desirous, devoted, or faithful. But even if it did, it would be impossible to leave out of consideration the name árya, meaning simply landholder, Vaisya, without any admixture of the meaning of faithful or devoted. The national name, ā́rya, comes directly from this árya, landholder, and árya, landholder, comes from ar, land, not from ari, which means enemy. To distinguish aryá, as a term of honour, in the sense of lord or master, from árya, the mere appellative, a change of accent was admitted, which is recognised by the earliest grammarians who mention aryá, lord, as distinguished from árya, landlord, while no native authority ever assigns to arya, still less to ari, the meaning of faithful.

Arya and Ârya, as national names, can be traced from India to Persia. In the Avesta, airya means venerable, and is at the same time the name of the people. The first

country created by Ormuzd or Ahuramazda is called in the Avesta, Airyanem vaêgô, *Arianum semen*. The whole extent of country occupied by the worshippers of Ormuzd is also called Airyâ. As opposed to the Aryan clans (airyâo dainhâvô), we hear in the Avesta of the un-Aryan clans (anairyâo dainhâvô), and the same name is contained in the Ἀναριάκαι of Strabo, a people and town on the frontiers of Hyrcania. Greek geographers use the name of Ariana in a wider sense than the Avesta. All the country between the Indian Ocean in the south and the Indus on the east, the Hindu-Kush and Paropamisus in the north, the Caspian gates, Karamania, and the mouth of the Persian Gulf in the west, is included by Strabo under the name of Ariana. Bactria is called by him the ornament of the whole of Ariana. As the Zoroastrian religion spread westward, Persia, Elymais, and Media, all claimed the Aryan title. Hellanicus, who wrote before Herodotus, gives Aria as a name of Persia. Herodotus attests that the Medians were called Arii; and for the northernmost part of Media, Atropatene, the name of Ariana has been preserved by Stephanus Byzantinus. Even Elymais has been supposed to be derived from Ailama, a modification of Airyama. That airya was considered a name of honour we see from the cuneiform inscriptions. There Darius calls himself Ariya and Ariyakitra, an Aryan, and of Aryan descent. The same element enters into many historical Persian names, Ariaramnes, Ariobarzanes, &c. When after centuries of foreign invasion and occupation Persia rose once more under the sceptre of the Sassanians to the rank of a national kingdom, the kings, the worshippers of Masdanes, called themselves again in their inscriptions, Kings of the Aryan and un-Aryan races, Irân va Anirân, Ἀριάνων καὶ Ἀναριάνων. Hence the modern name of Persia, Irân.

In the name of Armenia the same element of arya has been supposed to exist. The old name of the country is

Armina, and its etymology is doubtful. In the language of Armenia, however, ari exists, used in the widest sense for Aryan or Iranian, and also with the meaning of brave.

More westward still traces of the name have been discovered in Aghovan, the name of the Albanians on the border of the Caspian Sea, the gh being the true representative of an original r or l. In the Caucasus itself the only clan speaking an Iranian language, the Os of Ossethi, call themselves Iron.

Along the Caspian and in the country washed by the Oxus and Yaxartes, Aryan and non-Aryan tribes were mingled together. Their wars find their poetical record in the Persian epic, the Shahnameh, describing the feuds and friendships between Iran and Turan. Many Scythian names, preserved by Greek writers, have an Aryan character. Beyond the Oxus, in Transoxiana, too, people are mentioned under the name of Ariacæ and Antariani. Here, however, all certain traces of the word, as a geographical term, vanish. We have, indeed, Aria as an old name of Thrace, and on the Vistula we meet a German tribe called Arii; but nothing is known of the origin of these names, and no conclusions should be built on them.

It should be mentioned that some scholars (Curtius) connect the Greek ἄριστος with Sanskrit arya, though deriving it from a different root; while others (Pictet) recognise arya in the Irish *er*, good, brave, hero.

NOTE B.

Θεός AND *Deus*.

THAT Greek θ does not legitimately represent a Sanskrit, Latin, Slavonic, and Celtic *d* is a fact that ought never to have been overlooked by comparative philologists, and

nothing could be more useful than the strong protest entered by Windischmann, Schleicher, Curtius, and others, against the favourite identification of Sk. deva, *deus*, and θεός. Considering it as one of the first duties, in all etymological researches, that we should pay implicit obedience to phonetic laws, I have hardly ever, so far as I remember, quoted θεός as phonetically identical with *deus*, together with the other derivatives of the root div, such as Dyaus, Ζεύς, *Jupiter*, deva, Lith. *deva-s*, Irish *día*.

But with all due respect for phonetic laws, I have never in my own heart doubted that θεός belonged to the same cluster of words which the early Aryans employed to express the brightness of the sky and of the day, and which helped them to utter their first conception of a god of the bright sky (Dyaus), of bright beings in heaven, as opposed to the powers of night and darkness and winter (deva), and, lastly, of deity in the abstract.[1] I have never become an atheist; and though I did not undervalue the powerful arguments advanced against the identity of *deus* and θεός, I thought that other arguments also possessed their value, and could not be ignored with impunity. If, with our eyes shut, we submit to the dictates of phonetic laws, we are forced to believe that while the Greeks shared with the Hindus, the Italians, and Germans the name for the bright god of the sky, Ζεύς, Dyaus, *Jovis*, *Zio*, and while they again shared with them such derivatives as δῖος, heavenly, Sk. divyas, they threw away the intermediate old Aryan word for god, deva, *deus*, and formed a new one from a different root, but agreeing with the word which they had rejected in all letters but one. I suppose that even the strongest supporters of the atheistic theory would have accepted δεός, if it existed in Greek, as a correlative of deva and *deus*; and I ask, would it not be an almost incredible coincidence, if the Greeks, after giving up the common Aryan word, which would have

[1] *Lectures on the Science of Language*, vol. ii. p. 467.

been δοFός or δειFός or δεFός, had coined a new word for god from a different root, yet coming so near to δεFός as θεFός? These internal difficulties seem to me nearly as great as the external; at all events it would not be right to attempt to extenuate either.

Now, I think that, though much has been said against θεός for δεFός, something may also be said in support of δεFός assuming the form of θεός. Curtius is quite right in repelling all arguments derived from Sk. duhitar =θυγάτηρ, or Sk. dvâr=θύρ-α; but I think he does not do full justice to the argument derived from φιάλη and φιαρός. The Greek φιάλη has been explained as originally πιFάλη, the lost digamma causing the aspiration of the initial π. Curtius says: 'This etymology of φιάλη is wrecked on the fact that in Homer the word does not mean a vessel for drinking, but a kind of kettle.' This is true, but the fact remains that in later Greek φιάλη means a drinking-cup. Thus Pindar ('Isthm.' v. 58) says:

> Ἄνδωκε δ' αὐτῷ φέρτατος
> οἰνοδόκον φιάλαν χρυσῷ πεφρικνῖαν Τελαμών,

which refers clearly to a golden goblet, and not to a kettle. Besides, we have an exactly analogous case in the Sk. pâtram. This, too, is clearly derived from pâ, to drink, but it is used far more frequently in the sense of vessel in general, and its etymological meaning vanishes altogether when it comes to mean a vessel for something, or even a fit person. I see no etymology for φιάλη, except πιFάλη, a drinking-vessel.

Secondly, as to φιαρός, which is supposed to be the same as πιαρός, and to represent the Sanskrit pîvaras, fat, Curtius says that it occurs in Alexandrian poets only, that it there means bright, resplendent, and is used as an adjective of the dawn, while πιαρός means fat, and fat only. Against this I venture to remark, first, that there are passages where φιαρός means sleek, as in Theocr. ii. 21, φιαρωτέρα ὄμφακος ὠμᾶς, said of a young plump girl, who in

Sanskrit would be called pîvarî; secondly, that while πῖαρ is used for cream, φιαρός is used as an adjective of cream; and, thirdly, that the application of φιαρός to the dawn is hardly surprising, if we remember the change of meaning in λιπαρός in Greek, and the application in the Veda of such words as ghṛ́ta-pratîka to the dawn. Lastly, as in φιάλη, I see no etymology for φιαρός except πιϝαρός.

I think it is but fair, therefore, to admit that θεός for δεϝός would find some support by the analogy of φιάλη for πιϝάλη, and of φιαρός for πιϝαρός. There still remain difficulties enough to make us cautious in asserting the identity of θεός and *deus*; but in forming our own opinion these difficulties should be weighed impartially against the internal difficulties involved in placing θεός, as a totally independent word, by the side of deva and *deus*. And, as in φιάλη and φιαρός, may we not say of θεός also, that there is no etymology for it if we separate it from Ζεύς and δῖος, from Dyaus and divyas? Curtius himself rejects Plato's and Schleicher's derivation of θεός from θέω, to run; likewise C. Hoffmann's from dhava, man; likewise Bühler's from a root dhi, to think or to shine; likewise that of Herodotus and A. Göbel from θες, a secondary form of θε, to settle. Ascoli's analysis is highly sagacious, but it is too artificial. Ascoli[1] identifies θεός, not with deva, but with divyá-s. Divyás becoming διϝεός (like satya, ἐτεός), the accent on the last syllable would produce the change to δϝεό-ς, ϝ would cause aspiration in the preceding consonant and then disappear, leaving θεός=divyás. All these changes are just possible phonetically, but, as Curtius observes, the chief point for which the theists contend is not gained, for we should still have to admit that the Greeks lost the common word for god, deva and *deus*, and that they alone replaced it by a derivative divya, meaning heavenly, not bright.

[1] *Rendiconti del Reale Istituto Lombardo*, classe di lettere, iv. fasc. 6.

Curtius himself seems in favour of deriving *θεός* from *θες*, to implore, which we have in *θεσ-σάμενοι*, *θέσσαντο*, *πολύθεστος*, etc. *Θεός*, taken as a passive derivative, might, he thinks, have the meaning of *ἀρητός* in *πολυάρητος*, and mean the implored being. I cannot think that this is a satisfactory derivation. It might be defended phonetically and etymologically, though I cannot think of any analogous passive derivatives of a root ending in *s*. Where it fails to carry conviction is in leaving unexplained the loss of the common Aryan word for deity, and in putting in its place a name that savours of very modern thought.

I think the strongest argument against the supposed aspirating power of medial *v*, and its subsequent disappearance, lies in the fact that there are so many words having medial *v* which show no traces of this phonetic process (Curtius, p. 507). On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the Greeks might have felt a natural objection to the forms which would have rendered deva with real exactness, I mean *δοιός* or *δέος*, the former conveying the meaning of double, the latter of fear. A mere wish to keep the name for god distinct from these words might have produced the phonetic anomaly of which we complain; and, after all, though I do not like to use that excuse, there are exceptions to phonetic laws. No one can fully explain how *ὄγδοος* was derived from *ὀκτώ*, or *ἕβδομος* from *ἑπτά*, yet the internal evidence is too strong to be shaken by phonetic objections. In the case of *θεός* and *deus* the internal evidence seems to me nearly as strong as in *ὄγδοος* and *ἕβδομος*, and, though unwilling to give a final verdict, I think the question of the loss in Greek of the Aryan word for god and its replacement by another word nearly identical in form, but totally distinct in origin, should be left for the present an open question in Comparative Philology.

NOTE C.

The Vocative of Dyaús and Ζεύς.

The vocative of Dyaus, having the circumflex, is one of those linguistic gems which one finds now and then in the Rig-Veda, and which by right ought to have a place of honour in a Museum of Antiquities. It is a unique form. It occurs but once in the Rig-Veda, never again, as far as we know at present, in the whole of Vedic literature, and yet it is exactly that form which a student of language would expect who is familiar with the working of the laws of accent in Sanskrit and in Greek. Without a thorough knowledge of these laws, the circumflexed vocative in Sanskrit, Dyaũs, corresponding to Greek Ζεῦ, would seem a mere anomaly, possibly an accidental coincidence, whereas in reality it affords the most striking proof of the organic working of the laws of accent, and at the same time an unanswerable testimony in favour of the genuineness of the ancient text of the Rig-Veda.

The laws of accent bearing on this circumflexed vocative are so simple that I thought they would have been understood by everybody. As this does not seem to have been the case, I add a few explanatory remarks.

It was Benfey who, as on so many other points, so on the accent of vocatives, was the first to point out (in 1845) that it was a fundamental law of the Aryan language to place the acute on the first syllable of all vocatives, both in the singular and in the dual and plural.[1] In Sanskrit this law admits of no exception; in Greek and Latin the rhythmic accent has prevailed to that extent that we only find a few traces left of the original Aryan accentuation. It is well known that in vocatives of nouns ending in

[1] See Benfey, *Über die Enstehung des Indo-germanischen Vocativs*, Göttingen, 1872, p. 35.

ius, the ancient Romans preserved the accent on the first syllable, that they said *Vírgili*, *Váleri*, from *Virgílius* and *Valérius*. This statement of Nigidius Figulus, preserved by Gellius, though with the remark that in his time no one would say so, is the only evidence of the former existence of the Aryan law of accentuation in Latin. In Greek the evidence is more considerable, but the vocatives with the accent on the first syllable are, by the supreme law of the rhythmic accent in Greek, reduced to vocatives drawing back their accent as far as they can, consistently with the law which restricts the accent to one of the last three syllables. Thus while in Sanskrit a word like *'Αγαμέμνων* would in the vocative retract the accent on the first syllable, **Αγαμεμνον*, the Greek could do no more than say *'Αγάμεμνον* with the accent on the antepenultimate. In the same manner the vocative of *'Αριστοτέλης* can only be *'Αριστότελες*, whereas in Sanskrit it would have been **Αριστοτελες*.

Here, however, the question arises, whether in words like *'Αγαμέμνων*[1] and *'Αριστοτέλης*[2] the accent was not originally on the antepenultimate, but drawn on the penultimate by the rhythmic law. This is certainly the case in *ἥδιον*, as the vocative of *ἡδίων*, for we know that both in Sanskrit and Greek, comparatives in *ιων* retract their accent as far as possible, and have it always on the first syllable in Sanskrit, always on the penultimate in Greek, if the last syllable is long. But, *cessante causâ cessat effectus*, and therefore the accent goes back on the antepenultimate, not only in the vocative, but likewise in the nom. neuter *ἥδιον*.

It is possible that the same process may explain the

[1] The rule is that vocatives in *ον* from proper names in *ων* retract the accent, except *Λακεδαῖμον*, and those in *φρον*, as *Λυκόφρον* from *Λυκόφρων*.

[2] Vocatives in *ες* from proper names in *ης* retract the accent, as *Σώκρατες*, except those in *ωδες*, *ωλες*, *ωρες*, *ηρες*, as *Λειώδες*.

vocative δέσποτα from δεσπότης, if we compare Sanskrit compounds with pati, such as dâsápati, gáspati, dámpati, which leave the accent on the first member of the compound. In Δημήτηρ also all becomes regular, if we admit the original accentuation to have been Δήμητηρ, changed in Δημήτηρ, but preserved in the genitive Δήμητρος, and the vocative Δήμητερ.[1]

But there are other words in which this cannot be the case: for instance, ἄδελφε, πόνηρε, μόχθηρε, from ἀδελφός, πονηρός, μοχθηρός. Here the accent is the old Aryan vocatival accent. Again, in πατήρ, πατέρα, Sk. pitâ, pitáram, in μήτηρ, μητέρα, Sk. mâtâ, mâtáram, in θυγάτηρ, θυγατέρα, Sk. duhitâ, duhitáram, the radical accent was throughout on the suffix tár, nor would the rules of the rhythmic accent in Greek prevent it from being on the antepenultimate in the accusative. The fact, therefore, that it is retracted on the penultimate and antepenultimate in the vocative shows clearly that we have here, too, the last working of the original Aryan accentuation. The irregular accent in the nom. sing. of μήτηρ, instead of μητήρ, is probably due to the frequent use of the vocative (an explanation which I had adopted before I had seen Benfey's essay), and the same cause may explain the apparently irregular accentuation in θύγατρα, by the side of θυγατέρα, in θύγατρες and θύγατρας. Similar vocatives with retracted accent are δᾶερ, nom. δαήρ, εἰνατερ, nom. εἰνάτηρ, γύναι, nom. γυνή, σῶτερ, nom. σωτήρ, ἄνερ, nom. ἀνήρ, Ἄπολλοι, nom. Ἀπόλλων, Πόσειδον, nom. Ποσειδῶν, Ἥρακλες, nom. Ἡρακλῆς.

We have thus established the fact that one feature of the primitive Aryan accentuation, which consisted in the very natural process of placing the high accent on the first syllable of vocatives, was strictly preserved in Sanskrit, while in Greek and Latin it only left some scattered traces of its former existence. Without the light derived from Sanskrit, the changes in the accent of vocatives in Greek

[1] Benfey, *l.c.* p. 40.

and Latin would be inexplicable, they would be, what they are in Greek grammar, mere anomalies; while, if placed by the side of Sanskrit, they are readily recognised as what they really are, remnants of a former age, preserved by frequent usage or by an agent whom we do not like to recognise, though we cannot altogether ignore him—viz. chance.

Taking our position on the fact that change of accent in the vocative in Greek is due to the continued influence of an older system of Aryan accentuation, we now see how the change of nom. Ζεύς into voc. Ζεῦ, and of nom. Dyaús, into voc. Dyaũs, rests on the same principle. In Sanskrit the change, though at first sight irregular, admits of explanation. What we call the circumflex in Sanskrit is the combination of a rising and falling of the voice, or, as we should say in Greek, of an acute and grave accent. As Dyaús was originally Diaús, and is frequently used as two syllables in the Veda, the vocative would have been Díaùs, and this contracted would become Dyaũs. On exactly the same principle we have paribhvẽ from paribhũs. In Greek the facts are the same, but the explanation is more difficult. The general rule in Greek is that vocatives in *ου*, *οι*, and *ευ*, from oxytone or perispome nominatives, are perispome; as *πλακοῦ*, *βοῦ*, *Λητοῖ*, *Πηλεῦ*, *βασιλεῦ*, from *πλακοῦς*, *οῦντος*, *placenta*, *βοῦς*, *Λητώ*, *Πηλεύς*, *βασιλεύς*. The rationale of that rule has never been explained, as far as Greek is concerned. Under this rule the vocative of Ζεύς becomes Ζεῦ; but no Greek grammarian has attempted to explain the process by which Ζεύς becomes Ζεῦ, and nothing remains for the present but to admit that we have in it an ancient Aryan relic, preserved in Greek long after the causes which had produced it had ceased to act. It would fall into the same category as *εἶμι* and *ἴμεν*. Here, too, the efficient cause of the length and shortness of the radical vowel *i*—viz. the change of accent, Sk. émi, but imás—has disappeared in Greek, while its effect has been

preserved. But whatever explanation may hereafter be adopted, the simple fact which I had pointed out remains: the motive power which changed the nom. dyaús into the vocative dyaũs is the same which changed Ζεύς into Ζεῦ. Those who do not understand or do not admit this are bound to produce, from the resources of Greek itself, another motive power to account for the change of Ζεύς into Ζεῦ; but they must not imagine that a mere reference to a Greek elementary grammar suffices for explaining that process.

The passage in the Rig-Veda (VI. 51, 5) to which I referred is unique, and I therefore give it here, though it has in the meantime been most ably discussed by Benfey in his 'Essay on the Vocative' (1872).

'Dyaũh pítah prithivi mā́tah ádhruk
Ζεῦ πάτερ πλατεῖα μῆτερ ἀτρεκ(ές)
A'gne bhrā́tah vasavah mriláta nah [1]
Ignis φράτερ ϝεΣηϝες μέλδετε nos.'

This passage is clearly one of great antiquity, for it still recognises Dyaús, the father, as the supreme god; Earth, the mother, by his side; and Agni, fire, as the brother, not of Heaven and Earth, but of man, because living with men on the hearth of their houses. Vasu, as a general name of the bright gods, like deva in other hymns, corresponds, I believe, to the Greek adjective ἐΰς. The genitive plural ἐάων is likewise derived from ἐΰς or vásus, by Benfey (*l. c.* p. 57), and dâtā́ vásûnám (Rv. VIII. 51, 5), comes certainly very near to δοτὴρ ἐάων. The only difficulty would be the ᾱ instead of the η, as in ἐῆος, the gen. sing. of ἐΰς in Homer, a difficulty which might be removed by tracing the gen. plur. ἐάων back to a fem. ἐά, corresponding to a Sk. vasavî or vasavyâ. As to μέλδετε, it is phonetically the nearest approach to mrilata, *i.e.* *mar-

[1] See also M. M.'s *Lectures on the Science of Language*, vol. ii. p. 472.

data, though in Greek it means 'make mild' rather than 'be mild.' Mild and *mollis* come from the same root.

What gives to this passage its special value is, that in all other passages when dyaus occurs as a vocative and as bisyllabic, it appears simply with the udâtta, thus showing at how early a time even the Hindus forgot the meaning of the circumflex on dyaûs, and its legitimate appearance in that place. Thus in Rv. VIII. 100, 12, we read,

'Sákhe Vish*n*o vitarám ví kramasva,
Dyaú*h* dehí lokám vá*g*râya viskábhe
Hánâva v*r*itrám ri*n*á*k*âva síndhûn
I'ndrasya yantu prasavé ví*s*ri*sh*tâ*h*.'

'Friend Vish*n*u, stride further,
Dyaus, give room for the lightning to leap,
Let us both kill V*r*itra and free the rivers,
Let them go, sent forth at the command of Indra.'

Here, I have little doubt, the ancient Rishis pronounced Dyaûs, but the later poets, and the still later Âkâryas, were satisfied with the acute, and with the acute the word is written here in all the MSS. I know.

NOTE D.

Aryan words occurring in Zend, but not in Sanskrit.

It has been objected that the three instances which I had quoted of Zend words, not occurring in Sanskrit, but preserved in one or the other of the Indo-European languages, were not sufficient to establish the fact which I wished to establish, particularly as one of them, kehrp, existed in

Sanskrit, or, at least, in Vedic Sanskrit, as kṛip. I admit that I ought to have mentioned the Vedic kṛip, rather than the later kalpa; but I doubt whether the conclusions which I wished to draw would have been at all affected by this. For what I remarked with regard to kalpa applies with equal force to kṛip; it does not in Sanskrit mean body or flesh, like kehrp, and *corpus*, but simply form. But even if kehrp were not a case in point, nothing would have been easier than to replace it by other words, if at the time of printing my lecture I had had my collectanea at hand. I now subjoin a more complete list of words, present in Zend, absent in Sanskrit, but preserved in Greek, Latin, or German.

Zend ana, prep., upon; Greek *ἀνά*; Goth. *ana*, upon.

Zend erezataêna, adj., made of silver; Lat. *argentinus*. In Sk. we have ragatam, silver, but no corresponding adjective.

Zend içi, ice; O.N. *îss*; A.S. *îs*; O.H.S. *îs*.

Grimm compares the Irish *eirr*, snow, and he remarks that the other Aryan languages have each framed their own words for ice, Lith. *ledas*, O.S. *led*", and distantly connected with these, through the Russian *cholodnyi*, the Latin *glacies*, for *gelacies*; Greek *κρύος*, *κρυμός*, *κρύσταλλος*.

The root from which these Greek words for ice are derived has left several derivatives in other languages, such as Lat. *cru-s-ta*, and O.N. *hrî-m*, rime, hoar-frost, and in Zend khrûta, used as an adjective of zim, winter, originally the hard winter. In Zend khrûma, and khrûra, Sk. krûra, as in Greek *κρυόεις*, the meaning has changed to *crudus*, *crudelis*. In the English *raw*, O.H.G. *hrâo*, a similar change of meaning may be observed.

Another name connected with ice and winter is the Zend zyâo, frost, from the root hi, which has given us *χι-ών*, Sk. hi-ma, Lat. *hiem-s*, O.S. *zima*, but which in the simplest form has been preserved in Zend only and in the O.N. *gẹ*. Fick quotes *gẹ* with the doubtful meanings of cold and snow,

Curtius with that of storm, identifying it with Norw. *gjö*, *nix autumni recens*.

There is still another name for snow, absent in Sanskrit, but fully represented in Zend and the other Aryan languages, viz. Zend *çnizh*, to snow, Lat. *nix*, Goth. *snaiv-s*, Lith. *snig-ti*, to snow, Ir. *snechta*, snow, Gr. *νίφ-α* (acc.).[1]

Zend aêva, one; Gr. οἶος. In Sanskrit there is the adverb eva, only.

Zend kamara, girdle, vault; Gr. καμάρα, vault, covered carriage; A.S. *himil*. Connected with this we find the Zend kameredhe, skull, vault of head, very nearly connected with κμέλεθρον, μέλαθρον.

Zend kareta, knife; Lith. *kalta-s*, knife; *cf. culter*, Sk. kart-ari, etc. The Slav. *korda*, O.N. *kordi*, Hung. *kard*, are treated by Justi as words borrowed from Persian.

Zend thrâfanh, food; Gr. -τρέφες.

Zend da, *e.g.* vaêçmen-da, towards the house; Gr. οἰκόνδε; *cf.* Goth. *du*, to, O.S. *do*.

Zend daiti, gift; Gr. δόσις; Lat. *dôs*, *dôti-s*, Lith. *ûti-s*.

Zend dâmi, creation; Gr. θέμις, law.

Zend naçu, corpse; Gr. νέκυς; Goth. *nau-s*.

Zend napo, nom. sing.; A.S. *nefa*; O.H.G. *nefo*.

Zend paithya in qaêpaithya, own; Lat. *sua-pte*, *ipse*; Lith. *patis*, self; *cf.* Corssen, *s.v. pote*, *potis*.

Zend peretu, bridge; Lat. *portus*.

Zend fraêsta, most, best; Gr. πλεῖστος.

Zend brvat, brow; Gr. ἀβροῦτες (Macedon.); Lat. *frons*.

Zend madh, to cure; Lat. *mederi*.

Zend man, in upa-man, to wait; Lat. *manere*.

Zend yâre, year; Goth. *jer*; O.S. *jarŭ*, spring.

Zend yâonh, yâh, to gird; yâonha, dress; Gr. ζωσ in ζώννυμι; O.S. *po-yasŭ*, girdle.

[1] See M. M.'s *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, p. 372, note.

Zend râçta, straight; Lat. *rectus*; Goth. *raiht-s*.
Zend rap, to go; Lat. *repere*.
Zend ravah, space; Lat. *rus*, field.[1]
Zend varez, to work, vareza, work, varstva, work; Goth. *vaurkjaṅ*, to work; Gr. ἔοργα, ῥέζω; Goth. *vaurstv*. See, however, Vedic vṛikta; Darmesteter, 'Ormazd et Ahriman,' p. 40; Roth, 'Mélanges Asiatiques,' vii. p. 612.
Zend vaêti, willow; Lith. *výti-s*, withy; Lat. *vîtis*.
Zend çtaman, mouth; Gr. στόμα.

NOTE E.

Letter to Professor Fleckeisen: 'Are there Ablatives in D with the meaning of the Locative?'

'I GLADLY comply with your wish that I should write down for you my views on the restoration of *d* as the termination of the ablative in ancient Latin, such as they have shaped themselves in my own mind while reading lately Ritschl's new "Excursus on Plautus" (Leipzig, 1869), and Bergk's "Beiträge zur Lateinischen Grammatik" (Halle, 1870); and, more particularly, while discussing the subject with you in our late walks and talks at Dresden. Often have I expressed my conviction that nothing could be more advantageous to the true Science of Language than a free exchange of our opinions, which we have reached each of us in his own way, some while working at Greek or Latin, others while studying Sanskrit and Comparative Philology. In my lecture at Strassburg I dwelt even more on this point, and said:—

'"Much has of late been said of the antagonism between comparative and classical philology. To me it seems that these two depend so much on each other for help and

[1] See James Darmesteter, in his able review in the *Revue Critique*, December 23, 1876.

advice that their representatives ought to be united by the closest ties of fellowship. We must work on side by side, and accept counsel as readily as we give it. Without the help of Comparative Philology, for instance, Greek scholars would never have arrived at a correct understanding of the Digamma—nay, a freer intercourse with his colleague, Bopp, would have preserved Bekker from several mistakes in his restoration of the Digamma in Homer. Latin scholars would have felt far more hesitation in introducing the old *d* of the ablative in Plautus, if the analogy of Sanskrit had not so clearly proved its legitimacy.

'"On the other hand, we, comparative philologists, should readily ask and gladly accept the advice and help of our classical colleagues. Without their guidance, we can never advance securely: their warnings are to us of the greatest advantage, their approval our best reward. We are often too bold, we do not see all the difficulties that stand in the way of our speculations, we are too apt to forget that, in addition to its general Aryan character, every language has its peculiar genius. Let us all be on our guard against omniscience and infallibility. Only through a frank, honest, and truly brotherly co-operation can we hope for a true advancement of knowledge."

'It is to such a frank and honest co-operation that the following remarks owe their origin. Without your friendly encouragement I should never have thought of giving publicity to my misgivings as to certain emendations introduced by so high an authority as Ritschl into the text of Plautus. Since I left Gottfried Hermann's Seminary—and that is now many years ago—I have not had much time for Greek and Latin, least of all for the study of that most difficult of all Latin poets, Plautus, which seems to be in a constant state of fermentation. Only after the completion of my edition of the Rig-Veda have I found again a little leisure for reading at least the more important books which during many years, while I

was working for others rather than for myself, I had to lay aside unread. Foremost among them were the original works of Ritschl on the development of the oldest Latin which offers to the comparative philologist so many instructive facts and inspiriting views. That some of his views excite not only our admiration but also our surprise, is but natural. But never should I have dreamt of giving public expression to this surprise, had I not, during the unrestrained exchange of our ideas on some of his rather startling theories, conceived a hope that what received the approbation of a Fleckeisen might not be altogether unwelcome to other classical scholars also.

'I shall try, therefore, to explain as shortly as possible, first my own views on the origin and the disappearance of the *d* of the ablative in Latin, such as they were formed by a comparative study of analogous facts; and then to consider the objections which Latin scholars might bring forward against them, chiefly on the strength of facts collected from Latin inscriptions and the text of Plautus. If I succeed in bringing these facts of language into harmony with the postulates of the science of language, a conviction which we all, to whatever school we may belong, share, will perhaps have been strengthened, viz. that there is in no language anything anomalous, in the strict sense of that word, or nothing, at all events, irrational. If I fail in this, nothing remains but to re-examine afresh the correctness of our theories and the true bearing of the facts before us; and this, too, can only be advantageous both to classical and comparative scholars.

'The view of comparative philologists with regard to the *d* of the ablative is shortly this:—

'(1) Latin, like Sanskrit and Zend, and like Greek also, possessed originally an ablative in *d* (not in *t*, as has been frequently maintained; see p. 154), which was intended to express motion from a place; and a locative in *i*, intended to express rest in a place. So long as these two

cases remained phonetically distinct, their functions also remained distinct: the ablative had the meaning of an ablative only; the locative, that of a locative only. As in Sanskrit nagarât means from the town, nagare, in the town, so in Latin also, as long as *Tarentod* stood by the side of *Tarentoi* or *Tarenti*, the former meant "from Tarentum" only, the latter "at Tarentum," and nothing else. The same applies to *Româd*, by the side of *Romai* or *Romae*, to *rurīd* by the side of *rurī*. To say *in Româd*, at Rome, would, during that early stage of language, have been quite as impossible as to say *ex Romai* or *ex Romae*. I leave out of consideration the old instrumental, because, though it had been developed as a grammatical category in Latin as well as in Sanskrit, it had at an early period ceased to be phonetically distinguishable from other cases. *Hastâ percussi* can still be felt as an instrumental; but, as spoken, *hastâ* is to the Roman an ablative—*i.e.* the Whence has taken the place of the Whereby.

'(2) We then come to a consideration of the second stage, when, through a general phonetic process, the final *d* was dropped, and the ablative of words of the third declension became identical with the locative. Thus *rurĕ*, the new representative of *rurīd* and *rurī*, was used to express both motion from (*a rure*) and rest in (*in rure*). This phonetic change, we must remember, does not take place on a sudden. For a time the original and the modified forms co-exist side by side, and the speakers are hardly aware of any important change. Afterwards the old form begins to make the impression of something old-fashioned and strange, and it is on that ground more and more avoided by the rising generation. We can watch this process in the few documents of Latin dating from the sixth century. We do not find *rurīd* at once driven out by *rurĕ*, but the form of the ablative passes through several intermediate stages before it arrives at the other extreme of *rurĕ*. Though it might be desirable, it is hardly pos-

sible, considering the scarcity of ancient ablatives, to distinguish those of bases of the third declension ending in *i* from those of bases ending in consonants. We take * *eid* as the oldest form of the ablative which we have a right to postulate after nouns of the third declension, the *ei* representing really *guna* of the final vowel, which from an early time encroached on bases with final consonants. The oldest form which actually occurs is *îd*, in *airid*, *coventionid*, (*no*)*minid*. The remaining forms cannot be arranged in strictly chronological order, so as to show the transition from *ê* to *ei*, and from *ei* to *i*. The forms in *ei* occur as early as those in *ê* and *î*, and even forms in *e* belong, according to Bücheler ("Lateinische Declination," p. 50), to the sixth century. Thus we place together as collateral forms—

'I. Ablatives in *ê*: *patrê* (tit. Scip. 30), *facilê* (tit. Scip. 33), *aire* (I.L.A. 181), *ordinê* (Nævius), *montê* (Ennius).

'II. Ablatives in *ei*: *virtutei* (tit. Scip. 34), *fontei* (tab. Gen. a. 637; but ibid. *fonte*), *dotei* (Plautus).

'III. Ablatives in *î*: *sorti* (l. repet.), *parti* and *parte* (l. repet.), *mulierî*, etc. (Plautus).

'IV. Ablatives in *ĕ*, since the end of the sixth century, but often changing with *î*, without any rule, in spite of the rules of grammarians.

'Without insisting too strongly on a strictly chronological order, we see that in the end all ablatives of nouns of the third declension dwindle down to *ĕ*, and that in certain nouns only *î* was retained.

'The same short *ĕ*, however, is likewise the last result of the termination of the locative. Here, too, we find, after bases ending in consonants and in *i*, the two locative terminations *î* and *e*. The *î*, however, is here decidedly older than the *ĕ*, and we see that names of places, forming their ablative in *ĕ*, retain a locative in *î*. Still older than this *î* is the locative *ê* in *manê*, *rurê* (Bücheler, *l.c.* p. 62).

'While thus the old forms of the ablative and locative

became phonetically identical, a new case, which was neither ablative nor locative, but both together, developed itself in the grammatical consciousness of the Romans. It expressed simply locality, and corresponded perhaps most closely to Greek forms in φι. It was chiefly due to the phonetic levelling in the forms of the third declension—in which, according to Mommsen ("Rhein. Museum," ix. p. 463), the final *d* disappeared first—that this new indifferent local case sprang up. In the first and second declensions the process was different. Here the old exclusive locatives disappeared owing to their frequent employment as genitives, or, according to others, owing to their phonetic identity with the genitives; while the ablatives, after losing their *d*, became in the second—and for a time also in the first—declension identical in form with the datives. In the second declension the difference between the locative and dative was for a time as palpable in Latin as in Greek. As in Sanskrit we have the dative d e v â y a, by the side of the locative d e v e (*i.e.* d e v a + i), we have in Greek οἴκῳ, by the side of the locative οἴκοι; and in Latin *humoi* (trisyllabic), by the side of the locative *humoi* (dissyllabic).

'This last *oi* of the locative became *e* (in *hume*), *ei* (in *die septimei*), a form established by you (Dr. Fleckeisen) in Plautus ("Persa," v. 260; "Dichterfragmente bei Gellius," p. 31), and lastly *i* in *humi*. It never becomes *o*. The *oi* of the dative, on the contrary, became *ô* from the sixth century, and thus identical with the ablative—never with the locative. Even in the first declension the ablative in *â* became, for a time at least, identical with the dative, but never with the locative. The ablative *Româd* became *Româ*; the locative *Romai* (dissyllabic) became *Romæ*, the dative *Romai* (trisyllabic) became for a time *Româ* (Bücheler, *l.c.* p. 53), but, as a rule, *Romæ*.

'We thus see that, owing to purely phonetic causes, the sharp distinction established during the earliest Aryan

period between the cases expressing the Where and the Whence became lost. In the first declension the Whence case in *â* was not encroached upon, but the Where case in *ai* was absorbed by the genitive and dative. It was impossible to say *in Romæ*, because *Romai* had become too exclusively genitive and locative. But as it was right to say *ex villâ*, it was not thought to be wrong to say *in villâ* also.

'In the second declension the ablative and dative, the locative and genitive ran together. It was impossible to say *in agri*, because the *i* had been too exclusively appropriated by the genitive. But, as it was right to say *ex agro*, it was not thought to be wrong to say *in agro* also.

'In the third declension the grammatical conscience revolted neither against *ex rure* nor against *in rure*.

'Thus the ablative had become in different ways, yet in the end with the same result, a general local or paratactic case, no longer restricted to express the Whence only; while the exclusive Where case served in the first and second declensions as genitive, being besides identical with the dative in the first declension.

'For (to mention this in passing) I see no arguments in support of the theory that the genitive sing. of the first declension in *æ* should be taken for the old genitive in *æs*, with the final *s* dropped. True, the loss of a final *s* in Latin is very common, in prose as well as in poetry. But we must here too distinguish, viz. between an occasional and a permanent loss of final *s*. No doubt the Romans said and wrote *filio* and *filiu*, but they never forgot that the real nominative was *filius*. The Romans said *palmi*, nay, even *palm* (*cf.* Cic. *Or.* § 153), but the typical grammatical form always remained *palmis*. What would have become of Latin, if it had thrown off permanently every final *s*; and if *palmi* had taken the place of *palmis*, *palmâ* of *palmas*, *cibi* of *cibis*, *cibo* of *cibos*, *voce* of *voces*, *ama* of *amas*? If *familiai* were in reality nothing but a phoneti-

cally impaired *familiais*; if *familiæ* were no more than a quickly pronounced *familiæs*, why should not the far more frequently used genitive *familias* have dwindled down to a genitive *familiâ*? I believe one may lay it down almost as a general rule that, after a long vowel, Latin never drops a final *s* permanently. That there was also a genitive sing. in *s*, both in the first and the second declensions, is not denied. Oscan and Umbrian forms make this clearer even than Latin. What I doubt, and more than doubt, is that from the old genitives in *s* we can derive those without an *s* by the easy phrase that "final *s* was dropped." The nearest analogy is offered by the nominative plur. in the second declension, where, by the side of the old forms in *is*, we have the more modern forms in *i*. But these two forms also should, according to my opinion, not be treated as successive, but as parallel forms, like the corresponding nom. plur. in certain Sanskrit words, such as samâs and same. Another analogy might be discovered in the nom. sing. of the first declension, if only it could be proved that there ever was an *s* after the long *â*. I know very well that Bopp, Schleicher, and even Bücheler, hold that opinion, but I believe I have proved ("Selected Essays," vol. i. p. 154) that the only example of a nom. sing. fem. ending in *â-s*, which was quoted from the Veda, has hardly any authority, and cannot serve as a support of such a theory. On the other hand, nothing is more natural than that a locative should take the functions of a genitive. A "king at Rome" becomes easily a "king of Rome" (*un roi de Rome*), and after that first stage, everything else follows naturally. In Sanskrit it is well known that in the dual genitive and locative are identical in form, thus showing how easily the two angles of vision of the locative and genitive can be made to coincide. In the dialect of Thessaly the genitives of the second declension are said to end in *oi*.[1] I hold, therefore, that the genitives in *ae* and

[1] *Cf.* Ahrens, *De Dial. Æol.* p. 221; *De Dial. Dor.* p. 528.

i are locatives functionally enlarged, not genitives phonetically reduced. If there is a difficulty in assuming *āī* to stand for the locative *āĭ*, it is, as Curtius remarked, the lengthening of the final *ĭ*; but the same difficulty would apply to *familiâĭ*, if explained as a corruption of *familiâĭs*.

'If we clearly place before our eyes events of this character, which affect both the form and the inner life of language, if we take part in them ourselves, as we do in historical events, whether of past or present times, then certain things become perfectly intelligible, others disclose at once their impossible character. It is perfectly intelligible that, after a change of pronunciation has taken place—for instance, after the *d* of the ablative has ceased to be pronounced—the old forms, such as the ablative with final *d*, should be maintained in certain expressions and typical formulas, or that they should live on in the language of the common people, long after they were avoided as old-fashioned or vulgar by the higher classes and in literary society. As we say "by rights," the Roman may have said *meritod* long after in ordinary parlance he had dropped the *d*. Certain classes of poetry, too, may have retained a taste for such real relics of ancient speech; and nothing is more natural than that they should have been made to do service in the lapidary style of composition and the curial style of legislation. Similar proceedings may be discovered everywhere, in modern as well as in ancient languages. Thus in French the final *t* of *il aime(t)* has completely disappeared, both in writing and speaking, and the final *e* has become mute. In poetry, however, the *e* is not yet mute, but counts as a syllable, *e.g. ĭl āimĕ sēs ămīs*; and in certain cases, as, for instance, in *aime-t-il*, even the old *t* has maintained itself both in speaking and in writing. The same state of things may be seen in so-called ancient languages. In Sanskrit the accusative plural ended originally in n s. The accus. plur. of s a, h e, was tâ n s (τονς=τούς), not tân, which in Greek would

have been τῶν. But as Sanskrit never tolerates two consonants at the end of words, nor final *s* before initial sonants, tâns would, on purely phonetic grounds, dwindle down to tân. *In pausâ* tâns became tân; before sonants tâns atti, tâns dadâti was impossible, and became tân atti, tân dadâti. Before gutturals and labials, the gihvâmmûlîya (tongue-root spirant) and upadhmânîya (labial spirant) disappeared; hence tân karoti, tân pâti. Only before dentals and palatals the *s* was retained, and so we find tâns te, and tâns ka, never tân te, and tâñ ka. Grammarians, not understanding the historical development of these forms, invert the process, and instead of trying to account for the loss of the original final *s*, give a purely phonetic rule, viz. that an *s* must be inserted after final *n*, if followed by dentals and palatals.

'But while such *survivals* are perfectly intelligible, whether in the history of language or in the history of manners and customs, while no one would be startled by the retention of such forms as *Gnaivod* or *meritod*, whether in inscriptions, laws, formulas, or in certain kinds of poetry, it would be not only startling but perfectly unintelligible that during a time when such forms could still be retained in the memory of language, the same forms should be used with a meaning which they never had or could have had before they suffered that change which rendered them phonetically undistinguishable from other forms, and thus seemed to transfer to them the powers of those other forms with which they had become phonetically identical. To take an instance: *Gnaivod* as expressing Whence, *belli*, *proxumæ viciniæ* as expressing Where, are perfectly legitimate forms, long after the final *d* has been thrown off in most words, and long after *i* and *æ* have ceased to be felt as terminations of the locative, and were used for the purposes of the genitive and dative cases only. But without a shadow of excuse, without any historical legitimacy, would be a phrase such as *in altod marid*, retaining the old *d* of

the ablative, which never expressed anything but whence, preceded by *in*, which always expresses the where. No one would dream of saying *e belli* or *e viciniæ*, or in Greek ἐκ χθονί, ἐξ ἀγροῖ, or ἐν χθονός. Such incongruities and anachronisms are impossible in the natural growth of any language. Yet we know that they exist in Latin, and the question which we have to answer is, what are we to make of such monstrosities?

'We saw and could easily understand that, after the disappearance of the final *d* of the ablative, forms such as *meritod*, *de sententiad* might be retained, and leave in the mind of the speakers the impression that to add these final *d*'s imparted to a speech a certain air of antiquity. Quintilian, I. vii. 11, has expressed this very sentiment. He says: "Verum orthographia quoque consuetudini servit ideoque sæpe mutata est, nam illa vetustissima transeo tempora, quibus et pauciores literæ nec similes his nostris earum formæ fuerunt et vis quoque diversa: sicut apud Græcos . . . , ut a Latinis veteribus *d* plurimis in verbis adjectam ultimam, quod manifestum est etiam [here *nunc* should be added with Bergk] ex columna rostrata, quæ est Duilio in foro posita" (*cf.* Ritschl, *l.c.* p. 3). Quintilian looks upon the *d* as something added. He probably never heard it in conversation, but may have seen it on the *columna rostrata* and elsewhere, and known that the old Romans used it more frequently. Charisius expresses a similar opinion (p. 112 K): "Quibus (antiquis) mos erat *d* litteram omnibus pæne vocibus vocali littera finitis adjungere" (*cf.* Ritschl, *l.c.* p. 4); and Marius Victorinus, "De Orthogr." p. 2462 P. (17 G.) says: "Et adjecta *d* littera, quam plerisque verbis adjiciebant" (*cf.* Ritschl, *l.c.* p. 5).

'When this idea, as here expressed by Quintilian and others, once took possession of the public mind, or of the mind of literary people at Rome, two things were perfectly intelligible: 1. That whenever one wished to give to one's language a more ancient appearance, real old forms and

formulas with ablatives in *d* might be chosen with a certain predilection. 2. That for the same purpose a final *d* was added, *omnibus pœne vocibus vocali littera finitis*, thus giving birth to such monsters as *in altod marid*.

'This might happen, as it does with us, in the legal jargon of solicitors' clerks or in inscriptions affecting an archaic character, but hardly, and not even hardly, in a living language—not in authors who wrote as they spoke, least of all in poets who wrote for the public stage. So long as *ôd* and *ô*, *âd* and *â*, *îd* and *î* existed peacefully side by side in the spoken language, we can well understand their retaining and even showing a certain preference for real ōld ablatives; but never, unless I am greatly mistaken, their adding a purely paragogic and utterly unhistoric *d* to words which at no time in the history of the language could have ended in *d*, except when used as real ablatives. Phrases such as *in altod marid*, forms such as *credod* for *credo*, *potavid* for *potavi*, which Bothe has ventured to introduce into Plautus and even into Terence (*cf.* Ritschl, *l.c.* p. 8), are intolerable. We can well understand that Nævius should have written *Noctu Trojad exibant*, never *Noctud Trojad exibant*.

'Classical scholars will probably say that all this is quite plausible *a priori*, but what is to become of the facts of language? Shall we find fault with Nævius and Plautus because their language runs counter to the theories of comparative philologists? Shall we correct inscriptions, or declare them altogether spurious, because they upset our grammatical speculations? I answer, Certainly not. But what we ought to do is to look twice at the facts of Latin before we declare that they run counter to the theories of comparative philologists, or that they cannot be brought into harmony with the laws established by the Science of Language.

'The principal witnesses brought into court to prove that in the sixth century the old forms in *d* were no longer

restricted to express the Whence, but that, like the so-called ablatives of classical Latin, they could express the Where also, are the inscriptions on the *Columna Rostrata*, and the *Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus*.

'No one will at present seriously maintain that the inscription of the Columna Rostrata which we possess is the same which was put up in the year 494/260. That inscription, whether we place it under Claudius (41–54 A.D.) or under Augustus, is the work of learned grammarians. The material, viz. Parian marble, the forms of the letters, the lengthy style, phonetic peculiarities such as *ae* instead of *ai*, all speak against an early republican date. The strict retention of *C* for *G* is no counter proof. People knew perfectly well that *C* was the old sign for *G*, and it was chosen throughout for the new Duilian inscription, while in the inscription of Scipio Barbatus *G* and *C* still stand side by side. The inscription of the *Barbati filius*, which Ritschl holds to be more ancient ("Rhein. Museum," ix. p. 9), offers no opportunity for the *G*, which, as is well known, was introduced by Spurius Carvilius, 520/234. What from the first gave me the strongest feeling against the genuineness of that inscription were forms such as *in altod marid*, *i.e.* ablatives with a purely local meaning; and, besides this, the fact that this inscription and the S.C. de Bacchanalibus are the only larger inscriptions which add the *d systematically* to all ablatives without exception. They are a little better than Quintilian, in so far as they do not add *d* to every final vowel, but only to the final vowels of ablatives; but while the almost contemporaneous Scipionic inscriptions use both forms side by side, as in *Gnaivod patre*, etc., the restorers of the Duilian inscription allowed not a single ablative to escape, but added the paragogic *d* to every one. All this together puts the Duilian inscription, such as we have it, out of court.

'The matter becomes much more serious when we turn to the S.C. de Bacchanalibus. It is true we do not possess

the S.C. itself (568/186), but a copy only. That copy, however, is contemporaneous, and if it were only for the L with its acute angle (Ritschl, "Rhein. Mus." ix. p. 2), no one would doubt that it belonged to the sixth century.

'Then comes the question, Does that document represent the language of Rome as it was then spoken—for instance, by Plautus, who died two years later, 570/184? Surely, even if we restored the final *d* in Plautus by the dozen, no one would place his Latin on the same level as that of the S.C. de Bacchanalibus. No one would insert the *d* after every ablative in Plautus, as it is in the S.C., even in cases where the metre repudiates the *d*, and requires elision or synizesis of a final vowel before an initial vowel. While, therefore, on the stage the metre requires ever so many times an *á*, *ó*, and *é* as the final vowel of the ablative, are we to believe that at the same time in the Senate no ablative, without any exception,[1] was allowed to drop its *d*, as is the case in the S.C. de Bacchanalibus? Is it not much more likely that the secretaries employed in the Senate looked upon the final *d* as part and parcel of the regular office style, handed down to them by their predecessors, and not lightly to be departed from? Thus and thus only can we account for the many ablatives in *d* occurring in the S.C., even where the ablative is no true ablative, but a locative that never could have ended in *d*. Expressions like *in oquoltod*, *in poblicod*, *in preivatod*, *in coventionid*, are quite as objectionable as *in altod marid*. They can be accounted for as grammatical red tape, never as the outcome of the natural growth of language.

Such a view of the nature of the S. C. de Bacchanalibus is considerably supported by its address. Here we have again the ordinary language of the day, and here we find, therefore, the only ablative in the document not ornamented with the archaic *d*, viz. *in agro Teurano*. Here

[1] There is one exception, *pro magistratuo*, but that most likely should be read *pro magistratud*.

we have the language of Plautus. We have an ablative in the modern sense of the word, *i.e.* a paratactic case that is no longer either ablative or locative, but capable of either employment, according to circumstances, but we have it without a final *d*.

'What evidence then remains, after disposing of the Duílian inscription and the S. C. de Bacchanalibus, to prove that any Roman, speaking or writing his native tongue, ever used a case in *d* with a local meaning? So far as I know, none. And may we not ask why an ancient Roman should ever have been driven to employ such a *hysteron proteron* as an ablative in *d* with a locative meaning? If he wished to use a locative case, were not the old forms of the locative ready at hand, quite as much as the old forms of the ablative? Could he not say *Romai*? Then why say *Romad*? The really genuine inscriptions leave no doubt on this point. Three years before the S. C. de Bacchanalibus, we read in the decree of Æmilius Paulus *ea tempestate*, not *ead tempestated*; ibid. *in turri Lascutana*; the Scipionic inscriptions N. 33, *in longa vita*, N. 34, *ætate quom parva*. Whenever we find the final *d*, it always expresses a Whence or Whereby: *e.g.* *Benventod* (a coin of the fifth century) *aire moltaticod* (Picene bronze tablet, I.L.A. 181) *de praedad* (ibid. 63, 64); *meritod* (ibid. 190), but *mereto* (ibid. 183); *Hinnad cepit*, 543/211, but a little later, 565/189, *Aetolia cepit*. Adverbs also ending in *d* may be conceived as ablatives, so that *meritod* meant originally 'from merit, on account of merit, well-merited,' *facilumed*, 'from the easiest side or way, easily. Expressions like *ex facili*, and adverbs such as *peni-tus*, *clari-tus*, show the way on which language, starting from ablatives, reached these purely adverbial expressions. (Bergk, *l.c.* p. 19.)

'Let us ask, then, without entering into further detail, what is the sum total and the final result of our researches? It is neither more nor less than that we must not force into the text of Plautus anything which runs counter to

the character of Latin inscriptions contemporaneous with Plautus. After Ritschl has successfully proved from still extant MSS. the existence of *d* in *med*, *ted*, *sed*, after he has rendered the former existence of that *d* in MSS. of Plautus more than probable, it is perfectly free to classical scholars to have recourse to that *d*, wherever the restoration of corrupt passages in the *textus receptus* seems to require it. It is a question of critical tact, which can be acquired by long practice only, how far this remedy may be applied, and how far it should be preferred to other remedies. Here I should not venture to pass any judgment. One observation only I should like to make with regard to controversies respecting the hiatus. No language, as is well known, is more inexorable with regard to hiatus than Sanskrit. Nevertheless, there are exceptions. If the hiatus is due to the omission of a final consonant, for instance, it is tolerated. Thus, if tâv iti has been changed to tâ iti, the final and initial vowels remain unaffected and must not be contracted. When sav indra has become sa indra, a further change to sendra is exceptional only. Thus hiatus might have been tolerated in Latin also in cases where the consciousness of the former presence of the final *d* remained. However, instead of discussing the generalities and possibilities, let us look at some of these cases of hiatus in the MSS. of Plautus. We read, Amph. 169, *quo facto aut dicto adest opus, quietus ne sis.* How could a copyist think of introducing here a totally unidiomatic expression, *opus adest aliqua re*? I believe Ritschl has found the only possible explanation. The old MS. gave *quo facto aut dictod est opus*, and some scribe put *dicto adest*, instead of *dictod est.* This is so evident that, as Ritschl remarked in the "Nachträge," Pareus had already, on the suggestion of Gulielmius, adopted that reading. If we adopted Bergk's conjecture, *l.c.* 68, *quo facto aut dicto adeost opus*, it would be difficult to understand the cause of the corrupt reading.

'An equally certain proof of the former presence of *d* in ancient MSS. occurs in Mil. glor. 267. You have shown in your journal (1873, p. 502) that *vi pugnando* is a recognised phrase in Latin. Such idiomatic expressions are never interfered with. They are what they are only so long as they remain untouched and unchanged. No one will say in English *to and also fro* instead of *to and fro*. Nor would Plautus ever have thought of saying *vi pugnandoque*, instead of *vi pugnando*. Yet the MSS. read: *res paratast: vi pugnandoque hominem caperest certa res*. How did this *que* creep in? Your answer seems to me convincing. Every student of MSS. knows how often D is mistaken for an O. In our case D was for once mistaken for Q. We must restore the text, *vi pugnandod hominem caperest certa res*, and we must see in a former really written D the origin of the letter Q, *i.e. que*.

'We must not forget that the text of Plautus, as it is almost inevitable with popular plays, had to accommodate itself to the changes of the spoken language. Ritschl shows that the popularity of the plays of Plautus revived in the first *decennia* of the seventh century (*cf.* Bergk, *l.c.* p. 130), a time when Latin had long shaken off its old pronunciation. This being so, it is really astonishing that any palpable traces of the old-fashioned *d* should have remained in our MSS. If we want a text of Plautus, such as he may have written it himself, not as the theatrical managers of the seventh century arranged it, I see no reason why the final *d* should not be restored, when necessary, though in each single case a free choice must be left to the critic between the restitution of the *d* or some other more plausible restoration of the metre. Here the criticism of the text of Plautus rests very much on the same principles as that of the text of Shakespeare, where we have always to ask ourselves whether we wish to have a text such as Shakespeare might have written, or such as it was

used on the stage, and handed down in the books of the managers of the theatres.

'The only point against which the student and the historical critic of language must protest is the attempt to force a final ablatival *d* on Plautus in cases where even the oldest Latin inscriptions do not tolerate it. Until some much stronger arguments have been advanced, Plautine critics must abstain from all ablatives in *d* with the local or temporal meaning of Where and When. There is no serious objection to expressions such as *fer aequod animo* (Mil. glor. 1343), because *aequod animo* may be taken as an adverbial expression like *meritod*. And much may be said in favour of *aurod onustam, famed emortuos, clementid animo*. Impossible, however, are constructions such as *hoc in equod insunt milites* (Bacch. 941); *in platead ultuma*, etc. Plautus could not have spoken like the learned scholars who restored the inscription on the Duilian column, nor like the secretaries of the Senate who drafted the S. C. de. Bacchanalibus. He may have allowed himself the use of expressions such as we find in the Scipionic incriptions, or in the decree of Æmilius Paulus, or in other ancient documents. But what would have been impossible in them, is impossible in Plautus also. Every effort has been made to point out one single ablative in *d* with the meaning of a locative, but in vain. *Eod die* in the *Fasti* of Amiternum, after the year 769, seemed at first to supply the missing link. Ritschl thought it possible that *eod* might by accident have been preserved in our copy from a very ancient original, but admitted its doubtful character. Bücheler formerly suspected a clerical blunder ("Lat. Decl." p. 47), but at present it seems generally admitted that *eod* is an abbreviation of *eodem* (Bücheler, in "Jahrbücher für class. Philol.," 1869, p. 488). *Eodem die* occurs frequently in the *Fasti Iuliani*, as printed by Mommsen in the "Ephemeris epigraphica," 1872, pp. 35–41.

'The same "Ephemeris," however (1874, p. 205), contains the following inscription, which, I confess, disturbed me considerably for some time.

IN · HOCE · LOVCARID · STIRCVS
NE //IS · FVNDATID · NEVE · CADAVER
PROIECITAD · NEVE · PARENTATID
SEI · QVIS · ARVORSV . HAC · FAXIT ///IVM
QVIS · VOLET · PRO · IOVDICATOD · NI
MANVM · INIECTO · ESTOD · SEIVE
MAC// STERATVS · VOLET · MOLTARE
///CETOD

'Mommsen reads it: *in hoce loucarid stircus ne [qu]is fundatid, neve cadaver proiecitad, neve parentatid. sei quis arvorsu hac faxit, [in] ium quis volet pro ioudicatod n(umum) [L] manum iniect [i]o estod. seive mac[i]steratus volet moltare, licetod.*

'Put into ordinary Latin it is: *in hoc luco stercus ne quis fundito, neve cadaver proicito, neve parentato. si quis adversus hoc fecerit, in eum ei qui volet pro iudicato nummum L manus iniectio esto. sive magistratus volet multare, liceto.*

'Every scholar will see at once that the inscription contains a number of the greatest linguistic treasures: (1) a problematical locative in *id*, (2) an ablative in *od*, (3) an old construction such as *manum injectio*, (4) a new verb, *fundare*, (5) a *c* for *g*, in *macisteratus*, which would place this inscription before that of Scipio Barbatus, (6) the mixture of *u* and *o*, the latter after *v* only and before *l*, (7) imperatives in *tâd*, *tod*, *atid*, the first and last forms being entirely new, the second hitherto very doubtfully authenticated, at least in inscriptions[1] (Ritschl, "Neue Excurse," pp. 100–102).

[1] Even *tud* in *facitud* in the bronze tablet of the Museum at Bologna rests on a conjecture only. Mommsen reads: [*Iunon*]*e Loucinai* [*die nef*]*astud facitud*; Ritschl: [*Iunon*]*e Loucinai* [*sacrom c*]*astud facitud*, in the sense of *castu facto*; while Bergk translates the last words by *caste facito*.

'The value of this inscription of the stone of Luceria would be immense, if the copy could be entirely trusted. It was published by J. B. d'Amelis in the "Storia della città di Lucera," 1861. Mommsen, who went to Luceria in order to inspect the valuable stone, writes: "Hujus lapidis videndi causa a. 1873 Luceriam profectus vidi eum, sed conjectum in fundamenta domus. . scripta parte latente et sepulta." Nothing remains but to wait till the stone can be disinterred, nor would it be prudent till then to build on it any theories as to the history of the Latin language. Even now, I must confess that my fears as to a real locative in *id* have been considerably diminished by your conjectural emendation, viz.: IN HOCE LOVCARIO, instead of LOVCARID. O and D have frequently been mistaken one for the other (Ritschl, *l. c.* pp. 23, 27, 32, 61), and a substantive *lucarium* might well be accounted for. *Lucar* signifies money levied for sacred groves. Here it would have been used for *lucus*, supposing *lucarid* to be the right reading. If we accept this otherwise unsupported meaning, *lucarium* might well claim the same meaning, considering that *pulvinarium* also does not differ much from *pulvinar*. Or, again, *lucarium* might signify the place where the taxes levied from sacred groves were kept, and would then have been formed in analogy with *aer-arium*, *vas-arium*. Lastly, as the inscription is found at *Luceria*, the word may really have been somehow connected with the name of the place. At all events, the one problematical form *loucarid*, preceded by *hoce*, is not sufficient to legitimise old ablatives in *d* with the meaning of a locative either in Plautus, or for a period in the history of the Latin language when it was still possible to form imperatives in *tod*, and even in *tâd*.

'For the present, therefore, the fact remains that ablatives in *d* cannot express Where and When in genuine documents of ancient Latin, and that emendations of the text of Plautus carried out by means of such forms must be

surrendered and replaced by others. For instance, in Bacch. 941, instead of *hoc in equod insunt milites*, read *hoc insunt in equo milites*; in Curc. 278, instead of *in platead ultuma*, read *platea in ultuma*, as Ritschl himself suggests. It is curious that a scholar such as he was, after admitting that he had no understanding for a case like the ablative, combining the opposite meanings of Whence and Whither, should have become reconciled with ablatives in *d*, expressing both motion from and rest in a place. It is necessary, therefore, to consider one more argument produced by him in support of his view.

'Ritschl remarks (p. 79) that if, by a confusion in the grammatical consciousness of a people, an ablative could assume the power of an accusative, the use of old ablatives in *d* to convey the meaning of Where, need not disturb us. This argument after all would never amount to more than an explanation of the *ignotum per ignotius*, for the fact that an ablative may be used instead of an accusative throws no light whatever on how the same ablative may be used instead of a locative. Besides, I doubt very much whether the ablatives to which he refers as being accusatives also, *med*, *ted* and *sed* did ever become accusatives; and I think that we have to look for another explanation.

'Let us consider, first, that these pronominal ablatives have something very peculiar both in Sanskrit and in Latin. In Sanskrit they and they alone have short *a* mad, tvad, and not, as one should expect, long *â*; in Latin they and they alone have *êd* instead of *ôd*, supposing that they are ablatives of bases in *o*.[1]

'Secondly, mad and tvad in Sanskrit are not ablatives only, but also—and, it would seem, originally—bases. We say mad-rogas, my illness, tvad-rogos, thy illness, just as we say hṛid-rogas, heart illness.

[1] In the S. C. de Bacchan. *facilumed* instead of *facilumod* looks artificial; *cf.* Bergk, *l.c.* p. 17.

'Thirdly, by the side of mâd and tvad we find secondary ablatives, mat-tas, tvat-tas, formed like *penitus*, from within, *radicitus*, from the root, radically.

'We have therefore to deal, not with a transition of a real ablative into an accusative, as if *Româd* were used in the sense of *Romam*, but it is far more likely, to say no more, that the old forms *med*, *ted*, *sed*, if used as accusatives, represent the original bases, mad and tvad, and that these have afterwards lost their final *d* and become *me*, *te*, and *se*, forms which otherwise it would really be difficult to explain, because phonetically they neither agree with Greek μέ, σέ, ἕ, nor with Sk. mâm, tvâm. In Sanskrit these bases are used as ablatives, just as asmad and yushmad are in the plural. This is, no doubt, peculiar, but not altogether unintelligible with a pronoun which had developed special forms for all other cases. In Latin *med*, *ted*, and *sed* are analogous forms which, after dropping final *d*, become *me*, *te*, *se*, used as accusatives. By some such explanation the facts in Latin can be accounted for without having recourse to the view that a specialised and fully-developed ablative should ever have assumed in Latin the functions of the accusative. It seems to me historically impossible that, after the ablatives *med*, *ted*, and *sed* had lost their final *d*, a confusion of thought should have taken place by which even the unabbreviated forms, *med*, *ted*, *sed*, could be used as accusatives. I do not deny that the explanation which I have proposed, and which, as Professor Curtius informs me, he too has advocated, is not without some difficulties. That the base mad should be used as an ablative is strange; still it is less strange with pronouns than with nouns, considering that in Sanskrit the grammatically little specialised forms, nas (nos), and vas (vos), can be made to do duty as accusatives, datives, and even genitives. What remains to be accounted for is that in Latin the bases should be used as accusatives likewise. This, as we know, happens with the neuter only, never with

the masculine; and perhaps it may be argued that the personal pronouns, too, are neuter, or, at all events, sexless.

'But enough. My chief object was to show how a free exchange of ideas between classical and comparative philologists may be of real advantage to both parties, and thus, in the end, to science itself. I cannot understand the stiff and absurd tone which these two schools adopt towards each other. Are they not perfect equals? Is it something so much greater to collect and collate MSS., to interpret texts, and to correct corrupt passages, than to collect and collate grammatical forms from cognate languages, such as Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Gothic, Lithuanian, and Irish, to interpret their true etymological purport, and to correct the corrupt views handed down to us on the development of language in India, Greece, and Italy? The one study is neither easier nor harder than the other, and in the end, to tell the truth, neither is beyond the reach of honest work. It is in human nature that few can be equally strong in both. If, therefore, a comparative philologist does not always know the latest emendation in Plautus, or has rendered himself guilty of a false quantity in Plautine metres—which, I must say, do not seem governed by strictly Median laws—he should not for that reason be put down as a mere *tiro*. It is not easy for a comparative philologist to suppress a smile, if, for instance, we see that the final *d* of the ablative, which exists in Sanskrit as well as in Latin, and cannot well have a different mother in Latin and in Sanskrit, is derived by classical scholars from the purely Latin preposition *de*, and if it is argued that *de* and *di* correspond to Greek $\theta\epsilon(\nu)$ and $\theta\iota$, and are therefore fit to express both the Whence and the Where. Such things will in time become impossible, whenever the relations between classical and comparative philologists have assumed a natural and more friendly aspect. I am quite aware that in speaking of the grammar and metres of Plautus, I have ventured on ground where even the best

Latin scholars have not always proved invulnerable, and I am quite prepared to be told that I have overlooked this and that which "every scholar ought to know." Very well; I care for things, not for words. What I care for is to know whether the same objections which I feel against ablatives in *d* with the meaning of locatives, are shared by classical scholars. If this be the case, Comparative Philology would for once have rendered some small service to classical studies; and a number of emendations in Plautus would have to be reconsidered. If, on the contrary, my objections can be answered, I am quite willing to surrender the position which I have taken up, as no longer tenable. For the present I feel convinced that it is a tenable position, and nothing could have confirmed me more in that opinion than your invitation to allow this letter of mine to be published in your own journal, the "Jahrbücher für classische Philologie."'

IV.

ON SPELLING.

THE remarks which I venture to offer in these pages on the corrupt state of the present spelling of English, and on the advantages and disadvantages connected with a reform of English orthography, were written in fulfilment of a promise of very long standing. Ever since the publication of the Second Volume of my "Lectures on the Science of Language" in 1863, where I had expressed my sincere admiration for the courage and perseverance with which Mr. Isaac Pitman and some of his friends, (particularly Mr. A. J. Ellis, for six years his most active associate,) had fought the battle of a reform in English spelling, Mr. Pitman had been requesting me to state more explicitly than I had done in my "Lectures" my general approval of his life-long endeavours. He wished more particularly that I should explain why I, though by profession an etymologist, was not frightened by the spectre of phonetic spelling, while such high authorities as Archbishop Trench and Dean Alford had declared that phonetic spelling would necessarily destroy the historical and etymological character of the English language.

If I ask myself why I put off the fulfilment of my promise from year to year, the principal reason I find

is, that really I had nothing more to say than what, though in few words, I had said before. Everything that can be said on this subject has been said and well said, not only by Mr. Pitman, but by a host of writers and lecturers, among whom I might mention Mr. Alexander J. Ellis, Dr. Latham, Professors Haldeman, Whitney, and Hadley, Mr. Withers, Mr. E. Jones, Dr. J. H. Gladstone, and many others. The whole matter is no longer a matter for argument; and the older I grow, the more I feel convinced that nothing vexes people so much, and hardens them in their unbelief and in their dogged resistance to reforms, as undeniable facts and unanswerable arguments. Reforms are carried by Time, and what generally prevails in the end, are not logical deductions, but some haphazard and frequently irrational motives. I do not say, therefore, with Dean Swift, that "there is a degree of corruption wherein some nations, as bad as the world is, will proceed to an amendment; till which time particular men should be quiet." On the contrary, I feel convinced that practical reformers, like Mr. Pitman, should never slumber nor sleep. They should keep their grievances before the public in season and out of season. They should have their lamps burning, to be ready whenever the right time comes. They should repeat the same thing over and over again, undismayed by indifference, ridicule, contempt, and all the other weapons which the lazy world knows so well how to employ against those who venture to disturb its peace.

I myself, however, am not a practical reformer; least of all in a matter which concerns Englishmen only—namely, the spelling of the English language. I should much rather, therefore, have left the fight to others, content

with being merely a looker-on. But when I was on the point of leaving England my conscience smote me. Though I had not actually given a pledge, I remembered how, again and again, I had said to Mr. Pitman that I would much rather keep than make a promise; and though overwhelmed with other work at the time, I felt that before my departure I ought, if possible, to satisfy Mr. Pitman's demands. The article was written; and though my own plans have since been changed, and I remain at Oxford, it may as well be published in discharge of a debt which has been for some time heavy on my conscience.

What I wish most strongly to impress on my readers is that I do not write as an advocate. I am not an agitator for phonetic reform in England. My interest in the matter is, and always has been, purely theoretical and scientific. Spelling and the reform of spelling are problems which concern every student of the science of language. It does not matter whether the language be English, German, or Dutch. In every written language the problem of reforming its antiquated spelling must sooner or later arise; and we must form some clear notion whether anything can be done to remove or alleviate a complaint inherent in the very life of language. If my friends tell me that the idea of a reform of spelling is entirely Quixotic, that it is a mere waste of time to try to influence a whole nation to surrender its historical orthography and to write phonetically, I bow to their superior wisdom as men of the world. But as I am not a man of the world, but rather an observer of the world, my interest in the subject, my convictions as to what is right and wrong, remain just the same. It is the duty of scholars and

philosophers not to shrink from holding and expressing what men of the world call Quixotic opinions; for, if I read the history of the world rightly, the victory of reason over unreason, and the whole progress of our race, have generally been achieved by such fools as ourselves "rushing in where angels fear to tread," till after a time the track becomes beaten, and even angels are no longer afraid. I hold, and have confessed, much more Quixotic theories on language than this belief,—that what has been done before by Spaniards and Dutchmen—what is at this very moment being done by Germans, namely, to reform their corrupt spelling—may be achieved even by Englishmen and Americans.

I have expressed my belief that the time will come when not only the various alphabets and systems of spelling, but many of the languages themselves which are now spoken in Europe, to say nothing of the rest of the world, will have to be improved away from the face of the earth and abolished. Knowing that nothing rouses the ire of a Welshman or a Gael so much as to assert the expediency, nay, necessity, of suppressing the teaching of their languages at school, it seems madness to hint that it would be a blessing to every child born in Holland, in Portugal, or in Denmark—nay, in Sweden and even in Russia—if, instead of learning a language which is for life a barrier between them and the rest of mankind, they were at once to learn one of the great historical languages which confer intellectual and social fellowship with the whole world. If, as a first step in the right direction, four languages only, namely, English, French, German, Italian, (or possibly Spanish,) were taught at school, the saving of time—and what *is* more precious than time?—would be infinitely greater than

what has been effected by railways and telegraphs. But I know that no name in any of the doomed languages would be too strong to stigmatise such folly. We should be told that a Japanese only could conceive such an idea; that for a people deliberately to give up its language was a thing never heard of before; that a nation would cease to be a nation if it changed its language; that it would, in fact, commit "the happy despatch," *à la Japonaise*. All this may be true, but I hold that language is meant to be an instrument of communication, and that in the struggle for life, the most efficient instrument of communication must certainly carry the day, as long as natural selection, or, as we formerly called it, reason, rules the world.

The following figures may be of use for forming an opinion as to the fates of the great languages of Europe:[1]—

Portuguese is spoken in			
Portugal, by	3,980,000		
Brazil, by ..	10,000,000	—	13,980,000
Italian, by			27,524,238
French, in France, Belgium, Switzerland, etc., by			40,188,000
Spanish, in Spain by ..	16,301,000		
in South America by	27,408,082	—	43,709,082
Russian, by			51,370,000
German, by			55,789,000
English, in			
Europe, by ..	31,000,000		
America, by ..	45,000,000		
Australia, etc., by	2,000,000		
the Colonies, by ..	1,050,000		79,050,000

According to De Candolle, the population doubles in

England in	56 years	Spain in ..	112 years
America, among the German races, in ..	25 „	South America in	27½ „
Italy in	135 „	Germany in ..	100 „
Russia in	100 „	France in ..	140 „

[1] See W. E. A. Axon's "The Future of the English Language," the *Almanach de Gotha*, and De Candolle's *Histoire des Sciences*, 1873.

Therefore, in 200 years (barring accidents)

Italian will be spoken by			53,370,000
French	„	„	72,571,000
German	„	„	157,480,000
Spanish, in Europe, by	36,938,338		
South America, by	468,347,904	—	505,286,242
English will be spoken in			
Europe by	178,846,153		
United States & British dependencies, by	1,658,440,000	—	1,837,286,153

But I shall say no more on this, for as it is, I know I shall never hear the end of it, and shall go down to posterity, if for nothing else, at least for this the most suicidal folly in a student of languages; a folly comparable only to that of Leibniz, who actually conceived the possibility of one universal language.

To return, however, to the problem to the solution of which Mr. Pitman has devoted the whole of his active life, let me say again that my interest in it is purely philological; or, if you like, historical. The problem which has to be solved in England and the United States of America is not a new one, nor an isolated one. It occurs again and again in the history of language; in fact, it must occur. When languages are reduced to writing, they are at first written phonetically, though always in a very rough and ready manner. One dialect, that of the dominant, the literary, or priestly class, is generally selected; and the spelling, once adopted, becomes in a very short time traditional and authoritative. What took place thousands of years ago, we can see taking place, if we like, at the present moment. A missionary from the island of Mangaia, the Rev. W. Gill, first introduced the art of writing among his converts. He learned their language, at least one dialect of it, he translated part of the Bible into it, and adopted, of necessity, a phonetic spelling.

That dialect is gradually becoming the recognised literary language of the whole island, and his spelling is taught at school. Other dialects, however, continue to be spoken, and they may in time influence the literary dialect. For the present, however, the missionary dialect, as it is called by the natives themselves, and the missionary spelling, rule supreme, and it will be some time before a spelling reform is wanted out there.

Among the more ancient nations of Europe, not only does the pronunciation of a language maintain its inherent dialectic variety, and fluctuate through the prevalence of provincial speakers, but the whole body of a language changes, while yet the spelling, once adopted in public documents, and taught to children, remains for a long time the same. In early times when literature was in its infancy, when copies of books could easily be counted, and when the *norma scribendi* was in the hands of a few persons, the difficulty of adapting the writing to the ever-varying pronunciation of a language was comparatively small. We see it when we compare the Latin of early Roman inscriptions with the Latin of Cicero. We know from Cicero himself that when he settled among the patricians of Rome, he had on some small points to change both his pronunciation and his spelling of Latin. The reform of spelling was a favourite subject with Roman scholars, and even emperors were not too proud to dabble in inventing new letters and diacritical signs. The difficulty, however, never assumed serious proportions. The small minority of people who were able to read and write, pleased themselves as best they could; and, by timely concessions, prevented a complete estrangement between the written and the spoken language.

Then came the time when Latin ceased to be Latin, and the vulgar dialects, such as Italian, French, and Spanish, took its place. At that time the spelling was again phonetic, though here and there tinged by reminiscences of Latin spelling. There was much variety, but considering how limited the literary intercourse must have been between different parts of France, Spain, or Italy, it is surprising that on the whole there should have been so much uniformity in the spelling of these modern dialects. A certain local and individual freedom of spelling, however, was retained; and we can easily detect in mediæval MSS. the spelling of literate and illiterate writers, the hand of the learned cleric, the professional clerk, and the layman.

[A style of spelling will now be introduced which has received the name of Semiphonotypy. It requires no new letter: "Ʊ ·ɒ," for the vowel in *but*, *son*, are made from "D p" by a pen-knife. The short vowels, diphthongs, and consonants are all written phonetically, except an occasional "n"="ŋ" before *k* and *g*, and "th"=both "ɟ" and "đ;" leaving only the long vowels in the old spelling. Six syllables out of seven are thus written as in full phonotypy. The italic and script forms of "ɒ" are "*ɒ*" (a turned italic "*a*") and 𝒮 *ꝛ*]

The great event hwich formz a deseisiv epok in the histori ov speling, iz the introdɒkshon ov printing. With printed buks, and partikiularli with printed Beibelz, skaterd over the kɒntri, the speling ov wɒrdz bekame rijid, and universali beinding. Sɒm langwejez, sɒch az Italian, wer more fortiunate than ɒtherz in having a more rashonal sistem ov speling tu start with. Sɒm, agen, leik Jerman, wer abel tu make teimli konseshonz, hweil ɒtherz, sɒch az Spanish, Dɒch, and French, had Akademiz tu help them at kritikal periodz ov their histori. The most ɒnfortiunate in all theze respekts woz Inglish. It started with a Latin alfabet,

the pronunsiashon ov hwich woz unseteld, and hwich had tu be apleid tu a Tiutonik laŋgwej. After this ferst fonetik kompromeiz it had tu pas through a konfiúzd sistem ov speling, half Sakson, half Norman; half fonetik, half tradishonal. The histori ov the speling, and even ov the pronunsiashon, ov Inglish, in its pasej from Anglo-Sakson tu midel and modern Inglish, haz lateli been studid with great sukses bei Mr. Ellis and Mr. Sweet. Ei must refer tu their buks "On Erli Inglish Pronunsiashon," and "On the Histori ov Inglish Soundz," hwich kontain a welth ov ilustrashon, almost bewildering. And even after Inglish reachez the period ov printing, the konfiuzhon iz bei no meanz terminated; on the kontrari, for a teim it iz greater than ever. Hou this kame tu pas haz been wel ilustrated bei Mr. Marsh in hiz ekselent "Lektiurz on the Inglish Langwej," p. 687. *seq.*(1) Hwot we nou kall the establisht sistem ov Inglish orthografi may, in the main, be trast bak tu Jonson'z Dikshonari, and tu the stil more kaprishus sway ekserseizd bei larj printing-ofisez and publisherz. It iz true that the evil ov printing karid tu a serten ekstent its own remedi. If the speling bekame unchanjabel, the langwej itself, too, woz, bei meanz ov a printed literatiur, chekt konsiderabli in its natiural growth and its deialektik vareieti. Nevertheles Inglish haz chanjed sins the invenshon ov printing; Inglish iz chanjing, though bei imperseptibel degreez, even nou; and if we kompare Inglish az spoken with Inglish az

1. The pronoun *it* woz speld in eight diferent wayz bei Tyndale, thus, *hyt hyft, hit, hitt, it, itt, yt, ytt.* Another author speld *tongue* in the folowing wayz; *tung, tong, tunge, tonge, tounge.* The word *head* woz variusli speld *hed, heede, hede, hefode.* The spelingz *obay, survay, pray, vail, vain,* ar often uzed for *obey, survey, prey, veil, vein.*

riten, they seem almost leik two diferent langwejez; az diferent az Latin iz from Italian.

This, no dout, iz a nashonal misfortiun, but it iz inevitabel. Litel az we perseive it, langwej iz, and alwayz must be, in a state ov fermentashon; and hwether within hundredz or within thouzandz ov yearz, all living langwejez must be prepared tu enkounter the difikulti hwich in England starez us in the fase at prezent. "Hwot shal we do?" ask our frendz. "Ther iz our hole nashonal literatiur," they say; "our leibrariz aktiuali bursting with buks and niuzpaperz. Ar all theze tu be thrown away? Ar all valiuabel buks tu be reprinted? Ar we ourselvz tu unlern hwot we hav lernd with so much trubel, and hwot we hav taught tu our children with greater trubel stil? Ar we tu sakrifeiz all that iz historikal in our langwej, and sink doun tu the low level ov the *Fonetik Nuz?*" Ei kud go on multipleiing theze kwestionz til even thoze men ov the world who nou hav onli a shrug ov the shoulder for the reformerz ov speling shud say, "We had no eidea hou strong our pozishon reali iz."

But with all thát, the problem remainz unsolvd. Hwot ar peopel tu do hwen langwej and pronunsiashon chanje, hweil their speling iz deklared tu be unchanjabel? It iz, ei believ, hardli nesesari that ei shud prove hou korupt, efete, and uterli irrashonal the prezent sistem ov speling iz, for nowun seemz inkleind tu denei all thát. Ei shal onli kwote, therefor, the jujment ov wun man, the late Bishop Thirlwall, a man who never uzed ekzajerated langwej. "Ei luk," he sez, "upon the establisht sistem, if an aksidental kustom may be so kalld, az a mas ov anomaliz, the growth ov ignorans and chans, ekwali repugnant tu gud taste and tu komon

sens. But ei am aware that the publik kling tu theze anomaliz with a tenasiti proporshond tu their absurditi, and ar jelus ov all enkroachment on ground konsekrated tu the free play ov bleind kaprise."

It may be useful, houever, tu kwote the testimonialz ov a fiu praktikal men in order tu show that this sistem ov speliŋ haz reali bekum wun ov the greatest nashonal misfortiunz, swolowing up milionz ov muni everi year and bleiting all atempts at nashonal ediukashon. Mr. Edward Jones, a skoolmaster ov great eksperiens, having then the siuperintendens ov the Heibernian Skoolz, Liverpool, rote in the year 1868:

"The Guvernment haz for the last twenti yearz taken ediukashon under its kare. They diveided the subjekts ov instrukshon intu siks gradez. The heiest point that woz atempted in the Guvernment Skoolz woz that a piupil shud be abel tu read with tolerabel eaze and ekspreshon a pasej from a niuzpaper, and tu spel the same with a tolerabel amount ov akiurasi."

Let us luk at the rezults az they apear in the report ov the Komiti ov Kounsil on Ediukashon for 1870-71:

Skoolz or Departments under separate hed teacherz in Ingland and Walez inspekted diuring the year 31st August, 1870		15,287
Sertifikated, asistant, and piupil teacherz emploid in theze skoolz		28,033
Skolarz in daili averej atendans throughout the year		1,168,981
Skolarz prezent on the day ov inspekshon ...		1,473,883
Skolarz prezented for ekzaminashon:—		
Under ten yearz ov aje ...	473,444	
Over ten yearz ov aje	292,144	765,588
Skolarz prezented for Standard VI.:—		
Under ten yearz ov aje ...	227	
Over ten yearz ov aje	32,953	33,180
Skolarz who past in Standard VI.:—		
1. Reading a short paragraf from a niuzpaper		30,985
2. Reiting the same from diktashon ...		27,989
3. Arithmetik		22,839

Therefor, les than wun skolar for each teacher, and les than two skolarz for each skool inspekted, reacht Standard VI.

In 1873 the state ov thingz, akording tu the ofishal returnz ov the Ediukashon Department woz much the same. Ferst ov all, ther ought tu hav been at skool 4,600,000 children between the ajez ov three and therteen. The number ov children on the rejister ov inspekted skoolz woz 2,218,598. Out ov thát number, about 200,000 leav skool aniuali, their ediukashon being supozed tu be finisht. Out ov theze 200,000, neinti per sent. leav without reaching the 6th Standard, eighti per sent. without reaching the 5th, and siksti per sent. without reaching the 4th Standard.

The report for 1874-75 showz an inkreas ov children on the buks, but the proporshon ov children pasing in the varius standardz iz substanshali the same. (See "Popiular Ediukashon," bei E. Jones, B.A., an eks--skoolmaster, 1875.) It iz kalkiulated that for such rezults az theze the kuntri, hwether bei taksashon or bei voluntari kontribiushonz, payz aniuali nearli £3,500,000.

Akording tu the same authoriti, Mr. E. Jones, it nou takes from siks tu seven yearz tu lern the arts ov reading and speling with a fair degree ov intelijens—thát iz, about 2,000 ourz; and tu meni meindz the difikultiz ov orthografi ar insurmountabel. The bulk ov the children pas through the Guvernment skoolz without having akweird the abiliti tu read with eaze and intelijens.

"An averej cheild," sez anuther skoolmaster, "begining skool at seven, ought tu be abel tu read the Niu Testament fluentli at eleven or twelv yearz ov aje, and

at therteen or fourteen ought tu be abel tu read a gud leading artikel with eaze and ekspreshon." Thát iz, with seven ourz a week for forti weeks for feiv yearz, a cheild rekweirz 1,400 ourz' wurk tu be abel tu read the Niu Testament.

After a kareful ekzaminashon ov yung men and wimen from therteen tu twenti yearz ov aje in the faktoriz ov Birmingham, it woz proved that onli 4½ per sent. wer abel tu read a simpel sentens from an ordinari skool-buk with intelijens and akiurasi.

This apleiz tu the lower klasez. But with regard tu the heier klasez the kase seemz almost wurs; for Dr. Morell, in hiz "Maniual ov Speling" aserts that out ov 1,972 failiurz in the Sivil Servis Ekzaminashonz, 1,866 kandidates wer plukt for speling.

So much for the piupilz. Amung the teacherz themselvz it woz found in Amerika that out ov wun hundred komon wurdz, the best speler amung the eighti or neinti teacherz ekzamind faild in wun, sum preiz-takerz faild in four or feiv, and sum utherz mist over forti. The Depiuti State Siuperintendent deklared that on an averej the teacherz ov the State wud fail in speling tu the ekstent ov 25 per sent.

Hwot, houever, iz even more serius than all this iz not the great waste ov teim in lerning tu read, and the almost komplete failiur in nashonal ediukashon, but the aktiual mischef dun bei subjekting yung meindz tu the illojikal and tedius drujeri ov lerning tu read Inglish az speld at prezent. Everithing they hav tu lern in reading (or pronunsiashon) and speling iz irrashonal; wun rule kontradikts the uther, and each statement haz tu be aksepted simpli on authoriti, and with a komplete disregard ov all thoze rashonal instinkts which lei dor-

mant in the cheild, and ought tu be awakend bei everi keind ov helthi ekserseiz.

Ei nó ther ar personz who kan defend enithing, and who hold that it iz diu tu this veri disiplin that the Inglish karakter iz hwot it iz: that it retainz respekt for authoriti: that it dυz not rekweir a reazon for everithing; and that it dυz not admit that hwot iz inkonseivabel iz therefor imposibel. Even Inglish orthodoksi haz been trast bak tu thát hiden sourse, bekauz a cheild akυstomd tu believe that t-h-o-u-g-h iz *tho,* and that t-h-r-o-u-g-h iz *throo,* wud afterwardz believe enithing. It may be so; stil ei dout hwether even sυch objekts wud jυstifei sυch meanz. Lord Lytton sez, "A more leiing, round-about, pυzel-heded deluzhon than thát bei hwich we konfiúz the klear instinkts ov truth in our akυrsed sistem ov speling woz never konkokted bei the father ov fols'hud. . . . Hou kan a sistem ov ediukashon flυrish that beginz bei so monstrυs a fols'hud, hwich the sens ov hearing sυfeizez tu kontradikt?"

Though it may seem a wυrk ov siupererogashon tu bring forward stil more fakts in sυport ov the jeneral kondemnashon past on Inglish speling, a fiu ekstrakts from a pamflet bei Mr. Meiklejohn, late Asistant-Komishoner ov the Endoud Skoolz Komishon for Skotland, may here feind a plase.

"Ther ar therteen diferent wayz ov reprezenting the sound ov long *o*:—*note, boat, toe, yeoman, soul, row, sew, hautboy, beau, owe, floor, oh! O!*"

And agen (p. 16),—

"Double-you-aitch-eye-see-aitch		is	*which*
Tea-are-you-tea-aitch	... ...	„	*truth*
Bee-o-you-gee-aitch	... ...	„	*bough*

See-are-eh-bee	...	...	is	*crab*
Bee-ee-eh-see-aitch	...	...	„	*beach*
Oh-you-gee-aitch-tee	...	...	„	*ought*
Oh-enn-see-ee	...	...	„	*once.*

"Or, tu sum up the hole indeitment agenst the kulprit: 1. Out ov the twenti-siks leterz, onli eight ar true, fikst, and permanent kwolitiz—thát iz, ar true both tu eí and ear. 2. Ther ar therti-eight distinkt soundz in our spoken langwej; and ther ar about 400 distinkt simbolz (simpel and kompound) tu reprezent theze therti-eight soundz. In uther wurdz, ther ar 400 servants tu do the wurk ov therti-eight. 3. Ov the twenti-siks leterz, fifteen hav akweird a habit ov heiding themselvz. They ar riten and printed; but the ear haz no akount ov them; such ar *w* in *wrong,* and *gh* in *right.* 4. The vouel soundz ar printed in diferent wayz; a long *o* for ekzampel haz therteen printed simbolz tu reprezent it. 5. Fourteen vouel soundz hav 190 printed simbolz atácht tu their servis. 6. The singel vouel *e* haz feiv diferent fsnkshonz; it ought onli tu hav wun. 7. Ther ar at least 1,300 wurdz in hwich the simbol and the sound ar at varians—in hwich the wurd iz not sounded az it iz printed. 8. Ov theze 1,300, 800 ar monosilabelz—the komonest wurdz, and supozed tu be eazier for children. 9. The hole langwej ov kuntri children leiz within theze wurdz; and meni agrikultiural laborerz go from the kradel tu the grave with a stok ov no more than 500 wurdz."

The kwestion, then, that wil hav tu be anserd sooner or later iz this:—Kan this unsistematik sistem ov speling Inglish be aloud tu go on for ever? Iz everi Inglish cheild, az kompared with uther children, tu be mulkted in two or three yearz ov hiz leif in order tu

lern it? Ar the lower klasez tu go through skool without lerning tu read and reit their own langwej intelijentli? And iz the kuntri tu pay milionz everi year for this uter failiur ov nashonal ediukashon? Ei do not believ that such a state ov thingz wil be aloud tu kontiniu for ever, partikiularli az a remedi iz at hand—a remedi that haz nou been tested for twenti or therti yearz, and that haz anserd ekstremeli wel. Ei mean Mr. Pitman'z sistem ov fonetik reiting, az apleid tu Inglish. Ei shal not enter here intu eni miniút diskushon ov fonetiks, or re-open the kontroversi hwich haz arizen between the advokets ov diferent sistemz ov fonetik reiting. Ov kourse, ther ar diferent degreez ov ekselens in diferent sistemz ov fonetik speling; but even the wurst ov theze sistemz iz infinitli siuperior tu the tradishonal speling.

Ei giv Mr. Pitman'z alfabet, hwich komprehendz the therti-siks broad tipikal soundz ov the Inglish langwej, and aseinz tu each a definit sein. With theze therti-siks seinz, Inglish kan be riten rashonali and red eazili; and, hwot iz most important, it haz been proved bei an eksperiens ov meni yearz, bei niumerus publikashonz, and bei praktikal eksperiments in teaching both children and adults, that such a sistem az Mr. Pitman'z iz perfektli praktikal.

THE PHONETIC ALPHABET.

The phonetic letters in the first column are pronounced like the italic letters in the words that follow. The last column contains the names *of the letters.*

CONSONANTS.

Mutes.

P	p	ro*pe*.....	pi
B	b	ro*be*.....	bi
T	t	fa*te*	ti
D	d	fa*de*.....	di
Ȼ	ç	*etch*	çɛ
J	j	e*dge*	jɛ
K	k	lee*k*.....	kɛ
G	g	lea*gue*...	gɛ

Continuants.

F	f	sa*fe*.....	ef
V	v	sa*ve*.....	vi
Ƕ	ϑ	wrea*th*...	iϑ
Ƌ	ƌ	wrea*the*..	ƌi
S	s	his*s*.....	es
Z	z	his.....	zi
Σ	ʃ	vi*cious*...	iʃ
Ȝ	ʒ	vi*sion*....	ʒi

Nasals.

M	m	see*m*....	em
N	n	see*n*.....	en
Ŋ	ŋ	si*ng*.....	iŋ

Liquids.

L	l	fa*ll*.....	el
R	r	*rare*.....	ar

Coalescents.

W	w	*wet*.....	wɛ
Y	y	*yet*.....	yɛ

Aspirate.

H	h	*h*ay	ɛç

VOWELS.

Guttural.

A	a	*a*m.....	at
Ɑ	ɑ	*al*ms	ɑ
E	e	*e*ll	et
Ɛ	ɛ	*a*le.....	ɛ
I	i	*i*ll.....	it
Ɨ	ɨ	*ee*l.....	ɨ

Labial.

O	o	*o*n.....	ot
Ɔ	ɔ	*a*ll.....	ɔ
Ɤ	ɤ	*u*p.....	ɤt
Ơ	ơ	*o*pe.....	ơ
U	u	*u*ll.....	ut
Ʉ	ʉ	*oo*d.....	ʉ

DIPHTHONGS: EI ei, IU iu, OU ou, AI ai, OI oi.
as heard in b*y*, n*ew*, n*ow*, K*ai*ser, b*oy*.

[In the next fourteen pages, five of the new letters will be employed, viz., ɛ, ɤ, ð, ʒ, ŋ, for the sounds represented by the italic letters in *f*ather, son b*u*t, *th*in, visi*o*n, si*ng*.]

Nou ei ask eni intelijent reader who dɤz not ðiŋk that everiðiŋ niu and stranje iz, *ipso facto,* ridikiulɤs and absɤrd, hwether after a fiu dayz' praktis, he or she wud not read and reit Iŋglish, akordiŋ tu Mr. Pitman's sistem, with perfekt eaze? Ov kourse it takes more than feiv minits tu master it, and more than feiv minits tu form an opinion ov its merits. Bɤt admitiŋ even that peopel ov a serten aje shud feind this niu alfabet trɤbelsɤm, we mɤst not forget that no reform kan be karid out without a jenerashon or two ov marterz; and hwot true reformerz hav tu ðiŋk ov iz not themselvz, bɤt thoze who kɤm after them—thoze, in fakt, who ar nou growiŋ ɤp tu inherit hereafter, hwether they leik it or not, all the gud and all the evil hwich we chooz tu leav tu them.

It meit be sed, houever, that Mr. Pitman's sistem, beiŋ enteirli fonetik, iz too radikal a reform, and that meni and the wɤrst irregiularitiz in Iŋglish speliŋ kud be removed without goïŋ kweit so far. The prinsipel that hɛf a loaf iz beter than no bred iz not without sɤm truð, and in meni kasez we nó that a polisi ov kompromeiz haz been prodɤktiv ov veri gud rezɤlts. Bɤt, on the ɤther hand, this hɛf-harted polisi haz often retarded a real and komplete reform ov ekzistiŋ abiúsez; and in the kase ov a reform ov speliŋ, ei almost dout hwether the difikɤltiz inherent in hɛf-meʒurz ar not az great az the difikɤltiz ov kariiŋ a komplete reform. If the wɤrld iz not redi for reform, let ɤs wait. It seemz far beter, and at all events far more onest, tu wait til it iz redi than tu kari the relɤktant wɤrld with you a litel

wáy, and then tu feind that all the impɔlsiv forse iz spent, and the greater part ov the abiúsez establisht on fermer ground than ever.

Mr. Jones,[1] who reprezents the konsiliatori reformerz ov speliŋ, wud be satisfeid with a moderet skeme ov speliŋ reform, in hwich, bei obzerviŋ analoji and folowiŋ presedent in olteriŋ a komparativli small nɔmber ov wɔrdz, it wud be posibel tu simplifei orʃografi tu a konsiderabel ekstent without apleiiŋ eni niu prinsipel, or introdiúsiŋ niu leterz, and yet tu rediús the teim and labor in teachiŋ readiŋ and speliŋ bei at least wɔnhɛf. It meit at all events be posibel tu setel the speliŋ ov thoze two or three ʃouzand wɔrdz hwich at prezent ar speld diferentli bei diferent auʃoritiz. This skeme, advokated bei Mr. Jones, iz sertenli veri klever; and if it had a chans ov sɔkses, ei meiself shud konsider it a great step in adváns. Mei onli dout iz hwether, in a kase leik this, a small meʒur ov reform wud be karid more eazili than a komplete reform. It iz diferent in Jerman, hwere the diseaz haz not spred so far. Here the Komíti apointed bei Gɔvernment tu konsider the kwestion ov a reform ov speliŋ haz deklared in favor ov sɔm sɔch moderet prinsipelz az Mr. Jones advokates for Iŋglish. In Iŋglish, houever, the difikɔlti leiz in chanjiŋ eniθiŋ; and if the prinsipel ov eni chanje iz wɔns admited, it wud reali be eazier, ei believ, tu begin *de novo* than tu chanje sɔmθiŋ, and leav the rest ɔnchanjed.

Let ɔs nou see hou Mr. Pitman's or eni similar sistem ov fonetik reitiŋ haz wɔrkt hwere it haz been put tu the test.

Mr. William White reits:—"Ei speak from eksperiens.

[1] Popular Education—A Revision of English Spelling a National Necessity. By E. Jones, B.A. London, 1875.

Ei hav taught poor children in Glasgow tu read the Sermon on the Mount after a kourse ov ekserseizez ekstendiŋ over no more than siks ourz."

The folowiŋ iz an ekstrakt from a leter riten sɔm teim ago bei the late Mr. William Colbourne, manajer ov the Dorset Baŋk at Sturminster, tu a frend ov hiz, a skoolmaster. He sɛz :—

" Mei litel Sidney, who iz nou a fiu mɔnθs more than four yearz old, wil read eni fonetik buk without the sleitest hezitashon ; the hardest namez or the loŋgest wɔrdz in the Old or Niu Testament form no obstakel tu him. And hou loŋ do you θiŋk it tuk me—for ei am hiz teacher—tu impart tu him this pouer ? Hwei sɔmθiŋ les than eight ourz ! You may believ it or not az you leik, bɔt ei am konfident that not more than thát amount ov teim woz spent on him, and thát woz in snachez ov feiv minits at a teim, hweil tea woz getiŋ redi. Ei nó you wil be inkleind tu say, 'All thát iz veri wel, bɔt hwot iz the use ov readiŋ fonetik buks ? he iz stil az far of, and may be farther, from readiŋ románik buks.' Bɔt in this you ar mistaken. Take anɔther ekzampel. Hiz nekst elder brɔther, a boi ov siks yearz, haz had a fonetik ediukashon so far. Hwot iz the konsekwens ? Hwei, readiŋ in the ferst staje woz so deleitful and eazi a θiŋ tu him, thạt he taught himself tu read romanikali, and it wud be a difikɔlt mater tu feind wɔn boi in twenti, ov a korespondiŋ aje, that kud read hɛf so wel az he kan in eni buk. Agen, mei oldest boi haz riten more fonetik shorthand and loŋhand, perhaps, than eni boi ov hiz aje (eleven yearz) in the kiŋdom ; and nowɔn ei daresay haz had les tu do with thát absɔrditi ov absɔrditiz, the speliŋ-buk ! He iz nou at a ferst-rate skool in Wiltshire, and in the hɛf-

-year presediŋ Kristmas, he karid of the preiz for orƌografi in a kontest with boiz sɔm ov them hiz seniorz bei yearz!"

Bei the adopshon ov the fonetik alfabet, the difikɔltiz that lei in the way ov forenerz lerniŋ Iŋglish, also wud be dɔn away with. The Rev. Newman Hall reits, "Ei met with a Danish jentelman the ɔther day who heili preizd the Iŋglish fonotipik Niu Testament. It had been ov great use tu him, and *enabeld him tu read* [*buks in the komon speliŋ*] *without an instrɔkter*, removiŋ the greatest obstakel in akweiriŋ Iŋglish, the monstrɔs anomaliz ov pronɔnsiashon." Ekzampelz leik theze go a loŋ way.

Mr. A. J. Ellis, than whom nowɔn haz labord more devotedli for a reform ov speliŋ, az a ferst step in a reform ov nashonal ediukashon, and who haz himself elaborated several most injeniɔs sistemz ov fonetik reitiŋ, givz ɔs the folowiŋ az the rezɔlts ov hiz praktikal eksperiens:—

"With the fonetik sistem ov speliŋ, the Primer iz masterd within ƌree mɔnƌs, at most. The children then proseed tu praktis this fonetik readiŋ for sɔm teim, til they kan read with fluensi from the jeneral luk ov the wɔrd, and not from konsideriŋ the pouerz ov its leterz. Ƌree mɔnƌs more, at most, ar rekweird for this staje.

"Hwen this pouer ov fluent readiŋ in fonetik print iz akweird, buks in the ordinari print, siuted tu their kapasitiz, ar tu be put intu the children'z handz, and they ar told tu read them. Each wɔrd hwich they fail tu ges iz told them immedietli; but it iz found that children ar mostli abel tu read the ordinari print without eni fɔrther instrɔkshon. The teim nesesari for

kompletiŋ this step may be taken, at the loŋgest, az two mɔnðs, so that the hole teim ov lerniŋ tu read in the ordinari print, on the Readiŋ Reform sistem, may be rekond az feiv ourz a week for eight mɔnðs. The hole task haz, in meni kasez, been akomplisht in les teim, even in ðree mɔnðs. On the ɔther hand, in wɔn skool hwere it iz uzed, eleven mɔnðs ar okiupeid, az the master feindz it advantajɔs in ɔther respekts tu keep the piupil loŋger at fonetik readiŋ. Bɔt onli wɔn our a day iz rekweird." Mr. Ellis sɔmz ɔp az folowz:

"Kareful eksperiments in teachiŋ children ov variɔs ajez and raŋks, and even pauperz and kriminal adɔlts, hav establisht—

"1. That piupilz may be taught tu read buks in fonetik print, slowli bɔt shureli, in from ten tu forti ourz, and wil atain konsiderabel fluensi after a fiu weeks' praktis.

"2. That hwen the piupilz hav ataind fluensi in readiŋ from fonetik print, a veri fiu ourz sɔfeiz tu giv them the same fluensi in readiŋ ordinari print.

"3. That the hole teim nesesari for impartiŋ a nolej ov boð fonetik and ordinari readiŋ dɔz not ekseed eight mɔnðs for children ov averej intelijens, between four and feiv yearz ov aje, taught in klas, at skool, not more than hɔf-an-our tu an our each day; and that in this teim an abiliti tu read iz akweird siuperior tu thát uʒuali ataind in two or ðree teimz the period on the old plan; hweil the pronɔnsiashon ov the piupil iz mɔch improved, hiz interest in hiz stɔdi iz kept aleiv, and a lojikal trainiŋ ov endiúriŋ valiu iz given tu hiz meind bei the habitiual analisis and sinðesis ov spoken soundz.

"4. That thoze taught tu read in this maner akweir

the art ov ordinari speliŋ more redili than thoze inˌstrəkted on the old međod."

Tu all who nó Mr. Alexander J. Ellis, this evidens wil be səfiṣhent az tu the praktikal usefulnes ov the Fonetik Sistem ov speliŋ. Tu thoze who wish for more evidens ei rekomend a pamflet bei Mr. G. Withers, "The Iŋglish Laŋgwej Speld az Pronoúnst." 1874: and wən bei Dr. J. W. Martin, "The Gordian Nót Kət," 1875, hwere they wil feind the kònkərent testimoni ov praktikal teacherz in Iŋgland, Skotland, Eirland, and Amerika, all agreeiŋ that, bođ az a praktikal and a lojikal trainiŋ, the Fonetik sistem haz proved the greatest səkses.

Ther remainz, therefor, this wən objekshon onli, that hwotever the praktikal, and hwotever the đeoretikal advantejez ov the fonetik sistem may be, it wud əterli destroi the historikal or etimolojikal karakter ov the Iŋglish laŋgwej.

Səpoze it did; hwot then? The Reformashon iz səpozed tu hav destroid the historikal karakter ov the Iŋglish Chərch, and thát sentimental grievans iz stil felt bei səm stiudents ov ekleziastikal antikwitiz. Bət did Iŋgland, did all the reali progresiv nashonz ov Europe, alou this sentimental grievans tu outweigh the praktikal and đeoretikal advantejez ov Protestant Reform? Laŋgwej iz not made for skolarz and etimolojists: and if the hole rase ov Iŋglish etimolojists wer reali tu be swept away bei the introdəkshon ov a Speliŋ Reform, ei hope they wud be the ferst tu rejois in sakrifeiziŋ themselvz in so gud a kauz.

Bət iz it reali the kase that the historikal kontiniúiti ov the Iŋglish laŋgwej wud be broken bei the adopshon ov fonetik speliŋ, and that the profeshon ov the

etimolojist wud be gon for ever? Ei say, No, most emfatikali, tu boθ propozishonz. If the seiens ov laŋgwej haz proved eniθiŋ, it haz proved that all laŋgwejez chanje akordiŋ tu law, and with konsiderabel uniformiti. If therefor, the reitiŋ folowd, *pari passu,* on the chanjez in pronɔnsiashon, hwot iz kalld the etimolojikal konshɔsnes ov the speakerz and the readerz —ei speak, ov kourse, ov ediukated peopel onli—wud not sɔfer in the least. If we retain the feeliŋ ov an etimolojikal konekshon between *gentlemanly* and *gentlemanlike,* we shud shureli retain it hwether we reit *gentlemanly* or *gentelmanli.* If we feel that *think* and *thought, bring* and *brought, buy* and *bought, freight* and *fraught,* beloŋ tugether, shud we feel it les if we rote *θœt, brœt, bœt, frœt?* If, in speakiŋ, thoze who nó Latin retain the feeliŋ that wɔrdz endiŋ in *-ation* korespond tu Latin wɔrdz in *-atio,* wud they looz the feeliŋ if they saw the same wɔrdz speld with *eʃon?* or even "-eʃɔn?" Do they not rekogneiz Latin *-itia* in *-ice;* or *-ilis* in *-le,* az in *-able* (Latin *abilis*)? If the skolar nóz, at wɔns, that sɔch wɔrdz az *barbarous, anxious, circus, genius,* ar ov Latin orijin, wud he hezitate if the last silabel in all ov them wer uniformli riten "ɔs?" Nay, iz not the prezent speliŋ ov *barbarous* and *anxious* enteirli misleadiŋ, bei konfoundiŋ wɔrdz endiŋ in *-osus,* sɔch az *famous (famosus)* with wɔrdz endiŋ in *-us,* leik *barbarous, anxious,* ets.? Bekauz the Italianz reit *filosofo,* ar they les aware than the Iŋglish, who reit *philosopher,* and the French, who reit *philosophe,* that they hav before them the Latin *philosophus,* the Greek φιλόσοφος? If we reit *f* in *fansi,* hwei not in *phantom?* if in *frenzy* and *frantic,* hwei not in *phrenology?* A laŋgwej hwich tolerates *vial* for

phial, need not shiver at *filosofer.* Everi ediukated speaker nóz that sɔch wɔrdz az *honour, ardour, colour, odour, labour, vigour, error, emperor,* hav past from Latin tu French, and from French tu Iŋglish. Wud he nó it les if all wer speld aleik, sɔch az *onor* (*onorable*) *ardor, vigor* (*vigorous*), *labor* (*laborious*), or even "onɔr, ardɔr, vigɔr?" The old speliŋ ov *emperor, doctor, governor,* and *error,* woz *emperour, doctour, governour,* and *errour.* If theze kud be chanjed, hwei not the rest? Spenser haz *neibor* for *neighbour,* and it iz difikɔlt tu say hwot woz gaind bei chanjiŋ *-bor* intu *-bour* in sɔch piurli Sakson wɔrdz az *neighbor, harbor.* No dout if we see *laugh* riten with *gh* at the end, thoze who nó Jerman ar at wɔns remeinded ov its etimolojikal konekshon with the Jerman *lachen;* bɔt we shud soon nó the same bei analoji, if we found not onli "lɔf," bɔt "kof" for *cough* (Jer. *keuchen*), "enɔf" for *enough* (Jerman *genug*), ets. In "draft," fonetik speliŋ haz nearli sɔplanted the so-kalld historikal speliŋ *draught;* in "dwarf" (*dwergh, thweorh*) and in "ruff" (*rough*), altugether.

Hwot peopel kall the etimolojikal konshɔsnes ov the speaker iz striktli a mater ov oratorikal sentiment onli, and it wud remain nearli az stroŋ az it iz nou, hwotever speliŋ be adopted. Bɔt even if it shud sɔfer here and there, we ought tu bear in meind that, eksept for oratorikal pɔrposez, thát konshɔsnes, konfeind az it iz tu a veri fiu ediukated peopel, iz ov veri small importans, ɔnles it haz ferst been korekted bei a strikt etimolojikal disiplin. Without thát, it often dejenerates intu hwot iz kalld "popiular etimoloji," and aktiuali tendz, in sɔm kasez, tu vishiate the korekt speliŋ ov wɔrdz.

Ei hav frekwentli dwelt on this before, in order tu show hou, hwot iz nou kalld the etimolojikal or historikal speliŋ ov wɜrdz, iz in meni kasez, ɜterli ɜnetimolojikal and ɜnhistorikal. We spel *to delight*, and thɜs indiús meni peopel tu believ that this wɜrd iz sɜmhou konekted with *light* (lux), or *light* (levis); hwereaz the old speliŋ woz *to delyt* or *to delite* (Tyndale) reprezentiŋ the old French *deleiter*. On the ɜther hand we feind for *quite* and *smite*, the old speliŋ *quight*, *smight*, which may be old and historikal, bɜt iz deseidedli ɜnetimolojikal.

Sovereign and *foreign* ar speld az if they wer konekted with *reign*, *regnum*; the true etimoloji ov the former beiŋ *superanus*, Old French *sovrain*, Old Iŋglish *soveraine*; hweil *foreign* iz the late Latin *foraneus*; Old French *forain*; Old Iŋglish *forein*. And hwei do we reit *to feign?* Archbishop Trench ("Iŋglish Past and Prezent," p. 238) ðiŋks the *g* in *feign* iz elokwent tu the eí; bɜt its elokwens iz misleadiŋ. *Feign* iz not taken from Latin *fingo*, az litel az *honour* iz taken from Latin *honor*. *Feign* kɜmz from the Old French *faindre*; it woz in Old Iŋglish *faynen* and *feynen*, and it woz therefor a mere etimolojikal feint tu insert the *g* ov the Latin *fingo*, and the French *feignant*. The Old Iŋglish *shammfasst* (Orm.), formd leik *stedefasst* (stedfast), iz nou speld *shamefaced*, az if it had sɜmðiŋ tu do with a blɜshiŋ fase. *Aghast*, insted ov Old Iŋglish *agast*, iz sɜpozed tu luk more freitful bekauz it remeindz ɜs ov *ghost*. The French *lanterne* woz riten *lant-horn*, az if it had been so kalld from the transparent sheets ov horn that enklozed the leit. The *s* in *island* owez its orijin tu a mistaken belief that the wɜrd iz konekted with *isle* (*insula*), hwereaz it iz the Aŋglo-Sakson *eáland* (Jerman

eiland), thát iz, water-land. The speliŋ *iland* woz stil kɜrent in Shakspere'z teim. In *aisle*, too, the *s* iz ɜn-etimolojikal, though it iz historikal, az haviŋ been taken over from the Old French *aisle*.

This tendensi tu olter the speliŋ in order tu impart tu a wɜrd, at all hazardz, an etimolojikal karakter, beginz even in Latin, hwere *postumus*, a siuperlativ ov *post*, woz sɜmteimz riten *posthumus*, az if, hwen apleid tu a late-born sɜn, it woz dereivd from *humus*. In Iŋglish, this fols speliŋ iz retaind in *posthumous*. *Cena* woz speld bei peopel who wonted tu show their nolej ov Greek, *cœna*, az if konekted with *κοινή*, hwich it iz not.

Bɜt nou let ɜs luk more karefuli intu the far more important statement, that the Iŋglish laŋgwej, if riten fonetikali, wud reali looz its historikal and etimolojikal karakter. The ferst kwestion iz, in hwot sens kan the prezent speliŋ ov Iŋglish be kalld historikal? We hav onli tu go bak a veri short way in order tu see the modern ɜpstart karakter ov hwot iz kalld historikal speliŋ. We nou reit *pleasure*, *measure*, and *feather*, bɜt not veri loŋ ago, in Spenser'z teim, theze wɜrdz wer speld *plesure*, *mesure*, *fether*. Tyndale rote *frute*; the *i* in *fruit* iz a mere restorashon ov the French speliŋ. For *debt*, on the kontrari, we feind, bɜt three or four hɜndred yearz ago, *dett*. This iz more historikal therefor than *debt*, bekauz in French, from hwich the wɜrd woz borowd, the *b* had disapeard, and it woz a piurli etimolojikal fansi tu restore it. The *b* woz leikweiz re-introdiúst in *doubt*, bɜt the *p* woz not restored in *tu kount* (French *compter*, Latin *computare*), hwere *p* had at least the same reit az *b* in *doute*. Thɜs *receipt* reziúmz the Latin *p*, bɜt *deceit* dɜz without it. Tu *deign* keeps the *g*, tu *disdain* dɜz without it. Ther

iz anɔther *b* hwich haz a serten historikal air in sɔm Iŋglish wɔrdz, bɔt hwich woz orijinali piurli fonetik, and iz nou simpli siupérfluɔs. The old wɔrd for *member* woz *lim*. In sɔch kompoundz az *lim-lama*, lim(b)-lame *lim-leas* lim(b)-less, it woz imposibel tu avoid the interkalashon ov a *b* in pronɔnsiashon. In this maner the *b* krept in, and we hav nou tu teach that in *limb*, *crumb* (crume), *thumb* (thuma) the *b* mɔst be riten, bɔt not pronoúnst. Agen, *tung* (Jer. *zunge*), *yung* (Jer. *jung*), az speld bei Spenser, hav a far more historikal aspekt than *tongue* and *young*.

If we wisht tu reit historikali, we ought tu reit *salm* insted ov *psalm*, for the inishal *p*, beïŋ lost in pronɔnsiashon, woz dropt in reitiŋ at a veri erli teim (Aŋglo-Sakson *sealm*) and woz re-introdiúst simpli tu pleaz sɔm ekleziastikal etimolojists; also *nevew* (French *neveu*) insted ov *nephew*, hwich iz both ɔnetimolojikal and ɔnfonetik.

In hwot sens kan it be kalld historikal speliŋ if the old pluralz ov *mouse* and *louse*, hwich wer *mys* and *lys*, ar nou speld *mice* and *lice*? The plural ov *goose* iz not speld *geece* bɔt *geese*, yet everibodi nóz hou tu pronoúns it. The same mistaken atempt at an okazhonal fonetik speliŋ haz separated *dice* from *die*, and *pence* from *pens*, thát iz, *penyes*; hweil in *nurse*, hwere the speliŋ *nurce* wud hav been useful, az remeindiŋ ɔs ov its true etimon *nourrice*, the *c* haz been replast bei *s*.

Ther ar, in fakt, meni speliŋz hwich wud be at the same teim more historikal and more fonetik. Hwei reit *little*, hwen nowɔn pronoúnsez *little*, and hwen the old speliŋ woz *lytel*? Hwei *girdle*, when the old speliŋ woz *girdel*? The same rule apleiz tu nearli all wɔrdz endiŋ in *le*, sɔch az *sickle*, *ladle*, *apple*, ets., hwere the etimoloji

iz kompleteli obskiúrd bei the prezent orθografi. Hwei *scent,* bɤt *dissent,* hwen even Milton stil rote *sent?* Hwei *ache,* insted ov the Shaksperian *ake?* Hwei *cat,* bɤt *kitten*; hwei *cow,* bɤt *kine?* Hwei *accede, precede, secede,* bɤt *exceed, proceed, succeed?* Hwei indeed, èksept tu waste the preshɤs teim ov children?

And if it iz difikɤlt tu say hwot konstitiuts historikal speliŋ, it iz ekwali perpleksiŋ tu defein the real meaniŋ ov etimolojikal speliŋ. For, hwere ar we tu stop? It wud be konsiderd veri ɜnetimolojikal wer we tu reit *nee* insted ov *knee, now* insted ov *know, night* insted ov *knight*; yet nowɜn komplainz about the los ov the inishal *h,* the reprezentativ ov an orijinal *k,* in *loaf,* A. S. hlâf (cf. κλίβανος), in *ring* (A.S. *hring*); in *lade, ladder, neck,* ets.

If we ar tu reit etimolojikali, then hwei not retɜrn tu *loverd,* or *hlaford,* insted ov *lord?* tu *nose-thrill,* or *nosethirle* insted ov *nostril*; tu *swister* insted ov *sister*; hwich wud not be more trɤbelsɤm than *sword. Wifmann* shureli wud be beter than *woman*; *meadwife* beter than *midwife*; *godspel* beter than *gospel, ortyard* beter than *orchard, puisne* beter than *puny.* Frekwentli the prezent rekogneizd speliŋ luks etimolojikal, bɤt iz ɜterli ɜnetimolojikal. *Righteous* luks leik an ajektiv in *-eous,* sɤch az *plenteous,* bɤt it iz reali a Sakson wɤrd, *rightwis* thát iz *rightwise,* formd leik *otherwise,* ets.

Could iz riten with an *l* in analoji tu *would,* bɤt hweil the *l* iz jɤstifeid in *would* from *will,* and *should* from *shall,* we feind the Old Iŋglish imperfekt ov *can* riten *cuthe,* then *couthe, coude.* The *l,* therefor, iz neither fonetik nor etimolojikal. Nɤθiŋ, agen, kan be more misleadiŋ tu an etimolojist than the prezent speliŋ ov *whole* and *hale.* Both kɤm from the same sourse, the

Goθik *hail-s,* Sanskrit *kalya-s,* meaniŋ orijinali, *fit, redi*; then *sound, complete, whole.* In Aŋglo-Sakson we hav *hæl,* hole; and *hal,* heldi, without eni trase ov a *w,* either before or after. The Old Iŋglish *halsum,* holesʊm, iz the Jerman *hailsam. Whole,* therefore, iz a mere mis-speliŋ, the *w* haviŋ probabli been aded in analoji tu *who, which,* ets. From a piurli etimolojikal point ov viu, the *w* iz roŋli left out before *h* in *hou*; for az Anglo--Sakson *hwy* bekame *why,* Aŋglo-Sakson *hwa* shud hav bekʊm *whow.*

If we reali atempted tu reit etimolojikali, we shud hav tu reit *bridegroom* without the *r,* bekauz *groom* iz a mere korʊpshon ov *guma,* man, Aŋglo-Sakson *bryd-guma.* We shud hav tu reit *burse* insted ov *purse,* az in *disburse.* In fakt, it iz difikʊlt tu say hwere we shud stop. Hwei do we not reit *metal* insted ov *mettle, worthship* insted ov *worship, chirurgeon* insted ov *surgeon, furhlong* (thát iz, fʊrow loŋ) insted ov *furlong, feordhing* (thát iz fourth part) insted ov *farthing?* If we reit piuni *puisne,* we meit az wel reit *post-natus.* We meit spel koi, *quietus;* pert, *apertus;* priest, *presbyter*; master, *magister;* seks-ton, *sacristan;* alms, *eleemosyne,* ets. If enibodi wil tel me at hwot date etimolojikal speliŋ iz tu begin, hwether at 1,500 A.D., or at 1,000, A.D., or at 500 A.D., ei am wiliŋ tu diskʊs the kwestion. Til then, ei beg leav tu say that etimolojikal speliŋ wud play greater havok in Iŋglish than fonetik speliŋ, even if we wer tu draw a lein not more than feiv hʊndred yearz ago.

The two stroŋgest argiuments, therefor, agenst fonetik speliŋ, nameli, that it wud destroi the historikal and etimolojikal karakter ov the Iŋglish laŋgwej, ar, after all, bʊt veri parshali true. Here and there, no dout, the etimoloji and histori ov an Iŋglish wʊrd meit be

obskiúrd bei fonetik speliŋ; az if, for instans, we rote "Yɥrɵp" insted ov *Europe*. Bɤt even then analoji wud help ɤs, and teach thoze who nó Greek, ov whom ther ar not meni, that "Yɥr" in sɤç wɤrdz az *Europe*, *Eurydice*, reprezented the Greek εὐρύς. The real anser, houever, iz, that nowɤn kud onestli kall the prezent sistem ov speliŋ either historikal or etimolojikal; and ei believ, that taken az a hole, the los okazhond bei konsistent fonetik speliŋ wud not be greater than the gain.

Anɤther objekshon ɤrjd agenst fonetik speliŋ, nameli, that with it it wud be imposibel tu distiŋgwish homonimz, mɤst be met in the same way. No dout it iz a serten advantej if in reitiŋ we kan distiŋgwish *right*, *rite*, *write* and *wright*. Bɤt if, in the hɤri ov konversashon, ther iz hardli ever a dout hwich wɤrd iz ment, shureli ther wud be mɤch les danjer in the slow proses ov readiŋ a kontiniuɤs sentens. If variɤs speliŋz ov the same wɤrd ar nesesari tu point out diferent meaniŋz, we shud rekweir eight speliŋz for *box*, tu signifei a chest, a Kristmas gift, a hɤntiŋ seat, a tree, a slap, tu sail round, seats in a ɟeater, and the frɤnt seat on a koach; and this prinsipel wud hav tu be apleid tu abɤv 400 wɤrdz. Who wud ɤndertake tu proveid all theze variashonz ov the prezent uniform speliŋ ov theze wɤrdz? And we mɤst not forget that, after all, in readiŋ a paje we ar seldom in dout hwether *sole* meanz a fish, or the *sole* ov a fut, or iz uzed az an ajektiv. If ther iz at eni teim eni real difikɤlti, laŋgwej proveidz its own remedi. It either drops sɤch wɤrdz az *rite* and *sole*, replasiŋ them bei *seremony* and *only*, or it uzez a perifrastik ekspreshon, sɤch az the sole ov the fut, or the sole and onli ground, ets.

[Five other new letters, representing the long vowels, will now be introduced, namely, ɛ, i̧, ɷ, ɵ, ɥ, for the sounds heard in
they, field, saw, no, do
mate, see, call, core, true
mare, police, ought, coal, poor]

Thɤs far ei hav treid tu anser the ri̧ali important argiuments hwich hav bi̧n brɷt forward agenst fɵnetik speliŋ. Ei hav dɤn sɵ with speshal referens tu the pouerful remonstransez ov Archbishop Trench, and hiz mɵst ɛbel pli̧diŋ in fɛvor ov the establisht sistem ov orɟografi. Az a mi̧r skolar, ei fuli shɛr hiz fi̧liŋz, and ei sinsi̧rli admeir hiz elokwent advokasi. Ei difer from him bekɷz ei dɥ not ɟiŋk, az hi̧ dɤz, that the los entɛld bei fɵnetik speliŋ wud bi̧ sɵ grɛt az wi̧ imajin; or that it wud bi̧ ɷl on wɤn seid. Beseidz, ɤnles hi̧ kan shɵ hou a reform ov speliŋ iz not ɵnli for the prezent tu bi̧ avoided, bɤt ɷltugether tu bi̧ renderd ɤnnesesari, ei konsider that the sɥner it iz tɛken in hand the beter. It si̧mz tu mi̧ that the Archbishop luks on the introdɤkshon ov fɵnetik speliŋ az a mi̧r krochet ov a fiu skolarz, or az an atempt on the part ov sɤm hɛf-ediukɛted personz, wishiŋ tu avoid the trɤbel ov lerniŋ hou tu spel korektli. If thát wer sɵ, ei kweit agri̧ with him that pɤblik opinion wud never asiúm sɤfishent fɵrs for kariiŋ thɛr ski̧m. Bɤt ther iz a mɵtiv pouer beheind thi̧z fɵnetik reformerz hwich the Archbishop haz hardli tɛken intu akount. Ei mi̧n the mizeri endiúrd bei milionz ov children at skɥl, hɥ meit lern in wɤn yi̧r, and with ri̧al advantej tu themselvz, hwot thɛ nou rekweir fɵr or feiv yi̧rz tu lern, and seldom sɤksi̧d in lerniŋ after ɷl. If the evidens ov sɤch men az Mr. Ellis iz tu bi̧ depended on, and ei beli̧v hi̧ iz wiliŋ tu sɤbmit tu eni test, then shɥrli the los ov sɤm historikal and etimolojikal *souvenirs* wud wɛ litel agenst the hapi-

nes ov milionz ov children, and the stil heier hapînes ov milionz ov Iŋglishmen and Iŋglishwimen, grœiŋ ɝp az the ɛrz tu ɷl the weld and streŋd ov Iŋglish literatiur, or ɝnɛbel tu rid ịven thɛr Beibel. Hịr it iz hwɛr ei ventiur tu difer from the Archbishop, not az bịiŋ saŋgwin az tu eni immịdiet sɝkses, bɝt simpli az fịliŋ it a diuti tu help in a kœz hwich at prezent iz mœst ɝnpopiular. The ịvil dɛ mɛ bị put of for a loŋ teim, partikiularli if the wɛt ov sɝch men az Archbishop Trench iz ɖrœn intu the ɝther skɛl. Bɝt ɝnlés laŋgwej sịsez tu bị laŋgwej, and reitiŋ sịsez tu bị reitiŋ, the dɛ wil shụrli kɝm hwen pịs wil hav tu bị mɛd betwịn the tụ. Jermani haz apoimted a Gɝvernment Komishon tu konsider hwot iz tu bị dɝn with Jerman speliŋ. In Amerika, tụ, sɝm lịdiŋ stɛtsmen sịm inkleind tu tɛk ɝp the reform ov speliŋ on nashonal groundz. Iz ther nœ stɛtsman in Iŋgland sɝfishentli prụf agenst ridikiul tu kœl the atenshon ov Parliment tu hwot iz a grœiŋ misfortiun?

Mɝch, houever, az ei difer from the Archbishop on thịz groundz, ei kanot bɝt deprekɛt the tœn in hwich hiz pouerful opœzishon haz bịn met bei meni ov the ɝphœlderz ov fœnetik speliŋ. Nɛ, ei mɝst gœ stil fɝrther, and fraŋkli konfés that tu wɝn ov hiz argiuments ei feind it difikɝlt, at prezent, tu giv a satisfaktori anser.

"It iz a mịr asɝmpshon," the Archbishop remarks, "that ɷl men pronoúns ɷl wɝrdz aleik; or that hwenever thɛ kɝm tu spel a wɝrd thɛ wil ekzaktli agrị az tu hwot the outlein ov its sound iz. Nou wị ar shụr men wil not dụ this, from the fakt that, befœr ther woz eni fikst and seteld ordɔgrafi in our laŋgwej, hwen, therfor, everibodi woz mœr or les a fœnografer, sịkiŋ tu reit doun the wɝrd az it sounded tu *him*,—for hị had nœ ɝther lœ tu geid him,—the vɛrieshonz ov speliŋ ar infinit. Tɛk,

for instans, the wɜrd *sudden*, hwich dɜz not sim tu promis eni grɛt skɷp for vareieti. Ei hav meiself met with this wɜrd speld in nɷ les than fɷrtin wɛz amɜŋ our erli reiterz. Agen, in hou meni wɛz woz Raleigh's nɛm speld, or Shakspere's? The sɛm iz evident from the speliŋ ov ɜnediukɛted personz in our ɷn dɛ. Thɛ hav nɷ ɜther rul bɜt the sound tu geid them. Hou iz it that thɛ du not ɷl spel aleik?"—*Inglish Past and Prezent*, p. 203.

Leik mɷst men hu pljd with thɛr hart az wel az with thɛr hed, the Archbishop haz hir ɷverlukt wɜn obviɜs anser tu hiz kwestion. Thɛ du not spel aleik bekɷz thɛ hav bin brɷt ɜp with a sistem ov speliŋ in hwich the sɛm sound kan bi reprezented in ten diferent wɛz, and in hwich hardli eni wɜn leter iz restrikted tu wɜn fɷnetik pouer ɷnli. If children wer brɷt ɜp with an alfabet in hwich ich leter had bɜt wɜn sound, and in hwich the sɛm sound woz ɷlwɛz reprezented bei the sɛm sein—and this iz the veri esens ov fɷnetik reitiŋ—then it wud bi simpli imposibel that thɛ shud drim ov reitiŋ *sudden* in fɷrtin, or *Woburn* in 140, diferent wɛz.

Bɜt for ɷl thát ther iz sɜm trut in the Archbishop's remark; and if wi kompɛr the diferent wɛz in hwich the advokets ov fɷnetik speliŋ—men leik Pitman, Bell, Ellis, Withers, Jones—reit the sɛm wɜrdz, iven hwen yuziŋ the sɛm fɷnetik alfabet, wi shal si that the difikɜlti pointed out bei the Archbishop iz a rial wɜn. Everiwɜn nɷz hou diferentli the sɛm wɜrdz ɷlwɛz hav bin and stil ar pronoúnst in diferent parts ov Inggland. And it iz not ɷnli in tounz and kountiz that thiz pekiuliaritiz prevɛl; ther ar serten wɜrdz hwich wɜn famili pronoúnsez diferentli from anɜther; and ther ar beseidz the stɜdid and ɜnstɜdid pekiuliaritiz ov individiual

spiker. Tu konvins pipel that wɜn pronɔnsieshon iz reit and the ɔther roŋ, simz ɔterli hɔples. Ei hav herd a heili kɔltiveted man defendiŋ hiz dropiŋ the *h* at the beginiŋ ov serten wɜrdz, bei the ɔnanserabel argiument that in the plɛs hwɛr hi woz brɔt ɔp, nɔwɜn pronoúnst thiz inishal *h*z. Hwot Skochman wud admit that hiz pronɔnsieshon woz fɔlti? Hwot Eirishman wud sɔbmit tu lɔz ov speliŋ past in Lɔndon? And hwot renderz argiument on eni neisetiz ov prɔnɔnsieshon stil mɔr difikɔlt iz, that bɔt the ir and the tɔŋ ar mɔst trecherɔs witnesez. Ei hav herd Amerikanz menten in gud ernest that ther woz mɔch les ov nɛzal twaŋ in Amerika than in Iŋgland. Pipel ar not awɛr hou the pronoúns, and hou diferentli the pronoúns wɜn and the sɛm wɜrd. Az a forener ei hav had ampel oportiunitiz for obzerveshon on this point. Sɔm frendz wud tel mi for instans, that *world* woz pronoúnst leik *whirl'd*, *father* leik *farther*, *nor* (befɔr konsonants) leik *gnaw*, *bud* leik *bird*, *burst* leik *bust*, *fɔr* leik *fur*, *birth* leik *berth*; that the vouelz had the sɛm sound in *where* and *were*, in *not* and *war*, in *God* and *gaudy*; hweil ɔtherz ashurd mi that nɔwɜn bɔt a forener kud diŋk sɔ. And the wɜrst iz that iven the sɛm person dɔz not ɔlwez pronoúns the sɛm wɜrd in ekzaktli the sɛm maner. Konstantli, hwen ei askt a frend tu repit a wɜrd hwich hi had jɜst pronoúnst, hi wud pronoúns it agen, bɔt with a sleit diferens. The mir fakt ov hiz treiiŋ tu pronoúns wel wud giv tu hiz pronɔnsieshon a konshɔs and emfatik karakter. The prepozishon *of* iz pronoúnst bei mɔst pipel *ov*, bɔt if kros-ekzamind, meni wil sɛ that the pronoúns *ov*, bɔt the *o* not ekzaktli leik *off*.

The konfiuzon bekɔmz grɛtest hwen it iz atempted tu eidentifei the pronɔnsieshon, sɛ ov a vouel in Jerman

with a vouel in Iŋglish. Nơ tú Iŋglishmen and nơ tú Jermanz sįmd tu bį ɛbel tu agrį on hwot thɛ herd with thɛr įrz, or hwot thɛ sed with thɛr tɜŋz; and the rezɜlt in the end iz that nơ vouel in Jerman woz rįali the sɛm az eni ɜther vouel in Iŋglish. Tu tɛk wɜn or tú instansez from Mr. Ellis's kį tu Palioteip (Palœotype), ei kan hįr nơ diferens betwįn the *a* in Italian *mano*, Iŋglish *father*, and Jerman *mahnen*, ɜnles ei restrikt mei obzervɛshonz tu the ɜterans ov serten individiualz; hwɛraz ei dų hįr a veri deseided, and jenerali adopted, diferens betwįn the vouelz in Jerman *böcke* and French *jeune*. Mr. Ellis, tɜchiŋ on the sɛm difikɜlti, remarks, "Mr. Bell's pronɔnsiɛshon, in meni instansez, diferz from thát hwich ei am akɔstomd tu giv, espeshali in foren wɜrdz. Bơt ov ɔs mɛ bį roŋ." Mr. Sweet remarks, p. 10, "Mr. Ellis insists stroŋli on the monofθoŋgal karakter ov hiz ơn *eez* and *ooz*. Ei hįr hiz *ee* and *oo* az distiŋkt difθoŋz, not ơnli in hiz Iŋglish pronɔnsiɛshon, bɜt ɑlsơ in hiz pronɔnsiɛshon ov French, Jerman, and Latin." If fơnetik reitiŋ ment this miniút fơtografi ov spơken soundz, in which Mes. Bell and Ellis eksél; if eni atempt had ever bįn mɛd tu emploi this hɛr-splitiŋ mashįneri for a praktikal reform ov Iŋglish speliŋ, the objekshonz rɛzd bei Archbishop Trench wud bį kweit ɔnanserabel. Ther wud bį fifti diferent wɛz ov speliŋ Iŋglish, and the konfiuzon wud bį grɛter than it iz nou. Not įven Mr. Bell's θerti-siks kategoriz ov vouel sound wud bį sɔfishent tu render everi pekiuliariti ov vouel kwoliti, pich, and kwontiti, with perfekt akiurasi. (Sį (H. Sweet, "Histori ov Iŋglish Soundz," pp. 58, 68.) Bɜt this woz never intended, and hweil konsįdiŋ mɔch tu the Archbishop's argiuments, ei mɔst not konsįd tų mɔch.

Hwot ei leik in Mr. Pitman'z sistem ov speliŋ iz ekzaktli hwot ei nó haz bįn found fɷlt with bei ɤtherz, nɛmli, that hį dɤz not atempt tu refein tų mɤch, and tu ekspres in reitiŋ thɷz endles shɛdz ov pronɤnsiɛshon, hwich mɛ bį ov the grɛtest interest tu the stiudent ov akoustiks, or ov fɷnetiks, az apleid tu the stɤdi ov liviŋ deialekts, bɤt hwich, for praktikal az wel az for seientifik filolojikal pɤrposez, mɤst bį enteirli ignɷrd. Reitiŋ woz never intended tu fɷtograf spɷken laŋgwejez: it woz ment tu indikɛt, not tu pɛnt, soundz. If Voltaire sez, "L'écriture c'est la peinture de la voix," hį iz reit; bɤt when hį gɷz on tu sɛ, "plus elle est ressemblante, meilleur elle est," ei am not serten that, az in a piktiur ov a landskɛp, sɷ in a piktiur ov the vois, prį-Rɛfɛleit miniútnes mɛ not destroi the veri objekt ov the piktiur. Laŋgwej dįlz in brɷd kɤlorz, and reitiŋ ɷt tu folɷ the ekzampel ov laŋgwej, hwich thɷ it alouz an endles varcieti ov pronɤnsiɛshon, restrikts itself for its ɷn pɤrpos, for the pɤrpos ov ekspresiŋ ɟɷt in ɷl its modifikɛshonz, tu a veri limited nɤmber ov tipikal vouelz and konsonants. Out ov the larj nɤmber ov soundz, for instans, hwich hav bįn katalogd from the vɛriɤs Iŋglish deialekts, thɷz ɷnli kan bį rekogneizd az konstitiuent elements ov the laŋgwej hwich in, and bei, thɛr diferens from įch ɤther konvɛ́ a diferens ov mįniŋ. Ov sɤch pregnant and ɟɷt-konvɛiŋ vouelz, Iŋglish pozésez nɷ mɷr than twelv. Hwotever the meinor shɛdz ov vouel soundz in Iŋglish deialekts mɛ bį, thɛ dų not enrich the laŋgwej, az sɤch, thát iz, thɛ dų not enɛbel the spįker tu konvɛ́ mɷr miniút shɛdz ov ɟɷt than the twelv tipikal siŋgel vouelz. Beseidz, ther jenerali iz hwot the French meit kɷl a fɷnetik solidariti in įch deialekt. If wɤn vouel chɛnjez, the ɤtherz ar apt tu folɷ, and the mɛn

objekt ov laŋgwej remɛnz the sɛm θrųout, nɛmli, tu prevent wɔn wɔrd from rɔniŋ intu anɔther, and yet tu ábstɛn from tų miniút fonetik distiŋkshonz, hwich an ordinari įr meįt feind it difikɔlt tu grasp. This prinsipel ov fonetik solidariti iz ov grɛt importans, not onli in ekspląniŋ the gradiual çenjez ov vouelz, bɔt olsɔ sɔch jeneral chɛnjez ov konsonants az wį sį, for instans, in the Jerman *Lautverschiebung*. Az sųn az wɔn plɛs iz left vɛkant, ther iz preshur tu fil it, or sɔ mɔch ov it az iz left vɛkant, bɔt nɔ mɔr.

Ther ar, in fakt, tų branchez, or at ol events, tų kweit distiŋkt praktikal aplikɛshonz ov the seiens ov Fonetiks, hwich, for wont ov beter nɛmz, ei designɛt az *filolojikal* and *deialektikal*. Ther iz hwot mɛ bį kold a filolojikal stɔdi ov Fonetiks, hwich iz an esenshal part ov the Seiens ov Laŋgwej, and haz for its objekt tu giv a klįr eidja ov the alfabet, not az riten, bɔt az spoken. It trįts ov the matįrialz out ov hwich, the instruments with hwich, and the proses bei hwich, vouelz and konsonants ar formd; and after ekspląniŋ hou serten leterz agrį, and difer, in thɛr matįrial, in the instruments with hwich, and the proses bei hwich, thɛ ar prodiúst, it enɛbelz ɔs tu ɔnderstand the kozez and rezɔlts ov hwot iz kold Fonetik Chɛnj. In meni respekts the most instrɔktiv trįtment ov the jeneral θįori ov Fonetiks iz tu bį found in the Prâtiśâkhyas; partikiularli in the oldest (400 B.C.), thát atacht tu the Rig Veda.[1] Thɔ the nɔmber ov posibel soundz mɛ sįm infinit, the nɔmber ov rįal soundz yųzd in Sanskrit or eni ɔther given laŋgwej for the pɔrpos ov ekspresiŋ diferent shɛdz ov

[1] "Rig-Veda-Prâtisâkhya, Das älteste Lehrbuch der Vedischen Phonetik, Sanskrit Text mit Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, herausgegeben," von F. Max Müller, Leipzig, 1869.

mįniŋ, iz veri limited. It iz with thįz brɔd kategoriz ov sound alɔn that the Prâtisâkhyas dįl; and it iz for a proper ɜnderstandiŋ ov thįz the Seiens ov Laŋgwej haz tu inklųd within its sfįr a kɛrful stɔdi ov Fɔnetiks.

The deialektikal stɔdi ov Fɔnetiks haz larjer objekts. It wishez tu ekzɔst ɔl posibel soundz hwich kan bį prodiúst bei the vɔkal organz, litel konsernd az tu hwether thįz soundz okɛ́r in eni rįal laŋgwej or not. It iz partikiularli yųsful for the pɜrpos ov pɛntiŋ, with the ɜtmɔst akiurasi, the aktiual pronɔnsiɛshon ov individiualz, and ov fiksiŋ the fɛntest shɛdz ov deialektik vareieti. The mɔst marvelɔs achįvment in this branch ov apleid fɔnetiks mɛ bį sįn in Mr. Bell's "Vizibel Spįch."

Thįz tų branchez ov fɔnetik seiens, houever, shud bį kept kɛrfuli distiŋkt. Az the foundɛshon ov a praktikal alfabet, leikweiz az the ɔnli sɛf foundɛshon for the Seiens ov Laŋgwej, wį wont filolojikal or fįoretik Fɔnetiks. Wį wont an ɜnderstandiŋ ov thɔz jeneral prinsipelz and thɔz brɔd kategoriz ov sound hwich ar trįted in the Prâtisâkhyas; wį dų not wont eni ov the miniút deialektik distiŋkshonz hwich hav nɔ gramatikal pɜrpos, and ar thɛrfor outseid the pɛl ov gramatikal seiens. Tų miniút distiŋkshon prodiúsez konfiuzon, and hwɛr it kan bį avoided, without a sakrifeiz ov akiurasi, it ɔt tu bį avoided. Hwɛr vɛgnes ekzists in rįaliti, and hwɛr nɛtiur alouz a brɔd marjin on either seid, it wud bį roŋ tu ignɔr thát latitiud. Akiurasi itself wud hįr bekɜm inakiurasi.

Bɜt hwen wį wont tu ekzɔst ɔl posibel shɛdz ov sound, hwen wį wont tu fɔtograf the pekiuliaritiz ov serten deialekts, or mezur the dįviɛshonz in the pronɔnsiɛshon ov individiualz bei the mɔst miniút degrįz, wį then mɜst avɛl ourselvz ov thát ekskwizit artistik mashįneri kon-

strɔkted bei Mr. Bell, and handeld with sơ mɔch skil bei Mr. A. J. Ellis, thơ fiu ơnli wil bį ɛbel tu yųz it with rįal sɔksɛs.

Sɔm pįpel sįm tu imajin that the pouer ov distiŋgwishiŋ miniút diferensez ov soundz iz a natiural gift, and kanot bį akweird. It mɛ bį sơ in kweit eksepshonal kɛsez, bɔt ei nó az a fakt that à cheild that had, az pįpel sɛ, nơ įr for miuzik, and kud not siŋ "God sɛv the Kwįn," gradiuali akweird the pouer ov distiŋgwishiŋ the ordinari nơts, and ov siŋiŋ a tiun. Spįkiŋ from mei ơn ekspįriens, ei shud sɛ that a gud įr kɔmz bei inheritans, for, az loŋ az ei kan remember, a fols nơt, or, az wį yųst tu kơl it, an impiur *(unrein)* nơt, woz tu mį fizikali pɛnful.

Bɔt this apleiz tu miuzik ơnli, and it iz bei nơ mįnz jenerali trų, that pįpel hų hav a gud miuzikal įr, hav ơlsơ a gud įr for laŋgwej. Ei hav nơn pįpel kweit ɔnmiuzikal, pozést ov a veri gud įr for laŋgwej, and *vice versâ*. The tų natiural gifts, thɛrfor, if natiural gifts thɛ ar, ov distiŋgwishiŋ miniút degrįz ov pich and kwoliti ov sound dų not sįm tu bį the sɛm. The rįal difikɔ́lti, houever, hwich mɛks itself felt in diskɔ́siŋ miniút shɛdz ov sound, areizez from the insɔfishensi ov our nomenklatiur, from the ơlmơst irrezistibel influens ov imajinɛshon, and in the end, from the wont ov a fơnometer. A gud miuzishan kan distiŋgwish betwįn *C sharp* and *D flat*, a gud fonetishan betwįn a "lơ-bak-narơ" and a "lơ-mikst-narơ" vouel. Bɔt thɛ kanot ơlwɛz translɛt thɛr sentiments intu definit laŋgwej, and if thɛ trei bei aktiual eksperiment tu imitɛt thįz tų soundz or vouelz, the imperfekshonz ov the įr and tɔŋ, bơt in the spįker and the lisener, frįkwentli render ơl atempts at a miutiual ɔnderstandiŋ imposibel. Wį shal never areiv at

seientifik presiʒon til wį hav a fonometer for kwoliti ov sound, nor dų ei sį hwei sɔch an instrument shud bį imposibel. Ei wel remember Wheatstone teliŋ mį, that hį wud ɔndertɛk tu rįprodiús bei mįnz ov an instrument everi shɛd ov vouel in eni laŋgwɛj ov the wɔrld, and ei shud ϑiŋk that Willis's and Helmholtz's eksperiments wud sɔplei the elements from hwich sɔch a fonometer meit bį konstitiuted. Az sųn az wį kan mɛʒur, defein, and rįprodiús, at plɛʒur, hwot at prezent wį kan onli deskreib in aproksimɛt termz, the seiens ov fonetiks wil bekɔm mɔst frųtful, and asiúm its lejitimet plɛs az a *sine qud non* tu the stiudent ov laŋgwej.

Ei hav sɔmteimz bįn blɛmd for haviŋ insisted on Fonetiks bįiŋ rekogneizd az the foundɛshon ov the Seiens ov Laŋgwej. Prof. Benfey and ɔther skolarz protested agenst the chapter ei hav devoted tu Fonetiks in the Sekond Sįrįz ov mei "Lektiurz," az an ɔnnesesari inovɛshon, and thɔz protests hav bekɔm stil stroŋger ov lɛt. Bɔt hįr, tu, wį mɔst distiŋgwish betwįn tú ϑiŋz. Filolojikal or jeneral Fonetiks, ar, ei hold az stroŋli az ever, an integral part ov the Seiens ov Laŋgwej; deialektik Fonetiks mɛ bį yųsful hįr and thɛr, bɔt thɛ shud bį kept within thɛr proper sfįr; ɔtherweiz, ei admit az redili az eniwɔn els, thɛ obskiúr rɛther than revįl the brod and masiv kɔlorz ov sound hwich laŋgwej yųzez for its ordinari wɔrk.

If wį reflekt a litel, wį shal sį that the filolojikal konsepshon ov a vouel iz sɔmϑiŋ tɔtali diferent from its piurli akoustik or deialektik konsepshon. The former iz chįfli konsernd with the sfįr ov posibel vɛriɛshon, and the later with the piurli fenomenal individiualiti ov įch vouel. Tu the filolojist, the ϑrį vouelz in *septimus*, for instans, hwotever thɛr ekzakt pronɔnsiɛshonz mɛ hav

bi̯n at diferent teimz, and in diferent provinsez ov the Rɔman Empeir, ar pɔtenshali wɔn and the sɛm. Wi̯ luk on *septimus* and ἕβδομος az on Sanskrit *saptamas*, and ɔnli bei nɔiŋ that *e*, *i*, and *u* in *septimus* ar ɷl reprezentativz ov a short *a*, or that *optimus* standz for the mɔr ɛnshent *optumus* and *optomos*, dų wi̯ tɛk in at wɔn glans the hɔl histori and posibel veriɛshon ov thi̯z vouelz in diferent laŋgwejez and deialekts. Ɛven hwɛr a vouel disapi̯rz kompli̯tli, az in *gigno* for *gigeno*, in πίπτω for πιπετω, the mental eí ov the filolojist disérnz and wɛz hwot nɔ i̯r kan hi̯r. And hweil in thi̯z kɛsez the etimolojist, disregardiŋ the kli̯rest vareieti ov pronɔnsiɛshon, tri̯ts sɔch vouelz az *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, *u* az wɔn and the sɛm, in ɔtherz hwɛr tų vouelz si̯m tu hav ekzaktli the sɛm sound tu the deialektishan, the filolojist on hiz part persi̯vz diferensez ov the grɛtest importans. The *i* in *fides* and *cliens* mɛ hav the sɛm sound az the *i* in *gigno* or *septimus*, the *u* ov *luo* mɛ not difer from the *u* in *optumus* or *lubens*, bɔt thɛr intrinsik valiu, thɛr kɛpabilitiz ov grɔd and dekɛ́, ar tɔtali diferent in i̯ch. Wi̯ shal never bi̯ ɛbel tu spi̯k with eniðiŋ leik ri̯al seientifik akiurasi ov the pronɔnsiɛshon ov ɛnshent laŋgwejez, bɔt i̯ven if wi̯ luk tu thɛr riten api̯rans ɔnli, wi̯ si̯ agén and agén hou vouelz, riten aleik, ar historikali tɔtali distiŋkt. Grimm introdiúst the distiŋkshon betwi̯n *ái* and *aí*, betwi̯n *áu* and *aú*, not bekɷz it iz bei eni mi̯nz serten that the pronɔnsiɛshon ov thi̯z diffɔŋz verid, bɔt bekɷz hi̯ wisht tu indikɛt that the antesi̯dents ov *ái* and *áu* wer diferent from thɔz ov *aí* and *aú*. In Goðik *faíhu*, (Sk. pasu, pecu,) *aí* iz *a* shortend tu *i*, and brɔken befɔr *h* tu *ái*; in Goðik *váit* (Sk. veda, (οἶδα), *ai* iz radikal *i* streŋðend tu *ái*. In Goðik *daúhtar* (Sk. duhitar θυγάτηρ), *aú* iz radikal *u* brɔken tu *aú*; in *aúhna*, ɔven (Sk. asna.

ἰπνό=ἰκνο=ἀκνο), the *au* iz *a*, darkend tu *u*, and brøken tu *áu*; hweil in Goϑik *báug* (πέφευγα), *áu* iz orijinal *u* streŋϑend tu *áu*. Hwen wį hįr *ê* and *ô* in Goϑik, wį sį *á*, jɤst az wį sį Dorik *ā* beheind Eionik η. Hwen wį hįr *c* in *canis*, wį sį Sanskrit *s*; hwen wį hįr *c* in *cruor*, wį sį Sanskrit *k*. Hwen wį hįr γ in γένος, wį sį Arian *g*; hwen wį hįr γ in φλέγω, wį sį Arian *z*.

Thįz fiu ilɤstrɛshonz wil eksplɛn, eı høp, the esenshal diferens in the aplikɛshon ov fønetiks tu filoloji and deialektoloji, and wil shø that in the former our brɤsh mɤst ov nesesiti bį brød, hweil in the later it mɤst bį fein. It iz bei miksiŋ ɤp tų separɛt leinz ov reserch, įch heili important in itself, that sø mɤch konfiuʒon haz ov lɛt bįn okɛʒond. The valiu ov piurli fønetik obzervɛshonz shud on nø akount bį ɤnderrɛted; bɤt it iz nesesari, for thát veri rįzon, that deialektikal az wel az filolojikal fønetiks shud bį konfeind tu thɛr proper sfįr. The filolojist haz mɤch tu lern from the fønetishan, bɤt hį shud never forget that hįr, az elshwɛr, hwot iz brød and tipikal iz az important and az seientifikali akiuret az hwot iz miniút and speshal.

Hwot iz brød and tipikal iz often mør akiuret įven than hwot iz miniút and speshal. It meit bį posibel, for instans, bei a føtografik proses, tu reprezent the ekzakt pozishon ov the tɤŋ and the inseid wølz ov the mouϑ hweil wį pronoúns the Italian vouel *į*. Bɤt it wud bį the grɛtest mistɛk tu sɤpøz that this imej givz ɤs the ønli wɛ in hwich thát vouel iz, and kan bį, pronoúnst. Thø įch individiual mɛ hav hiz øn wɛ ov plɛsiŋ the tɤŋ in pronoúnsiŋ *į*, wį hav ønli tu trei the eksperiment in order tu konvins ourselvz that, with sɤm efort, wį mɛ vɛri thát pozishon in meni wɛz and yet prodiús the sound ov *į*. Hwen, thɛrfor, in mei "Lektiurz on the

Seiens ov Laŋgwej," ei gɛv piktiurz ov the pozishonz ov the vɔkal organz rekweird for pronoúnsiŋ the tipikal leterz ov the alfabet, ei tuk grɛt kɛr tu mɛk them tipikal, thát iz, tu ljv them rɔf skechez rsther than miniút fɔtografs. Ei kanot beter ekspres hwot ei fįl on this point than bei kwɔtiŋ the wɔrdz ov Hæckel :—

" For didaktik pɔrposez, simpel skįmatik figiurz ar far mɔr yųsful than piktiurz prezerviŋ the grɛtest feđfulnes tu nɛtiur and karid out with the grɛtest akiurasi." (" Ziele und Wege," p. 37).

[The following three letters, now introduced, will complete the Phonetic Alphabet— đ, ç, ʃ,
for the sounds heard in — *th*en, *ch*eap, *sh*e.]

Tu retɔrn, after đis digreʃon, tu Mr. Pitman'z alfabet, ei repįt đat it rekomendz itself tu mei meind bei hwot ɔđerz kɷl its inakiurasi. It ʃɔz its rįal and praktikal wizdom bei not atemptiŋ tu fiks eni distiŋkʃonz hwiç ar not absolųtli nesesari. If, for instans, wį tɛk đe gɛnɔral teniuis, wį feind that Iŋgliʃ rekogneizez wɔn *k* ɔnli, ɷlđɔ its pronɔnsiɛʃon vɛriz konsiderabli. It iz sɔmteimz pronoúnst sɔ az tu prodiús ɷlmɔst a ʃarp krak; sɔmteimz it haz a dįp, holɔ sound; and sɔmteimz a soft, lɛzi, *mouillé* karakter. It vɛriz konsiderabli akordiŋ tu đe vouelz hwiç folɔ it, az enibodi mɛ hįr, nɛ fįl, if hį pronoúnsez, in sɔkseʃon, *kɷt, kųl, kar, kat, kit.* Bɔt az Iŋgliʃ dɔz not yųz điz diferent *kz* for the pɔrpos ov distiŋgwiʃiŋ wɔrdz or gramatikal formz, wɔn brɷd kategori ɔnli ov voisles gɛnɔral çeks haz tu bį admited in reitiŋ Iŋgliʃ. In đe Semitik laŋgwejez đe kɛs iz diferent; not ɔnli ar *kaf* and *kof* diferent in sound, bɔt đis diferens iz yųzd tu distiŋgwiʃ diferent mįniŋz.

Or if wį tɛk đe vouel *a* in its orijinal, piur pronɔnsiɛʃon, leik Italian *a*, wį kan įzili persįv đat it haz diferent

kɤlorz in diferent kountiz ov Iŋgland. Yet in reitiŋ it mɛ bį trįted az wɤn, bekɷz it haz bɤt wɤn and đe sɛm gramatikal intenʃon, and dɤz not konvé a niu mįniŋ til it eksįdz its weidest limits. Gud spįkerz in Iŋgland pronoúns đe *a* in *last* leik đe piur Italian *a;* wiđ ɤđerz it bekɤmz brɷd, wiđ ɤđerz ɟin. Bɤt đơ it mɛ đɤs osilɛt konsiderabli, it mɤst not enkrơç on đe provins ov *e,* hwiç wud çɛnj its mįniŋ tu *lest;* nor on đe provins ov *o,* hwiç wud çɛnj it tu *lost;* nor on đe provins ov *u,* hwiç wud çɛnj it tu *lust.*

Đe difikɤlti, đɛrfor, hwiç Arçbiʃop Trench haz pointed out iz rįali restrikted tu đơz kɛsez hwɛr đe pronɤnsiɛʃon ov vouelz—for it iz wiđ vouelz çįfli đat wį ar trɤbeld—vɛriz sơ mɤç az tu ơverstep đe brɷdest limits ov wɤn ov đe rekogneizd kategoriz ov sound, and tu enkrơç on anɤđer. If wį tɛk đe wɤrd *fast,* hwiç iz pronoúnst veri diferentli įven bei ediukɛted pįpel, đer wud bį nơ nesesiti for indikɛtiŋ in reitiŋ đe diferent ʃɛdz ov pronɤnsiɛʃon hwiç lei betwįn đe sound ov đe ʃort Italian *a* and đe loŋ *a* herd in *father.* Bɤt hwen đe *a* in *fast* iz pronoúnst leik đe *a* in *fat,* đen đe nesesiti ov a niu grafik ekspơnent wud areiz, and Arçbiʃop Trench wud bį reit in twitiŋ fơnetik reformerz wiđ saŋkʃoniŋ tų́ speliŋz for đe sɛm wɤrd.

Ei kud menʃon đe nɛmz ov ɟrį biʃops, wɤn ov hum pronoúnst đe vouel in *God* leik *Gɷd,* anɤđer leik *rod,* a ɟerd leik *gad.* Đe last pronɤnsiɛʃon wud probabli bį kondemd bei everibodi, bɤt đe ɤđer tų́ wud remɛn, saŋkʃond bei đe heiest ɷɟoriti, and đɛrfor retɛnd in fơnetik reitiŋ.

Sơ far, đen, ei admit đat Arçbiʃop Trench haz pointed out a rįal difikɤlti inhįrent in fơnetik reitiŋ; bɤt hwot iz đát wɤn difikɤlti kompɛrd wiđ đe difikɤltiz ov đe

prezent sistem ov Iŋgliʃ speliŋ? It wud not bį onest tu trei tu evɛd hiz çarj, bei sɛiŋ ðat ðer iz bɔt wɔn pronɔnsieʃon rekogneizd bei ðe yųzej ov ediukɛted pįpel. Ðát iz not sơ, and ðơz hų nó best ðe beioloji ov laŋgwej, nó ðat it kanot bį sơ. Ðe veri leif ov laŋgwej konsists in a konstant frikʃon betwįn ðe sentripetal fơrs ov kɔstom and ðe sentrifiugal fơrs ov individiual frįdom. Agenst ðát difikɔlti ðerfor ðer iz nơ remedi. Ónli hįr agen ðe Arçbiʃop sįmz tu hav ơverlukt ðe fakt ðat ðe difikɔlti beloŋz tu ðe prezent sistem ov speliŋ nįrli az mɔç az tu ðe fơnetik sistem. Ðer iz bɔt wɔn rekogneizd wɛ ov speliŋ, bɔt everibodi pronoúnsez akordiŋ tu hiz ơn idiosinkrasiz. It wud bį ðe sɛm wiɗ fơnetik speliŋ. Wɔn pronɔnsieʃon, ðe best rekogneizd, wud hav tu bį adopted az a standard in fơnetik reitiŋ, ljviŋ tu everi Iŋgliʃman hiz frįdom tu pronoúns az sįmeɗ gud tu him. Wį ʃud lųz nɔðiŋ ov hwot wį nou pozés, and ol ðe advantejez ov fơnetik reitiŋ wud remɛn ɔnimperd. Ðe rjal stɛt ov ðe kɛs iz, ðerfor, ðis—Nơwɔn defendz ðe prezent sistem ov speliŋ; everiwɔn admits ðe sjriɔs injuri hwiç it inflikts on naʃonal ediukeʃon. Everibodi admits ðe praktikal advantejez ov fơnetik speliŋ, bɔt after ðát, ol eksklɛm ðat a reform ov speliŋ, hweðer parʃal or kompljt, iz imposibel. Hweðer it iz imposibel or not, ei gladli ljv tu mɛn ov ðe wɔrld tu deseid. Az a skolar, az a stiudent ov ðe histori ov laŋgwej, ei simpli mɛntɛn ðat in everi riten laŋgwej a reform ov speliŋ iz, sųner or lɛter, inevitabel. Nơ dout ðe įvil dɛ mɛ bį put ơf. Ei hav litel dout ðat it wil bį put of for meni jenerɛʃonz, and ðat a rjal reform wil probabli not bį karid eksept konkɔrentli wiɗ a veiolent sơʃal konvɔlʃon. Ónli let ðe kwestion bį argiud fɛrli. Let fakts hav sɔm wɛt, and let it not bį sɔpơzd bei men ov ðe wɔrld ðat

ðoz hų defend ðe prinsipelz ov ðe *Fonetik Niuz* ar onli tįtotalerz and vejetɛrianz, hų hav never lernd hou tu spel.

If ei hav spoken stroŋli in sɔport ov Mr. Pitman'z sistem, it iz not bekoz on ol points ei konsider it siupįrior tu ðe sistemz prepɛrd bei ɔðer reformerz, hų ar dɛli inkrįsiŋ in nɔmber; bɔt çįfli bekoz it haz bįn tested so larjli, and haz stud ðe test wel. Mr. Pitman'z *Fonetik Jornal* haz nou [1880] bįn pɔbliſt ðerti-ɛt yįrz, and if it iz non ðat it iz pɔbliſt wįkli in 12,000 kopiz, įç kopi reprezentiŋ at ljst for or feiv rjderz, it mɛ not sįm so veri fųliſ, after ol, if wį imajin ðat ðer *iz* sɔm veital pouer in ðát insignifikant jerm.

V.

COMPARATIVE MYTHOLOGY.

(1856.)

Phœdros. Dost thou see that very tall plane-tree?

Sokrates. Certainly I do.

Phœdros. There is shade there, and the wind is not too strong, and there is grass to sit, or, if we like, to lie down.

Sokrates. Lead on then!

Phœdros. Tell me, Sokrates—is it not from some place here they say that Boreas carried away Oreithyia from the Ilissos?

Sokrates. So they say.

Phœdros. Should it not be from this spot? for the waters seem so lovely, and pure, and transparent, and as if made for girls to play on the bank.

Sokrates. No; it is two or three stadia further down, where you cross over to the temple of Agra—and there you find, somewhere, an altar of Boreas.

Phœdros. I was not aware of this. But tell me, by Zeus, O Sokrates—dost *thou* believe this myth to be true?

Sokrates. Well, if I did not believe it, like the wise people, I should not be so very far wrong; and I might set up an ingenious theory and say that a gust of Boreas, the Northwind, carried her down from the rocks in the neighbourhood, while she was playing with her friend

Pharmakeia; and that, having died in this manner, she was reported to have been carried off by Boreas from thence, or from the Ares peak—for there goes this story also, that she was carried off from that, and not from this spot. As to myself, Phædros, I think these explanations, on the whole, very pleasant; but they require a man of strong mind and hard work, and a man who, after all, is not much to be envied, if it were only for this, that when he has set right this one fable, he is bound to do the same for the form of the Hippokentaurs, and again for that of the Chimæra. And then a host of such beings rushes in—Gorgons and Pegasos', and masses of other hopeless beings, and absurdities of monstrous creatures. And if a man, not believing in the existence of these creatures, should try to represent each according to the probable explanation, dealing in a rough kind of philosophy, he would require abundance of leisure. I, at least, have no time to spare for these things, and the reason, my friend, is this, that I cannot yet, according to the Delphic line, know myself; and it seems to me ridiculous that a man who does not yet know this, should trouble himself about what does not concern him. Therefore I leave those things alone, and, believing what other people believe about them, I meditate, as I said just now, not on them, but on myself—whether I be a monster more complicated and more savage than Typhon, or a tamer and simpler creature, enjoying by nature a blessed and modest lot. But while we are talking, my friend—was not this the tree to which thou wert to lead us?

Phædros. This is the very tree.

THIS passage, from the Introduction of Plato's 'Phædros,' has been frequently quoted in order to show what the wisest of the Greeks thought about the rationalists of his day. There were at Athens then, as there have been at all times and in all

countries, men who had no sense for the miraculous and supernatural, and who, without having the moral courage to deny altogether what they could not bring themselves to believe, endeavoured to find some plausible explanation by which the sacred legends which tradition had handed down to them, and which had been hallowed by religious observances, and sanctioned by the authority of the law, might be brought into harmony with the dictates of reason and the laws of nature. That Sokrates, though himself accused of heresy, did not entertain a very high opinion of these speculators—that he thought their explanations more incredible and absurd than even the most incredible absurdities of Greek mythology—nay, that at a certain period of his life he treated such attempts as impious, is clear from this and other passages of Plato and Xenophon.

But if Mr. Grote, in his classical work on the 'History of Greece,' avails himself of this and similar passages, in order to introduce, as it were, Sokrates himself among the historians and critics of our own time—if he endeavours to make him bear witness 'to the uselessness of digging for a supposed basis of truth' in the myths of the Greek world, he makes the ancient philosopher say more than he really said. Our object in considering the myths of the Greeks, or any other nation of antiquity, is so different from that of Sokrates that the objections which he urged against his rationalising contemporaries could hardly be said to apply to us. For what is it that makes us at the present day ask the question of the origin of the Greek myths? Why

do men study ancient history, acquire a knowledge of dead languages, and decipher illegible inscriptions? What inspires them with an interest not only in the literature of Greece and Rome, but of ancient India and Persia, of Egypt and Babylonia? Why do the puerile and often repulsive legends of savage tribes rivet their attention and engage their thoughts? Have we not been told that there is more wisdom in the 'Times' than in Thukydides? Are not the novels of Walter Scott more amusing than Apollodoros? or the works of Bacon more instructive than the cosmogony of the Purânas? What, then, gives life to the study of antiquity? What compels men, in the midst of these busy times, to sacrifice their leisure to studies apparently so unattractive and useless, if not the conviction that, in order to obey the Delphic commandment—in order to know what *Man is*, we ought to know *what Man has been*? This is a view as foreign to the mind of Sokrates as any of the principles of inductive philosophy by which men like Columbus, Leonardo da Vinci, Copernicus, Kepler, Bacon, and Galileo regenerated and invigorated the intellectual life of modern Europe. If we grant to Sokrates that the chief object of philosophy is that man should know himself, we should hardly consider his means of arriving at this knowledge adequate to so high an aim. To his mind man was pre-eminently the individual, without any reference to his being but one manifestation of a power, or, as he might have said, of an idea, realised in and through an endless variety of human souls. He is ever seeking to solve the mystery of human nature by brooding over his own

mind, by watching the secret workings of the soul, by analysing the organs of knowledge, and by trying to determine their proper limits; and thus the last result of his philosophy was, that he knew but one thing, and this was, that he knew nothing. To us, man is no longer this solitary being, complete in himself, and self-sufficient; man to us is a brother among brothers, a member of a class, of a genus, or a kind, and therefore intelligible only with reference to his equals. The earth was unintelligible to the ancients, because looked upon as a solitary being, without a peer in the whole universe; but it assumed a new and true significance as soon as it rose before the eyes of man as one of many planets, all governed by the same laws, and all revolving around the same centre. It is the same with the human soul, and its nature stands before our mind in quite a different light since man has been taught to know and feel himself as a member of one great family —as one of the myriads of wandering stars all governed by the same laws, and all revolving around the same centre, and all deriving their light from the same source. The history of the world, or, as it is called, 'Universal History,' has laid open new avenues of thought, and it has enriched our language with a word which never passed the lips of Sokrates, or Plato, or Aristotle—*mankind*.[1] Where the Greek saw barbarians, we see brethren; where the Greek saw heroes and demi-gods, we see our parents and ancestors; where the Greek saw nations (ἔθνη), we see mankind, toiling and suffering, separated by oceans, divided by language, and severed by national

[1] See Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 37.

enmity—yet evermore tending, under a divine control, towards the fulfilment of that inscrutable purpose for which the world was created, and man placed in it, bearing the image of God. History, therefore, with its dusty and mouldering pages, is to us as sacred a volume as the book of nature. In both we read, or we try to read, the reflex of the laws and thoughts of a Divine Wisdom. As we acknowledge no longer in nature the working of demons or the manifestation of an evil principle, so we deny in history an atomistic conglomerate of chances, or the despotic rule of a mute fate. We believe that there is nothing irrational in either history or nature, and that the human mind is called upon to read and to revere in both the manifestations of a Divine Power. Hence, even the most ancient and shattered pages of traditions are dear to us, nay, dearer, perhaps, than the more copious chapters of modern times. The history of those distant ages and distant men—apparently so foreign to our modern interests—assumes a new charm as soon as we know that it tells us the story of our own race, of our own family—nay, of our own selves. Sometimes, when opening a desk which we have not opened for many years—when looking over letters which we have not read for many years, we read on for some time with a cold indifference, and though we see it is our own handwriting, and though we meet with names once familiar to our heart, yet we can hardly believe that we wrote these letters, that we felt those pangs, that we shared in those delights till at last the past draws near and we draw near to the past, and our heart grows warm, and we feel

again as we felt of old, and we know that these letters were our letters. It is the same in reading ancient history. At first it seems something strange and foreign; but the more intensely we read, the more our thoughts are engaged and our feelings warmed; and the history of those ancient men becomes, as it were, our own history—their sufferings our sufferings—their joys our joys. Without this sympathy, history is a dead letter, and might as well be burnt and forgotten; while, if it is once enlivened by this feeling, it appeals not only to the antiquarian, but to the heart of every man.

We find ourselves on a stage on which many acts have been acted before us, and where we are suddenly called to act our own part. To know the part which we have to act ourselves, we ought to know the character of those whose place we take. We naturally look back to the scenes on which the curtain of the past has fallen, for we believe that there ought to be one thought pervading the whole drama of mankind. And here history steps in, and gives us the thread which connects the present with the past. Many scenes, it is true, are lost beyond the hope of recovery; and the most interesting, the opening scenes of the childhood of the human race, are known to us by small fragments only. But for this very reason the antiquarian, if he descries a relic of those early times, grasps it with the eagerness of a biographer who finds unexpectedly some scraps written by his hero when yet a child—entirely himself, and before the shadows of life had settled on his brow. In whatever language it may be written, every line, every word, is welcome, that bears the impress of

the early days of mankind. In our museums we collect the rude playthings of our hero's boyhood, and we try to guess from their colossal features the thoughts of the mind which they once reflected. Many things are still unintelligible to us, and the hieroglyphic language of antiquity records but half of the mind's half-unconscious intentions. Yet more and more the image of man, in whatever clime we meet him, rises before us, noble and pure from the very beginning: even his errors we learn to understand —even his dreams we begin to interpret. As far as we can trace back the footsteps of man, even on the lowest strata of history, we see that the divine gift of a sound and sober intellect belonged to him from the very first; and the idea of a humanity emerging slowly from the depths of an animal brutality can never be maintained again in our century. The earliest work of art wrought by the human mind—more ancient than any literary document, and prior even to the first whisperings of tradition—the human language, forms an uninterrupted chain from the first dawn of history down to our own times. We still speak the language of the first ancestors of our race; and this language, with its wonderful structure, bears witness against such gratuitous theories. The formation of language, the composition of roots, the gradual discrimination of meanings, the systematic elaboration of grammatical forms—all this working which we can still see under the surface of our own speech, attests from the very first the presence of a rational mind—of an artist as great, at least, as his work.

The period during which expressions were coined

for the most necessary ideas—such as pronouns, prepositions, numerals, and the household words of the simplest life—a period to which we must assign the first beginnings of a free and, as yet, hardly agglutinative grammar—a grammar not impressed with any individual or national peculiarities, yet containing the germs of all the Turanian, as well as the Aryan and Semitic forms of speech—this period forms the first in the history of man—the first, at least, to which even the keenest eye of the antiquarian and the philosopher can reach—and we call it the *Rhematic Period.*

This is succeeded by a second period, during which we must suppose that at least two families of language left the simply agglutinative, or nomadic stage of grammar, and received, once for all, that peculiar impress of their formative system which we still find in all the dialects and national idioms comprised under the names of *Semitic* and *Aryan*, as distinguished from the *Turanian*, the latter retaining to a much later period, and in some instances to the present day, that agglutinative reproductiveness which has rendered a traditional and metamorphic system of grammar impossible, or has at least considerably limited its extent. Hence we do not find in the nomadic or Turanian languages scattered from China to the Pyrenees, from Cape Comorin, across the Caucasus, to Lapland, that sharp family likeness which enables us to treat the Teutonic, Celtic, Slavonic, Italic, Hellenic, Iranic, and Indic languages on one side, and the Arabian, Aramæan, and Hebrew dialects on the other, as mere varieties of two specific forms of speech, in which, at a very early period, and

through influences decidedly political, if not individual and personal, the floating elements of grammar have been arrested and made to assume an amalgamated, instead of a merely agglutinative, character. This second may be called the *Dialectic Period.*

Now, after these two periods, but before the appearance of the first traces of any national literature, there is a period, represented everywhere by the same characteristic features—a kind of Eocene period, commonly called the *Mythological* or *Mythopœic* Age. It is a period in the history of the human mind, perhaps the most difficult to understand, and the most likely to shake our faith in the regular progress of the human intellect. We can form a tolerably clear idea of the origin of languge, of the gradual formation of grammar, and the unavoidable divergence of dialects and languages. We can understand, again, the earliest concentrations of political societies, the establishment of laws and customs, and the first beginnings of religion and poetry. But between the two there is a gulf which it seems impossible for any philosophy to bridge over. We call it the *Mythic Period,* and we have accustomed ourselves to believe that the Greeks, for instance, such as we find them represented to us in the Homeric poems, far advanced in the fine arts, acquainted with the refinements and comforts of life, such as we see in the palaces of Menelaos and Alkinoos, with public meetings and elaborate pleadings, with the mature wisdom of a Nestor and the cunning enterprise of an Odysseus, with the dignity of a Helena and the loveliness of a Nausikaa, could have been preceded by a race of men whose chief

amusement consisted in inventing absurd tales about gods and other nondescript beings—a race of men, in fact, on whose tomb the historian could inscribe no better epigram than that on Bitto and Phainis. Although later poets may have given to some of these fables a charm of beauty, and led us to accept them as imaginative compositions, it is impossible to conceal the fact that, taken by themselves, and in their literal meaning, most of these ancient myths are absurd and irrational, and frequently opposed to the principles of thought, religion, and morality, which guided the Greeks as soon as they appear to us in the twilight of traditional history. By whom, then, were these stories invented?—stories, we must say at once, identical in form and character, whether we find them on Indian, Persian, Greek, Italian, Slavonic, or Teutonic soil. Was there a period of temporary insanity, through which the human mind had to pass, and was it a madness identically the same in the south of India and in the north of Iceland? It is impossible to believe that a people who, in the very infancy of thought, produced men like Thales, Herakleitos, and Pythagoras, should have consisted of idle talkers but a few centuries before the time of these sages. Even if we take only that part of mythology which refers to religion, in our sense of the word, or the myths, which bear on the highest problems of philosophy—such as the creation, the relation of man to God, life and death, virtue and vice—myths generally the most modern in origin, we find that even this small portion, which might be supposed to contain some sober ideas, or some pure and sublime conceptions, is unworthy of

the ancestors of the Homeric poets, or the Ionic philosophers. When the swineherd Eumæos, unacquainted, perhaps, with the intricate system of the Olympian mythology, speaks of the Deity, he speaks like one of ourselves. 'Eat,' he says to Odysseus, 'and enjoy what is here, for God will grant one thing, but another he will refuse, whatever he will in his mind, for he can do all things.'[1] This, we may suppose, was the language of the common people at the time of Homer, and it is simple and sublime, if compared with what has been supposed one of the grandest conceptions of Greek mythology—that, namely, where Zeus, in order to assert his omnipotence, tells the gods that if they took a rope, and all the gods and goddesses pulled on one side, they could not drag him down from the heaven to the earth; while, if he chose, he could pull them all up, and suspend the earth and the sea from the summit of Olympos. What is more ridiculous than the mythological account of the creation of the human race by Deukalion and Pyrrha throwing stones behind them (a myth which owes its origin to a mere pun on λαός and λᾶας), while we can hardly expect, among pagans, a more profound conception of the relation between God and man, than the saying of Herakleitos, 'Men are mortal gods, and gods are immortal men.' Let us think of the times which could bear a Lykurgos and a Solon—which could found an Areopagos and the Olympic games, and how can we imagine that, a few generations

[1] *Od.* xiv. 443. Ἔσθιε, δαιμόνιε ξείνων, καὶ τέρπεο τοῖσδε
Οἷα πάρεστι· θεὸς δὲ τὸ μὲν δώσει τὸ δ' ἐάσει,
Ὅ τι κεν ᾧ θυμῷ ἐθέλῃ· δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα.

before that time, the highest notions of the Godhead among the Greeks were adequately expressed by the story of Uranos maimed by Krònos—of Kronos eating his children, swallowing a stone, and vomiting out alive his whole progeny. Among the lowest tribes of Africa and America we hardly find anything more hideous and revolting. It is shutting our eyes to the difficulties which stare us in the face if we say, like Mr. Grote, that this mythology was 'a past which was never present;' and it seems blasphemy to consider these fables of the heathen world as corrupted and misinterpreted fragments of a divine revelation once granted to the whole race of mankind, a view so frequently advocated by Christian divines. These myths have been made by man at a certain period of history. There was an age which produced these myths, an age half-way between the Dialectical Period, presenting the human race gradually diverging into different families and languages, and the National Period, exhibiting to us the earliest traces of nationalised language, and a nationalised literature in India, Persia, Greece, Italy, and Germany. The fact is there, and we must either explain it, or admit in the gradual growth of the human mind, as in the formation of the earth, some violent revolutions, which broke the regularity of the early strata of thought, and convulsed the human mind, like volcanoes and earthquakes arising from some unknown cause below the surface of history.

Much, however, will be gained if, without being driven to adopt so violent and repugnant a theory, we are able to account in a more intelligible manner for the creation of myths. Their propagation and

subsistence in later times, though strange in many respects, is yet a much less intricate problem. The human mind has an inborn reverence for the past, and the religious piety of the man flows from the same natural spring as the filial piety of the child. Even though the traditions of past ages may appear strange, wild, and sometimes immoral or impossible, each generation accepts them, and fashions them so that they can be borne with again, and even made to disclose a true and deeper meaning. Many of the natives of India, though versed in European science, and imbued with the principles of a pure natural theology, yet bow down and worship the images of Vishnu and Siva. They know that these images are but stone; they confess that their feelings revolt against the impurities attributed to these gods by what they call their sacred writings; yet there are honest Brahmans who will maintain that these stories have a deeper meaning, that immorality being incompatible with a divine being, a mystery must be supposed to be concealed in these time-hallowed fables, a mystery which an inquiring and reverent mind may hope to fathom. Nay, even where Christian missionaries have been successful, where the purity of the Christian faith has won the heart of a native, and made the extravagant absurdities of the Purânas insupportable to him, the faith of his early childhood will still linger on and break out occasionally in unguarded expressions, as several of the myths of antiquity have crept into the legends of the Church of Rome.[1] We find frequent indications in ancient history that the Greeks them-

[1] See Grimm's Introduction to his great work on *Teutonic Mythology*, second edition, 1844, p. xxxi. This work has lately been trans-

selves were shocked by the stories told of their gods; yet as even in our own times faith with most men is not faith in God or in truth, but faith in the faith of others, we may understand why even men like Sokrates were unwilling to renounce their belief in what had been believed by their fathers. As their idea of the Godhead became purer, they felt that the idea of perfection, involved in the idea of a divine being, excluded the possibility of immoral gods. Pindar, as pointed out by Otfried Müller,[1] changes many myths because they are not in harmony with his purer conceptions of the dignity of gods and heroes; and, because, according to his opinion, they must be false. Plato[2] argues in a similar spirit when he examines the different traditions about Eros, and in the 'Symposium' we see how each speaker maintains that myth of Eros to be the only true one which agrees best with his own ideas of the nature of this god—Phædros[3] calling him the oldest, Agathon the youngest of the gods; yet each appealing to the authority of an ancient myth. Thus, men who had as clear a conception of the omnipotence and omnipresence of a supreme God as natural religion can reveal, still called him Zeus, forgetting the adulterer and parricide:—

Ζεὺς ἀρχὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται,

lated into English by Mr. Stallybrass (Sonnenschein & Allen, 1880).

[1] See O. Müller's excellent work, *Prolegomena zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie*, 1825, p. 87.

[2] *Phædros*, 242 E.

[3] *Symp.* 178 C. οὕτως πολλαχόθεν ὁμολογεῖται ὁ Ἔρως ἐν τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις εἶναι· πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὢν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν αἴτιός ἐστιν· 195 A. ἔστι δὲ κάλλιστος ὢν τοιόσδε· πρῶτον μὲν νεώτατος θεῶν, ὦ Φαῖδρε.

'Zeus is the beginning, Zeus the middle; out of Zeus all things have been made:

—an Orphic line, but an old one, if, as Mr. Grote supposes, Plato alluded to it.[1] Poets, again, who felt in their hearts the true emotion of prayer, a yearning after divine help and protection, still spoke of Zeus, forgetting that at one time Zeus himself was vanquished by Titan, and had to be delivered by Hermes.[2] Æschylos[3] says: 'Zeus, whoever he is, if this be the name by which he loves to be called—by this name I address him. For, pondering on all things except Zeus, I cannot tell whether I may truly cast off the idle burden from my thought.'

No, the preservation of these mythic names, the long life of these fables, and their satisfying the religious, poetical, and moral wants of succeeding generations, though strange and startling, is not the real difficulty. The past has its charms, and tradition has a powerful friend in language. We still speak of the sun rising and setting, of rainbows, of thunderbolts, because language has sanctioned these expres-

[1] Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* p. 523, gives

Ζεὺς κεφαλή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται.

See Preller's *Greek Mythology*, 1854, p. 99; Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, p. 53.

[2] Apollod., 1, 6, 3, Grote, *H. G.* p. 4.

[3] I give the text, because it has been translated in so many different ways:

Ζεύς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστιν, εἰ τόδ' αὐ-
τῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ,
τοῦτό νιν προσεννέπω·
οὐκ ἔχω προσεικάσαι,
πάντ' ἐπισταθμώμενος
πλὴν Διὸς, εἰ τὸ μάταν ἀπὸ φρόντιδος ἄχθος
χρὴ βαλεῖν ἐτητύμως.

sions. We use them, though we do not believe in them. The difficulty is how at first the human mind was led to such imaginings—how the names and tales arose, and unless this question can be answered, our belief in a regular and consistent progress of the human intellect, through all ages and in all countries, must be given up as a false theory.

Nor can it be said that we know absolutely nothing of this period during which the as yet undivided Aryan nations—for it is chiefly of them that we are now speaking—formed their myths. Even if we saw only the deep shadow which lies on the Greek mind from the very beginning of its political and literary history, we should be able to infer from it something of the real character of that age which must have preceded the earliest dawn of the national literature of Greece. Otfried Müller,[1] though he was unacquainted with the new light which Comparative Philology has shed on this primitive Aryan period, says: 'The mythic form of expression which changes all beings into persons, all relations into actions, is something so peculiar that we must admit for its growth a distinct period in the civilisation of a people.' But Comparative Philology has since brought this whole period within the pale of documentary history. It has placed in our hands a telescope of such power that where formerly we could see but nebulous clouds we now discover distinct forms and outlines; nay, it has given us what we may call contemporary evidence, exhibiting to us the state of thought, language, religion, and civilisation at a period when Sanskrit was not yet Sanskrit, Greek not yet Greek, but when

[1] *Prol. Myth.* p. 78.

both, together with Latin, German, and other Aryan dialects, existed as yet as one undivided language, in the same manner as French, Italian, and Spanish may be said to have at one time existed as one undivided language, in the form of Latin.

This will require a short explanation. If we knew nothing of the existence of Latin; if all historical documents previous to the fifteenth century had been lost; if tradition even were silent as to the former existence of a Roman empire, a mere comparison of the six Romance dialects would enable us to say that at some time there must have been a language from which all these modern dialects derived their origin in common; for without this supposition it would be impossible to account for the facts exhibited by these dialects. Let us look at the auxiliary verb. We find:

	Italian.	Walachian.	Rhætian.	Spanish.	Portuguese.	French.
I am:	sono	sum (sunt)	sunt	soy	sou	suis
Thou art:	sei	es	eis	eres	es	es
He is:	è	é (este)	ei	es	he	est
We are:	siamo	sûntemu	essen	somos	somos	sommes
You are:	siete	sûnteți	esses	sois	sois	êtes (estes)
They are:	sono	sûnt	eân (sun)	son	sao	sont

It is clear, even from a short consideration of these forms, first, that all are but varieties of one common type; secondly, that it is impossible to consider any one of these six paradigms as the original from which the others had been borrowed. To this we may add, thirdly, that in none of the languages to which these verbal forms belong, do we find the elements of which they could have been composed. If we find such forms as *j'ai aimé*, we can explain them by a mere reference to the grammatical materials which French has still at its command, and the

same may be said even of compounds like *j'aimerai*, i.e. *je-aimer-ai*, I have to love, I shall love. But a change from *je suis* to *tu es* is inexplicable by the light of French grammar. These forms could not have grown, so to speak, on French soil, but must have been handed down as relics from a former period—must have existed in some language antecedent to any of the Romance dialects. Now, fortunately, in this case, we are not left to a mere inference, but as we possess the Latin verb, we can prove how by phonetic corruption, and by mistaken analogies, every one of the six paradigms is but a national metamorphosis of the Latin original.

Let us now look at another set of paradigms :

	Sanskrit.	Lithuanian.	Zend.	Doric.	Old Slav.	Latin.	Gothic.	Armen.
I am :	àsmi	esmi	ahmi	ἐμμί	yesmĕ	sum	im	em
Thou art :	ási	essi	ahi	ἐσσί	yesi	es	is	es
He is :	ásti	esti	asti	ἐστί	yestŏ	est	ist	ê
We (two) are :	'svás	esva	..	..	yesva	..	siju	..
You (two) are :	'sthás	esta	sthо ?	ἐστόν	yesta	..	sijuts	..
They (two) are :	'stás	(esti)	sto	ἐστόν	yesta	..	..	..
We are :	'smás	esmi	hmahi	ἐσμές	yesmo	sumus	sijum	emq
You are :	'stha	este	sta	ἐστέ	yeste	estis	sijuth	êq
They are :	sánti	(esti)	hĕnti	ἐντί	somtĕ	sunt	sind	en

From a careful consideration of these forms, we ought to draw exactly the same conclusions : first, that all are but varieties of one common type ; secondly, that it is impossible to consider any of them as the original from which the others have been borrowed ; and thirdly, that, here again, none of the languages in which these verbal forms occur, possess the grammatical materials out of which such forms could have been framed. That Sanskrit cannot be taken as the original from which all the rest were derived (an opinion held by many scholars) is clear, if we see that Greek has, in several instances, pre-

served a more primitive, or, as it is called, more organic form than Sanskrit. Ἐσ-μές cannot be derived from the Sanskrit smas, because smas has lost the radical *a*, which Greek has preserved, the root being as, to be, the termination mas, we. Nor can Greek be fixed upon as the more primitive language from which the others were derived, for not even Latin could be called the daughter of Greek, the language of Rome having preserved some forms more primitive than Greek; for instance, *sunt* instead of ἐντί or ἐνσί or εἰσί. Here Greek has lost the radical as altogether, ἐντί standing instead of ἐσεντί, while Latin has at least, like Sanskrit, preserved the radical *s* in *sunt* = Sanskrit santi.

Hence, all these dialects point to some more ancient language which was to them what Latin was to the Romance dialects, only that at that early period there was no literature to preserve to us any remnants of that mother-tongue that died in giving birth to the modern Aryan dialects, such as Sanskrit, Zend, Greek, Latin, Gothic, Slavonic, and Celtic. Yet, if there is any truth in inductive reasoning, that language was once a living language, spoken in Asia by a small tribe, nay, originally by a small family living under one and the same roof, as the language of Camoens, Cervantes, Voltaire, and Dante, was once spoken by a few peasants who had built their huts on the Seven Hills near the Tibris. If we compare the two tables of paradigms, the coincidences between the language of the Veda and the dialect spoken at the present day by the Lithuanian recruit at Berlin are greater by far than those between French and Italian; and, after Bopp's 'Comparative Gram-

mar' has been completed, it will be seen clearly that all the essential forms of grammar had been fully framed and established before the first separation of the Aryan family took place.

But we may learn much more of the intellectual state of the primitive and undivided family of the Aryan nations, if we use the materials which Comparative Philology has placed at our disposal; and, here again, the Romance languages will teach us the spell by which we may hope to open the archives of the most ancient history of the Aryan race. If we find in all the Romance dialects a word like the French *pont*, the Italian *ponte*, the Spanish *puente*, the Wallachian *pod*, identically the same in all, after making allowance for those peculiarities which give to each dialect its national character, we have a right to say that *pons*, the name for *bridge*, was known *before* these languages separated, and that, therefore, the art of building bridges must have been known at the same time. We could assert, even if we knew nothing of Latin and of Rome, that previous, at least, to the tenth century, books, bread, wine, houses, villages, towns, towers, and gates, &c., were known to those people, whoever they were, from whose language the modern dialects of Southern Europe are derived. It is true, we should not be able to draw a very perfect picture of the intellectual state of the Roman people if we were obliged to construct their history from such scanty materials only; yet we should be able to prove that there really was such a people, and, in the absence of any other information, even a few casual glimpses of their work in life would be welcome.

But, though we might safely use this method positively, only taking care to avoid foreign terms, we could not invert it or use it negatively. Because each of the Romance dialects has a different name for certain objects, it does not follow that the objects themselves were unknown to the ancestors of the Romance nations. Paper was known at Rome, yet it is called *carta* in Italian, *papier* in French.

Now, as we know nothing of the Aryan race before it was broken up into different nationalities, such as Indian, German, Greek, Roman, Slavonic, Teutonic, and Celtic, this method of making language itself tell the history of ancient times will become of great value, because it will give a character of historical reality to a period in the history of the human race the very existence of which had been doubted, to a period that had been called 'a past that was never present.' We must not expect a complete history of civilisation, exhibiting in full detail a picture of the times when the language of Homer and of the Veda had not yet been formed. But we shall feel by some small but significant traits the real presence of that early period in the history of the human mind—a period which, for reasons that will be clearer hereafter, we identify with the *Mythopœic*.

	Sanskrit.	Zend.	Greek.	Latin.	Gothic.	Slavonic.	Irish.
Father:	pitár	patar	πατήρ	pater	fadar	..	athair
Mother:	mâtár	mâtar	μήτηρ	mater	..	mati (gen. matere)	mathair
Brother:	bhrâtar	brâtar	(φρατήρ)frater		brôthar	brat'	brathair
Sister:	svâsar	qanhar	..	soror	svistar	sestra	siur
Daughter:	duhitár	dughdhar	θυγάτηρ	..	dauhtar	(Lith.) dukte	dear

The mere fact that the names for *father*, *mother*, *brother*, *sister*, and *daughter* are the same in most

of the Aryan languages, might at first sight seem of immaterial significance; yet, even these words are full of import. That the name of father was coined at that early period, shows that the father acknowledged the offspring of his wife as his own, for thus only had he a right to claim the title of father. *Father* is derived from a root PA, which means, not to beget, but to protect, to support, to nourish. The father as progenitor, was called in Sanskrit *g*anitár, but as protector and supporter of his offspring he was called pitár. Hence, in the Veda these two names are used together, in order to express the full idea of father. Thus the poet says (I. 164, 33):—

Dyaús me pitấ *g*anitấ.
Jo(vi)s mei pater genitor.
Ζεὺς ἐμοῦ πατὴρ γενετήρ.

In a similar manner mâtár, mother, is joined with *g*anitrî, *genitrix* (Rv. III. 48, 2), which shows that the word mâtar must soon have lost its etymological meaning, and have become an expression of respect and endearment. Among the earliest Aryans, mâtar had the meaning of maker, from MA, to fashion; and in this sense, and with the same accent as the Greek μήτηρ, mấtar, not yet determined by a feminine affix, it is used in the Veda as a masculine. Thus we read, for instance, Rv. VIII. 41, 4:—

Sáh mấtâ pûrvyám padám.

'He, Varu*n*a (Uranos), is the maker of the old place.'

Now, it should be observed, that mâtar, as well as pitar, is but one out of many names by which the idea of father and mother might have been ex-

pressed. Even if we confined ourselves to the root PA, and took the granting of support to his offspring as the most characteristic attribute of father, many words might have been, and actually were, formed, all equally fit to become, so to say, the proper names of father. In Sanskrit, protector can be expressed not only by PA, followed by the derivative suffix tar, but by pâ-la, pâ-laka, pâ-yú, all meaning protector. The fact that out of many possible forms, one only has been admitted into all the Aryan dictionaries, shows that there must have been something like a traditional usage in language long before the separation of the Aryan family took place. Besides, there were other roots from which the name of father might have been formed, such as GAN, from which we have *ganitár*, *genitor*, γενετήρ; or TAK, from which the Greek τοκεύς; or PAR, from which the Latin *parens*; not to mention many other names equally applicable to express some prominent attribute of a father in his relation to his children. If each Aryan dialect had formed its own name for father, from one of the many roots which all the Aryan dialects share in common, we should be able to say that there was a radical community between all these languages; but we should never succeed in proving, what is most essential, their historical community, or their divergence from one language which had already acquired a decided idiomatic consistency.

It happens, however, even with these, the most essential terms of an incipient civilisation, that one or the other of the Aryan dialects has lost the ancient expression, and replaced it by a new one. The common Aryan names for brother and sister, for

instance, do not occur in Greek, where brother and sister are called ἀδελφός and ἀδελφή. To conclude from this that at the time when the Greeks started from their Aryan home, the names of brother and sister had not yet been framed, would be a mistake. We have no reason to suppose that the Greeks were the first to leave, and, if we find that nations like the Teutonic or Celtic, who could have had no contact with the natives of India after the first separation had taken place, share the name of brother in common with Sanskrit, it is as certain that this name existed in the primitive Aryan language as the occurrence of the same word in Walachian and Portuguese would prove its Latin origin, though no trace of it existed in any of the other Romance dialects. No doubt, the growth of language is governed by immutable laws, but the influence of accident is more considerable here than in any other branch of natural science; and though in this case it is possible to find a principle which determines the accidental loss[1] of the ancient names for brother and sister in Greek, yet this is not the case always, and we shall frequently find that one or the other Aryan dialect does not exhibit a term which, on the strength of our general argument, we shall feel justified in ascribing to the most ancient period of Aryan speech.

The mutual relation between brother and sister had been hallowed at that early period, and it had been sanctioned by names which had become traditional before the Aryan family broke up into different colonies. The original meaning of bhrâtar

[1] See *Edinburgh Review*, Oct. 1851, p. 320.

seems to me to have been he who carries or assists; of svasar, she who pleases or consoles—svasti meaning in Sanskrit joy or happiness.

In duhitar, again, we find a name which must have become traditional long before the separation took place. It is a name identically the same in all the dialects, except Latin, and yet Sanskrit alone could have preserved a consciousness of its appellative power. Duhitar, as Professor Lassen was the first to show, is derived from DUH, a root which in Sanskrit means to milk. It is perhaps connected with the Latin *dūco*, and the transition of meaning would be the same as between *trahere*, to draw, and *traire*, to milk. Now, the name of milkmaid, given to the daughter of the house, opens before our eyes a little idyll of the poetical and pastoral life of the early Aryans. One of the few things by which the daughter, before she was married, might make herself useful in a nomadic household, was the milking of the cattle, and it discloses a kind of delicacy and humour, even in the rudest state of society, if we imagine a father calling his daughter his little milkmaid, rather than sutâ, his begotten, or *filia*, the suckling. This meaning, however, must have been forgotten long before the Aryans separated. Duhitar was then no longer a nickname, but it had become a technical term, or, so to say, the proper name of a daughter. That many words were formed in the same spirit, and that they were applicable only during a nomadic state of life, we shall have frequent opportunity of seeing, as we go on. But as the transition of words of such special meaning into general terms, deprived of all etymological

vitality may seem strange, we may as well give at once a few analogous cases where, behind expressions of the most general currency, we can discover, by means of etymology, this peculiar background of the ancient nomad life of the Aryan nations. The very word *peculiar* may serve as an illustration, taken from more modern times. Peculiar now means singular, extraordinary, but originally it meant what was private, *i.e.* not common, property; being derived from *peculium*. Now, the Latin *peculium* stands for *pecudium* (like *consilium* for *considium*); and being derived from *pecus*, *pecudis*, it expressed originally what we should call cattle and chattel. Cattle constituting the chief personal property of agricultural people, we may well understand how peculiar, meaning originally what refers to one's own property, came to mean not-common, and at last, in our modern conversation, passed into the meaning of strange. I need hardly mention the well-known etymology of *pecunia*, which being derived from the same word, *pecu*, and therefore signifying flocks, took gradually the meaning of money, in the same manner as the Anglo-Saxon *feoh*, the German *Vieh*, cattle (and originally, according to Grimm's law, the same word as *pecu*), received in the course of time the sense of a pecuniary remuneration, a fee.[1] What takes place in modern languages, and, as it were, under our own eyes, must not surprise us in more distant ages. Now, the most useful cattle have always been the ox and the cow, and they seem to have constituted the chief riches and the most important means of subsistence among the Aryan

[1] Lord Neaves, *A Glance at Comparative Philology*, 1870, p. 14.

nations. Ox and cow are called in Sanskrit go, plur. gâvas, which is the same word as the Old High-German *chuo*, plur. *chuowi*, and with a change from the guttural to the labial media, the classical *βοῦς*, *βόες*, and *bôs*, *bôves*. Some of the Slavonic languages also have preserved a few traces of this ancient name: for instance, the Lettish *gôws*, cow; the Slavonic *govyado*, a herd; Servian *govedar*, a cow-herd. From *βοῦς*, we have in Greek *βουκόλος*, which meant originally a cow-herd; but in the verb *βουκολέω*, the meaning of tending cows has been absorbed by the more general one of tending cattle, nay, it is used in a metaphorical sense, such as *ἐλπίσι βουκολοῦμαι*, I feed myself on vain hopes. It is used with regard to horses, and thus we find for horse-herd, *ἱπποβούκολος*, originally a cow-herd of horses, —an expression which we can only compare to Sanskrit goyuga, meaning a yoke of oxen, but afterwards any pair, so that a pair of oxen would be called go-go-yuga. Thus, in Sanskrit, go-pa means originally a cow-herd, but it soon loses this specific meaning, and is used for the head of a cow-pen, a herdsman, and at last, like the Greek *ποιμὴν λαῶν*, for a king. From gopa a new verb is formed, gopayati, and in it all traces of its original meaning are obliterated; it means simply to protect. As gopa meant a cow-herd, go-tra, in Sanskrit, was originally a hurdle, and meant the enclosure by which a herd was protected against thieves, and kept from straying. Gotra, however, has almost entirely lost its etymological power in the later Sanskrit, where the feminine only, gotrâ, preserves the meaning of a herd of kine. In ancient times, when most

wars were carried on, not to maintain the balance of power of Asia or Europe, but to take possession of good pasture, or to appropriate large herds of cattle,[1] the hurdles grew naturally into the walls of fortresses, the hedges became strongholds; Anglo-Saxon *tun*, a close (German *Zaun*), became a town; and those who lived behind the same walls were called a *gotra*, a family, a tribe, a race. In the Veda, gotra is still used in the sense of folds or hurdles (III. 39, 4):

Nákiḥ êshâm ninditấ mártyeshu
Yé asmấkam pitárah góshu yodhấḥ
Índraḥ eshâm drimhitấ mấhinâvân
Út gotrấṇi sasrige damsánâvân.

'There is not among men one scoffing at them who were our fathers, who fought among the cows. Indra, the mighty, is their defender; he, the powerful, spread out their hurdles,[2] *i.e.* their possessions.'

'Fighting among or for the cows,' goshu-yúdh, is used in the Veda as a name for warrior, in general, I. 112, 22; and one of the most frequent words for battle is gáv-ishṭi, literally 'striving for cows.' In the later Sanskrit, however, gaveshana means simply, research (physical or philosophical), gavesh,

[1] Ὑπὲρ νομῆς ἢ λείας μαχόμεθα. *Toxar.* 36. Grimm, *History of the German Language*, p 17.

[2] Hurdle seems to be connected with the Vaidik khardis, house, *i.e.* enclosure, and from the same root we have Gothic *hairda*, Anglo-Saxon *heord*, *hiörð*, a herd. The original root would have been khard, which stands for skard, and the initial *s* being dropt, we should get the initial tenuis which is required to account for Gothic *hairda*. Another explanation is given by Aufrecht in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. i. p. 362.

to inquire. Again, goshtha means cow-pen or stable (*βούσταθμον*); but, with the progress of time and civilisation, goshthî became the name of an assembly, nay, it was used to express discussion and gossip, as gossip in English, too, meant originally a godfather or godmother, and then took the abstract sense of idle conversation or tattle.

All these words, composed with go, cattle, to which many more might have been added if we were not afraid of trying the patience of our less sceptical readers, proved that the people who formed them must have led a half nòmadic and half pastoral life, and we may well understand how the same people came to use duhitar in the sense of daughter. Language has been called a map of the science and manners of the people who speak it, and we should probably find, if we examined the language of a maritime people, that instead of cattle and pasture, ships and water would form part of many words which afterwards were applied in a more general sense.

We proceed to examine other terms which indicate the state of society previous to the separation of the Aryan race, and which we hope will give to our distant picture that expression of truth and reality which can be appreciated even by those who have never seen the original.

We pass over the words for son, partly because their etymology is of no interest, their meaning being simply that of *natus*, born,[1] partly because

[1] For instance, Sansk. sûnú, Goth. *sunus*, Lith. *sunus*, all from su, to beget, whence Greek *viós*, but by a different suffix. Sansk. putra, son, is of doubtful origin. It was supposed to be shared by the Celtic branch, (Bret. *paotr*, boy; *paotrez*, girl,) but it has

the position of the son, or the successor and inheritor of his father's wealth and power, would claim a name at a much earlier time than daughter, sister, or brother. All these relations, in fact, expressed by father and mother, son and daughter, brother and sister, are fixed, we should say, by the laws of nature, and their acknowledgment in language would not prove any considerable advance in civilisation, however appropriately the names themselves might have been chosen. But there are other relations, of later origin, and of a more conventional character, sanctioned, it is true, by the laws of society, but not proclaimed by the voice of nature—relations which are aptly expressed in English by the addition of in-law, as father-in-law, mother, son, daughter, brother, and sister-in-law. If the names for these relations could be vindicated for the earliest period of Aryan civilisation, we should have gained something considerable, for though there is hardly a dialect in Africa or Australia in which we do not find words for father, mother, son, daughter, brother, and sister, and hardly a tribe in which these natural degrees of relationship are not hallowed, there are languages in which the degrees of affinity have never received expression, and tribes who ignore their very meaning.[1]

The table on next page shows that, before the separation of the Aryan race, every one of the degrees of affinity also had received expression and sanction in language, for, although some spaces had to be left empty, the coincidences, such as they are, are

been shown that the Breton *paotr* comes from *paltr*, as *aotrou* is the Corn. *altrou*.

[1] See Sir J. Lubbock, *Transact. of Ethnol. Society*, vi. 337.

	Sanskrit.	Greek.	Latin.	Gothic.	Slavonic.	Celtic.
Father-in-law:	svâsura	ἑκυρός	socer	svaihra	svekr	W. chwegrwn
Mother-in-law:	svasrû	ἑκυρά	socrus	svaihrô	ṣvekrvj	W. chwegyr
Son-in-law:	gâmâtar	γαμβρός	gener	..	..	Bret. géver
Daughter-in-law:	snushâ	νυός	nurus	O.H.G. snûr	snocha	..
Brother-in-law:	dêvâr	δαήρ (ἀνδράδελφος)	levir	A.S. tâcor	Lith. deweri-s	..
Sister-in-law:	(nânandar)	γάλως (ἀνδραδέλφη)	glos	..	O.Bohem. selva	..
	yâtaras (wives of brothers)	εἰνάτερες	janitrices	..	Poln. jatrew	..
	syâlâ (wife's brother)	ἀέλιοι	..	..	..	..
	syâlî (wife's sister)	εἰλιόνες (husbands of sisters)	..	..	..	..

sufficient to warrant one general conclusion. If we find in Sanskrit, the word syâla, a wife's brother, and in Greek the derivation *ἀ-έλιοι, i.e.* those who are wife's brothers together (*cf.* *ἀνέψιοι*), we must remember that, although none of the other Aryan dialects has preserved traces of this word, yet the identity of the Greek and Sanskrit terms can only be explained on the supposition that syâla was a common Aryan term, well known before any branch of this family was severed from the common stem.

In modern languages we might, if dealing with similar cases, feel inclined to admit a later communication, but, fortunately, in ancient languages no such intercourse was possible, after the southern branch of the Aryan family had once crossed the Himâlaya, and the northern branch set foot on the shores of Europe. Different questions are raised where, as is the case with *gâmâtar* and *γαμβρός*, originally bridegroom or husband,[1] then son-in-law, we

[1] *Γαμβρὸς καλεῖται ὁ γήμας ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων τῆς γαμηθείσης.*

are only able to prove that the same root was taken, and therefore the same radical idea expressed by Greek and Sanskrit, while the derivation is peculiar in each language. Here no doubt we must be more careful in our conclusions, but generally we shall find that these formal differences are only such as occur in dialects of the same language, when out of many possible forms, used at first promiscuously, one was chosen by one poet, one by another, and then became popular and traditional. This at least is more likely than to suppose that to express a relation which might be expressed in such various ways, the Greek should have chosen the same root γαμ to form γαμρός and γαμβρός, independently of the Hindu, who took that root for the same purpose, only giving it a causal form (as in bhrâtar instead of bhartar), and appending to it the usual suffix, tar; thus forming gâ'mâ-tar, instead of gamara or yamara. The Latin word *gener* is more difficult still, and if it is the same word as the Greek γαμβρός for γαμρός, the transition of *m* into *n* can only be explained by a process of assimilation, and by a desire to give to the ancient word *gemer* a more intelligible form by bringing it nearer to the root *gen*. When, as it happens not unfrequently, one of the Aryan languages has lost a common term, we are sometimes enabled to prove its former existence by means of derivatives. In Greek, for instance—at least in the classical language—there is no trace of *nepos*, grandson, which we have in Sanskrit nápât, German *nefo*; nor of *neptis*, Sanskrit náptî, German *nift*. Yet there is in Greek ἀ-νεψιός, a first cousin, *i.e.* one with whom we are grandsons together, as the uncle is called the little-grandfather, *avunculus* from

avus. This word *ἀ-νεψιός* is formed like Latin *consobrinus, i.e. consororinus,* one with whom we are sister-children, our modern cousin, Italian *cugino,* in which there remains very little of the original word *soror,* from which, however, it is derived. *Ἀνεψιός,* therefore, proves that in Greek also, some word like *νεπους* must have existed in the sense of child or grandchild, in the same manner as we saw that *ἀέλιοι* testified to the former existence of a Greek word corresponding to syâla, a wife's brother. In Sanskrit a husband calls his wife's brother syâla, his wife's sister syâlî. In Greek, likewise, Peleus might have called Poseidon, and Poseidon Peleus, his syâla, while Amphitrite would have been syâlî to Peleus, Thetis to Poseidon. Peleus and Poseidon, therefore, being syâlas together, were called in Greek *ἀ-ἔλιοι,* a name utterly inexplicable except when referred to Sanskrit syâla. For sy between two vowels is generally dropt in Greek; and the only anomaly consists in the short *ε* representing the long â in Sanskrit.

There are still a few words which throw a dim light on the early organisation of the Aryan family life. The position of the widow was acknowledged in language and in law, and we find no trace that, at that early period, she who had lost her husband was doomed to die with him. If this custom had existed, the want of a name for widow would hardly have been felt, or, if it had been, the word would most likely have had some reference to this awful rite. Now, husband, or man, in Sanskrit is dhava, a word which does not seem to exist in the other Aryan languages, for *dea,* which Pictet brings forward as Celtic, in the

sense of a man or person, is a word that has never been authenticated. From dhava, Sanskrit forms the name of the widow by the addition of the preposition vi, which means without: therefore vi-dhavâ, husbandless, widow. This compound has been preserved in languages which have lost the simple word dhava, thus showing the great antiquity of this traditional term. We have it not only in Celtic *feadbh*, but in Gothic *viduvô*, Slavonic *vĭdova*, Old Prussian *widdewû*, and Latin *vidua*. If the custom of widow-burning had existed at that early period, there would have been no vidhavâs, no husbandless women, because they would all have followed their husband into death. Therefore the very name indicates, what we are further enabled to prove by historical evidence, the late origin of widow-burning in India.[1]

It is true that, when the English Government prohibited this melancholy custom, as the Emperor Jehángir had done before, and when the whole of India was said to be on the verge of a religious revolution, the

[1] Vidhávâ has been derived by Yâska and other native Sanskrit grammarians from vi, without, and dhava, man. Bopp, Pott, Curtius and other scholars accepted this etymology. Then came a reaction. Benfey compared vidhava with ἠίθεος, without, however, fully accounting for the phonetic changes, nor for the difference of meaning, ἠίθεος being a bachelor, not a widower. Roth (Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, xix. 223) went a step further, and derived vidhávâ, widow, from a root vindh, to be without a thing; but he never explained how vidh-áva could be derived from that root. Curtius accepted this etymology (*Grundzüge*, 5th ed., p. 36). Pott (*Etym. Forsch.* iv. 918), after carefully examining these new etymologies, inclines to the old derivation. I myself had pointed out the difficulty of deriving *viduus* from vidhava on page 357, but I feel unable to accept Roth's etymology. If the old Latin *bi-vira* (*i.e. dvi-vira*) was used by Varro (according to Nonnius, ii. p. 56, ed. Gerlach) in the sense of widow, it would form a striking analogy to vidhavâ.

Brahmans were able to appeal to the Veda as the authority for this sacred rite, and as they had the promise that their religious practices should not be interfered with, they claimed respect for the Suttee. Raghunandana and other doctors had actually quoted chapter and verse from the Rig-Veda, and Colebrooke,[1] the most accurate and learned Sanskrit

[1] 'On the Duties of a Faithful Widow,' *Asiatic Researches*, vol. iv. pp. 209, 219. Calcutta, 1795. The principal authorities of this Essay are to be found in Colebrooke's *Digest*, book iii. cap. 3, sect. 1, which is a literal translation of a section of *G*agannâtha's Vivâda-bhangârnava, to be found in MS. Wilson, 224, vol. iii. p. 62. See some interesting remarks on this subject, and the correction of a mistake in my notes, in the third volume of the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Part I., Art. VII., 'The Source of Colebrooke's Essay "On the Duties of a Faithful Hindu Widow,"' by Fitzedward Hall, Esq., M.A., D.C.L., Oxon. The reasons which I gave at a meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society for my opinion that Colebrooke availed himself of the Vivâda-bhangârnava, while writing his Essay on 'The Duties of a Faithful Hindu Widow,' were as follows:—On page 117, Colebrooke quotes:

1. A passage from Vishnu;
2. A passage from Prajetas;
3. A passage from the Smriti.

The same passages, in exactly the same order, are quoted as Nos. 133, 134, 135 of the *Digest*.

This argument has been, if not invalidated, at least modified, by the fact that the same passages occur likewise in the same order in Raghunandana's Suddhitattva, a work which was consulted by *G*agannâtha in the compilation of his *Corpus Juris*.

My second reason was:—On page 119, Colebrooke quotes:

1. A saying ascribed to Nârada (*i.e.* taken from the Brihan Nâradîya Purâna);
2. A passage from Brihaspati, with which, at the end, a line of Raghunandana's commentary is mixed up;
3. A passage supported by the authority of Gotama (or Gautama).

The same passages, in exactly the same order, form Nos. 127, 128, 129 of the Vivâda-bhangârnava. The line from Raghunandana follows in the Vivâda-bhangârnava, as in Colebrooke's Essay, immediately after the extract from Brihaspati, and the mistake of mixing the words of Raghunandana with those of Brihaspati could only

scholar we have ever had, has translated this passage in accordance with their views:

'Om! let these women, not to be widowed, good wives adorned with collyrium, holding clarified butter, consign themselves to the fire! Immortal, not childless, not husbandless, well adorned with gems, let them pass into the fire, whose original element is water.' (From the Rig-Veda.)

Now, this is perhaps the most flagrant instance of what can be done by an unscrupulous priesthood. Here have thousands and thousands of lives been sacrificed, and a fanatical rebellion been threatened on the authority of a passage which was mangled, mistranslated, and misapplied. If anybody had been able at the time to verify this verse of the Rig-Veda, the Brahmans might have been beaten with their own weapons; nay, their spiritual prestige might have been considerably shaken. The Rig-Veda, which now hardly one Brahman out of a hundred is able to read, so far from enforcing the burning of widows, shows clearly that this custom was not sanctioned during the earliest period of Indian history. According to the hymns of the Rig-Veda and the Vaidik ceremonial contained in the Gṛihya-sûtras, the wife accompanies the corpse of her husband to the funeral pile, but she is there addressed with a verse taken from the Rig-Veda, and ordered to leave her husband, and to return to the world of the living.[1] 'Rise, woman,' it is said,

have arisen because, instead of mentioning Raghunandana's name, the MS. of the Vivâda-bhangârṇava reads: iti Smârtâḥ. Neither the Suddhitattva, nor any other work that I have met with, gives these three passages with the extract from Raghunandana in the same order as the Vivâda-bhangârṇava and Colebrooke's Essay.

[1] See Grimm's Essay on 'The Burning of the Dead;' Roth's

'come to the world of life; thou sleepest nigh unto him whose life is gone. Come to us! Thou hast thus fulfilled thy duties of a wife to the husband who once took thy hand, and made thee a mother.'

This verse is preceded by the very verse which the later Brahmans have falsified and quoted in support of their cruel tenet. The reading of the verse is beyond all doubt, for there is no various reading, in our sense of the word, in the whole of the Rig-Veda. Besides, we have the commentaries and the ceremonials, and nowhere is there any difference as to the text or its meaning. It is addressed to the other women who are present at the funeral, and who have to pour oil and butter on the pile:—

'May these women who are not widows, but have good husbands, draw near with oil and butter. Those who are mothers may go up first to the altar, without tears, without sorrow, but decked with fine jewels.'

Now the words, 'the mothers may go first to the altar,' are in Sanskrit,

'Â rohantu *g*anayo yonim agre;'

and this the Brahmans have changed into

'Â rohantu *g*anayo yonim agne*h*;'

article on 'The Burial in India;' Professor Wilson's article on 'The supposed Vaidik Authority for the Burning of Hindu Widows;' and my own translation of the complete documentary evidence, published by Professor Wilson at the end of his article, and by myself in the *Journal of the German Oriental Society*, vol. ix. fasc. 4. Professor Wilson was the first to point out the falsification of the text, and the change of 'yonim agre' into 'yonim agne*h*.'

—a small change, but sufficient to consign many lives to the womb (yonim) of fire (agneh).[1]

The most important passage in Vedic literature to prove the decided disapproval of widow-burning on the part of the ancient Brahmans, at least as far as their own caste was concerned, occurs in the Brihad-devatâ. There we read:—

Udîrshva nârîty anayâ mritam patny anurohati,
Bhrâtâ kanîyân pretasya nigadya pratishedhati;
Kuryâd etat karma hotâ, devaro na bhaved yadi,
Pretânugamanam na syâd iti brâhmanasâsanât.
Varnânâm itâreshâm ka strîdharmo 'yam bhaven na vâ.

'With the verse "Rise, woman," the wife ascends to follow her dead husband; the younger brother of the departed, repeating the verse, prevents her. The Hotri priest performs that act, if there is no brother-in-law, but to follow the dead husband is forbidden, so says the law of the Brâhmans. With regard to the other castes this law for women may be or may not be.'[2]

[1] In a similar manner the custom of widow-burning has been introduced by the Brahmans in an interpolated passage of the 'Toy-Cart,' an Indian drama of king Sudraka, which was translated by Professor Wilson, and has lately been performed at Paris. 'Le Chariot d'Enfant,' Drame en vers en cinq actes et sept tableaux, traduction du Drame Indien du Roi Soudraka, par MM. Méry et Gérard de Nerval. Paris, 1850.

[2] Part of this passage is wanting in MSS. B. b, but it is found in A. C. See also M. M., 'Die Todtenbestattung bei den Brahmanen,' *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, vol. ix. p. vi., where the ritual is somewhat different. Sannyâsopanishad, in *Bibliotheca Indica*, 65, p. 150.

I add a few extracts from Mr. H. J. Bushby's work on *Widow Burning*:—p. 21, 'Long ago, Oriental scholars, both native and

After this digression, we return to the earlier period of history of which language alone can give us any information, and, as we have claimed for it the name of widow, or the husbandless, we need not wonder that the name for husband also is to this day in most of the Aryan languages the same which had been fixed upon by the Aryans before their separation. It is pati in Sanskrit, meaning originally strong, like Latin *potis* or *potens*. In Lithuanian the form is exactly the same, *patis*, and this, if we apply Grimm's law, becomes *faths*, as in Gothic *bruth-faths*, bridegroom. In Greek, again, we find πόσις instead of πότις. Now, the feminine of pati in

European, had shown that the rite of widow-burning was not only unsanctioned, but imperatively forbidden, by the earliest and most authoritative Hindoo scriptures. Nay, Colonel Tod in his book on Rajpootána (*Annals of Rajasthan*, 1829, vol. i. p. 635), had actually indicated this anomaly in Hindoo doctrine as the best point of attack for abolitionists to select.' P. 22, 'Scholars, it is true, had proved Suttee to be an innovation and a heresy; but it was an innovation of 2,000 years standing, and a heresy abetted by the priesthood since the days of Alexander. Though unnoticed by Manu, the supplementary writings with which the Hindoos, like the Jews, have overlaid their primitive books, are profuse in its praise.' P. 29, 'Major Ludlow determined, if possible, to induce two or three trustworthy and influential natives to undertake the cause; to ply them with the critical objection drawn from the older Scriptures." For further particulars as to the efforts made for the suppression of Suttee I may refer to the interesting narrative of Mr. H. J. Bushby, on *Widow-Burning*, published originally in the *Quarterly Review*, and afterwards as a separate pamphlet (London, Longmans, 1855). It shows how much has been done, and therefore how much more may be done, by appealing to the most ancient and most sacred Sanskrit authorities in discussions with the natives of India. If the fact that Manu never sanctions the burning of widows could produce such an impression on the Vakeels of Rájputána as described by Mr. Bushby, how much more powerful would be an appeal to the Veda, the authority of which, whenever a discrepancy occurs, invariably overrides that of Manu!

Sanskrit is patnî, and there is no doubt that the old Prussian *pattin*, in the accusative *wais-pattin*, and the Greek πότνια, are mere transcripts of it, all meaning the mistress.

What the husband was in his house—the lord, the strong protector—the king was among his people. Now, a common name for people was vis in Sanskrit, from which the title of the third caste, the householders, or Vaisyas is derived. It comes from the same root from which we have in Sanskrit vesa, house, οἶκος, *vicus*, Gothic *veihs*, German *wich*, and the modern English termination of many names of places. Hence vispati in Sanskrit meant king, *i.e.* lord of the people, and that this compound had become a title sanctioned by Aryan etiquette before the separation, is confirmed in a strange manner by the Lithuanian *wiêsz-patis*, a lord, *wiêsz-patene*, a lady, as compared with the Sanskrit vis-patis and vispatnî. There was, therefore, at that early period, not only a nicely-organised family life, but the family began to be absorbed by the state, and here again conventional titles had been fixed, and were handed down perhaps two thousand years before such a title as Cæsar was heard of.

Another name for people being dâsa or dasyu, dâsa-pati no doubt was an ancient name for king. There is, however, this great difference between vis and dâsa, that the former means people, the latter subjects, conquered races, nay, originally, enemies. Dasyu in the Veda is enemy, but in the Zend-Avesta, where we have the same word, it means provinces or *gentes*; and Darius calls himself, in his mountain records, 'king of Persia and king of the provinces'.

(kshâyathîya Pârsaiya, kshâyathîya dahyunâm). Hence it is hardly doubtful that the Greek δεσ-πότης represents a Sanskrit title dâsa-pati, lord of nations; but we cannot admit that the title of Hospodar, which has lately become so notorious, should, as Bopp says, be the same as Sanskrit vis-pati or dâsa-pati. The word is *gaspadorus* in Lithuanian; in Old Slav. *gospod*, *gospodin*, and *gospodar*; Pol. *gospodarz*; Boh. *hospodár*. A Slavonic g, however, does not correspond to Sanskrit d, nor could the t of pati become d.[1] Benfey, who derives *gospod* from the Vaidik *gâspati*, avoids the former, but not the latter difficulty; and it is certainly better to state these difficulties than to endeavour to smuggle in some ancient Aryan terms, in defiance of laws which can never be violated with impunity.

A third common Aryan word for king is *râg* in the Veda; *rex*, *regis*, in Latin; *reiks* in Gothic, a word still used in German, as *reich*, *regnum*, *Frankreich*, *regnum Francorum*; in Irish *riogh*; Welsh *ri*. It meant originally a leader, possibly a steersman.

A fourth name for king and queen is simply father and mother. *Ganaka* in Sanskrit means father, from GAN, to beget; it also occurs, as the name of a well-known king, in the Veda. This is the Old German *chuning*, the English *king*. Mother in Sanskrit is *gani* or *ganî*, the Greek γυνή, the Gothic *quinô*, the Slavonic *zena*, the English *queen*. Queen, therefore, means originally mother, or lady; and thus, again, we see how the language of family life grew gradually into the political language of the

[1] See Schleicher's excellent remarks in his *Formenlehre der Kirchenslawischen Sprache*, 1852, p. 107.

oldest Aryan state, and how the brotherhood of the family became the φρατρία of the state.[1]

We have seen that the name of house was known before the Aryan family broke up towards the south and the north, and we might bring further evidence to this effect by comparing Sanskrit dama with Greek δόμος, Latin *domus*, Slav. *domü*, Celtic *daimh*, and Gothic *timrjan*, to build, from which English timber. The identity of the Slavonic *grod*, castle, burg, and *gorod* (Nov-gorod) with the Gothic *gards* has been doubted without sufficient reason, though there may be difficulty in accounting for the *t* in *hortus* and χόρτος, which have likewise been compared with garda.[2] The most essential part of a house, particularly in ancient times, being a door well fastened and able to resist the attacks of enemies, we are glad to find the ancient name preserved in Sanskrit dvar, dvâras, Gothic *daur*, Lithuanian *durrys*, Celtic *dor*, Greek θύρα, Latin *fores*. The builder also, or architect, has the same name in Sanskrit and Greek, takshan being the Greek τέκτων. The Greek ἄστυ, again, has been compared with Sanskrit vastu, house; the Greek κώμη with Gothic *haims*, a village; the English home. Still more conclusive as to the early existence of cities, is the Sanskrit purî, town,

[1] See *Lectures on the Science of Language*, Second Series, p. 255, and particularly the German translation, where objections to this derivation have been answered.

[2] Totally distinct from these words are karta, kert, and gird, occurring at the end of Τιγρανόκερτα, Balâshgird (*i.e.* Vologasocerta), and other names of Iranian towns. They are Zend kereta, made, founded (Hübschmann, *Zeitschrift der d. m. G.* xxx. p. 138; Nöldeke, *ib.*, xxx. p. 143). This kereta, again, is totally distinct from the Hebrew *kereth*, town, occurring in the names of *Carthage, Cirta, &c.*

preserved by the Greeks in their name for town, πόλις; and that highroads also were not unknown, appears from Sanskrit path, pathi, panthan, and pâthas, all names for road, the Greek πάτος, the Gothic *fad*, which Bopp believes to be identical with Latin *pons*, *pontis*, and Slavonic *ponti*.

It would take a volume were we to examine all the relics of language, though no doubt every new word would strengthen our argument, and add, as it were, a new stone from which this ancient and venerable ruin of the Aryan mind might be reconstructed. The evidence, however, which we have gone through must be sufficient to show that the race of men which could coin these words—words that have been carried down the stream of time, and washed up on the shores of so many nations, could not have been a race of savages, of mere nomads and hunters. Nay, it should be observed, that most of the terms connected with chase and warfare differ in each of the Aryan dialects, while words connected with more peaceful occupations belong generally to the common heir-loom of the Aryan language. The proper appreciation of this fact in its general bearing will show how a similar remark made by Niebuhr with regard to Greek and Latin requires a very different explanation from that which that great scholar, from his more restricted point of view, was able to give it. It will show that all the Aryan nations had led a long life of peace before they separated, and that their language acquired individuality and nationality as each colony started in search of new homes—new generations forming new terms connected with the warlike and adventurous life of their onward migrations. Hence

it is that not only Greek and Latin, but all Aryan languages have their peaceful words in common; and hence it is that they all differ so strangely in their warlike expressions. Thus the domestic animals are generally known by the same name in England and in India, while the wild beasts have mostly different names, even in Greek and Latin. I can only give a list, which must tell its own story, for it would take too much time to enter into the etymological formation of all these words, though no doubt a proper understanding of their radical meaning would make them more instructive as living witnesses to the world of thought and the primitive household of the Aryan race. (*See next page.*)

Of wild animals some were known to the Aryans before they separated, and they happen to be animals which live both in Asia and Europe, the bear and the wolf:—

	Sanskrit.	Greek.	Italian.	Teutonic.	Slavonic.	Celtic.
Bear:	ṛiksha	ἄρκτος	ursus	..	Lith-loky-s	Ir. art
Wolf:	vṛika	λύκος	lupus (v)irpus	G. vulf	Lith. wilka-s	Ir. brech

To them should be added the serpent:—

	Sanskrit.	Greek.	Italian.	Teutonic.	Slavonic.	Celtic.
Serpent:	ahi	ἔχις	anguis	O.H.G. unc	Lith. angi-s	..
		(ἔγχελυς)	(anguilla)	..	(angury-s)	..
	sarpa	ἕρπετον	serpens	..	..	W. sarff

Without dwelling on the various names of those animals which had partly been tamed and domesticated, while others were then, as they are now, the natural enemies of the shepherd and his flocks, we proceed at once to mention a few words which indicate that this early pastoral life was not without some of the most primitive arts, such as ploughing, grinding, weaving, and the working of useful and precious metals.

	Sânskrit and Zend.		Greek.	Italian.	Teutonic.	Lithuanian.	Slavonic.	Celtic.
Cattle:	paśu	paśu	πῶυ?	pecu	G. faihu / O.H.G. fihu	Pruss. pecku	…	…
Ox and cow:	go (nom. gaus)	gâo	βοῦς	bos	O.H.G. chuo	Lett. gow	govjado	Ir. bó
Ox:	ukshan	ukhshan	…	vacca (?)	G. auhsan	…	…	W. ych
Steer:	sthûra	staora	ταῦρος	taurus	stiur	taura-s	tour	Ir. tor
Heifer:	starî	…	στεῖρα	(sterilis)	stairo	…	…	…
Horse:	âśu, aśva	aspa	ἵππος	equus	A.S. eoh	aszua, fem.	…	Ir. ech / Gaulish, epo-s
Foal:	…	…	πῶλος	pullus	G. fula	…	…	…
Dog:	śvan	śpâ (σπάκα)	κύων	canis	G. hund	szů	R. sobaka / Bulg. kuce	Ir. cu
Sheep:	avi	…	ὄϊς	ovis	G. avi-str) / E. ewe	avi-s	Slav. ovjza	Ir. oi
Calf:	vatsa	…	ἴταλος	vitulus	…	…	…	(Ir. fithal)
He-goat:	…	…	κάπρος	caper	O.H.G. hafr	…	…	Ir. cabhar
She-goat:	agâ	…	αἴξ	…	…	ozi-s	…	Ir. aighe
Sow:	sû (kara)	…	ὗς	sus	O.H.G. sû	…	svinia	Ir. suig
Hog:	…	…	πόρκος	porcus	O.H.G. farah	parsza-s	Pol. prosie	Ir. porc
Pig:	ghṛishvi	…	χοῖρος	…	O.N. grîs / Scotch gris	…	…	…
Donkey:	…	…	ὄνος	asinus	asilu	asila-s	osilu	(W. asyn) / (Ir. asail)
Mouse:	mûsh	…	μῦς	mus	O.H.G. mûs	…	Pol mysz	…
Fly:	makshikâ	makhshi	μυῖα	musca	O.H.G. micco	muse	R. mucha	…
Goose:	haṁsa	…	χήν	anser	O.H.G. kans	zasi-s	Boh. hus	G. ganra
Duck:	âti (for anti ?)	…	νῆσσα	ana(t)s	O.H.G. anut	anti-s	…	…

The oldest term for ploughing is AR, which we find in Latin *arare*, Greek *ἀροῦν*, to ear, Old Slav. *orati*, Gothic *arjan*, Lithuanian *arti*, and Gaelic *ar*. From this verb we have the common name of the plough, *ἄροτρον*, *aratrum*, Old Saxon *erida*, Old Norse *ardhr*, Old Slavonic *oralo* and *oradlo*, Lithuanian *arkla-s*, Welsh *aradyr* and *arad*, Cornish *aradar*. Possibly the Sk. ratha, car, comes from the same root ar, and such words as *rata* in Lithuanian, *rota* in Latin, *roth* in Old Irish, prove at all events that conveyance by means of wheels was known in early days. *Ἄρουρα* and *arvum*, too, come from the same root. But a more general name for field is Sanskrit pada, Greek *πέδον*, Umbrian *perum*, Latin *pedum* in *oppidum*, Pol. *pole*, Saxon *folda*, O.H.G. *feld*, *field*; or Sanskrit agra, *ἀγρός*, *ager*, and Gothic *akr-s*.[1]

The corn which was grown in Asia could not well have been the same which the Aryan nations afterwards cultivated in more northern regions. Some of

[1] *Lectures on the Science of Language*, fifth edition, vol. i. p. 283. Some instructive remarks on the words here used for drawing a picture of the early civilisation of the Aryans may be seen in an article by Mr. Wilkins, published in *Essays and Addresses of Owens College*, 1874. They profess to be founded on Fick's *Die ehemalige Spracheinheit der Indogermanen Europas*, but they represent a real improvement on the original. Some of Professor Fick's criticisms have proved very valuable, but in many cases where I have adhered to my original statements, Mr. Wilkins will find that Professor Fick's objections had either been long anticipated, or have since been answered by such scholars as Professors Benfey and Curtius, to say nothing of Professor Pott, the Nestor of Comparative Philologists, whom Mr. Wilkins, not quite respectfully, calls 'that most learned and most erratic of philologists.' On *arvum* and *ἄρουρα*, see Curtius' *Grundzüge*, 5th edition, p. 341, and particularly Benfey, *Augusburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1875, Beilage Nos. 208 and 209. On the whole subject see some excellent remarks in Benfey's *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft*, p. 597.

the names, however, have been preserved, and may be supposed to have had, if not exactly the same, at least a similar botanical character. Such are Sanskrit yava, Zend yava, Lithuanian *javai*, which in Greek must be changed to *ζέα*. Sanskrit *sveta* means white, and corresponds to Gothic *hveit*, O.H.G. *huiz* and *wiz*, the Anglo-Saxon *hvît*. But the name of the colour became also the name of the white grain, and thus we have Gothic *hvaitei*, Lith. *kwêty-s*, the English wheat, with which some scholars have compared the Slav. *shito*, and the Greek *σῖτος*.[1] The name of corn signified originally what is crushed or ground. Thus *kûrna* in Sanskrit means ground, *gîrna*, pounded, and from the same radical element we must no doubt derive the Russian *zerno*, the Gothic *kaurn*, the Latin *granum*. In Lithuanian *girna* is a mill-stone, and the plural *girnós* is the name of a hand-mill. The Russian word for mill-stone is, again, *zernov*, and the Gothic name for mill, *qvairnus*, the later *quirn*. The English name for mill is likewise of considerable antiquity, for it exists not only in the O.H.G. *muli*, but in the Lithuanian *maluna-s*, the Bohemian *mlyn*, the Welsh *melin*, the Latin *mola*, and the Greek *μύλη*.

We might add the names for cooking and baking, and the early distinction between flesh and meat, to show that the same aversion which is expressed in later times—for instance, by the poets of the Veda—against tribes eating raw flesh, was felt already during this primitive period. Kravya-ad (*κρέας-ἐδω*) and âma-ad (*ὠμός-ἐδω*) are names applied to barbarians, and used with the same horror in India as *ὠμοφάγοι*

[1] Professor Benfey compares *σῖτος* with Sanskrit sîtya, corn, from sîtâ, furrow (*Augsburger Allg. Zeitung*, 1875, *l.c.*).

and *κρεωφάγοι* in Greece. But we can only now touch on these points, and must leave it to another opportunity to bring out in full relief this old picture of human life.

As the name for clothes is the same among all the Aryan nations, being vastra in Sanskrit, *vasti* in Gothic, *vestis* in Latin, *ἑσθής* in Greek, *fassradh* in Irish, *gwisk* in Welsh, we are justified in ascribing to the Aryan ancestors the art of weaving as well as of sewing. To weave in Sanskrit is ve, and, in a causative form, vap. With ve coincide the Latin *vieo*, and the Greek radical of *ῥή-τριον*; with vap, the O.H.G. *wab*, the English weave, the Greek *ὑφ-αίνω*.

To sew in Sanskrit is siv, from which sûtra, a thread. The same root is preserved in Latin *suo*, in Gothic *siuja*, in O.H.G. *siwu*, the English to sew, Lithuanian *siuv-u*, Greek *κασσύω* for *κατασύω*. Another Sanskrit root, with a very similar meaning, is NAH, which must have existed also as nabh and nadh. From nah we have Latin *neo* and *necto*, Greek *νέω*, German *nâhan* and *nâvan*, to sew; from nadh, the Greek *νήθω*; from nabh, the Sanskrit nâbhi and nâbha or ûrnanâbha, the spider, literally the wool-spinner.

There is a fourth root which seems to have had originally the special meaning of sewing or weaving, but which afterwards took in Sanskrit the more general sense of making. This is rak, which may correspond to the Greek *ῥάπτω*, to stitch together or to weave; nay, which might account for another name of the spider, *ἀράχνη* in Greek, and *aranea* in Latin, and for the classical name of woven wool, *λάχνος* or *λάχνη*, and the Latin *lana*.

That the value and usefulness of some of the

metals were known before the separation of the Aryan race can be proved only by a few words; for the names of most of the metals differ in different countries. Yet there can be no doubt that iron was known, and its value appreciated, whether for defence or for attack. Whatever its old Aryan name may have been, it is clear that Sanskrit ayas, Latin *ahes* in *aheneus*, and even the contracted form, *æs*, *æris*, the Gothic *ais*, the Old High-German *er* and the English *iron*, are names cast in one and the same mould, and only slightly corroded even now by the rust of so many centuries.[1] The names of the precious metals, such as gold and silver, have suffered more in passing through the hands of so many generations. But, notwithstanding, we are able to discover even in the Celtic *airgiod* the traces of the Sanskrit ragata, the Greek ἄργυρος, the Latin *argentum*; and even in the Gothic *gulth*, gold, a similarity with the Slavonic *zlato* and Russian *zoloto*, Greek χρύσος and Sanskrit hiranyam, although their formative elements differ widely. The radical seems to have been har-at, from whence the Sanskrit harit, the colour of the sun and of the dawn, as *aurum* also descends from the same root with *aurora*. Some of the stone or metal implements used, whether for peaceful or warlike purposes, have kept their original name, and it is extremely curious to find the exact similarity of the Sanskrit parasu and the Greek πέλεκυς, axe, of Sanskrit asi, sword, and Latin *ensis*, of Sanskrit ishu, arrow, and

[1] Much new evidence has lately been collected on the knowledge possessed by the ancient Aryan people of metals besides gold and silver, and it can hardly be maintained any longer that the coincidences pointed out in the text prove more than that the Aryans knew a third metal besides gold and silver, which may have been iron, or copper, or bronze.

Greek *ἰός*, of Sanskrit kshura, razor, and Greek *ξυρόν*.[1]

New ideas do not gain ground at once, and there is a tendency in our mind to resist new convictions as long as we can. Hence it is only by a gradual and careful accumulation of facts that we can hope, on this linguistic evidence, to establish the reality of a period in the history of mankind previous to the beginning of the most ancient known dialects of the Aryan world—previous to the origin of Sanskrit as well as Greek—previous to the time when the first Greek arrived on the shores of Asia Minor, and looking at the vast expanse of sky and sea and country to the west and north, called it Europa. Let us examine one other witness, whose negative evidence will be important. During this early period, the ancestors of the Aryan race must have occupied a more central position in Asia, whence the southern branches extended towards India, the northern to Asia Minor, and Europe. It would follow, therefore, that before their separation, they could not have known the existence of the sea, and hence, if our theory be true, the name for sea must be of later growth, and different in the Aryan languages. And this expectation is fully confirmed. We find, indeed, identical names in Greek and Latin, but not one name for sea is identically the same in the northern and southern branches of the Aryan family. And even these Greek and Latin names are evidently metaphorical expressions—names that existed in the ancient language, and were transferred, at a later time, to this new phenomenon. *Pontus* and *πόντος* mean sea in the same sense as Homer speaks of *ἰγρὰ*

[1] See, however, Curtius, *Grundzüge* (5th edit.), p. 699.

κέλευθα, for *pontus* comes from the same source from which we have *pons, pontis,* and the Sanskrit pantha, if not pâthas. The sea was not called a barrier, but a high-road—more useful for trade and travel than any other road—and Professor Curtius[1] has well pointed out Greek expressions, such as πόντος ἁλὸς πολιῆς and θάλασσα πόντου, as indicating, even among the Greeks, a consciousness of the original import of πόντος. Nor can words like Sanskrit sara, Latin *sal,* and Greek ἅλς, ἁλός, be quoted as proving an acquaintance with the sea among the early Aryans. Sara in Sanskrit means, first, water, afterwards, salt made of water,[2] but not necessarily of sea-water. We might conclude from Sanskrit sara, Greek ἅλς, and Latin *sal,* that the preparation of salt by evaporation was known to the ancestors of the Aryan family before they separated. But this is all that could be proved by ἅλς, *sal,* and Sanskrit sara or salila; the exclusive application of these words to the sea belongs to later times; and though the Greek ἐνάλιος means exclusively marine, the Latin *insula* is by no means restricted to an island surrounded by salt-water. The same remark applies to words like *æquor* in Latin or πέλαγος in Greek. Θάλασσα has long been proved to be a dialectical form of θάρασσα or τάρασσα, expressing the troubled waves of the sea (ἐτάραξε δὲ πόντον Ποσειδῶν), and even if the Latin *mare* were the same as Sanskrit vâri, vâri in Sanskrit does not mean sea, but water in general, and could, therefore, only confirm the fact that all the Aryan nations ap-

[1] See Kuhn's *Journal of Comparative Philology,* i. 34. Professor Curtius gives the equation: πόντος : πάτος = πένθος : πάθος = βένθος : βάθος.

[2] See Benfey, *Correspondenzblatt für Anthropologie,* 1877, January, p. 7.

plied terms of a general meaning when they had each to fix their names for the sea. *Marè*, however, is more likely a name for dead or stagnant water, like Sanskrit maru, the desert, derived from *mṛi*, to die; and though it is identical with Gothic *marei*, English *mere*, Slav. *more*, Irish *muir*, the application of all these words to the ocean is again of later date. But, although the sea had not yet been reached by the Aryan nations before their common language branched off into various dialects, navigation was well known to them. The words oar and rudder can be traced back to Sanskrit, and the name of the ship is identically the same in Sanskrit (naus, nâvas), in Latin (*navis*), in Greek (*vaûs*), and in Teutonic (Old High-German *nacho*, Anglo-Saxon *naca*).

It is hardly possible to look at the evidence hitherto collected, and which, if space allowed, might have been considerably increased,[1] without feeling that these words are the fragments of a real language, once spoken by a united race at a time which the historian has till lately hardly ventured to realise. Yet here we have in our own hands, the relics of that distant time; we are using the same words which were used by the fathers of the Aryan race, changed only by phonetic influences; nay, we are as

[1] A large collection of common Aryan words is found in Grimm's *History of the German Language*. The first attempt to use them for historical purposes was made by Eichhof; but the most useful contributions have since been made by Winning, in his *Manual of Comparative Philology*, 1838; by Kuhn, Curtius, and Förstemann; and much new material is to be found in Bopp's *Glossarium* and Pott's *Etymologische Forschungen*. Pictet's great work, *Les Origines Indo-Européennes*, two vols. 1859 and 1863, brings together the most complete mass of materials, but requires also the most careful sifting. With regard to Sanskrit words, in particular, the greatest caution is required, as M. Pictet has not paid to it the same attention as to Celtic, Latin, Greek, and Slavonic.

near to them in thought and speech as the French and Italians are to the ancient people of Rome. If any more proof were wanted as to the reality of that period which must have preceded the dispersion of the Aryan race, we might appeal to the Aryan numerals, as irrefragable evidence of that long-continued intellectual life which characterises that period. Here is a decimal system of numeration, in itself one of the most marvellous achievements of the human mind, based on an abstract conception of quantity, regulated by a spirit of philosophical classification, and yet conceived, matured and finished before the soil of Europe was trodden by Greek, Roman, Slave, or Teuton. Such a system could only have been formed by a very small community, and more than any part of language it seems to necessitate the admission of what might almost be called a conventional agreement among those who first framed and adopted the Aryan names for one to hundred. Let us imagine, as well as we can, that at the present moment we were suddenly called upon to invent new names for one, two, three, and we may then begin to feel what kind of task it was to form and fix such words. We could easily supply new expressions for material objects, because they always have some attributes which language can render either metaphorically or periphrastically. We could call the sea the salt-water; the rain, the water of heaven; the rivers, the daughters of the earth. Numbers, however, are by their very nature such abstract and empty conceptions, that it tries our ingenuity to the utmost to find any attributive element in them to which expression might be given, and which might in time become the proper name of a merely quantitative

idea. There might be less difficulty for one and two; and hence these two numerals have received more than one name in the Aryan family. But this again would only create a new difficulty, because, if different people were allowed to use different names for the same numeral, the very object of these names would be defeated. If five could be expressed by a term meaning the open hand, and might also be rendered by the simple plural of the word for fingers, these two synonymous terms would be useless for the purpose of any exchange of thought. Again, if a word meaning fingers or toes might have been used to express five as well as ten, all commerce between individuals using the same word in different senses, would have been rendered impossible. Hence, in order to form and fix a series of words expressing one, two, three, four, etc., it was necessary that the ancestors of the Aryan race should have come to some kind of unconscious agreement to use but one term for each number, and to attach but one meaning to each term. This was not the case with regard to other words, as may be seen by the large proportion of synonymous and polyonymous terms by which every ancient language is characterised. The wear and tear of language in literary and practical usage is the only means for reducing the exuberance of this early growth, and for giving to each object but one name, and to each name but one power. And all this must have been achieved with regard to the Aryan numerals before Greek was Greek, for thus only can we account for the coincidences as exhibited in the subjoined table :—

	Sanskrit.	Greek.	Latin.	Lithuanian.	Gothic.
I.	ekas	εἷς (οἴνη)	unus	wienas	ains
II.	dvau	δύω	duo	du	tvai
III.	trayas	τρεῖς	tres	trys	threis
IV.	ḱatvâras	τέτταρες (Æolic, πίσυρες)	quatuor (Oscan, petora)	keturi	fidvôr
V.	paṅkan	πέντε	quinque (Oscan, pomtis)	penki	fimf
VI.	shash	ἕξ	sex	szeszi	saihs
VII.	saptan	ἑπτά	septem	septyni	sibun
VIII.	ashṭan	ὀκτώ	octo	asztůni	ahtau
IX.	navan	ἐννέα	novem	dewyni	niun
X.	dasan	δέκα	decem	deszimt	taihun
XI.	ekâdasan	ἕνδεκα	undecim	wieno-lika	ain-lif
XII.	dvâdasan	δώδεκα	duodecim	dwy-lika	tva-lif
XX.	vinsati	εἴκοσι	viginti	dwi-deszimti	tvaitigjus
C.	satam	ἑκατόν	centum	szimtas	taihun taihund
M.	sahasram	χίλιοι	mille	tukstantis	thusundi

If we cannot account for the coincidences between the French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Walachian numerals, without admitting that all were derived from a common type, the Latin, the same conclusion is forced upon us by a comparison of the more ancient numerals. They must have existed ready made in that language from which Sanskrit as well as Welsh is derived; but only as far as hundred. Thousand had not received expression at that early period, and hence the names for thousand differ, not, however, without giving, by their very disagreement, some further indications as to the subsequent history of the Aryan race. We see Sanskrit and Zend share the name for thousand in common (Sanskrit sahasra, Zend hazanra), which shows, that after the southern branch had been severed from the northern, the ancestors of the Brahmans and Zoroastrians continued united for a time by the ties of a common language. The same conclusion may be drawn from the agreement between the Gothic *thusundi* and the Old Prussian *tûsimtons* (acc.), the Lithuanian *tukstantis*, the Old

Slavonic *tiiisasta*; while the Greeks and the Romans stand apart from all the rest, and seem to have formed, each independently, their own name for thousand.

This earliest period, then, previous to any national separation, is what I call the *mythopœic* period, for every one of these common Aryan words is, in a certain sense, a myth. These words were all originally appellative; they expressed one out of many attributes which seemed characteristic of a certain object, and the selection of these attributes and their expression in language, represents a kind of unconscious poetry, which modern languages have lost altogether.

Looking then at the whole evidence which the languages of the various Aryan nations still supply, we perceive that before their separation their life was that of agricultural Nomads, and probably most like the life of the ancient Germans, as described by Tacitus. They knew the arts of ploughing, of making roads, of building ships and carts, of weaving and sewing, and of erecting strongholds and houses, more or less substantial. They could count, and they had divided the year into months. They had tamed the most important domestic animals; they were acquainted with the most useful metals, and were armed with hatchets and swords, whether for peaceful or for warlike purposes. They followed their leaders and kings, obeyed their laws and customs; and were impressed with the idea of a Divine Being, which they invoked by various names. It might seem, indeed, as if the state of civilisation which the Aryan nations had reached before their separation was in some respects more advanced than that of the Aryan

colonists after their settlements in India, Greece, and Italy, for it has frequently been maintained that the hymns of the Rig-Veda represent as yet a purely nomadic state of life, and that we see in them the fresh pastures of the Seven-river country, now called the Pendjab, occupied either by peaceful tribes and their numerous herds, or by warlike confederations fighting for the possession of pastures and herds among themselves or against barbarian enemies. No other nation except the Vedic Aryans, says Dr. Kuhn, can boast of literary documents which sprang into existence previous to the period when men assumed settled abodes, and, not content with raising cattle, began to cultivate the soil.[1]

This view, however, of the very primitive state of society of the Aryan settlers of India is not borne out by the songs of the Rig-Veda. Professor Wilson, in the prefaces to the successive volumes of his translation of the Rig-Veda, has repeatedly dwelt on this point, and has proved by facts[2] that the people among whom the Vedic poets sprang up were a pastoral and, in a still greater degree, an agricultural people.

Language has been called fossil poetry. But as the artist does not know that the clay which he is handling contains the remnants of organic life, we do not feel that when we address a father, we call him protector, nor did the Greeks, when using the word δαήρ, brother-in-law, know that this term applied originally only to the younger brothers of the husband, who stayed at home with the bride while

[1] Adalbert Kuhn, *Die Herabkunft des Feuers*, p. 2.

[2] Wilson, vol. i. pp. xl.–xliv.; vol. ii. pp. xv.–xvii.; vol. iii. pp. xiv.–xx.

their elder brother was out in the field or the forests. The Sanskrit devar meant originally play-mate—it told its own story—it was a myth; but in Greek it has dwindled down into a mere name or a technical term. Yet, even in Greek it is not allowed to form a feminine of δαήρ, as little as we should venture even now to form a masculine of 'daughter.'

Soon, however, languages lose their etymological conscience, and thus we find in Latin, for instance, not only *vidua*, husbandless ('Penelope tam diu vidua viro suo caruit'), but *viduus*, a formation which, if analysed etymologically, is as absurd as the Teutonic a widower. It must be confessed, however, that the old Latin *viduus*,[1] a name of Orcus, who had a temple outside Rome, makes it doubtful whether the Latin *vidua* is really the Sanskrit vi-dhavâ, however great their similarity. At all events we should have to admit that a verb *viduare* was derived from *vidua*, and that afterwards a new adjective was formed with a more general sense, so that *viduus* to a Roman ear meant nothing more than *privatus*.

But, it may be asked, how does the fact that the Aryan languages possess this treasure of ancient names in common, or even the discovery that all these names had originally an expressive and poetical power, explain the phenomenon of mythological language among all the members of this family? How does it render intelligible that phase of the human mind which gave birth to the extraordinary stories of gods and heroes—of gorgons and chimæras—of things that no human eye had ever seen, and that

[1] Hartung, *Die Religion der Römer*, vol. ii. p. 90.

no human mind in a healthy state could ever have conceived?

Before we can answer this question, we must enter into some more preliminary observations as to the formation of words. Tedious as this may seem, we believe that while engaged in these considerations we shall see the mist of mythology gradually clearing away, and discover behind the shifting clouds of the dawn of thought and language that real nature which mythology has so long veiled and disguised.

All the common Aryan words which we have hitherto examined referred to definite objects. They are all substantives: they express something substantial, something open to sensuous perception. Nor is it in the power of language to express originally anything except objects as nouns, and qualities as verbs. Hence, the only definition we can give of language during that early state is, that it is the conscious expression in sound of impressions received by all the senses.

To us, abstract nouns are so familiar that we can hardly appreciate the difficulty which men experienced in forming them. We can scarcely imagine a language without abstract nouns. There are, however, dialects spoken at the present day which have no abstract nouns, and the more we go back in the history of languages, the smaller we find the number of these useful expressions. As far as language is concerned, an abstract word is nothing but an adjective raised into a substantive; but in thought the conception of a quality as a subject is a matter of extreme difficulty, and in strict logical parlance impossible. If we say 'I love virtue,' we seldom

connect any definite notion with virtue. Virtue is not a being, however unsubstantial; it is nothing individual, personal, active; nothing that could by itself produce an expressible impression on our mind. The word virtue is only a short-hand expression, and when men said for the first time 'I love virtue,' what they meant by it originally was 'I love all things that become an honest man, that are manly, or virtuous.'

But there are other words, which we hardly call abstract, but which nevertheless were so originally, and are so still, in form: I mean words like day and night, spring and winter, dawn and twilight, storm and thunder. For what do we mean if we speak of day and night, or of spring and winter? We may answer, a season, or any other portion of time. But what is time, in our conceptions? It is nothing substantial, nothing individual; it is a quality raised by language into a substance. Therefore if we say 'the day dawns,' 'the night approaches,' we predicate actions of things that cannot act, we affirm a proposition which if analysed logically would have no definable subject.

The same applies to collective words, such as sky and earth, dew and rain—even to rivers and mountains. For if we say 'the earth nourishes man,' we do not mean any tangible portion of soil, but the earth conceived as a whole; nor do we mean by the sky the small horizon which our eye can scan. We imagine something which does not fall under our senses, but whether we call it a whole, a power, or an idea, in speaking of it we change it unawares into something individual.

Now, in ancient languages every one of these words had necessarily a termination expressive of gender, and this naturally produced in the mind the corresponding idea of sex, so that these names received not only an individual, but a sexual character. There was no substantive which was not either masculine or feminine; neuters being of later growth, and distinguishable chiefly in the nominative.[1]

What must have been the result of this? As long as people thought in language, it was simply impossible to speak of morning or evening, of spring and winter, without giving to these conceptions something of an individual, active, sexual, and, at last, personal character. They were either nothings, as they are nothings to our withered thought, or they were something; and then they could not be con-

[1] 'It is with the world, as with each of us in our individual life; for as we leave childhood and youth behind us, we bid adieu to the vivid impressions things once made upon us, and become colder and more speculative. To a little child not only are all living creatures endowed with human intelligence, but *everything* is *alive*. In *his* Kosmos, Pussy takes rank with Pa and Ma, in point of intelligence. He beats the chair against which he has knocked his head; and afterwards kisses it in token of renewed friendship, in the full belief, that like himself, it is a moral agent amenable to rewards and punishments. The fire that burns his finger is "Naughty Fire," and the stars that shine through his bedroom window are Eyes, like Mamma's, or Pussy's, only brighter. The same instinct that prompts the child to *personify* everything remains unchecked in the savage, and grows up with him to manhood. Hence in all simple and early languages, there are but two genders, masculine and feminine. To develop such an idea as that of a *neuter*, requires the slow growth of civilisation for its accomplishment. We see the same tendency to class everthing as masculine or feminine among even civilised men, if they are uneducated. To a farm labourer, a bundle of hay is "*he*," just as much as is the horse that eats it. He resolutely ignores "*it*" as a pronoun for which there is not the slightest necessity.'—*Printer's Register*, Feb. 6, 1868.

ceived as mere powers, but as beings powerful. Even in our time, though we have the conception of nature as a power, what do we mean by power, except something powerful? Now, in early language, nature was *Natura*, a mere adjective made substantive; she was the Mother always 'going to bring forth.' Was this not a more definite idea than that which we connect with nature? And let us look to our poets, who still think and feel in language—that is, who use no word without having really enlivened it in their mind, who do not trifle with language, but use it as a spell to call forth real things, full of light and colour. Can they speak of the sun, or the dawn, or the storms as neutral powers, without doing violence to their feelings? Let us open Wordsworth, and we shall hardly find him use a single abstract term without some life and blood in it:

Religion.

Sacred Religion, mother of form and fear,
Dread arbitress of mutable respect,
New rites ordaining when the old are wrecked,
Or cease to please the fickle worshipper.

Winter.

Humanity, delighting to behold
A fond reflection of her own decay,
Hath painted Winter like a traveller old,
Propped on a staff, and through the sullen day,
In hooded mantle, limping o'er the plain,
As though his weakness were disturbed by pain:
Or, if a juster fancy should allow
An undisputed symbol of command,
The chosen sceptre is a withered bough,
Infirmly grasped within a palsied hand.

These emblems suit the helpless and forlorn;
But mighty Winter the device shall scorn.
For he it was—dread Winter!—who beset,
Flinging round van and rear his ghastly net,
That host, when from the regions of the Pole
They shrunk, insane Ambition's barren goal—
That host, as huge and strong as e'er defied
Their God, and placed their trust in human pride!
As fathers prosecute rebellious sons,
He smote the blossoms of their warrior youth;
He called on *Frost's* inexorable tooth
Life to consume in manhood's firmest hold . . . .
. . . And bade the *Snow* their ample backs bestride,
And to the battle ride.

So, again, of *Age and the Hours*:

Age! twine thy brows with fresh spring flowers,
And call a train of laughing *Hours*,
And bid them dance, and bid them sing;
And thou, too, mingle in the ring!

Now, when writing these lines, Wordsworth need hardly have thought of the classical Horæ: the conception of dancing Hours would come as natural to his mind as to the poets of old.

Or, again, of *Storms and Seasons*:

Ye *Storms*, resound the praises of your King!
And ye mild Seasons—in a sunny clime,
Midway, on some high hill, while father *Time*
Looks on delighted—meet in festal ring,
And loud and long of Winter's triumph sing!

We are wont to call this poetical diction, and to make allowance for what seems to us exaggerated language. But to the poet it is no exaggeration, nor

was it to the ancient poets of language. Poetry is older than prose, and abstract speech more difficult than the outpouring of a poet's sympathy with nature. It requires reflection to divest nature of her living expression, to see in the swift-riding clouds nothing but vaporous exhalations, in the frowning mountains masses of stone, and in the lightning electric sparks. Wordsworth feels what he says when he exclaims—

> Mountains, and Vales, and Floods, I call on you
> To share the passion of a just disdain;

and when he speaks of 'the last hill that parleys with the setting sun,' this expression came to him as he was communing with nature; it was a thought untranslated as yet into the prose of our traditional and emaciated speech; it was a thought such as the men of old would not have been ashamed of in their common every day conversation.

There are some poems of this modern ancient which are all mythology, and as we shall have to refer to them hereafter, I shall give one more extract, which to a Hindu and an ancient Greek would have been more intelligible than it is to us:—

> Hail, orient Conqueror of gloomy Night!
> Thou that canst shed the bliss of gratitude
> On hearts, howe'er insensible or rude;
> Whether thy punctual visitations smite
> The haughty towers where monarchs dwell,
> Or thou, impartial Sun, with presence bright
> Cheer'st the low threshold of the peasant's cell!
> Not unrejoiced I see thee climb the sky,

In naked splendour, clear from mist and haze,
Or cloud approaching to divert the rays
Which even in deepest winter testify
Thy power and majesty,
Dazzling the vision that presumes to gaze.
Well does thine aspect usher in this Day;
As aptly suits therewith that modest pace
Submitted to the chains
That bind thee to the path which God ordains
That thou shouldst trace,
Till, with the heavens and earth, thou pass away!
Nor less, the stillness of these frosty plains—
Their utter stillness, and the silent grace
Of yon ethereal summits, white with snow,
(Whose tranquil pomp and spotless purity
Report of storms gone by
To us who tread below)—
Do with the service of this Day accord.
Divinest object which th' uplifted eye
Of mortal man is suffered to behold;
Thou, who upon these snow-clad Heights hast poured
Meek lustre, nor forget'st the humble Vale;
Thou who dost warm Earth's universal mould,
And for thy bounty wert not unadored
By pious men of old;
Once more, heart-cheering Sun, I bid thee hail!
Bright be thy course to-day—let not this promise fail!

Why then, if we ourselves, in speaking of the Sun or the Storms, of Sleep and Death, of Earth and Dawn, connect either no distinct idea at all with these names, or allow them to cast over our mind the fleeting shadows of the poetry of old; why, if we, when speaking with the warmth which is natural to the human heart, call upon the Winds and the Sun, the Ocean and the Sky, as if they would still

hear us; why, if plastic thought cannot represent any one of these beings or powers without giving them, if not a human form, at least human life and human feeling—why should we wonder at the ancients, with their language throbbing with life and revelling in colour, if, instead of the grey outlines of our modern thought, they threw out those living forms of nature, endowed with human powers, nay, with powers more than human, inasmuch as the light of the Sun was brighter than the light of a human eye, and the roaring of the Storms louder than the shouts of the human voice? We may be able to account for the origin of rain and dew, of storm and thunder; yet, to the great majority of mankind, all these things, unless they are mere names, are still what they were to Homer, only perhaps less beautiful, less poetical, less real and living.

So much for that peculiar difficulty which the human mind experiences in speaking of collective or abstract ideas—a difficulty which, as we shall see, will explain many of the difficulties of Mythology.

We have now to consider a similar feature of ancient languages—the auxiliary verbs. They hold the same position among verbs as abstract nouns among substantives. They are of later origin, and had all originally a more material and expressive character. Our auxiliary verbs have had to pass through a long chain of vicissitudes before they arrived at the withered and lifeless form which fits them so well for the purposes of our abstract prose. *Habere*, which is now used in all the Romance languages simply to express a past tense, *j'ai aimé*, I loved, was originally, to hold fast, to hold back, as we

may see in its derivative, *habenæ*, the reins. Thus *tenere*, to hold, becomes, in Spanish, an auxiliary verb, that can be used very much in the same manner as *habere*. The Greek ἔχω is the Sanskrit sah, and meant originally, to be strong, to be able, or to can. The Latin *fui*, I was, the Sanskrit bhû, to be, corresponds to the Greek φύω, and there shows still its original and material power of growing, in an intransitive and transitive sense. As, the radical of the Sanskrit as-mi, the Greek ἐμ-μί, the Lithuanian *as-mi*, I am, had probably the original meaning of breathing, if the Sanskrit as-u, breath, is correctly traced back to that root. *Stare*, to stand, sinks down in the Romance dialects to a mere auxiliary, as in *j'ai-été*, I have been, *i.e. habeo statum*, I have stood; *j'ai-été convaincu*, I have stood convinced; the phonetic change of *statum* into *été* being borne out by the transition of *status* into *état*. The German *werden*, which is used to form futures and passives, the Gothic *varth*, points back to the Sanskrit vrit, the Latin *verto*. *Will*, again, in *he will go*, has lost its radical meaning of wishing; and *shall* used in the same tense, *I shall go*, hardly betrays, even to the etymologist, its original power of legal or moral obligation. *Schuld*, however, in German means debt and sin, and *soll* has there not yet taken a merely temporal signification, the first trace of which may be discovered, however, in the names of the three Teutonic Parcæ. These are called *Vurdh*, *Verdhandi*, and *Skuld*—Past, Present, and Future.[1] But what could be the original conception of a verb which, even in its earliest application, has already the abstract

[1] Kuhn, *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*, vol. iii. p. 449.

meaning of moral duty or legal obligation? Where could language, which can only draw upon the material world for its nominal and verbal treasures, find something analogous to the abstract idea of he shall pay, or he ought to yield? Grimm, who has endeavoured to follow the German language into its most secret recesses, proposes an explanation of this verb, which deserves serious consideration, however strange and incredible it may appear at first sight.

Shall, and its preterite *should*, have the following forms in Gothic:—

Present.	Preterite.
Skal	Skulda
Skalt	Skuldês
Skal	Skulda
Skulum	Skuldedum
Skuluth	Skuldeduth
Skulun	Skuldedun

In Gothic this verb *skal*, which seems to be a present, can be proved to be an old perfect, analogous to Greek perfects like *οἶδα*, which have the form of the perfect but the power of the present. There are several verbs of the same character in the German language, and in English they can be detected by the absence of the *s* as the termination of the third person singular of the present. *Skal*, then, according to Grimm, means, I owe, I am bound; but originally, it meant I have killed. The chief guilt punished by ancient Teutonic law was the guilt of manslaughter—and in many cases it could be atoned for by a fine. Hence *skal* meant literally, I am guilty, *ich bin schuldig*; and afterwards, when this full expression had been ground down into a legal

phrase, new expressions became possible, such as I have killed a free man, a serf, *i.e.* I am guilty of a free man, a serf; and at last, I owe (the fine for having slain) a free man, a serf. In this manner Grimm accounts for the still later and more anomalous expressions: such as, he shall pay, *i.e.* he is guilty to pay (*er ist schuldig zu zahlen*); he shall go, *i.e.* he must go; and last, I shall withdraw, *i.e.* I feel bound to withdraw. Chaucer says ('Court of Love'), 'For by the faith I shall to God.'[1]

A change of meaning like this seems, no doubt, violent and fanciful, but we should feel more inclined to accept it if we considered how almost every word we use discloses similar changes as soon as we analyse it etymologically, and then follow gradually its historical growth. The general conception of thing is in Walachian expressed by *lucru*, the Latin *lucrum*, gain. The French *chose* was originally *causa*, or cause. If we say, I am obliged to go, or, I am bound to pay, we forget that the origin of these expressions carries us back to times when men were bound to go, or bound over to pay. *Hoc me fallit* means, in Latin, it deceives me, it escapes me. Afterwards, it took the sense of it is removed from me, I want it, I must have it: and hence, *il me faut*, I must. Again, *I may* is the Gothic

Mag, maht, mag, magum, maguth, magun;

and its primary signification was, I am strong. Now, this verb also was originally a preterite, and derived from a root which meant to grow, whence the Gothic *magus*, boy, *ma(g)vi* and *magath-s*, girl, the English *maid*; Goth. *megs, gener*, English *match*; also *might* and *main*.

[1] See Fiske, *Genesis of Language*, p. 341.

In mythological language we must make due allowance for the absence of merely auxiliary words. Every word, whether noun or verb, had still its full original power during the mythopœic ages. Words were heavy and unwieldy. They said more than they ought to say, and hence much of the strangeness of the mythological language, which we can only understand by watching the natural growth of speech. Where we speak of the sun following the dawn, the ancient poets could only speak and think of the sun loving and embracing the dawn. What is with us a sunset was to them the Sun growing old, decaying, or dying. Our sunrise was to them the Night giving birth to a brilliant child; and in the Spring they really saw the Sun or the Sky embracing the earth with a warm embrace, and showering treasures into the lap of nature. There are many myths in Hesiod, of late origin, where we have only to replace a full verb by an auxiliary, in order to change mythical into logical language. Hesiod calls Nyx (Night) the mother of Moros (Fate), and the dark Kêr (Destruction); of Thanatos (Death), Hypnos (Sleep), and the tribe of the Oneiroi (Dreams). And this her progeny she is said to have borne without a father. Again, she is called the mother of Mômos (Blame), and of the woeful Oizys (Woe), and of the Hesperides (Evening Stars), who guard the beautiful golden apples on the other side of the far-famed Okeanos, and the trees that bear fruit. She also bore Nemesis (Vengeance), and Apatê (Fraud), and Philotes (Lust), and the pernicious Geras (Old Age), and the strong-minded Eris (Strife). Now, let us use our modern expressions, such as 'the stars are

seen as the night approaches,' 'we sleep,' 'we dream,' 'we die,' 'we run danger during night,' 'nightly revels lead to strife, angry discussions and woe,' 'many nights bring old age, and at last death,' 'an evil deed concealed at first by the darkness of night will at last be revealed by the day,' 'Night herself will be revenged on the criminal,' and we have translated the language of Hesiod—a language to a great extent understood by the people whom he addressed—into our modern form of thought and speech.[1] All this is hardly mythological language, but rather a poetical and proverbial kind of expression known to all poets, whether modern or ancient, and frequently to be found in the language of common people.

Uranos, in the language of Hesiod, is used as a name for the sky; he is made or born that 'he should be a firm place for the blessed gods.'[2] It is said twice that Uranos covers everything (*v.* 127), and that when he brings the night, he is stretched out everywhere, embracing the earth. This sounds almost as if the Greek myth had still preserved a recollection of the etymological power of Uranos. For

[1] As to Philotes being the Child of Night, Juliet understood what it meant when she said—

> Spread thy close curtain, love-performing Night!
> That Runaway's eyes may wink, and Romeo
> Leap to these arms, untalked of and unseen!—

See *Shakespeare's Sonnets*, by G. Massey, p. 601.

[2] Hesiod, *Theog.* 128—

> Γαῖα δέ τοι πρῶτον μὲν ἐγείνατο ἶσον ἑαυτῇ
> Οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντ', ἵνα μιν περὶ πάντα καλύπτοι,
> ὄφρ' εἴη μακάρεσσι θεοῖς ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί.

In the Rig-Veda, VIII. 42, 9, we have Várunasya dhruvám sádas.

Uranos is the Sanskrit Varuṇa, and this is derived from a root VAR, to cover; Varuṇa being in the Veda also a name of the firmament, but especially connected with the night, and opposed to Mitra, the day. At all events, the name of Uranos retained with the Greek something of its original meaning, which was not the case with names like Apollo or Dionysos; and when we see him called ἀστερόεις, the starry heaven, we can hardly believe, as Mr. Grote says, that to the Greek, 'Uranos, Nyx, Hypnos, and Oneiros (Heaven, Night, Sleep, and Dream) are persons, just as much as Zeus and Apollo.' We need only read a few lines further in Hesiod, in order to see that the progeny of Gæa, of which Uranos is the first, has not yet altogether arrived at that mythological personification or crystallisation which makes most of the Olympian gods so difficult and doubtful in their original character. The poet has asked the Muses in the introduction how the gods and the earth were first born, and the rivers and the endless sea, and the bright stars, and the wide heaven above (*οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὕπερθεν*). The whole poem of the 'Theogony' is an answer to this question; and we can hardly doubt, therefore, that the Greek saw in some of the names that follow simply poetical conceptions of real objects, such as the earth, and the rivers, and the mountains. Uranos, the first offspring of Gæa, is afterwards raised into a deity, endowed with human feelings and attributes; but the very next offspring of Gæa, *Οὔρεα μακρά*, the great Mountains, are even in language represented as neuter, and can therefore hardly claim to be considered as persons, like Zeus and Apollo.

Mr. Grote goes too far in insisting on the purely literal meaning of the whole of Greek mythology. Some mythological figures of speech remained in the Greek language to a very late period, and were perfectly understood—that is to say, they required as little explanation as our expressions of 'the sun sets,' or 'the sun rises.' Mr. Grote feels compelled to admit this, but he declines to draw any further conclusions from it. 'Although some of the attributes and actions ascribed to these persons,' he says, 'are often explicable by allegory, the whole series and system of them are never so; the theorist who adopts this course of explanation finds that after one or two simple and obvious steps, the path is no longer open, and he is forced to clear a way for himself by gratuitous refinements and conjectures.' Here, then, Mr. Grote admits what he calls allegory as an ingredient of mythology; still he makes no further use of it, and leaves the whole of mythology as a riddle that cannot and ought not to be solved, as something irrational—as a past that was never present—declining even to attempt a partial explanation of this important problem in the history of the Greek mind. Πλέον ἥμισυ παντός. Such a want of scientific courage would have put a stop to many systems which have since grown to completeness, but which at first had to make the most timid and uncertain steps. In palæontological sciences we must learn to be ignorant of many things; and what Suetonius says of the grammarian, 'boni grammatici est nonnulla etiam nescire,' applies with particular force to the mythologist. It is in vain to attempt to solve the secret of every name; and nobody has expressed this with

greater modesty than he who has laid the most lasting foundation of Comparative Mythology. Grimm, in the introduction to his 'German Mythology,' says, without disguise, 'I shall, indeed, interpret all that I can, but I cannot interpret all that I should like.' But surely Otfried Müller had opened a path into the labyrinth of Greek mythology, which a scholar of Mr. Grote's power and genius might have followed, or which at least he ought to have proved as either right or wrong. How late mythological language was in vogue among the Greeks has been shown by O. Müller (p. 65) in the myth of Kyrene. The Greek town of Kyrene in Libya was founded about Olymp. 37; the ruling race derived its origin from the Minyans, who reigned chiefly in Iolkos, in Southern Thessaly; the foundation of the colony was due to the oracle of Apollo at Pytho. Hence the myth—'The heroic maid Kyrene, who lived in Thessaly, is loved by Apollo and carried off to Libya;' while in modern language we should say—'The town of Kyrene, in Thessaly, sent a colony to Libya, under the auspices of Apollo.' Many more instances might be given, where the mere substitution of a more matter-of-fact verb divests a myth at once of its miraculous appearance.[1]

Kaunos is called the son of Miletos—*i.e.* Kretan colonists from Miletos had founded the town of Kaunos in Lycia. Again, the myth says that Kaunos fled from Miletos to Lycia, and his sister Byblos was changed, by sorrow over her lost brother, into a fountain. Here Miletos in Ionia, being better known than the Miletos in Kreta, has been brought

[1] Kanne's *Mythology*, § 10, p. xxxii.

in by mistake—Byblos being simply a small river near the Ionian Miletos.[1] Again, Pausanias tells us, as a matter of history, that Miletos, a beautiful boy, fled from Kreta to Ionia, in order to escape the jealousy of Minos—the fact being that Miletos in Ionia was a colony of the Miletos of Kreta, and Minos the most famous king of that island. Again, Marpessa is called the daughter of Evenos, and a myth represents her as carried away by Idas—Idas being the name of a famous hero of the town of Marpessa. The fact, implied by the myth and confirmed by other evidence, is that colonists started from the river Evenos, and founded Marpessa in Messina. And here again the myth adds that Evenos, after trying in vain to reconquer his daughter from Idas, was changed by sorrow into a river, like Byblos, the sister of Miletos.

If the Hellenes call themselves *αὐτόχθονες*, we fancy we understand what is meant by this expression. But, if we are informed that *πυῤῥά*, the red, was the oldest name of Thessaly, and that Hellen was the son of Pyrrha, Mr. Grote would say that we have here to deal with a myth, and that the Greeks, at least, never doubted that there really was one individual called Pyrrha, and another called Hellen. Now, this may be true with regard to the later Greeks, such as Homer and Hesiod; but was it so—could it have been so originally? Language is always language—it always meant something originally, and he, whoever it was, who first, instead of calling the Hellenes

[1] For similar river myths, see Bholanauth Chunder's *Travels*, I. pp. 226, 307; *Cornhill Magazine*, 1869, pp. 35–40; Grote, *History of Greece*, i. p. 535.

born of the soil, spoke of Pyrrha, the mother of Hellen, must have meant something intelligible and rational; he could not have meant a friend of his whom he knew by the name of Hellen, and an old lady called Pyrrha; he meant what we mean if we speak of Italy as the mother of Art.

Even in more modern times than those of which Otfried Müller speaks, we find that 'to speak mythologically' was the fashion among poets and philosophers. Pausanias complains of those 'who genealogise everything, and make Pythis the son of Delphos.' The story of Eros in the 'Phædros' is called a myth (*μῦθος*, 254 D; *λόγος*, 257 B); yet Sokrates says ironically 'that it is one of those which you may believe or not' (*τούτοις δὴ ἔξεστι μὲν πείθεσθαι, ἔξεστι δὲ μή*). Again, when he tells the story of the Egyptian god Theuth, he calls it a 'tradition of old' (*ἀκοήν γ' ἔχω λέγειν τῶν προτέρων*), but Phædros knows at once that it is one of Sokrates' own making, and he says to him, 'Sokrates, thou makest easily Egyptian or any other stories' (*λόγοι*). When Pindar calls Apophasis the daughter of Epimetheus, every Greek understood this mythological language as well as if he had said 'an afterthought leads to an excuse.'[1] Nay, even in Homer, when the lame Litæ

[1] O. Müller has pointed out how the different parents given to the *Erinyes* by different poets were suggested by the character which each poet ascribed to them. 'Evidently,' he says, in his *Essay on the Eumenides*, p. 184, 'this genealogy answered better to the views and poetical objects of Æschylos than one of the current genealogies by which the Erinyes are derived from Skotos and Gæa (Sophokles), Kronos and Eurynome (in a work ascribed to Epimenides), Phorkys (Euphorion), Gæa Eurynome (Istron), Acheron and Night (Endemos), Hades and Persephone (Orphic hymns), Hades and Styx (Athenodoros and Mnaseas).' See, however, *Ares*, by H. D. Müller, p. 67.

(Prayers) are said to follow Atê (Mischief), trying to appease her, a Greek understood that language as well as we do when we say that 'Hell is paved with good intentions.'

When Prayers are called the daughters of Zeus, we are hardly as yet within the sphere of pure mythology. For Zeus was to the Greeks the protector of the suppliants, Ζεὺς ἱκετέσιος,—and hence Prayers are called his daughters, as we might call Liberty the daughter of England, or Prayer the offspring of the soul.

All these sayings, however, though mythical, are not yet myths. It is the essential character of a true myth that it should no longer be intelligible by a reference to the spoken language. The plastic character of ancient language, which we have traced in the formation of nouns and verbs, is not sufficient to explain how a myth could have lost its expressive power or its life and consciousness. Making due allowance for the difficulty of forming abstract nouns and abstract verbs, we should yet be unable to account for anything beyond allegorical poetry among the nations of antiquity; mythology would still remain a riddle. Here, then, we must call to our aid another powerful ingredient in the formation of ancient speech, for which I find no better name than *Polyonymy* and *Synonomy*.[1] Most nouns, as we have seen before, were originally appellatives or predicates, expressive of what seemed at the time the most characteristic attribute of an object. But as most objects have more than one attribute, and

[1] See the Author's letter to Chevalier Bunsen *On the Turanian Languages*, p. 35.

as, under different aspects, one or the other attribute might seem more appropriate to form the name, it happened by necessity that most objects, during the early period of language, had more than one name. In the course of time, the greater portion of these names became useless, and they were mostly replaced in literary dialects by one fixed name, which might be called the proper name of such objects. The more ancient a language, the richer it is in synonyms.

Synonyms, again, if used constantly, must naturally give rise to a number of homonyms. If we may call the sun by fifty names expressive of different qualities, some of these names will be applicable to other objects also, which happen to possess the same quality. These different objects would then be called by the same name—they would become homonyms.

In the Veda, the earth is called urvî (wide), *p*rithvî (broad), mahî (great), and many more names, of which the Nigha*n*tu mentions twenty-one. These twenty-one words would be synonyms. But urvî (wide) is not only given as a name of the earth, but also means a river. *P*rithvî (broad) means not only earth, but sky and dawn. Mahî (great, strong) is used for cow and speech, as well as for earth. Hence, earth, river, sky, dawn, cow, and speech, would become homonymes. All these names, however, are simple and intelligible. But most of the old terms, thrown out by language at the first burst of youthful poetry, are based on bold metaphors. These metaphors once forgotten, or the meaning of the roots whence the words were derived once dimmed and changed, many of these words would naturally

lose their radical as well as their poetical meaning. They would become mere names handed down in the conversation of a family; understood, perhaps, by the grandfather, familiar to the father, but strange to the son, and misunderstood by the grandson. This misunderstanding may arise in various manners. Either the radical meaning of a word is forgotten, and thus what was originally an appellative, or a name, in the etymological sense of the word (*nomen* stands for *gnomen*, 'quo gnoscimus res,' like *natus* for *gnatus*), dwindled down into a mere sound—a name in the modern sense of the word. Thus *ζεύς*, being originally a name of the sky, like the Sanskrit dyáus, became gradually a proper name, which betrayed its appellative meaning only in a few proverbial expressions, such as *Ζεὺς ὕει*, or 'sub Jove frigido.'

Frequently it happened that after the true etymological meaning of a word had been forgotten, a new meaning was attached to it by a kind of etymological instinct which exists even in modern languages. Thus, *Λυκηγενής*, the son of light—Apollo—was changed into a son of Lycia; *Δήλιος*, the bright one, gave rise to the myth of the birth of Apollo in Delos.

Again, where two names existed for the same object, two persons would spring up out of the two names, and as the same stories could be told of either, they would naturally be represented as brothers and sisters, as parent and child. Thus we find Selene, the moon, side by side with Mene, the moon; Helios (Sûrya), the Sun, and Phœbos (Bhava [?], a different form of Rudra); and in most of the Greek heroes we

can discover humanised forms of Greek gods, with names which, in many instances, were epithets of their divine prototypes. Still more frequently it happened that adjectives connected with a word as applied to one object were used with the same word even though applied to a different object. What was told of the Sea was told of the Sky, and the Sun once being called a lion or a wolf was soon endowed with claws and mane, even where the animal metaphor was forgotten. Thus the Sun with his golden rays might be called 'golden-handed,' *hand* being expressed by the same word as *ray*. But when the same epithet was applied to Apollo or Indra, a myth would spring up, as we find it in German and Sanskrit mythology, telling us that Indra lost his hand, and that it was replaced by a hand made of gold.

Here we have some of the keys to mythology, but the manner of handling them can only be learnt from comparative philology. As in French it is difficult to find the radical meaning of many a word unless we compare it with its corresponding forms in Italian, Spanish, or Provençal; we should find it impossible to discover the origin of many a Greek word without comparing it with its more or less corrupt relatives in German, Latin, Slavonic, and Sanskrit. Unfortunately, we have in this ancient circle of languages nothing corresponding to Latin, by which we can test the more or less original form of a word in French, Italian, and Spanish. Sanskrit is not the mother of Latin and Greek, as Latin is the mother of French and Italian. But although Sanskrit is but one among many sisters, it is, no doubt, the eldest, in so far as it has preserved its words in their most

primitive state; and if we once succeed in tracing a Latin and Greek word to its corresponding form in Sanskrit, we are generally able at the same time to account for its formation and to fix its radical meaning. What should we know of the original meaning of *πατήρ*, *μήτηρ*, and *θυγάτηρ*,[1] if we were reduced to the knowledge of one language like Greek? But as soon as we trace these words to Sanskrit, their primitive power is clearly indicated. O. Müller was one of the first to see and acknowledge that classical philology must surrender all etymological research to comparative philology, and that the origin of Greek words cannot be settled by a mere reference to Greek. This applies with particular force to mythological names. In order to become mythological, it was necessary that the radical meaning of certain names should have been obscured and forgotten in the language to which they belong. Thus what is mythological in one language is frequently natural and intelligible in another. We say 'the sun sets,' but in our own Teutonic mythology a seat or throne is given to the sun on which he sits down, as in Greek *Eos* is called *χρυσόθρονος*, or as the Modern Greek speaks of the setting sun as *ἥλιος βασιλεύει*. We doubt about Hekate, but we understand at once *Ἑκατος* and *Ἑκατήβολος*. We hesitate about Lucina, but we accept immediately what is a mere contraction of Lucna (or *louxna*),[2] the Latin Luna.

[1] Here is a specimen of Greek etymology, from the *Etymologicum Magnum*: *Θυγάτηρ παρὰ τὸ θύειν καὶ ὁρμᾶν κατὰ γαστρός· ἐκ τοῦ θύω καὶ τοῦ γαστήρ· λέγεται γὰρ τὰ θήλεα τάχιον κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ.*

[2] See *Lectures on the Science of Language* (1880), i. p. 13.

What is commonly called Hindu mythology is of little or no avail for comparative purposes. The stories of Śiva, Vishṇu, Mahâdeva, Pârvatî, Kâlî, Kṛishṇa, &c., are of late growth, indigenous to India, and full of wild and fanciful conceptions. But while this late mythology of the Purâṇas and even of the Epic poems, offers no assistance to the comparative mythologist, a whole world of primitive, natural, and intelligible mythology has been preserved to us in the Veda. The mythology of the Veda is to comparative mythology what Sanskrit has been to comparative grammar. There is, fortunately, no system of religion or mythology in the Veda. Names are used in one hymn as appellatives, in another as names of gods. The same god is sometimes represented as supreme, sometimes as equal, sometimes as inferior to others. The whole nature of these so-called gods is still transparent; their first conception, in many cases, clearly perceptible. There are as yet no genealogies, no settled marriages between gods and goddesses. The father is sometimes the son, the brother is the husband, and she who in one hymn is the mother, is in another the wife. As the conceptions of the poet varied, so varied the nature of these gods. Nowhere is the wide distance which separates the ancient poems of India from the most ancient literature of Greece more clearly felt than when we compare the growing myths of the Veda with the full-grown and decayed myths on which the poetry of Homer is founded. The Veda is the real Theogony of the Aryan races, while that of Hesiod is a distorted caricature of the original image. If we want to know whither the human mind, though endowed

with the natural consciousness of a divine power, is driven necessarily and inevitably by the irresistible force of language as applied to supernatural and abstract ideas, we must read the Veda; and if we want to tell the Hindus what they are worshipping —mere names of natural phenomena, gradually obscured, personified, and deified—we must make them read the Veda. It was a mistake of the early Fathers to treat the heathen gods[1] as demons or evil spirits, and we must take care not to commit the same error with regard to the Hindu gods. Their gods have no more right to any substantive existence than Eos or Hemera—than Nyx or Apatê. They are masks without an actor—the creations of man, not his creators; they are *nomina* not *numina*; names without being, not beings without names.

In some instances, no doubt, it happens that a Greek, or a Latin, or a Teutonic myth may be explained from the resources which each of these languages still possesses, as there are many words in Greek which can be explained etymologically without any reference to Sanskrit or Gothic. We shall begin with some of these myths, and then proceed to the more difficult, which must receive light from more distant regions, whether from the snowy rocks of Iceland and the songs of the Edda, or from the borders of the 'Seven Rivers,' and the hymns of the Veda.

[1] Aristotle has given an opinion of the Greek gods in a passage of the *Metaphysics*. He is attacking the Platonic ideas, and tries to show their contradictory character, calling them *αἰσθητὰ ἀΐδια*, things eternal, and at the same time sensible, *i.e.* things that cannot be conceived; as men, he continues, maintain that there are gods, but give them a human form, thus making them really 'immortal mortals,' *i.e.* non-entities.

The rich imagination, the quick perception, the intellectual vivacity, and ever-varying fancy of the Greek nation, make it easy to understand that, after the separation of the Aryan race, no language was richer, no mythology more varied, than that of the Greeks. Words were created with wonderful facility, and were forgotten again with that carelessness which the consciousness of inexhaustible power imparts to men of genius. The creation of every word was originally a poem, embodying a bold metaphor or a bright conception. But, like the popular poetry of Greece, these words, if they were adopted by tradition, and lived on in the language of a family, of a city, of a tribe, in the dialects, or in the national speech of Greece, soon forgot the father that had given them birth, or the poet to whom they owed their existence. Their genealogical descent and native character were unknown to the Greeks themselves, and their etymological meaning would have baffled the most ingenious antiquarian. The Greeks, however, cared as little about the etymological individuality of their words as they cared to know the name of every bard that had first sung the Aristeia of Menelaos or Diomedes. One Homer was enough to satisfy their curiosity, and any etymology that explained any part of the meaning of a word was welcome, no historical considerations being ever allowed to interfere with ingenious guesses. It is known how Sokrates changes, on the spur of the moment, Eros into a god of wings, but Homer is quite as ready with etymologies, and they are useful, at least so far as they prove that the real etymology of the names of the gods had been forgotten long before Homer.

We can best enter into the original meaning of a Greek myth when some of the persons who act in it have preserved names intelligible in Greek. When we find the names of Eos, Selene, Helios, or Herse, we have words which tell their own story, and we have a *πού στῶ* for the rest of the myth. Let us take the beautiful myth of Selene and Endymion. Endymion is the son of Zeus and Kalyke, but he is also the son of Aethlios, a king of Elis, who is himself called a son of Zeus, and whom Endymion is said to have succeeded as king of Elis. This localises our myth, and shows, at least, that Elis is its birthplace, and that, according to Greek custom, the reigning race of Elis derived its origin from Zeus. The same custom prevailed in India, and gave rise to the two great royal families of ancient India—the so-called Solar and the Lunar races: and Purûravas, of whom more by and by, says of himself,

> The great king of day
> And monarch of the night are my progenitors;
> Their grandson I. . . .

There may, then, have been a king of Elis, Aethlios, and he may have had a son, Endymion; but what the myth tells of Endymion could not have happened to the king of Elis. The myth transfers Endymion to Karia, to Mount Latmos, because it was in the Latmian cave that Selene saw the beautiful sleeper, loved him and lost him. Now, about the meaning of Selene there can be no doubt; but even if tradition had only preserved her other name, Asterodia, we should have had to translate this synonym as Moon, as 'Wanderer among the stars.' But who is

Endymion? It is one of the many names of the sun, but with special reference to the setting or dying sun. It is derived from *ἐνδύω*, a verb which, in classical Greek, is never used for setting, because the simple verb *δύω* had become the technical term for sunset. *Δυσμαὶ ἡλίου*, the setting of the sun, is opposed to *ἀνατολαί*, the rising. Now, *δύω* meant originally, to dive into; and expressions like *ἠέλιος δ' ἄρ' ἔδυ*, the sun dived, presuppose an earlier conception of *ἔδυ πόντον*, he dived into the sea. Thus Thetis addresses her companions, *Il.* xviii. 140:—

Ὑμεῖς μὲν νῦν δῦτε θαλάσσης εὐρέα κόλπον,
You may now dive into the broad bosom of the sea.

Other dialects, particularly of maritime nations, have the same expression. In Latin we find[1] '*Cur mergat seras æquore flammas.*' In Old Norse, '*Sól gengr i ægi.*' Slavonic nations represent the sun as a woman stepping into her bath in the evening, and rising refreshed and purified in the morning; or they speak of the Sea as the mother of the Sun (the *apâm napât*), and of the Sun as sinking into her mother's arms at night. We may suppose, therefore, that in some Greek dialect *ἐνδύω* was used in the same sense; and that from *ἐνδύω*, *ἔνδυμα* was formed to express sunset. From this was formed *ἐνδυμίων*,[2] like *οὐρανίων* from *οὐρανός*, and like most of the names of the Greek months. If *ἔνδυμα* had become the commonly received name for sunset, the myth of Endymion could never have arisen. But the original

[1] Grimm's *Deutsche Mythologie*, p. 704.

[2] Lauer, in his *System of Greek Mythology*, explains Endymion as the Diver. Gerhard, in his *Greek Mythology*, gives *Ἐνδυμίων* as *ὁ ἐν δύμῃ ὤν*.

meaning of Endymion being once forgotten, what was told originally of the setting sun was now told of a name, which, in order to have any meaning, had to be changed into a god or a hero. The setting sun once slept in the Latmian cave, the cave of night—Latmos being derived from the same root as Leto, Latona, the night—but now he sleeps on Mount Latmos, in Karia. Endymion sinking into eternal sleep after a life of but one day was once the setting sun, the sun of Zeus, the brilliant Sky, and of Kalyke, the covering night (from καλύπτω): or, according to another saying, of Zeus and Protogeneia, the first-born goddess, or the Dawn, who is always represented either as the mother, the sister, or the forsaken wife of the Sun. Now, he is the son of a king of Elis, probably for no other reason except that it was usual for kings to take names of good omen, connected with the sun, or the moon, or the stars—in which case a myth connected with a solar name would naturally be transferred to its human namesake. In the ancient poetical and proverbial language of Elis, people said 'Selene loves and watches Endymion,' instead of 'it is getting late;' 'Selene embraces Endymion,' instead of 'the sun is setting and the moon is rising;' 'Selene kisses Endymion into sleep,' instead of 'it is night.' These expressions remained long after their meaning had ceased to be understood; and as the human mind is generally as anxious for a reason as ready to invent one, a story arose by common consent, and without any personal effort, that Endymion must have been a young lad loved by a young lady, Selene; and, if children were anxious to know still

more, there would always be a grandmother happy to tell them that this young Endymion was the son of the Protogeneia—she half meaning and half not meaning by that name the dawn who gave birth to the sun; or of Kalyke, the dark and covering Night. This name, once touched, would set many chords vibrating; three or four different reasons might be given—as they really were given by ancient poets—why Endymion fell into this everlasting sleep, and if any one of these was alluded to by a popular poet, it became a mythological fact, repeated by later poets; so that Endymion grew at last almost into a type, no longer of the setting sun, but of a handsome boy beloved of a chaste maiden, and therefore a most likely name for a young prince. Many myths have thus been transferred to real persons by a mere similarity of name, though it must be admitted that there is no historical evidence whatsoever that there ever was a prince of Elis called by the name of Endymion.

Such is the growth of a legend, originally a mere word, a *μῦθος*, probably one of those many words which have but a local currency, and lose their value if they are taken to distant places, words useless for the daily interchange of thought, spurious coins in the hands of the many—yet not thrown away, but preserved as curiosities and ornaments, and deciphered at last by the antiquarian, after the lapse of many centuries. Unfortunately, we do not possess these legends as they passed originally from mouth to mouth in villages or mountain castles—legends such as Grimm has collected in his 'Mythology,' from the language of the poor people in Germany. We do not know them as they were told by the

older members of a family, who spoke a language half intelligible to themselves and strange to their children, or as the poet of a rising city embodied the traditions of his neighbourhood in a continuous poem, and gave to them their first form and permanence. Except where Homer has preserved a local myth, all is arranged as a system, with the 'Theogony' as its beginning, the 'Siege of Troy' as its centre, and the 'Return of the Heroes' as its end. But how many parts of Greek mythology are never mentioned by Homer! We then come to Hesiod—a moralist and theologian—and again we find but a small segment of the mythological language of Greece. Thus, our chief sources are the ancient chroniclers, who took mythology for history, and used of it only so much as answered their purpose. And not even these are preserved to us, but we only believe that they formed the sources from which later writers, such as Apollodoros and the scholiasts, borrowed their information. The first duty of the mythologist is, therefore, to disentangle this cluster, to remove all that is systematic, and to reduce each myth to its primitive unsystematic form. Much that is unessential has to be cut away altogether, and, after the rust is removed, we have to determine first of all, as with ancient coins, the locality, and, if possible, the age, of each myth, by the character of its workmanship; and as we arrange ancient medals into gold, silver, and copper coins, we have to distinguish most carefully between the legends of gods, heroes, and men. If, then, we succeed in deciphering the ancient names and legends of Greek or any other mythology, we learn that the past which

stands before our eyes in Greek mythology has had its present, that there are traces of organic thought in these petrified relics, and that they once formed the surface of the Greek language. The legend of Endymion was present at the time when the people of Elis understood the old saying of the moon (or Selene) rising under the cover of Night (or in the Latmian cave), to see and admire, in silent love, the beauty of the setting Sun, the sleeper Endymion, the son of Zeus, who had granted to him the double boon of eternal sleep and everlasting youth.

Endymion is not the Sun in the divine character of Phoibos Apollon, but a conception of the Sun in his daily course,[1] as rising early from the womb of Dawn, and, after a short and brilliant career, setting in the evening, never to return again to this mortal life. Similar conceptions occur in most mythologies. In Betshuana, an African dialect, 'the sun sets' is expressed by 'the sun dies.'[2] In Aryan mythology the Sun viewed in this light is sometimes represented as divine, yet not immortal; sometimes as living, but sleeping; sometimes as a mortal beloved by a goddess, yet tainted by the fate of humanity. Thus, *Tithonos*, a name that has been identified with the Sanskrit dîdhyânah,[3] brilliant, expressed originally the idea of the Sun in his daily or yearly character. He also, like Endymion, does not enjoy the full immortality of Zeus and Apollon. Endymion retains his youth, but is doomed to sleep. Tithonos is made immortal, but as Eos forgot to ask for his eternal

[1] Νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρῃ, Aristot. *Meteor.* ii. 2, 2.

[2] See Pott, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. ii. p. 109.

[3] See Sonne, 'On Charis,' in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. x. p. 178.

youth, he pines away as a decrepit old man, in the arms of his ever youthful wife, who loved him when he was young and is kind to him in his old age. Other traditions, careless about contradictions, or ready to solve them sometimes by the most atrocious expedients, call Tithonos the son of Eos and Kephalos, as Endymion was the son of Protogeneia, the Dawn; and this very freedom in handling a myth seems to show that, at first, a Greek knew what it meant if Eos was said to leave every morning the bed of Tithonos. As long as this expression was understood, I should say that the myth was present; it was past when Tithonos had been changed into a son of Laomedon, a brother of Priamos, a prince of Troy. Then the saying, that Eos left his bed in the morning, became mythical, and had none but a conventional or traditional meaning. Then, as Tithonos was a prince of Troy, his son, the Ethiopian Memnon, had to take part in the Trojan war. And yet how strange!—even then the old myth seems to float through the dim memory of the poet!—for when Eos weeps for her son, the beautiful Memnon, her tears are called 'morning-dew'—so that the past may be said to have been still half-present.

As we have mentioned Kephalos as the beloved of Eos, and the father of Tithonos, we may add that Kephalos also, like Tithonos and Endymion, was one of the many names of the Sun. Kephalos, however, was the rising Sun—the head of light—an expression frequently used of the sun in different mythologies. In the Veda, where the sun is addressed as a horse, the head of the horse is an expression meaning the rising sun. Thus the poet says, Rv. I.

163, 6, 'I have known through my mind thy self when it was still far—thee, the bird flying up from below the sky; I saw a head with wings, toiling on smooth and dustless paths.' The Teutonic nations speak of the sun as the eye of Wuotan, as Hesiod speaks of—

πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας·

and they also call the sun the face of their god.[1] In the Veda, again, the sun is called (I. 115, 1) 'the face of the gods,' or 'the face of Aditi' (I. 113, 19); and it is said that the winds obscure the eye of the sun by showers of rain (V. 59, 5).

A similar idea led the Greeks to form the name of Kephalos; and if Kephalos is called the son of Herse —the Dew—this patronymic meant the same in mythological language that we should express by the sun rising over dewy fields. What is told of Kephalos is, that he was the husband of Prokris, that he loved her, and that they vowed to be faithful to one another. But Eos also loves Kephalos; she tells her love, and Kephalos, true to Prokris, does not accept it. Eos, who knows her rival, replies that he might remain faithful to Prokris till Prokris had broken her vow. Kephalos accepts the challenge, approaches his wife disguised as a stranger, and gains her love. Prokris, discovering her shame, flies to Kreta. Here Diana gives her a dog and a spear that never miss their aim, and Prokris returns to Kephalos disguised as a huntsman. While hunting with Kephalos, she is asked by him to give him the

[1] Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, p. 666.

dog and the spear. She promises to do so only in return for his love, and when he has assented, she discloses herself, and is again accepted by Kephalos. Yet Prokris fears the charms of Eos; and while jealously watching her husband, she is killed by him unintentionally, by the spear that never misses its aim.

Before we can explain this myth, which, however, is told with many variations by Greek and Latin poets, we must dissect it, and reduce it to its constituent elements.

The first is 'Kephalos loves Prokris.' Prokris we must explain by a reference to Sanskrit, where prush and *prish* mean to sprinkle, and are used chiefly with reference to rain-drops. For instance, Rv. I. 168, 8: 'The lightnings laugh down upon the earth, when the winds shower forth the rain.'

The same root in the Teutonic languages has taken the sense of 'frost;' and Bopp identifies prush with O. H. G. *frus*, *frigere*. In Greek we must refer to the same root πρώξ, πρωκός, a dew-drop, and also Prŏkris, the dew.[1] Thus, the wife of

[1] I see no reason to modify this etymology of *Prokris*. *Prish* in Sanskrit means to sprinkle, and *prishita* occurs in the sense of shower, in vidyut-stanayitnu-*prishiteshu*, 'during lightning, thunder, and rain,' Gobh. 3, 3, 15, where Professor Roth ingeniously, but without necessity, suspects the original reading to have been prushita. *Prishat*, fem. *prishatî*, means sprinkled, and is applied to a speckled deer, a speckled cow, a speckled horse. *Prishata*, too, has the same meaning, but is likewise used in the sense of drops. Prush, a cognate root, means in Sanskrit to sprinkle, and from it we have prushva, the rainy season, and prushvâ, a drop, but more particularly a frozen drop, or frost. Now, it is perfectly true that the final sh of *prish* or prush is not regularly represented in Greek by a guttural consonant. But we find that in Sanskrit itself the lingual sh of this root varies with the palatal *s*, for instance in *pris*-ni, speckled; and Professor Curtius has rightly traced the

Kephalos is only a repetition of *Herse*, her mother—*Herse*, dew, being derived from Sanskrit v*rish*,[1] to sprinkle; *Prokris*, dew, from a Sanskrit root prush, having the same sense. The first part of our myth, therefore, means simply, 'The Sun kisses the Morning Dew.'

The second saying is 'Eos loves Kephalos.' This requires no explanation: it is the old story, repeated a hundred times in Aryan mythology, 'The Dawn loves the Sun.'

The third saying was, 'Prokris is faithless; yet her new lover, though in a different guise, is still the same Kephalos.' This we may interpret as a poetical expression for the rays of the sun being reflected in various colours from the dewdrops—so that Prokris may be said to be kissed by many lovers: yet they are all the same Kephalos, disguised, but at last recognised.

The last saying was, 'Prokris is killed by Kephalos,' *i.e.* the dew is absorbed by the sun. Prokris dies for her love to Kephalos, and he must kill her

Greek *περκ-νός*, spotted, back to the same root as the Sanskrit p*ris*-ni, and has clearly established for *πρόξ* and *προκάς*, the original meaning of a speckled deer. From the same root, therefore, not only *πρώξ*, a dewdrop, but *προκ-ρίς* also may be derived, in the sense of dew or hoar-frost, the derivative syllable being the same as in *νεβ-ρίς*, or *ἶδ-ρις*, gen. *ιος* or *ιδος*.

[1] This derivation of *ἔρση*, dew, from the Sanskrit root v*rish* has been questioned, because Sanskrit v is generally represented in Greek by the digamma, or the *spiritus lenis*. But in Greek we find both *ἔρση* and *ἕρση*, a change of frequent occurrence, though difficult to explain. In the same manner the Greek has *ἴστωρ* and *ἴστωρ*, from the root vid, *ἑστία*, from a root vas; and the Attic peculiarity of aspirating unaspirated initial vowels was well known even to ancient grammarians (Curtius, *Grundzüge*, p. 617). Forms like *ἐέρση* and *ἄερσα* clearly prove the former presence of a digamma (Curtius, *ibid.* p. 509).

because he loves her. It is the gradual and inevitable absorption of the dew by the glowing rays of the sun which is expressed, with so much truth, by the unerring shaft of Kephalos thrown unintentionally at Prokris hidden in the thicket of the forest.[1]

We have only to put these four sayings together, and every poet will at once tell us the story of the love and jealousy of Kephalos, Prokris, and Eos. If anything was wanted to confirm the solar nature of Kephalos, we might point out how the first meeting of Kephalos and Prokris takes place on Mount Hymettos, and how Kephalos throws himself afterwards, in despair, into the sea, from the Leukadian mountains. Now, the whole myth belongs to Attika, and here the sun would rise, during the greater part of the year, over Mount Hymettos like a brilliant head. A straight line from this, the most eastern point, to the most western headland of Greece, carries us to the Leukadian promontory—and here Kephalos might well be said to have drowned his sorrows in the waves of the ocean.

Another magnificent sunset looms in the myth of the death of Herakles. His twofold character as a god and as a hero is acknowledged even by Herodotos; and some of his epithets are sufficient to indicate his solar character, though, perhaps, no name has been made the vehicle of so many mythological and historical, physical and moral stories, as that of Herakles. Names which he shares with Apollo and Zeus are *Δαφνηφόρος*, *Ἀλεξίκακος*, *Μάντις*, *Ἰδαῖος*, *Ὀλύμπιος*, *Παγγενέτωρ*.

La rugiada
Pugna col sole.—Dante, *Purgatorio*, i. 121.

Now, in his last journey, Herakles also, like Kephalos, proceeds from east to west. He is performing his sacrifice to Zeus, on the Kenæon promontory of Eubœa, when Deianeira (dâsya-narî= dâsa-patnî) sends him the fatal garment. He then throws Lichas into the sea, who is transformed into the Lichadian islands. From thence Herakles crosses over to Trachys, and then to Mount Œta, where his pile is raised, and the hero is burnt, rising through the clouds to the seat of the immortal gods—himself henceforth immortal and wedded to Hebe, the goddess of youth. The coat which Deianeira sends to the solar hero is an expression frequently used in other mythologies;[1] it is the coat which in the Veda, 'the mothers weave for their bright son'—the clouds which rise from the waters and surround the sun like a dark raiment. Herakles tries to tear it off; his fierce splendour breaks through the thickening gloom, but fiery mists embrace him, and are mingled with the parting rays of the sun, and the dying hero is seen through the scattered clouds of the sky, tearing his own body to pieces, till at last his bright form is consumed in the general conflagration, his last-beloved being Iole—perhaps the violet-coloured evening clouds—a word which, as it reminds us also of *ióς*, poison (though the *ι* is long), may perhaps have originated the myth of a poisoned garment.

In these legends the Greek language supplies almost all that is necessary in order to render these strange stories intelligible and rational, though the

[1] 'Le Bhagavat-Purâṇa (VIII. 20, 24) appelle le crépuscule "le vêtement du dieu aux grands pas;"' *cf.* Senart, *Journal Asiatique*, 1873, p. 295.

later Greeks—I mean Homer and Hesiod—had certainly in most cases no suspicion of the original import of their own traditions. But as there are Greek words which find no explanation in Greek, and which, without a reference to Sanskrit and the other cognate dialects, would have for ever remained to the philologist mere sounds with a conventional meaning, there are also names of gods and heroes inexplicable from a Greek point of view, and which cannot be made to disclose their primitive character, unless confronted with contemporary witnesses from India, Persia, Italy, or Germany. Another myth of the dawn will best explain this :—

Ahan in Sanskrit is a name of the day, and is said to stand for dahan, like asru, tear, for dasru, Greek δάκρυ. Whether we have to admit an actual loss of this initial d, or whether the d is to be considered rather as a secondary letter, by which the root ah was individualised to dah, is a question which does not concern us at present. In Sanskrit we have the root dah, which means to burn, and from which a name of the day might have been formed in the same manner as dyu, day, is formed from dyu, to be brilliant. Nor does it concern us here whether the Gothic *daga*, nom. *dag-s*, day, is the same word or not. According to Grimm's law, daha in Sanskrit should in Gothic appear as *taga*, and not as *daga*. However, there are several roots in which the aspiration affects either the first or the last letter or both. This would give us dhah as a secondary type of dah, and thus remove the apparent irregularity of the Gothic *daga*.[1] Bopp seems

[1] This change of aspiration has been fully illustrated and well explained by Grassmann, in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xii. p. 110.

inclined to consider *daga* and daha identical in origin. Certain it is that the same root from which the Teutonic words for day are formed has also given rise to the name for dawn. In German we say, *der Morgen tagt*; and in Old English day was *dawe*; while to dawn was in Anglo-Saxon *dagian*. Now, in the Veda one of the names of the dawn is Ahanâ. It occurs only once, Rv. I. 123, 4:—

Gribám griham Ahanâ yâti ákkha
Divé dive ádhi nâma dádhânâ
Sísâsantî Dyotanâ sásvat â agât
A'gram agram ít bhagate vásûnâm.

'Ahanâ (the dawn) comes near to every house—she who makes every day to be known.

'Dyotanâ (the dawn), the active maiden, comes back for evermore—she enjoys always the first of all goods.'

We have already seen the Dawn in various relations to the Sun, but not yet as the beloved of the Sun, flying before her lover, and destroyed by his embrace. This, however, was a very familiar expression in the old mythological language of the Aryans. The Dawn has died in the arms of the Sun, or the Dawn is flying before the Sun, or the Sun has shattered the car of the Dawn, were expressions meaning simply, the sun has risen, the dawn is gone. Thus we read in the Rv. IV. 30, in a hymn celebrating the achievements of Indra, the chief solar deity of the Veda:—

'And this strong and manly deed also thou hast performed, O Indra, that thou struckest the

daughter of Dyaus (the Dawn), a woman difficult to vanquish.

'Yea, even the daughter of Dyaus, the magnified, the Dawn, thou, O Indra, a great hero, hast ground to pieces.

'The Dawn rushed off from her crushed car, fearing that Indra, the bull, might strike her.

'This her car lay there well ground to pieces; she went far away.'

In this case, Indra behaves rather unceremoniously to the daughter of the sky; but in other places she is loved by all the bright gods of heaven, not excluding her own father. The Sun, it is said, Rv. I. 115, 2, follows her from behind, as a man follows a woman. 'She, the Dawn, whose cart is drawn by white horses, is carried away in triumph by the two Asvins,' as the Leukippides are carried off by the Dioskuroi.

If now we translate, or rather transliterate, Dahanâ into Greek, Dáphne stands before us, and her whole history is intelligible. Daphne is young and beautiful—Apollo loves her—she flies before him, and dies as he embraces her with his brilliant rays. Or, as another poet of the Veda (X. 189) expresses it, 'The Dawn comes near to him—she expires as soon as he begins to breathe—the mighty one irradiates the sky.' Anyone who has eyes to sea and a heart to feel with nature, like the poets of old, may still see Daphne and Apollo—the dawn rushing and trembling through the sky, and fading away at the sudden approach of the bright sun. Thus even in so modern a poet as Swift, the old poetry of

nature breaks through when, in his address to Lord Harley on his marriage, he writes:

So the bright Empress of the Morn
Chose for her spouse a mortal born:
The Goddess made advances first,
Else what aspiring hero durst?
Though like a maiden of fifteen
She blushes when by mortals seen:
Still blushes, and with haste retires
When Sol pursues her with his fires.

The metamorphosis of Daphne into a laurel-tree is a continuation of the myth of peculiarly Greek growth. Daphne, in Greek, meant no longer the dawn, but it had become the name of the laurel.[1] Hence the tree Daphne was considered sacred to the lover of Daphne, the dawn, and Daphne herself was fabled to have been changed into a tree when praying to her mother to protect her from the violence of Apollo.

Without the help of the Veda the name of Daphne and the legend attached to her would have remained unintelligible, for the later Sanskrit supplies no key to this name. This shows the value of

[1] Professor Curtius admits my explanation of the myth of Daphne as the dawn, but he says, 'If we could but see why the dawn is changed into a laurel!' I have explained before the influence of homonymy in the growth of early myths, and this is only another instance of this influence. The dawn was called δάφνη, the burning; so was the laurel, as wood that burns easily. Afterwards the two, as usual, were supposed to be one, or to have some connection with each other, for how, the people would say, could they have the same name? See *Etym. M.* p. 250, 20, δαυχμόν· εὔκαυστον ξύλον; Hesych. δαυχμόν· ἔνκαυστον ξύλον δάφνης (l. εὔκαυστον ξύλον, δάφνην, Ahrens, *Dial. Græc.* ii. 532). Legerlotz, in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. vii. p. 292. *Lectures on the Science of Language*, Second Series, p. 502.

the Veda for the purpose of comparative mythology—a science which, without the Veda, would have remained mere guess-work, without fixed principles and without a safe basis.[1]

In order to show in how many different ways the same idea may be expressed mythologically, I have confined myself to the names of the dawn. The dawn is really one of the richest sources of Aryan mythology; and another class of legends, embodying the strife between winter and summer, the return of spring, the revival of nature, is in most languages but a reflection and amplification of the more ancient stories telling of the strife between night and day, the return of the morn, the revival of the whole world. The stories, again, of solar heroes fighting through a thunderstorm against the powers of darkness, are borrowed from the same source; and the cows so frequently alluded to in the Veda, as carried off by Vritra and brought back by Indra, are in reality the same bright cows which the Dawn drives out every morning to their pasture-ground; sometimes the clouds which from their heavy udders send down refreshing and fertilising rain or dew upon the parched earth; sometimes the bright days themselves that seem to step out one by one from the dark stable of the night, and to be carried off from their wide pasture by the dark powers of the West. There is no sight in nature more elevating than the dawn even to us, whom philosophy would wish to teach that *nil admirari* is the highest wis-

[1] For another development of the same word Ahanâ, leading ultimately to the myth of Athene, see *Lectures on the Science of Language*, Second Series, p. 502.

dom. Yet in ancient times the power of admiring was the greatest blessing bestowed on mankind; and when could man have admired more intensely, when could his heart have been more gladdened and overpowered with joy, than at the approach of

the Lord of light,
Of life, of love, and gladness!

The darkness of night fills the human heart with despondency and awe, and a feeling of fear and anguish sets every nerve trembling. There is man like a forlorn child fixing his eye with breathless anxiety upon the East, the womb of day, where the light of the world has flamed up so many times before. As the father waits the birth of his child, so the poet watches the dark heaving night who is to bring forth her bright son, the sun of the day. The doors of heaven seem slowly to open, and what are called the bright flocks of the Dawn step out of the dark stable, returning to their wonted pastures. Who has not seen the gradual advance of this radiant procession—the heaven like a distant sea tossing its golden waves—when the first rays shoot forth like brilliant horses racing round the whole course of the horizon—when the clouds begin to colour up, each shedding her own radiance over her more distant sisters! Not only the East, but the West, and the South, and the North, the whole temple of heaven is illuminated, and the pious worshipper lights in response his own small light on the altar of his hearth, and stammers words which express but faintly the joy that is in nature and in his own throbbing heart:—

'Rise! Our life, our spirit has come back! the darkness is gone, the light approaches!'

If the people of antiquity called these eternal lights of heaven their gods, their bright ones (deva), the dawn was the first-born among all the gods—Protogeneia—dearest to man, and always young and fresh. But if not raised to an immortal state, if only admired as a kind being, awakening every morning the children of man, her life would seem to be short. She soon fades away, and dies when the fountain-head of light rises in naked splendour, and sends his first swift glance through the vault of heaven. We cannot realise that sentiment with which the eye of antiquity dwelt on these sights of nature. To us all is law, order, necessity. We calculate the refractory power of the atmosphere, we measure the possible length of the dawn in every climate, and the rising of the sun is to us no greater surprise than the birth of a child. But if we could believe again that there was in the sun a being like our own, that in the dawn there was a soul open to human sympathy—if we could bring ourselves to look for a moment upon these powers as personal, free, and adorable, how different would be our feelings at the blush of day! That Titanic assurance with which we say, the sun *must* rise, was unknown to the early worshippers of nature, or if they also began to feel the regularity with which the sun and the other stars perform their daily labour, they still thought of free beings kept in temporary servitude, chained for a time, and bound to obey a higher will, but sure to rise, like Herakles, to a higher glory at the end of their labours. It seems to us childish when we read in the Veda such

expressions as, 'Will the Sun rise?' 'Will our old friend, the Dawn, come back again?' 'Will the powers of darkness be conquered by the God of light?' And when the Sun rose, they wondered how, but just born, he was so mighty, and strangled, as it were in his cradle, the serpents of the night. They asked how he could walk along the sky? why there was no dust on his road? why he did not fall backward?[1] But at last they greeted him like the poet of our own time—

Hail, orient Conqueror of gloomy Night!

and the human eye felt that it could not bear the brilliant majesty of Him whom they call 'the Life, the Breath, the brilliant Lord and Father.'

Thus sunrise was the revelation of nature, awakening in the human mind that feeling of dependence, of helplessness, of hope, of joy and faith in higher powers, which is the source of all wisdom, the spring of all religion. But if sunrise inspired the first prayers, called forth the first sacrificial flames, sunset was the other time when, again, the heart of man would tremble, and his mind be filled with awful thoughts. The shadows of night approach, the irresistible power of sleep grasps man in the midst of his pleasures, his friends depart, and in his loneliness his thoughts turn again to higher powers. When the day departs, the poet bewails the untimely death of his bright friend—nay, he sees in his short career the likeness of his own life. Perhaps, when he has fallen asleep, his sun may never rise again, and thus the place to which the setting sun withdraws in the

[1] *Cf. Le Mystère des Bardes*, par Henri Martin, 1869, p. 38.

far West rises before his mind as the abode where he himself would go after death, where 'his fathers went before him,' and where all the wise and the pious rejoice in a 'new life with Yama and Varuna.' Or he might look upon the sun, not as a short-lived hero, but as young, unchanging, and always the same, while generations after generations of mortal men were passing away: and hence, by the mere force of contrast, the first intimation of beings which do not wither and decay—of immortals, of immortality! Then the poet would implore the immortal sun to come again, to vouchsafe to the sleeper a new morning. The god of day would become the god of time, of life and death. Again, the evening twilight, the sister of the dawn, repeating, though with a more sombre light, the wonders of the morning, how many feelings must it have roused in the musing poet—how many poems must it have elicited in the living language of ancient times! Was it the dawn that came again to give a last embrace to him who had parted from her in the morning? Was she the immortal, the always returning goddess, and he the mortal, the daily dying sun? Or was she the mortal, bidding a last farewell to her immortal lover, burnt, as it were, on the same pile which would consume her, while he would rise to the seat of the gods?

Let us express these simple scenes in ancient language, and we shall find ourselves surrounded on every side by mythology full of contradictions and incongruities, the same being represented as mortal or immortal, as man or woman, as the poetical eye of man shifts its point of view and gives its own colour to the mysterious play of nature.

One of the myths of the Veda which expresses this correlation of the Dawn and the Sun, this love between the immortal and the mortal, and the identity of the Morning Dawn and the Evening Twilight, is the story of Urvasî and Purûravas. The two names Urvasî and Purûravas are to the Hindu mere proper names, and even in the Veda their original meaning has almost entirely faded away. There is a dialogue in the Rig-Veda between Urvasî and Purûravas, where both appear personified in the same manner as in the play of Kâlidâsa. The first point, therefore, which we have to prove is that Urvasî was originally an appellation, and meant dawn.

The etymology of Urvasî is difficult. It cannot be derived from urva by means of the suffix sa,[1] because there is no such word as urva, and because derivatives in sa, like romasá, yuvasá, etc., have the accent on the last syllable.[2] I therefore accept the common Indian explanation by which this name is derived from uru, wide (*εὐρυ*), and a root as, to pervade, and thus compare uru-asî with another frequent epithet of the Dawn, urûkî, the feminine of uru-ak, far-going. It was certainly one of the most striking features, and one by which the Dawn was distinguished from all the other dwellers in the heavens, that she occupies the wide expanse of the sky, and that her horses run, as it were, with the swiftness of thought round the whole horizon. Hence we find that names beginning with uru in

[1] Pânini, V. 2, 100.

[2] Other explanations of Urvasî may be seen in Professor Roth's edition of the Nirukta, and in the Sanskrit Dictionary published by him and Professor Boehtlingk.

Sanskrit, and with εὐρύ in Greek, are almost invariably old mythological names of the Dawn or the Twilight. The Earth also, it is true, claims this epithet, but in different combinations from those which apply to the bright goddess. Names of the Dawn are Euryphaessa, the mother of Helios; Eurykyde or Eurypyle, the daughter of Endymion; Eurymede the wife of Glaukos; Eurynome, the mother of the Charites; and Eurydike, the wife of Orpheus, whose character as an ancient god will be discussed hereafter. In the Veda the name of Ushas or Eos is hardly ever mentioned without some allusion to her far and wide spreading splendour; such as urviyâ vibhâti, she shines wide; urviyâ vikákshe, looking far and wide; varîyasî, the widest,[1] whereas the light of the Sun is not represented as wide-stretching, but rather as far-darting.

But there are other indications besides the mere name of Urvasî, which lead us to suppose that she was originally the goddess of the dawn. Vasish*tha*, though best known as the name of one of the chief poets of the Veda, is the superlative of vasu, bright; and as such also a name of the Sun. Thus it hap-

[1] The name which approaches nearest to Urvasî in Greek might seem to be *Europe*, because the palatal *s* is occasionally, though irregularly, represented by a Greek π, as ἀσυα = ἵππος. The only difficulty is the long ω in Greek; otherwise Europe, carried away by the white bull (vrishan, man, bull, stallion, in the Veda a frequent appellation of the sun, and sveta, white, applied to the same deity); carried away on his back (the sun being frequently represented as behind or below the dawn, see *supra*, p. 398, and the myth of Eurydike on p. 435); again carried to a distant cave (the gloaming of the evening); and mother of Apollo, the god of daylight, or of Minos (Manu, a mortal Zeus)—all this would well agree with the goddess of the dawn.

pens that expressions which apply properly to the sun only were transferred to the ancient poet. He is called the son of Mitra and Varuṇa, night and day, an expression which has a meaning only with regard to Vasishṭha, the sun; and as the sun is frequently called the offspring of the dawn, Vasishṭha, the poet, is said to owe his birth to Urvasî (Rv. VII. 33, 11). The peculiarity of his birth reminds us strongly of the birth of Aphrodite, as told by Hesiod.

Again, we find that in the few passages where the name of Urvasî occurs in the Rig-Veda, the same attributes and actions are ascribed to her which usually belong to Ushas, the Dawn.

It is frequently said of Ushas that she prolongs the life of man, and the same is said of Urvasî (V. 41, 19; X. 95, 10). In one passage (Rv. IV. 2, 18) Urvasî is even used as a plural, in the sense of many dawns or days increasing the life of man, which shows that the appellative power of the word was not yet quite forgotten. Again, she is called antarikshaprâ, filling the air, a usual epithet of the sun, bṛihaddivâ, with mighty splendour, all indicating the bright presence of the dawn. However, the best proof that Urvasî was the dawn is the legend told of her and of her love to Purûravas, a story that is true only of the Sun and the Dawn. That Purûravas is an appropriate name of a solar hero requires hardly any proof. Purûravas meant the same as πολυδευκής, endowed with much light; for though rava is generally used of sound, yet the root ru, which means originally to cry, is also applied to colour[1] in the sense of a loud or crying colour, *i.e.*

[1] Thus it is said, Rv. VI. 3, 6, the fire cries with light, śokishâ

red (*cf. ruber, rufus*, Lith. *rauda*, O.H.G. *rôt, rudhira, ἐρυθρός*; also Sanskrit ravi, sun). Besides, Purûravas calls himself Vasishtha, which, as we know, is a name of the Sun; and if he is called Aida, the son of Idâ, the same name is elsewhere (Rv. III. 29, 3) given to Agni, the fire.

Now, the story in its most ancient form is found in the Brâhmana of the Yagur-Veda. There we read:—

'Urvasî, a kind of fairy, fell in love with Purûravas, the son of Idâ, and when she met him, she said: "Embrace me three times a day, but never against my will, and let me never see you without your royal garments, for this is the manner of women." In this manner she lived with him a long time, and she was with child. Then her former friends, the Gandharvas, said: "This Urvasî has now dwelt a long time among mortals; let us see that she come back." Now, there was a ewe, with two lambs, tied to the couch of Urvasî and Purûravas, and the Gandharvas stole one of them. Urvasî said: "They take away my darling, as if I lived in a land where there is no hero and no man." They stole the second, and she upbraided her husband again. Then Purûravas looked and said: "How can that be a land without heroes or men where I am?" And

râtapîti; the two Spartan Charites are called Κλητά (κλητά, *incluta*) and Φαεννά, *i.e.* Clara, clear-shining (see Pausanias, iii. 18, 7, and Sonne, in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. x. p. 363). In the Veda the rising sun is said to cry like a new-born child (Rv. IX. 74, 1). Professor Kuhn himself has evidently misunderstood my argument. I do not derive ravas from rap, but I only quote rap as illustrating the close connection between loudness of sound and brightness of light. See also Justi, *Orient und Occident*, vol. ii. p. 69.

naked, he sprang up; he thought it too long to put on his dress. Then the Gandharvas sent a flash of lightning, and Urvasî saw her husband naked as by daylight. Then she vanished; "I come back," she said—and went. Then he bewailed his vanished love in bitter grief; and went near Kurukshetra. There is a lake there, called Anyatâ*h*plaksha, full of lotus flowers, and while the king walked along its border, the fairies were playing there in the water, in the shape of birds. And Urvasî discovered him, and said:—

'"That is the man with whom I dwelt so long." Then her friends said: "Let us appear to him." She agreed, and they appeared before him. Then the king recognised her and said:—

'"Lo! my wife! stay, thou cruel in mind! let us now exchange some words! Our secrets, if they are not told now, will not bring us luck on any later day."

'She replied: "What shall I do with thy speech? I am gone like the first of the dawns. Purûravas, go home again! I am hard to be caught, like the wind."

'He said, in despair: "Then may thy former friend now fall down, never to rise again; may he go far, far away! May he lie down on the threshold of death, and may rabid wolves there devour him!"

'She replied: "Purûravas, do not die! do not fall down! let not evil wolves devour thee! there is no friendship with women: their hearts are the hearts of wolves. When I walked among mortals under a different form—when I dwelt with thee, four nights of the autumn, I ate once a-day a small piece of butter—and even now I feel pleasure from it."

'Thus, at last, her heart melted, and she said: "Come to me the last night of the year, and thou shalt be with me for one night, and a son will be born to thee." He went the last night of the year to the golden seats, and while he was alone, he was told to go up, and then they sent Urvasî to him. Then she said: "The Gandharvas will to-morrow grant thee a wish; choose!" He said: "Choose thou for me." She replied: "Say to them, let me be one of you." Early the next morn, the Gandharvas gave him his choice; but when he said "let me be one of you," they said: "That kind of sacred fire is not yet known among men by which he could perform a sacrifice and become one of ourselves." They then initiated Purûravas in the mysteries of a certain sacrifice, and when he had performed it, he became himself one of the Gandharvas.'

This is the simple story, told in the Brâhmana, and it is told there in order to show the importance of a peculiar rite, the rite of kindling the fire by friction, which is represented as the one by which Purûravas obtained immortality.[1] The verses quoted in the story are taken from the Rig-Veda, where we find, in the last book, together with many strange relics of popular poetry, a dialogue between the two celestial lovers. It consists of seventeen verses, while the author of the Brâhmana knew only fifteen. In one of the verses which he quotes, Urvasî says,

[1] A most interesting and ingenious explanation of this ceremony is given by Professor Kuhn, in his Essay, *Die Herabkunft des Feuers*, p. 79. The application of that ceremony to the old myth of Urvasî and Purûravas belongs clearly to a later age: it is an after-thought that could only arise with people who wished to find a symbolical significance in every act of their traditional ritual.

'I am gone for ever, like the first of the dawns,' which shows a strange glimmering of the old myth in the mind of the poet, and reminds us of the tears which the mother of Memnon shed over the corpse of her son, and which even by later poets are called morning dew. Again, in the fourth verse, Urvasî addressing herself, says: 'This person (that is to say, I), when she was wedded to him, O Dawn! she went to his house, and was embraced by him day and night.' Again, she tells Purûravas that he was created by the gods in order to slay the powers of darkness (dasyuhatyâya), a task invariably ascribed to Indra and other solar beings. Even the names of the companions of Urvasî point to the dawn, and Purûravas says:—

'When I, the mortal, threw my arms around those flighty immortals, they trembled away from me like a trembling doe, like horses that kick against the cart.'

No goddess is so frequently called the friend of man as the Dawn. 'She goes to every house' (I. 123, 4); 'she thinks of the dwelling of man' (I. 123, 1); 'she does not despise the small or the great' (I. 124, 6); 'she brings wealth' (I. 48, 1); 'she is always the same, immortal, divine' (I. 124, 4; I. 123, 8); 'she does not grow old' (I. 113, 15); 'she is the young goddess, but she makes man grow old' (I. 92, 11). Thus Purûravas called Urvasî 'the immortal among the mortals;' and, in his last verse, he addressed his beloved in the following words:—

'I, the brightest Sun, I hold Urvasî, her who fills the air (with light), who spreads the sky. May the

blessing of thy kind deed be upon thee! Come back, the heart burns me.'

Then the poet says:—

'Thus the gods spake to thee, O son of *Idâ*: in order that thou, bound to death, mayest grow to be this (immortal), thy race should worship the gods with oblations! Then thou also wilt rejoice in heaven.'

We must certainly admit, that even in the Veda, the poets were as ignorant of the original meaning of Urvasî and Purûravas as Homer was of Tithonos, if not of Eos. To them they were heroes, indefinite beings—men, yet not men; gods, yet not gods. But to us, though placed at a much greater distance, they disclose their true meaning. As Wordsworth says:—

> Not unrejoiced, I see thee climb the sky
> In naked splendour, clear from mist and haze—

Antiquity spoke of the naked sun, and of the chaste dawn hiding her face when she had seen her husband. Yet she says she will come again. And after the sun has travelled through the world in search of his beloved, when he comes to the threshold of death and is going to end his solitary life, she appears again in the gloaming, the same as the dawn—as Eos in Homer begins and ends the day—and she carries him away to the golden seats of the immortals.[1]

I have selected this myth chiefly in order to show how ancient poetry is only the faint echo of ancient

[1] *Od.* v. 390, ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ τρίτον ἦμαρ ἐϋπλόκαμος τέλεσ' Ἠώς. For different explanations of this and similar verses, see Völcker, *Ueber homerische Geographie und Weltkunde*, Hanover, 1830, p. 31.

language, and how it was the simple story of nature which inspired the early poet, and held before his mind that deep mirror in which he might see reflected the passions of his own soul. For the heart of man, as long as it knows but its own bitterness, is silent and sullen. It does not tell its love and its loss. There may be a mute poetry in solitary grief, but *Mnemosyne*, the musing goddess of recollection, is not a muse herself, though she is the mother of the muses. It is the sympathy with the grief of others which first gives utterance to the poet's grief, and opens the lips of a silent despair. And if his pain was too deep and too sacred, if he could not compare it to the suffering of any other human heart, the ancient poet had still the heart of nature to commune with, and in her silent suffering he saw a noble likeness of what he felt and suffered within himself. When, after a dark night, the light of the day returned, he thought of his own light that would never rise again. When he saw the Sun kissing the Dawn, he dreamt of days and joys gone for ever. And when the Dawn trembled, and grew pale, and departed, and when the Sun seemed to look for her, and to lose her the more his brilliant eye sought her, an image would rise in his mind, and he would remember his own fate and yet forget it, while telling in measured words the love and loss of the Sun. Such was the origin of poetry. Nor was the evening without its charms. And when, at the end of a dreary day, the Sun seemed to die away in the far West, still looking for his Eastern bride, and suddenly the heavens opened, and the glorious image of the Dawn rose again, her beauty deepened by a gloaming sadness—would not the poet

gaze till the last ray had vanished, and would not the last vanishing ray linger in his heart, and kindle there a hope of another life, where he would find again what he had loved and lost on earth?

> There is a radiant, though a short-lived flame,
> That burns for poets in the dawning east;
> And oft my soul has kindled at the same,
> When the captivity of sleep had ceased.

There is much suffering in nature to those who have eyes for silent grief, and it is this tragedy—the tragedy of nature—which is the lifespring of all the tragedies of the ancient world. The idea of a young hero, whether he is called Baldr, or Sigurd, or Sîfrit, or Achilles, or Meleager, or Kephalos, dying in the fullness of youth, a story so frequently told, localised, and individualised, was first suggested by the Sun, dying in all his youthful vigour either at the end of a day, conquered by the powers of darkness, or at the end of the sunny season, stung by the thorn of winter. Again, that fatal spell by which these sunny heroes must leave their first love, become unfaithful to her or she to them, was borrowed from nature. The fate of these solar heroes was inevitable, and it was their lot to die by the hand or by the unwilling treachery of their nearest friends or relatives. The Sun forsakes the Dawn, and dies at the end of the day, according to an inexorable fate, and bewailed by the whole of nature. Or the Sun is the Sun of Spring, who woos the Earth, and then forsakes his bride and grows cold, and is killed at last by the thorn of Winter. It is an old story, but it is for ever new in the mythology and the legends of the ancient world. Thus

Baldr, in the Scandinavian Edda, the divine prototype of Sigurd and Sîfrit, is beloved by the whole world. Gods and men, the whole of nature, all that grows and lives, had sworn to his mother not to hurt the bright hero. The mistletoe alone, that does not grow on the earth, but on trees, had been forgotten, and with it Baldr is killed at the winter solstice:—

> So on the floor lay Balder, dead; and round
> Lay thickly strewn, swords, axes, darts, and spears,
> Which all the gods in sport had idly thrown
> At Balder, whom no weapon pierced or clove:
> But in his breast stood fixt the fatal bough
> Of mistletoe, which Lok, the accuser, gave
> To Hoder, and unwitting Hoder threw:
> 'Gainst that alone had Balder's life no charm.

Thus Isfendiyar, in the Persian epic, cannot be wounded by any weapon, yet it is his fate to be killed by a thorn, which, as an arrow, is thrown into his eye by Rustem. Rustem, again, can only be killed by his brother; Herakles, by the mistaken kindness of his wife; Sîfrit, by the anxious solicitude of Kriemhilt, or by the jealousy of Brunhilt, whom he had forsaken. He is vulnerable in one spot only, like Achilles, and it is there where Hagene (the thorn) strikes him. All these are fragments of solar myths. The whole of nature was divided into two realms—the one dark, cold, wintry, and deathlike, the other bright, warm, vernal, and full of life. Sigurd, as the solar hero is called in the Edda, the descendant of Odin, slays the serpent Fafnir, and conquers the treasure on which Andvari, the dwarf, had pronounced his curse: This is the treasure of the Niflungs or Nibelungs, the treasure of the earth which the nebu-

lous powers of winter and darkness had carried away like robbers. The vernal sun wins it back, and like Demeter, rich in the possession of her restored daughter, the earth becomes for a time rich with all the treasures of spring.[1] He then, according to the Edda, delivers Brynhild, who had been doomed to a magic sleep after being wounded with a thorn by Odin, but who is now, like the spring after the sleep of winter, brought back to new life by the love of Sigurd. But he, the lord of the treasure (vasupati), is driven onward by his fate. He plights his troth to Brynhild, and gives her the fatal ring he had taken from the treasure. But he must leave her, and when he arrives at the castle of Gunnar, Gunnar's wife, Grimhild, makes him forget Brynhild, and he marries her daughter, Gudrun. Already his course begins to decline. He is bound to Gunnar, nay, he must conquer for him his own former bride, Brynhild, whom Gunnar now marries. Gunnar Gjukason seems to signify darkness, and thus we see that the awakening and budding spring is gone, carried away by Gunnar, like Proserpina by Pluto; like Sitâ by Râvaṇa. Gudrun, the daughter of Grimhild, and sometimes herself called Grimhild, whether the latter name meant summer (*cf.* gharma in Sanskrit), or the earth and nature in the latter part of the year, is a sister of the dark Gunnar, and though now married to the bright Sigurd, she belongs herself to the nebulous regions. Gunnar, who has forced Sigurd to yield him Brynhild, is now

[1] *Cf.* Rig-Veda, V. 47, 1: 'Prayuñgatî divaḥ eti bruvâṇâ mahî mâtâ duhituḥ bodhayantî, âvivâsantî yuvatiḥ manîshâ pitṛibhyaḥ â sadane gohuvâṇâ.' On mahî mâtâ = *Magna Mater*, see Grassmann, in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xvi. p. 169. Duhitur bodhayantî, inquiring for or finding her daughter.

planning the death of his kinsman, because Brynhild has discovered in Sigurd her former lover, and must have her revenge. Högni dissuades his brother Gunnar from the murder; but at last the third brother, Gudhorm, stabs Sigurd while he is asleep at the winter solstice. Brynhild has always loved him, and when her hero is killed she distributes the treasure, and is burnt, like Nanna, on the same pile with Sigurd, a sword being placed between the two lovers. Gudrun also bewails the death of her husband, but she forgets him, and marries Atli, the brother of Brynhild. Atli now claims the treasure from Gunnar and Högni, by right of his wife, and when they refuse to give it up, he invites them to his house, and makes them prisoners. Gunnar still refuses to reveal the spot where the treasure is buried till he sees the heart of Högni, his brother. A heart is brought him, but it quivers, and he says, 'This is not the heart of my brother.' The real heart of Högni is brought at last, and Gunnar says, 'Now I alone know where the treasure lies, and the Rhine shall rather have it than I will give it up to thee.' He is then bound by Atli, and thrown among serpents. But even the serpents he charms by playing on the harp with his teeth, till at last one viper crawls up to him, and kills him.

How much has this myth been changed, when we find it again in the poem of the Nibelunge as it was written down at the end of the twelfth century in Germany! All the heroes are Christians, and have been mixed up with historical persons of the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries. Gunther is localised in Burgundy, where we know that, in 435, a Gundicarius or Gundaharius happened to be a real king, the same who,

according to Cassiodorus, was vanquished first by Aetius, and afterwards by the Huns of Attila. Hence Atli, the brother of Brynhild, and the second husband of Gudrun (or Kriemhilt), is identified with Attila, the king of the Huns (453); nay, even the brother of Attila, Bleda, is brought in as Blödelin, the first who attacked the Burgundians, and was killed by Dankwart. Other historical persons were drawn into the vortex of the popular story, persons for whom there is no precedent at all in the Edda. Thus we find in the Nibelunge Dietrich von Bern, who is no other but Theodoric the Great (455–525), who conquered Odoacer in the battle of Ravenna (the famous Rabenschlacht), and lived at Verona, in German, Bern. Irenfried, again, introduced in the poem as the Landgrave of Thuringia, has been discovered to be Hermanfried, the king of Thuringia, married to Amalaberg, the niece of Theodoric. The most extraordinary coincidence, however, is that by which Sigurd, the lover of Brynhild, has been identified with Siegbert, king of Austrasia from 561 to 575, who was actually married to the famous Brunehault, who actually defeated the Huns, and was actually murdered under the most tragical circumstances by Fredegond, the mistress of his brother Chilperic. This coincidence between myth and history is so great, that it has induced some euhemeristic critics to derive the whole legend of the Nibelunge from Austrasian history, and to make the murder of Siegbert by Brunehault the basis of the murder of Sifrit or Sîgurd by Brynhild. Fortunately, it is easier to answer these German than the old Greek euhemerists, for we find in contemporary history that Jornandes, who wrote his history

at least twenty years before the death of the Austrasian Siegbert, knew already the daughter of the mythic Sigurd, Swanhild, who was born, according to the Edda, after the murder of her father, and afterwards killed by Jörmunrek, whom the poem has again historicised in Hermanricus, a Gothic king of the fourth century.

Let us now apply to the Greek myths what we have learned from the gradual growth of the German myth. There are evidently historical facts round which the myth of Herakles has crystallised, only we cannot substantiate them so clearly as in the myth of the Nibelunge, because we have there no contemporaneous historical documents. Yet as the chief Herakles is represented as belonging to the royal family of Argos, there may have been a Herakles, perhaps the son of a king called Amphitryo, whose descendants, after a temporary exile, reconquered that part of Greece which had formerly been under the sway of Herakles. The traditions of the miraculous birth, of many of his heroic adventures, and of his death, were as little based on historical facts as the legends of Sîfrit. In Herakles killing the Hydra and similar monsters, we see the reflected image of the Delphian Apollo killing the worm, or of Zeus, the god of the brilliant sky, with whom Herakles shares in common the names of Idæos, Olympios, and Pangenetor. As the myth of Sigurd and Gunnar throws its last broken rays on the kings of Burgundy, and on Attila and Theodoric, the myth of the solar Herakles was realised in some semi-historical prince of Argos and Mykenæ. Herakles may have been the name of the national god of the Heraklidæ, and this

would explain the enmity of Hêrê, whose worship flourished in Agos before the Dorian immigration. What was formerly told of a god was transferred to Herakles, the leader of the Heraklidæ, the worshippers or sons of Herakles, while, at the same time, many local and historical facts connected with the Heraklidæ and their leaders may have been worked up with the myth of the divine hero. The idea of Herakles being, as it were, the bond-servant of Eurystheus is of solar origin—it is the idea of the sun fettered to his work, and toiling for men, his inferiors in strength and virtue.[1] Thus Sîfrit is toiling for Gunther, and even Apollo is for one year the slave of Laomedon—pregnant expressions, necessitated by the absence of more abstract verbs, and familiar even to modern poets:—

> 'As aptly suits therewith that modest pace
> Submitted to the chains
> That bind thee to the path which God ordains
> That thou shouldst trace.'

The later growth of epic and tragical poetry may be Greek, or Indian, or Teutonic; it may take the different colours of the different skies, the different warmth of the different climes; nay, it may attract and absorb much that is accidental and historical. But if we cut into it and analyse it, the blood that runs through all the ancient poetry is the same blood;

[1] The Peruvian Inca, Yupanqui, denied the pretension of the sun to be the doer of all things, for if he were free, he would go and visit other parts of the heavens where he had never been. He is, said the Inca, like a tied beast who goes ever round and round in the same track. *Garcilaso de la Vega*, part I. viii. 8. Acosta, *Historia del Nuevo Orbe*, cap. v. Tylor, *Early History of Mankind*, p. 343. Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*, p. 55.

it is the ancient mythical speech. The atmosphere in which the early poetry of the Aryans grew up was mythological, it was impregnated with something that could not be resisted by those who breathed in it. It was like the siren voice of the modern rhyme, which has suggested so many common ideas to poets writing in a common language.

We know what Greek and Teutonic poets have made of their epic heroes; let us see now whether the swarthy Hindu has been able to throw an equally beautiful haze around the names of his mythical traditions.

The story of the loves of Purûravas and Urvasî has frequently been told by Hindu poets. We find it in their epic poems, in their Purâ*n*as, and in the Br*i*hat-kathâ, the 'Great Story,' a collection of the popular legends of India. It has suffered many changes, yet even in Kâlidâsa's[1] play, of which I shall give a short abstract, we recognise the distant background, and we may admire the skill with which this poet has breathed new life and human feeling into the withered names of a language long forgotten.

The first act opens with a scene in the Himâlaya mountains. The nymphs of heaven, on returning from an assembly of the gods, have been attacked, and are mourning over the loss of Urvasî, who has been carried off by a demon. King Purûravas enters on his chariot, and on hearing the cause of their grief, hastens to the rescue of the nymph. He soon returns, after having vanquished the robber, and restores

[1] Professor Wilson has given the first and really beautiful translation of this play in his 'Hindu Theatre.' The original was published first at Calcutta, and has since been reprinted several times. The best edition is that published by Professor Bollensen.

Urvasî to her heavenly companions. But while he is carrying the nymph back to her friends in his chariot, he falls in love with her and she with him. He describes how he saw her slowly recovering from her terror:

'She recovers, though but faintly.
So gently steals the moon upon the night,
Retiring tardily; so peeps the flame
Of coming fires through smoky wreaths; and thus
The Ganges slowly clears her troubled wave,
Engulphs the ruin that the crumbling bank
Has hurled across her agitated course,
And flows a clear and stately stream again.'

When they part, Urvasî wishes to turn round once more to see Purûravas. She pretends that 'a straggling vine has caught her garland,' and, while feigning to disengage herself, she calls one of her friends to help her. Her friend replies,

'No easy task, I fear; you seem entangled
Too fast to be set free: but, come what may,
Depend upon my friendship.'

The eye of the king then meets that of Urvasî, and he exclaims,

'A thousand thanks, dear plant, to whose kind aid
I owe another instant, and behold
But for a moment, and imperfectly,
Those half-averted charms.'

In the second act we meet the king at Allahabad, his residence. He walks in the garden of the palace, accompanied by a Brahman, who acts the part of the gracioso in the Indian drama. He is the confidential companion of the king, and knows his love for Urvasî.

But he is so afraid of betraying what must remain a secret to everybody at court, and in particular to the queen, that he hides himself in a retired temple. There a female servant of the queen discovers him, and 'as a secret can no more rest in his breast than morning dew upon the grass,' she soon finds out from him why the king is so changed since his return from the battle with the demon, and carries the tale to the queen. In the meantime, the king is in despair, and pours out his grief—

'Like one contending with the stream,
And still borne backwards by the current's force.'

But Urvasî also is sighing for Purûravas, and we suddenly see her, with her friend, descending through the air to meet the king. Both are at first invisible to him, and listen to the confession of his love. Then Urvasî writes a verse on a birch-leaf, and lets it fall near the bower where her beloved reclines. Next, her friend becomes visible; and, at last, Urvasî herself is introduced to the king. After a few moments, however, both Urvasî and her friend are called back by a messenger of the gods, and Purûravas is left alone with his jester. He looks for the leaf on which Urvasî had first disclosed her love, but it is lost, carried away by the wind:

'Breeze of the south, the friend of love and spring,
Though from the flower you steal the fragrant down
To scatter perfume, yet why plunder me
Of these dear characters, her own fair hand,
In proof of her affection, traced? Thou knowest,
The lonely lover that in absence pines,
Lives on such fond memorials.'

But worse than this, the leaf is picked up by the queen, who comes to look for the king in the garden. There is a scene of matrimonial upbraiding, and, after a while, her majesty goes off in a hurry, like a river in the rainy season. The king is doubly miserable, for though he loves Urvasî, he acknowledges a respectful deference for his queen. At last he retires :—

> 'Tis past midday, exhausted by the heat,
> The peacock plunges in the scanty pool
> That feeds the tall tree's root: the drowsy bee
> Sleeps in the hollow chamber of the lotus,
> Darkened with closing petals; on the brink
> Of the now tepid lake the wild duck lurks
> Amongst the sedgy shades; and, even here,
> The parrot from his wiry bower complains,
> And calls for water to allay his thirst.'

At the beginning of the third act we are first informed of what befel Urvasî, when she was recalled to Indra's heaven. She had to act before Indra—her part was that of the goddess of beauty, who selects Vishnu for her husband. One of the names of Vishnu is Purushottama, and poor Urvasî, when called upon to confess whom she loves, forgetting the part she has to act, says, 'I love Purûravas,' instead of 'I love Purushottama.' The author of the play was so much exasperated by this mistake, that he pronounced a curse upon Urvasî, that she should lose her divine knowledge. But when the performance was over, Indra observing her as she stood apart, ashamed and disconsolate, called her. The mortal who engrossed her thoughts, he said, had been his friend in the hours of peril; he had aided him in conflict with the enemies of the gods, and was entitled to his

acknowledgments. She must, accordingly, repair to the monarch, and remain with him 'till he beholds the offspring she shall bear him.'

A second scene opens, in the garden of the palace. The king has been engaged in the business of the state, and retires as the evening approaches:

> 'So ends the day, the anxious cares of state
> Have left no interval for private sorrow.
> But how to pass the night? its dreary length
> Affords no promise of relief.'

A messenger arrives from the queen, apprising his majesty that she desires to see him on the terrace of the pavilion. The king obeys—and ascends the crystal steps while the moon is just about to rise, and the east is tinged with red.

> '*King.*—'Tis even so; illumined by the rays
> Of his yet unseen orb, the evening gloom
> On either hand retires, and in the midst
> The horizon glows, like a fair face that smiles
> Betwixt the jetty curls on either brow
> In clusters pendulous. I could gaze for ever.'

As he is waiting for the queen, his desire for Urvasî is awakened again:

> 'In truth, my fond desire
> Becomes more fervid as enjoyment seems
> Remote, and fresh impediments obstruct
> My happiness—like an impetuous torrent,
> That, checked by adverse rocks, awhile delays
> Its course, till high with chafing waters swollen
> It rushes past with aggravated fury.
> As spreads the moon its lustre, so my love
> Grows with advancing night.'

On a sudden Urvasî enters on a heavenly car, accompanied by her friend. They are invisible again, and listen to the king; but the moment that Urvasî is about to withdraw her veil, the queen appears. She is dressed in white, without any ornaments; and comes to propitiate her husband, by taking a vow.

'*King.*—In truth she pleases me. Thus chastely robed
In modest white, her clustering tresses decked
With sacred flowers alone, her haughty mien
Exchanged for meek devotion—thus arrayed
She moves with heightened charms.

'*Queen.*—My gracious lord, I would perform a rite,
Of which you are the object, and must beg you
Bear with the inconvenience that my presence
May for brief time occasion you.

'*King.*—You do me wrong; your presence is a favour,
. . . . . Yet trust me, it is needless
To wear this tender form, as slight and delicate
As the lithe lotus stem, with rude austerity.
In me behold your slave, whom to propitiate
Claims not your care—your favour is his happiness.'

'*Queen.*—Not vain my vow, since it already wins me
My lord's complacent speech.'

Then the queen performs her solemn vow; she calls upon the god of the moon—

'Hear, and attest
The sacred promise that I make my husband!
Whatever nymph attract my lord's regard,
And share with him the mutual bonds of love,
I henceforth treat with kindness and complacency.'

The Brahman (the confidential friend of the king),

apart to Purûravas—The culprit that escapes before his hand is cut off determines never to run such a risk again. (Aloud.) What then; is his majesty indifferent to your grace?

'*Queen.*—Wise sir, how think you—to promote his happiness
I have resigned my own. Does such a purpose
Prove him no longer dear to me?

'*King.*—I am not what you doubt me; but the power
Abides with you: do with me as you will.
Give me to whom you please, or if you please,
Retain me still your slave.

'*Queen.*—Be what you list;
My vow is plighted—nor in vain the rite,
If it afford you satisfaction. Come
Hence, girls; 'tis time we take our leave.

'*King.*—Not so:
So soon to leave me is no mark of favour.

'*Queen.*—You must excuse me; I may not forego
The duties I have solemnly incurred.'

It does not bring out the character of the king under a very favourable light, that this scene of matrimonial reconciliation, when the queen acts a part which we should hardly expect on an Oriental stage, should be followed immediately by the apparition of Urvasî. She has been present, though invisible, during the preceding conversation between him and his queen, and she now advances behind the king, and covers his eyes with her hands.

'It must be Urvasî (the king says);
No other hand could shed such ecstasy
Through this emaciate frame. The solar ray

Wakes not the night's fair blossom; that alone
Expands when conscious of the moon's dear presence.' [1]

Urvasî takes the resignation of the queen in good earnest, and claims the king as granted her by right. Her friend takes leave, and she now remains with Purûravas as his beloved wife.

'*Urvasî.*—I lament
I caused my lord to suffer pain so long.

'*King.*—Nay, say not so! The joy that follows grief
Gains richer zest from agony foregone.
The traveller who, faint, pursues his track
In the fierce day alone can tell how sweet
The grateful shelter of the friendly tree.'

The next act is the gem of the whole play, though it is very difficult to imagine how it was performed without a *mise en scène* such as our modern theatres would hardly be able to afford. It is a melo-dramatic intermezzo, very different in style from the rest of the play. It is all in poetry, and in the most perfect and highly elaborate metres. Besides, it is not written in Sanskrit, but in Prâkrit, the *lingua vulgaris* of India, poorer in form, but more melodious in sound than Sanskrit. Some of the verses are like airs to be performed by a chorus, but the stage directions which are given in the MSS. are so technical as to make their exact interpretation extremely difficult.

[1] This refers to a very well-known legend. There is one lotus which expands its flowers at the approach of the sun and closes them during night; while another, the beloved of the moon, expands them during night and closes them during day-time. We have a similar myth of the *daisy*, the Anglo-Saxon *dæges êâge*, day's eye, Wordsworth's darling.

We first have a chorus of nymphs, deploring the fate of Urvasî. She had been living with the king in the groves of a forest, in undisturbed happiness.

'Whilst wandering pleasantly along the brink
Of the Mandâkinî, a nymph of air,
Who gambolled on its sandy shore, attracted
The monarch's momentary glance—and this
Aroused the jealous wrath of Urvasî.
Thus incensed
She heedlessly forgot the law that bars
All female access from the hateful groves
Of Kârtikeya. Trespassing the bounds
Proscribed, she suffers now the penalty
Of her transgression, and, to a slender vine
Transformed, there pines till time shall set her free.'

Mournful strains are heard in the air—

'Soft voices low sound in the sky,
Where the nymphs a companion deplore
And lament, as together they fly,
The friend they encounter no more.

'So sad and melodious awakes
The plaint of the swan o'er the stream
When the red lotus blossoms, as breaks
On the wave the day's orient beam.

'Amidst the lake where the lotus, shining,
Its flowers unfold to the sunny beam,
The swan, for her lost companion pining,
Swims sad and slow o'er the lonely stream.'

The king now enters, his features expressing insanity—his dress disordered. The scene represents a wild forest, clouds gathering overhead, elephants, deer, peacocks, and swans are seen. Here are rocks

and waterfalls, lightning and rain. The king first rushes frantically after a cloud which he mistakes for a demon that carried away his bride.

'Hold, treacherous friend; suspend thy flight—forbear:
Ah! whither wouldst thou bear my beauteous bride?
And now his arrows sting me; thick as hail,
From yonder peak, whose sharp top pierces heaven,
They shower upon me.'

[*Rushes forward as to the attack, then pauses, and looks upwards.*]

'It is no demon, but a friendly cloud,—
No hostile quiver, but the bow of Indra;
The cooling rain-drops fall, not barbed shafts,—
And I mistake the lightning for my love.

These raving strains are interrupted by airs, bewailing the fate of the separated lovers; but it is impossible to give an idea of the real beauty of the whole, without much fuller extracts than we are able to give. The following passages may suffice:—

'Ah me! whatever I behold but aggravates
My woe. These bright and pendulous flowers,
Surcharged with dew, resemble those dear eyes,
Glistening with starting tears. How shall I learn
If she have passed this way?'

He addresses various birds, and asks them whether they have seen his love,—the peacock, 'the bird of the dark blue throat and eye of jet,'—the cuckoo, 'whom lovers deem Love's messenger,'—the swans, 'who are sailing northward, and whose elegant gait betrays that they have seen her,'—the *kakravâka*, 'a bird who, during the night, is himself separated from his mate,'—but none give answer. Neither he,

nor the bees who murmur amidst the petals of the lotus, nor the royal elephant, that reclines with his mate under the kadamba tree, has seen the lost one.

'*King.*—From his companion he accepts the bough,
Her trunk has snapped from the balm-breathing tree—
How rich with teeming shoots and juicy fragrance.
He crushes it.
Deep on the mountain's breast,
A yawning chasm appears—such shades are ever
Haunts of the nymphs of air and earth. Perchance,
My Urvasî now lurks within the grotto,
In cool seclusion. I will enter.—All
Is utter darkness. Would the lightning's flash
Now blaze to guide me— No, the cloud disdains—
Such is my fate perverse—to shed for me
Its many-channelled radiance. Be it so.
I will retire—but first the rock address.

Air.

With horny hoofs and a resolute breast,
The boar through the thicket stalks;
He ploughs up the ground, as he plies his quest
In the forest's gloomiest walks.

'Say, mountain, whose expansive slope confines
The forest verge,—oh tell me, hast thou seen
A nymph, as beauteous as the bride of love,
Mounting, with slender frame, thy steep ascent,
Or, wearied, resting in thy crowning woods?
How! no reply? remote, he hears me not,—
I will approach him nearer.

Air.

'From the crystal summits the glistening springs
Rush down the flowery sides,

And the spirit of heaven delightedly sings,
As among the peaks he hides.
Say, mountain so favoured,—have the feet
Of my fair one pressed this calm retreat?

'Now, by my hopes, he answers! He has seen her:
Where is she?—say. Alas! again deceived.
Alone I hear the echo of my words,
As round the cavern's hollow mouth they roll,
And multiplied return. Ah, Urvasî!
Fatigue has overcome me. I will rest
Upon the borders of this mountain torrent,
And gather vigour from the breeze that gleans
Refreshing coolness from its gelid waves.
Whilst gazing on the stream whose new swoln waters
Yet turbid flow, what strange imaginings
Possess my soul, and fill it with delight.
The rippling wave is like her arching brow;
The fluttering line of storks, her timid tongue;
The foamy spray, her white loose floating robe;
And this meandering course the current tracks,
Her undulating gait. All these recall
My soon-offended love. I must appease her . . . .
I'll back to where my love first disappeared.
Yonder the black deer couchant lies; of him
I will inquire. Oh, antelope, behold . . . .
How! he averts his gaze, as if disdaining
To hear my suit! Ah no, he, anxious, marks
His doe approach him; tardily she comes,
Her frolic fawn impeding her advance.'

At last the king finds a gem, of ruddy radiance; it is the gem of union, which, by its mighty spell, should restore Urvasî to her lover. He holds it in his hands, and embraces the vine, which is now transformed into Urvasî. The gem is placed on

Urvasi's forehead, and the king and his heavenly queen return to Allahabad.

'Yonder cloud
Shall be our downy car, to waft us swift
And lightly on our way; the lightning's wave
Its glittering banners; and the bow of Indra (the rainbow)
Hangs as its over-arching canopy
Of variegated and resplendent hues.'

[*Exeunt on the cloud. Music.*]

The fifth and last act begins with an unlucky incident. A hawk has borne away the ruby of reunion. Orders are sent to shoot the thief, and, after a short pause, a forester brings the jewel and the arrow by which the hawk was killed. An inscription is discovered on the shaft, which states that it belonged to Âyus, the son of Urvasî and Purûravas. The king is not aware that Urvasî has ever borne him a son; but while he is still wondering, a female ascetic enters, leading a boy with a bow in his hand. It is Âyus, the son of Urvasî, whom his mother confided to the pious *K*yavana, who educated him in the forest, and now sends him back to his mother. The king soon recognises Âyus as his son. Urvasî also comes to embrace him:—

'Her gaze intent
Is fixed upon him, and her heaving bosom
Has rent its veiling scarf.'

But why has she concealed the birth of this child? and why is she now suddenly bursting into tears? She tells the king herself,

'When for your love I gladly left the courts
Of heaven, the monarch thus declared his will:
"Go, and be happy with the prince, my friend;
But when he views the son that thou shalt bear him,
Then hitherward direct thy prompt return." . . . .
The fated term expires, and to console
His father for my loss, he is restored.
I may no longer tarry.

'*King.*—The tree that languished in the summer's blaze
Puts forth, reviving, as young rain descends,
Its leafy shoots, when lo! the lightning bursts
Fierce on its top, and fells it to the ground.

'*Urvasî.*—But what remains for me? my task on earth
Fulfilled. Once gone, the king will soon forget me.

'*King.*—Dearest, not so. It is no grateful task
To tear our memory from those we love.
But we must bow to power supreme: do you
Obey your lord; for me, I will resign
My throne to this my son, and with the deer
Will henceforth mourn amidst the lonely woods.'

Preparations are made for the inauguration of the young king, when a new *deus ex machina* appears—Narada, the messenger of Indra.

'*Messengèr.*—May your days be many! King, attend:
The mighty Indra, to whom all is known,
By me thus intimates his high commands.
Forego your purpose of ascetic sorrow,
And Urvasî shall be through life united
With thee in holy bonds.'

After this all concludes happily. Nymphs descend from heaven with a golden vase containing the water of the heavenly Ganges, a throne, and other paraphernalia, which they arrange. The prince is in-

augurated as partner of the empire, and all go together to pay their homage to the queen, who had so generously resigned her rights in favour of Urvasî, the heavenly nymph.

Here, then, we have the full flower whose stem we trace through the Purâṇas and the Mahâbhârata to the Brâhmaṇas and the Veda, while the seed lies buried deep in that fertile stratum of language from which all the Aryan dialects draw their strength and nourishment. Mr. Carlyle had seen deep into the very heart of mythology when he said, 'Thus, though tradition may have but one root, it grows, like a banian, into a whole over-arching labyrinth of trees.' The root of all the stories of Purûravas and Urvasî, were short proverbial expressions, of which ancient dialects are so fond. Thus—'Urvasî loves Purûravas,' meant 'the sun rises;' 'Urvasî sees Purûravas naked,' meant 'the dawn is gone;' 'Urvasî finds Purûravas again,' meant 'the sun is setting.' The names of Purûravas and Urvasî are of Indian growth, and we cannot expect to find them identically the same in other Aryan dialects. But the same ideas pervade the mythological language of Greece. There one of the many names of the dawn was Eurydike (p. 406). The name of her husband is, like many Greek words, inexplicable, but Orpheus is the same word as the Sanskrit *Ri*bhu or Arbhu, which, though it is best known as the name of the three *Ri*bhus, was used in the Veda as an epithet of Indra, and a name of the sun. The old story then, was this: 'Eurydike is bitten by a serpent (*i.e.* by the night), she dies, and descends into the lower regions. Orpheus follows her, and obtains from the

gods that his wife should follow him if he promised not to look back. Orpheus promises,—ascends from the dark world below; Eurydike is behind him as he rises, but, drawn by doubt or by love, he looks round;—the first ray of the sun glances at the dawn, —and the dawn fades away.' There may have been an old poet of the name of Orpheus,—for old poets delight in solar names; but, whether he existed or not, certain it is, that the story of Orpheus and Eurydike was neither borrowed from a real event, nor invented without provocation. In India also, the myth of the *Ribhus* has taken a local and historical colouring by a mere similarity of names. A man, or a tribe of the name of *Bribu* (Rv. VI. 45, 31–33),[1] was admitted into the Brahmanic community. They were carpenters, and had evidently rendered material assistance to the family of a Vedic chief, Bharadvâga. As they had no Vaidik gods, the *Ribhus* were made over to them, and many things were ascribed to these gods which originally applied only to the mortal *Bribus*. These historical realities will never yield to a mythological analysis, while the truly mythological answers at once if we only know how to test it. There is a grammar by which that ancient dialect can be retranslated into the common language of the Aryans.

I must come to a close; but it is difficult to leave a subject in which, as in an arch, each stone by itself threatens to fall, while the whole arch would stand the strongest pressure. One myth more.—We have seen how the sun and the dawn have suggested

[1] This explains the passage in *Manu* X. 107, and shows how it ought to be corrected.

so many expressions of love, that we may well ask, did the Aryan nations, previous to their separation, know the most ancient of the gods, the god of love? Was Eros known at that distant period of awakening history, and what was meant by the name by which the Aryans called him? The common etymology derives Eros from a Sanskrit root, *vri* or var, which means to choose, to select.

Now, if the name of love had first been coined in our ball-rooms, such an etymology might be defensible, but surely the idea of weighing, comparing, and prudently choosing could not have struck a strong and genuine heart as the most prominent feature of love. Let us imagine, as well as we can, the healthy and strong feelings of a youthful race of men, free to follow the call of their hearts—unfettered by the rules and prejudices of a refined society, and controlled only by those laws which nature and the graces have engraved on every human heart. Let us imagine such hearts suddenly lighted up by love,—by a feeling of which they knew not either whence it came and whither it would carry them; an impulse they did not even know how to name. If they wanted a name for it, where could they look? Was not love to them like an awakening from sleep? Was it not like a morn radiating with heavenly splendour over their souls, pervading their hearts with a glowing warmth, purifying their whole being like a fresh breeze, and illuminating the whole world around them with a new light? If it was so, there was but one name by which they could express love,—there was but one similitude for the roseate bloom that betrays the

dawn of love—it was the blush of the day, the rising of the sun. 'The sun has risen,' they said, where we say, 'I love;' 'the sun has set,' they said, where we say, 'I have loved.'

And this, which we might have guessed, if we could but throw off the fetters of our own language, is fully confirmed by an analysis of ancient speech. The name of the dawn in Sanskrit is ushas, the Greek Ἕως, both feminine. But the Veda knows also a masculine dawn, or rather a dawning sun (Agni aushasya, Ἑῷος), and in this sense Ushas might be supposed to have taken in Greek the form of Ἔρως. S is frequently changed into r. In Sanskrit it is a general rule that s followed by a media becomes r. In Greek we have the Lakonic forms in ορ instead of ος (Ahrens, 'D. D.' § 8); in Latin, an r between two vowels often exists in ancient inscriptions under the more original form of s (*asa*=*ara*). The very word ushas has in Latin taken the form of *aurora*, which is derived from an intermediate *auros, auroris*, like *flora*, from *flos, floris*.

But, however plausible such analogies may seem, it is only throwing dust in our eyes if comparative philologists imagine they can establish in this manner the transition of a Sanskrit sh into a Greek r. No, whatever analogies other dialects may exhibit, no Sanskrit sh between two vowels has ever as yet been proved to be represented by a Greek r. Therefore Eros cannot be Ushas.

And yet the name of Eros was originally that of the dawning sun. The sun in the Veda is frequently called the runner, the quick racer, or simply the horse, while in the more humanised mythology of Greece,

and also in many parts of the Veda, he is represented as standing on his cart, which in the Veda is drawn by two, seven, or ten horses, while in Greek we also have the quadriga:—

"Αρματα μὲν τάδε λαμπρὰ τεθρίππων
"Ηλιος ἤδη λάμπει κατὰ γῆν.

These horses are called haritas; they are always feminine. They are called bhadrâs, happy or joyful (I. 115, 3); *k*itrâs, many-coloured (I. 115, 3); gh*r*itâ*k*îs and gh*r*itasnâs, bathed in dew (IV. 6, 9); sva*nk*as, with beautiful steps; vîtapr*i*shth*a*s, with lovely backs (V. 45, 10). Thus we read:

Rv. IX. 63, 9. 'The Sun has yoked the ten Harits for his journey.'

Rv. I. 50, 8. 'The seven Harits bring thee, O bright Sun, on thy cart.'

Rv. IV. 13, 3. 'The seven Harits bring him, the Sun, the spy of the world.'

In other passages, however, they take a more human form, and as the Dawn which is sometimes called simply asvâ, the mare, is well known by the name of the sister, these Harits also are called the Seven Sisters (VII. 66, 15); and in one passage (IX. 86, 37) they appear as 'the Harits with beautiful wings.' After this I need hardly say that we have here the prototype of the Grecian 'Charites.'[1]

I should like to follow the track which this recognition of the Charites, as the Sanskrit Haritas,

[1] This point has been more fully discussed in the Second Series of my *Lectures on the Science of Language*, p. 408 *seq.* (1880).

opens to comparative mythology; but I must return to Eros, in whose company they so frequently appear. If, according to the laws which regulate the metamorphosis of common Aryan words adopted in Greek or Sanskrit, we try to transliterate ἔρως into Sanskrit, we find that its derivative suffix ως, ωτος is the same as the termination of the participle of the perfect. This termination is commonly represented in Sanskrit by vas, nom. masc. vân, fem. ushî, neut. vat, and this, though very different grammatically, may etymologically be considered as a parallel form of the originally possessive suffix vat, nom. masc. vân, fem. vatî, neut. vat. There being no short e in Sanskrit, and a Greek ρ corresponding to a Sanskrit r, ἔρως, ἔρωτος, if it existed at all in Sanskrit, would have had the form of ar-vas, nom. árvân, gen. ár-ushas. Now it is true that we do not find in Sanskrit ár-vân, gen. ár-ushas, with any meaning that approaches the Greek ἔρως. But we find ár-vat, gen. ár-vatas, which in the later Sanskrit means a horse, and which in the Veda has retained traces of its radical power, and still displays the sense of quick, running, vehement. This very word is applied to the Sun, so that in some passages it stands as the name of the Sun, while in others it is used as a substantive, meaning horse or rider. Thus, through the irresistible influence of the synonymous character of ancient language, and without any poetical effort on the part of the speaker, those who spoke of the sun as arvat, spoke and thought at the same time of a horse or rider. The word arvat, though intended only to express the rapid sun, set other ideas vibrating which gradually changed the

sun into a horse or a horseman. Arvat means simply horse in passages like I. 91, 20:

'The god Soma gives us the cow; Soma gives us the quick horse; Soma gives a strong son.'

It means horseman or runner, Rv. I. 152, 5:

'The rider is born without a horse, without a bridle.'

The rider who is meant here is the rising sun, and there is a whole hymn addressed to the sun as a horse. Nay, the growth of language and thought is so quick that in the Veda the myth turns, so to speak, back upon itself; and one of the poets (I. 163, 2) praises the bright Vasus, because 'out of the sun they have wrought a horse.' Thus árvat becomes by itself, without any adjective or explanation, the name for sun, like sûrya, âditya, or any other of his old titles. Rv. I. 163, 3, the poet tells the sun, 'Thou, O Arvat (horse), art Âditya' (the sun); and (VI. 12, 6), Agni, or the fire of the sun, is invoked by the same name: 'Thou, O Arvat, keep us from evil report! O Agni, lighted with all the fires! thou givest treasures, thou sendest away all evils; let us live happy for hundred winters; let us have good offspring.'

Before we can show how the threads of this name of the sun in India enter into the first woof of the god of love in Greece, we have still to observe that sometimes the horses, *i.e.* the rays of the sun, are called not only harítas, but rohítas (or róhitâs) and árushîs (or arushâs). Rv. I. 14, 12: 'Yoke the A'rushîs to thy cart, O bright Agni! the Haríts, the Rohíts! with them bring the gods to us!' These names may have been originally mere adjectives,

meaning red, bright, or brown,[1] but they soon grew into names of certain animals belonging to certain gods, according to their different colour and character. Thus we read:

Rv. II. 10, 2. 'Hear thou, the brilliant Agni, my prayer; whether the two black horses (syâvấ) bring thy cart, or the two ruddy (róhitâ), or the two red horses (arushấ).'

And again:

Rv. VII. 42, 2. 'Yoke the Haríts and the Rohíts, or the Arushâs which are in thy stable.'

A'rushî, by itself, is also used for cow; for instance, VIII. 55, 3, where a poet says that he has received four hundred cows (árushînâm *kátuh*-saṭam). These árushîs, or bright cows, belong more particularly to the Dawn, and instead of saying 'the day dawns,' the old poets of the Veda say frequently, 'the bright cows return' (Rv. I. 92, 1). We found that the Haríts were sometimes changed into seven sisters, and thus the A'rushîs also, originally the bright cows, underwent the same metamorphosis:

Rv. X. 5, 5. 'He brought the Seven Sisters, the A'rushîs (the bright cows):' or (X. 8, 3), 'When the sun flew up, the A'rushîs refreshed their bodies in the water.'

Sanskrit scholars need hardly be told that this árushî is in reality the feminine of a form árvas, nom. árvân, gen. árushas, while árvatî is the feminine of ár-vat, nom. árvâ, gen. árvatas. As vid-

[1] Poi che l'altro mattin la bella Aurora
L'aer seren fè bianco e rosso e giallo.—Ariosto, xxiii. 52.
Sì che le bianche e le vermiglie guance,
Là dove io era, della bella Aurora,
Per troppa etate divenivan rance.—Dante, *Purgatorio*, ii. 7.

vâ'n, knowing, forms its feminine vidúshî (*k*ikitvâ'n, *k*ikitúshî), so árvâ(*n*) leads to árushî, a form which fully explains the formation of the feminine of the past participle in Greek. This may be shown by the following equation:—vidvâ'n : vidúshî=*εἰδώς* : *εἰδυῖα*. This feminine árushî is important for our purpose, because it throws new light on the formation of another word, viz. arushá, a masculine, meaning bright or red, and in the Veda a frequent epithet of the sun. Arushá, gen. ásya, follows the weak declension, and árushî is by Sanskrit grammarians considered as the regular feminine of arushá. Arushá, as compared with the participial form ar-vas, is formed like *διάκτορος, ου*, instead of *διάκτωρ, ορος*; like Latin *vasum, i*, instead of *vas, vasis*; like Prâkrit *k*aranteshu, instead of *k*aratsu; like Modern Greek *ἡ νύκτα*, instead of *ἡ νύξ*.

This arushá, as applied in the Veda to bright and solar deities, brings us as near to the Greek Eros as we can expect. It is used in the sense of bright:

Rv. VII. 75, 6. 'The red bright horses are seen bringing to us the brilliant Dawn.'

The horses[1] of Indra, of Agni, of Br*i*haspati, as quick as the wind, and as bright as suns, who lick the udder of the dark cow, the night, are called arushá; the smoke which rises from the burning sun at daybreak, the limbs of the sun with which he climbs the sky, the thunderbolt which Indra throws,

[1] 'Arusha, si voisin d'Aru*n*a (cocher du soleil), et d'Arus (le soleil), se retrouve en Zend sous la forme d'Aurusha (dont Anquetil fait Eorosh, l'oiseau), les chevaux qui traînent Serosh.'—Burnouf, Bhâgavata-Purâ*n*a, p. LXXIX.

the fire which is seen by day and by night, all are called arushá. 'He who fills heaven and earth with light, who runs across the darkness along the sky, who is seen among the black cows of the night,' he is called arushá or the bright hero (arushó vríshâ).

But this bright solar hero, whether Agni[1] or Sûrya, is in the Veda, as in Greek mythology, represented as a child.

Rv. III. 1, 4. 'The Seven Sisters have nursed him, the joyful, the white one, as he was born, the red one (Arusha), by growth; the horses came as to a foal that is born; the gods brought up Agni when he was born.'

Arusha is applied to the young sun in the Veda; the sun who drives away the dark night, and sends his first ray to awaken the world:

Rv. VII. 71, 1. 'Night goes away from her sister, the Dawn; the dark one opens the path for Arusha.'

Though in some of his names there is an unintentional allusion to his animal character, he soon takes a purely human form. He is called Nṛikakshâs (III. 15, 3), 'having the eyes of a man;' and even his wings, as Grimm[2] will be glad to learn, have begun to grow in the Veda, where once, at least (V. 47, 3), he is called Arushá*h* suparnás, 'the bright sun with beautiful wings:'

> Τὸν δ' ἤτοι θνητοὶ μὲν Ἔρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηνόν,
> Ἀθάνατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα, διὰ πτεροφύτορ' ἀνάγκην.

[1] How the god Kâma was grafted on Agni, may be seen from later passages in the Atharva-veda, the Taittirîya-sanhitâ, and some of the Gṛihya-sûtras.—*Indische Studien*, vol. v. pp. 224–226.

[2] See Jacob Grimm's *Essay on the God of Love.*

As Eros is the child of Zeus, Arusha is called the child of Dyaus (Divâḥ sísus).

Rv. IV. 15, 6. 'Him, the god Agni, they adorn and purify every day like a strong horse—like Arushá (the bright sun), the child of Dyaus (heaven).'

Rv. VI. 49, 2. 'Let us worship Agni, the child of Dyaus, the son of strength, Arushá, the bright light of the sacrifice.'

This deity is the first of the gods, for he comes (V. 1, 5) agre ahnâm, 'at the point of the days;' ushasâm agre (VII. 8, 1; X. 45, 5), 'at the beginning of the dawns;' but in one passage two daughters are ascribed to him, different in appearance—the one decked with the stars, the other brilliant by the light of the sun—Day and Night, who are elsewhere called the daughters of the Sun. As the god of love, in the Greek sense of the word, Arusha does not occur, neither has love, as a mere feeling, been deified in the Veda under any name. Kâma, who is the god of love in the later Sanskrit, never occurs in the Veda with personal or divine attributes, except in one passage of the tenth book, and here love is rather represented as a power of creation than as a personal being. But there is one other passage in the Veda, where Kâma, love, is clearly applied to the rising sun. The whole hymn (II. 38, 6) is addressed to Savitar, the sun. It is said, 'He rises as a mighty flame—he stretches out his wide arms—he is even like the wind. When he stops his horses, all activity ceases, and the night follows in his track. But before the night has half finished her weaving, the sun rises again. Then Agni goes to all men and to

all houses; his light is powerful, and his mother, the Dawn, gives him the best share, the first worship among men.' Then the poet goes on:

'He came back, with wide strides, longing for victory; the love of all men came near. The eternal approached, leaving the work (of Night) half-done; he followed the command of the heavenly Savitar.'

'The love of all men,' may mean he who is loved by all men, or who grants their wishes to all men; yet I do not think it is by accident that Kâma, love, is thus applied to the rising sun.

Even in the latest traditions of the Purâṇas, the original solar character of the god of love, the beloved of the Dawn, was not quite forgotten. For we find that one of the names given to the son of Kâma, to Aniruddha,[1] the irresistible (*ἀνίκατος μάχαν*), is Ushâpati, the lord of the Dawn.

If we place clearly before our mind all the ideas and allusions which have clustered round the names of Arvat and Arusha in the Veda, the various myths told of Eros, which at first seem so contradictory, become perfectly intelligible. He is in Hesiod the oldest of the gods, born when there exist as yet only Chaos and Earth. Here we have 'Arusha born at the beginning of all the days.' He is the youngest of the gods, the son of Zeus, the friend of the Charites, also the son of the chief Charis, Aphrodite, in whom we can hardly fail to discover a female Eros (an Ushâ instead of an Agni aushasya).[2] Every one of these myths finds its

[1] The story of Ushâ, Aniruddha, and Kitralekhâ is told by Somadeva (transl. VI. c. 27–34, p. 134; Vishṇu-purâṇa, p. 549; Harivaṃśa, śl. 9910).

[2] *Cf. Raptus Helenæ*, 16, *Χαρίτων βασίλειαν Ἀφροδίτην*.

key in the Veda. Eros or Arusha is the rising sun, and hence the child, the son of Dyaus; he yokes the Harits, and is, if not the son,[1] at least the beloved of the Dawn. Besides, in Greek mythology also, Eros has many fathers and many mothers; and one pair of parents given him by Sappho, Heaven and Earth, is identical with his Vaidik parents, Dyaus and Idâ.[2]

[1] *Cf.* 'Maxim. Tyr.' XXIV. *τὸν Ἔρωτά φησιν ἡ Διοτίμα τῷ Σωκράτει οὐ παῖδα, ἀλλ' ἀκόλουθον τῆς Ἀφροδίτης, καὶ θεράποντα εἶναι.* See Preller, *Greek Mythology*, p. 238.

[2] The objections raised by Professor Curtius (*Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie*, p. 114) against the common origin of ἔρως and arvat deserve careful attention. 'How can we separate Ἔρως,' he says, 'from ἔρος, ἔραμαι, ἐράω, ἐρατός, ἐρατεινός, and other words, all of ancient date, and even Homeric? They cannot have sprung from the name ἔρως, and if we suppose that they sprang from the same root ar, to which we have to assign the sense of going, running, striving, ἔρος would mean striving, or desire, and it would be difficult to prove that the cognate Ἔρως started from the meaning of horse, or solar horse, which in Sanskrit was assigned to arvat.' Professor Curtius then proceeds to urge the same objections against the etymology of Charis: 'For what shall we do,' he says, 'with χαρά, χαίρω, χαρίζομαι, χαρίεις?' With regard to Charis, I may refer to the explanations which I have given in the Second Series of my Lectures, page 408, where I hope I have proved that Charis cannot be placed, as Professor Curtius proposes, in the same category of deities as Δειμός or Φόβος; and that there is nothing in the least improbable in certain derivatives of an ancient Aryan root taking a mythological character, while others retain an analogous appellative meaning. From the root dyu, to shine, we have Dyaus and Ζεύς: but we also have in Sanskrit diva and dina, day; and in Greek ἔνδιος, at noon day, δῆλος, bright. From the root vas or ush, to glow, to burn, we have Ἑστία, Vesta, Ushas, Eos, Aurora: but likewise Sanskrit usra, early, ushna, hot; Latin *uro, aurum*; Greek αὔω, αὔ-ριον, ἠρι. Unless we suppose that roots, after having given rise to a single mythological name, were struck by instantaneous sterility, or that Greek mythological names can only be derived from roots actually employed in that language, what we observe in the case of Eros and Charis is the natural and almost inevitable result of the growth of language and myth, such as we now understand it. Greek scholars have asked, 'how can we separate ἑρμηνεύω from Ἑρμῆς (*Grundzüge*, p. 312), or ἐριννύειν from

India, however, is not Greece; and though we may trace the germs and roots of Greek words and Greek

'Ερινύς (Welcker)?' Yet few have questioned Kuhn's etymology of 'Ερμῆς and 'Ερινύς, whatever difference of opinion may prevail as to the exact process by which these two deities came to be what they are. But, on the other hand, I cannot protest too strongly against the opinion that has been ascribed to me, that the Greeks were in any way conscious of the secondary or idiomatic meaning which arvat and harit had assumed in India. In India both arvat, running, and harit, bright, become recognised names for horse. As arvat was also applied to the sun, the heavenly runner, the conception of the sun as a horse became almost inevitable, and required no poetical effort on the part of people speaking Sanskrit. Nothing of the kind happened in Greek. In Greek ἔρως was never used as an appellative in the sense of horse, as little as ζεύς was used, except in later times, to signify the material sky. But unless we are prepared to look upon Eros, 'the oldest of the Greek gods,' as a mere abstraction, as, in fact, a kind of Cupid, I thought, and I still think, that we have to admit among the earliest worshippers of Eros, even on Greek soil, a faint recollection of the ancient Aryan mythology in which the same word as Eros had been applied to the sun, and especially the rising sun. All the rest is simple and easy. The root ar, no doubt, had the sense of running or rushing, and might have yielded therefore names expressive of quick motion as well as of strong desire. Not every shoot, however, that springs from such a seed, lives on, when transferred to a different soil. *Eros* might have been the name for horse in Greece as arvat was in India, but it was not; arvat, or some other derivative like artha, might have expressed desire in Sanskrit as it did in Greek, but this, too, was not the case. Why certain words die, and others live on, why certain meanings of words become prominent so as to cause the absorption of all other meanings, we have no chance of explaining. We must take the work of language as we find it, and in disentangling the curious skein, we must not expect to find one continuous thread, but rest satisfied if we can separate the broken ends, and place them side by side in something like an intelligible order. Greek mythology was not borrowed from Vedic mythology, any more than Greek words were taken from a Sanskrit dictionary. This being once understood and generally admitted, offence should not be taken if here and there a Vedic deity or a Sanskrit word is called a prototype. The expression, I know, is not quite correct, and cannot be defended, except on the plea that almost everybody knows what is meant by it. The Greek Charites are certainly not

ideas to the rich soil of India, the full flower of Aryan language, of Aryan poetry and mythology, belongs to Hellas, where Plato has told us what Eros is, and where Sophokles sang his

Ἔρως ἀνίκατε μάχαν,
Ἔρως, ὃς ἐν κτήμασι πίπτεις,
ὃς ἐν μαλακαῖς παρειαῖς
νεάνιδος ἐννυχεύεις·
φοιτᾷς δ' ὑπερπόντιος, ἔν τ'
ἀγρονόμοις αὐλαῖς·
καί σ' οὔτ' ἀθανάτων φύξιμος οὐδείς,
οὔθ' ἀμερίων ἐπ' ἀν-
θρώπων· ὁ δ' ἔχων μέμηνεν.[1]

If Hegel calls the discovery of the common origin of Greek and Sanskrit the discovery of a new world, the same may be said with regard to the common origin of Greek and Sanskrit mythology. The discovery is made, and the science of comparative mythology will soon rise to the same importance as that of comparative philology. I have here explained but a few myths, but they all belong to one small cycle, and many more names might have been added. I may refer those who take an interest in this geology of language to the 'Journal of Comparative Philology,' published by my learned friend, Dr. Kuhn,

a mere modification of the Vedic Haritas, nor the Greek Eros of the Vedic Arvat. There was no recollection of an equine character in the Greek Eros or the Charites, just as, from a purely Greek point of view, no traces of a canine character could be discovered in Ἑλένη = Saramâ, or Ἑρμείας = Sârameya. Arvat and Eros are radii starting from a common central thought, and the angle of the Vedic radius is less obtuse than that of the Greek. This is all that could be meant, and I believe this is the sense in which my words have been understood by the majority of my readers.

[1] *Antigone*, ed. Dindorf, Oxford 1859, v. 781.

at Berlin, who, in his periodical, has very properly admitted comparative mythology as an integral part of comparative philology, and who has himself discovered some of the most striking parallelisms between the traditions of the Veda and the mythological names of other Aryan nations. The very 'Hippokentaurs and the Chimæra, the Gorgons and Pegasos, and other monstrous creatures,' have apparently been set right; and though I differ from Dr. Kuhn on several points, and more particularly with regard to the elementary character of the gods, which he, like Lauer, the lamented author of the 'System of Greek Mythology,' seems to me to connect too exclusively with the fleeting phenomena of clouds and storms, and thunder, while I believe their original conception to have been almost always solar, yet there is much to be learnt from both. Much, no doubt, remains to be done, and even with the assistance of the Veda, the whole of Greek mythology will never be deciphered and translated. But can this be urged as an objection? There are many Greek words of which we cannot find a satisfactory etymology, even by the help of Sanskrit. Are we therefore to say that the whole Greek language has no etymological organization? If we find a rational principle in the formation of but a small portion of Greek words, we are justified in inferring that the same principle which manifests itself in part, governed the organic growth of the whole; and though we cannot explain the etymological origin of all words, we should never say that language had no etymological origin, or that etymology 'treats of a past which was never present.' That the later

Greeks, such as Homer and Hesiod, were ignorant of the origin and purport of their myths, I fully admit, but they were equally ignorant of the origin and purport of their words. What applies to etymology, therefore, applies with equal force to mythology. It has been proved by comparative philology that there is nothing irregular in language, and what was formerly considered as irregular in declension and conjugation is now recognised as the most regular and primitive stratum in the formation of grammar. The same, we hope, may be accomplished in mythology, and instead of deriving it, as heretofore, 'ab ingenii humani imbecillitate et a dictionis egestate,' it will obtain its truer solution, 'ab ingenii humani sapientia et a dictionis abundantia.' Mythology is only a dialect, an ancient form of language. Mythology, though chiefly concerned with nature, and here again mostly with those manifestations which bear the character of law, order, power, and wisdom impressed on them, was applicable to all things. Nothing is excluded from mythological expression; neither morals nor philosophy, neither history nor religion, have escaped the spell of that ancient sibyl. But mythology is neither philosophy, nor history, nor religion, nor ethics. It is, if we may use a scholastic expression, a *quale*, not a *quid*—something formal, not something substantial, and, like poetry, sculpture, and painting, applicable to nearly all that the ancient world could admire or adore.

VI.

GREEK MYTHOLOGY.[1]

It does not happen very often that we take up a German book of more than eight hundred pages, closely printed, and bristling with notes and quotations, and feel unwilling to put it down again before having finished the whole of it. However, this is what has happened to us, and will happen to many a reader of Professor Welcker's 'Greek Mythology,' if he is capable of entering with a real and human interest into the life and thoughts and feelings of the ancient Greeks, and more particularly into the spirit of their religion, their worship, and sacred traditions. To those who require any preliminary information respecting the author, we may say, first of all, that Welcker is a very old man, a man belonging almost to an age gone by, one of the few men remaining of the heroic age of German scholarship. The present generation, a race not quite contemptible in itself, looks up to him as the Greeks looked up to Nestor. He knew old Voss, the translator of Homer, when he was a young man fighting the battle of rational mythology against the symbolic school of Creuzer. He was the friend of Zoëga. He speaks

[1] *Griechische Götterlehre.* Von F. G. Welcker. Erster Band. Göttingen, 1857.

of Buttmann, of Lexilogus Buttmann, as a scholar who had felt the influence of his teaching; and he looks upon Otfried Müller, the Dorian Müller, as belonging originally to his school, though afterwards carrying out the views of his master in an independent, and sometimes too independent spirit. Welcker has been lecturing and writing on mythology for many years, and he finds, not without satisfaction, that many of the views which he first propounded in his lectures, lectures open to any one who liked to listen, have become current, and, as it were, public property, long before his book was published. He is not a man to put forward any claims of priority; and if he dwells at all on the subject, it is rather in self-defence. He wishes to remind his readers that if he propounds certain views with the warmth of a discoverer, if he defends them strenuously against all possible objections, it is because he has been accustomed to do so for years, and because it was necessary for him to do so, at the time when he first elaborated his system, and explained it in his lectures. Welcker's 'Mythology' has been expected for many years. It has been discussed long before it appeared. 'It is to my great regret, and certainly without my fault,' the author says, 'that so great expectations have been raised.' However, if the expectations have been great among the professors in Germany, they will admit that they have not been disappointed, and that the promise given by young Welcker has been fulfilled by the veteran.

'The science of the Greek Gods' ('die Griechische Götterlehre'), which is the title of the book, though it carries the reader along most rapidly, exciting curiosity at every page, and opening new views in

every chapter, is nevertheless a book which requires more than one perusal. It may be read, with the exception of some less finished chapters, for pleasure; but it deserves to be studied, to be thought over, examined and criticised, and it is then only that its real value is discovered. There have been many books published lately on mythology. Preller, Gerhard, Schelling, Maury, have followed each other in rapid succession. Preller's 'Greek Mythology' is a useful and careful compendium. Gerhard's 'Greek Mythology' is a storehouse, only sometimes rather a labyrinth, of mythological lore. On Schelling's 'Philosophy of Mythology,' published in his posthumous works, we hardly dare to pronounce an opinion. And yet, with all due respect for his great name, with a sincere appreciation, too, of some deep thoughts on the subject of mythology, and more particularly with a full acknowledgment of his merits in having pointed out more strongly than anybody else the inevitable character of mythological thought and language in the widest sense of the word, we must say, as critics, that his facts and theories defy all rules of sound scholarship, and that his language is so diffuse and vague, as to be unworthy of the century we live in. To one who knows how powerful and important an influence Schelling's mind exercised on Germany at the beginning of this century, it is hard to say this. But if we could not read his posthumous volumes without sadness, and without a strong feeling of the mortality of all human knowledge, we cannot mention them, when they must be mentioned, without expressing our conviction that though they are interesting on account of their author, they are disappointing in

every other respect. Maury's 'Histoire des Religions de la Grèce Antique' is, like all the works of that industrious writer, lucid and pleasing. It does not profess to add many results of independent research to what was known before on the various subjects on which he writes. The gifted author has thus escaped much of that violent criticism to which Welcker has been subjected, and only carried away the thanks of all who read his careful manuals.

What distinguishes Welcker from all his predecessors is, that with him mythology is not only a collection of fables, to be described, sifted, and arranged, but a problem to be solved, and a problem as important as any in the history of the world. His whole heart is in his work. He wants to know, and wants to explain what mythology means, how such a thing as Greek mythology could ever have existed. It is the origin of every god which he tries to discover, leaving everything else to flow naturally from the source once opened and cleared.

A second feature, which is peculiar to his treatment of mythology, is that he never looks on the Greek fables as a system. There were myths before there was a mythology, and it is in this, their original and unsystematic form alone, that we may hope to discover the genuine and primitive meaning of every myth.

A third distinguishing feature of Welcker's book consists in the many things he leaves out. If a myth had once been started, poets, artists, philosophers, and old women might do with it whatever they pleased. If there was once a Herakles travelling all over the earth, killing monsters, punishing every kind

of wickedness, and doing what no one else could do, the natural result would be that, in every town and village, whatever no one else could have done would be ascribed to Herakles. The little stories invented to account for all these Heraklean doings may be very interesting to the people of the village, but they have as little right to a place in Greek mythology as the Swiss legends of the Devil's bridges have to a place in a work on Swiss theology or history. To be able to distinguish between what is essential and what is not, requires a peculiar talent, and Professor Welcker possesses it.

A fourth point which is of characteristic importance in Welcker's manner of handling Greek mythology is the skill with which he takes every single myth to pieces. When he treats of Apollo, he does not treat of him as one person, beginning with his birth, detailing his various exploits, accounting for his numerous epithets, and removing the contradictory character of many of his good or bad qualities. The birth of the god is one myth, his association with a twin sister another, his quarrel with Hermes a third—each intelligible in itself, though perplexing when gathered up into one large web of Apollonic theology.

Nowhere, again, have we seen the original character of the worship of Zeus, as the God, or, as he is called in later times, as the Father of the Gods, as the God of Gods, drawn with so sure and powerful a hand as in Welcker's 'Mythology.' When we ascend with him to the most distant heights of Greek history, the idea of God, as the supreme Being, stands before us as a simple fact. Next to this adoration of One

God, the father of heaven, the father of men, we find in Greece a worship of nature. The powers of nature, originally worshipped as such, were afterwards changed into a family of gods, of which Zeus became the king and father. This third phase is what is generally called Greek mythology; but it was preceded in time, or at least rendered possible in thought, by the two prior conceptions, a belief in a supreme God, and a worship of the powers of nature. The Greek religions, says Welcker, if they are analysed and reduced to their original form, are far more simple than we think. It is so in all great things. And the better we are acquainted with the variety and complications of all that has grown up around them, the more we feel surprised at the smallness of the first seeds, the simplicity of the fundamental ideas. The divine character of Zeus, as distinct from his mythological character, is most carefully brought out by Welcker. He avails himself of all the discoveries of comparative philology in order to show more clearly how the same idea which found expression in the ancient religions of the Brahmans, the Slaves, and the Germans, had been preserved under the same simple, clear, and sublime name by the original settlers of Hellas. We are not inclined to be too critical when we meet with a classical scholar who avails himself of the works of Sanskrit philologists. It does him credit if he only acknowledges that the beginnings of Greek language, Greek thought and tradition, lie beyond the horizon of the so-called classical world. It is surprising to find, even at the present day, men of the highest attainments in Greek and Latin scholarship, intentionally shutting their eyes

to what they know to be the light of a new day. Unwilling to study a new subject, and unable to confess their ignorance on any subject, they try to dispose of the works of a Humboldt, Bopp, or Bunsen by pointing out a few mistakes, perhaps a wrong accent or a false quantity—which 'any schoolboy would be ashamed of.' They might as well scoff at Wyld's Globe because it has not the accuracy of an Ordnance survey. So, if we find in a work like Welcker's, little slips, such as devas, sky, instead of god, dyavî, a Sanskrit dative, instead of divê, the dative, or dyavi, the locative, we just mark them on the margin, but we do not crow over them like schoolmasters or rather schoolboys. We should sometimes like to ask a question, for instance, how Professor Welcker could prove that the German word God has the same meaning as good? He quotes Grimm's 'History of the German Language,' p. 571, in support of this assertion, but we have looked in vain for any passage where Grimm gives up his former opinion, that the two words *God* and *good* run parallel in all the Teutonic dialects, but never converge towards a common origin. However, Welcker's example, we hope, will have its good effect among classical scholars. What could have been a greater triumph for all who take an interest in comparative philology and in a more comprehensive study of ancient humanity, than to find in a work on Greek mythology, written by one of the most famous classical scholars, the fundamental chapter, the chapter containing the key to the whole system, headed, 'The Vedas'?

But even Welcker is not without his backslidings. In some parts of his work, and particularly in his

chapter on Zeus, he admits implicitly the whole argument of comparative mythology. He admits that the first beginnings of Zeus, the god of gods, must be studied in the ancient songs of the Veda, and in the ancient traditions of the chief members of the Aryan family. But afterwards he would like to make his reserves. He has been studying the Greek gods all his life, and the names and natures of many of them had become clear and intelligible to him without the help of Sanskrit or the Veda. Why should they be handed over to the Aryan crucible? This is a natural feeling. It is the same in Greek etymology. If we can fully explain a Greek word from the resources of the Greek language, why should we go beyond? And yet it cannot be avoided. Some of the most plausible Greek etymologies have had to give way before the most unlikely, and yet irrefragable, derivations from Sanskrit.

Many a Greek scholar may very naturally say, why, if we can derive *θεός* from *θέειν*, or from *τιθέναι*, should we go out of our way and derive it from any other root?[1] Any one acquainted with the true principles of etymology will answer this question; and Welcker himself would be the first to admit, that from whatever source it may be derived, it cannot be derived from *θέειν* or *τιθέναι*. But the same argument holds good with regard to the names of the gods. *Ζήs*, the old nominative, of which we have the accusative *Ζῆν* ('Iliad,' viii. 206, formerly *Ζῆν'*),

[1] The latest defence of the etymology of *θεός* as not to be separated from the cluster of words which spring from the root div, may be seen in Ascoli, 'Frammenti Linguistici,' *Rendiconti*, i. (1864), pp. 185–200. See also *Selected Essays*, vol. i. p. 215.

and *Ζήν*, of which we have the accusative *Ζῆνα*, might well have been derived by former Greek etymologists from *ζῆν*, to live. But Professor Welcker knows that, after etymology has once assumed an historical and scientific character, a derivation, inapplicable to the cognate forms of *Ζεύς* in Sanskrit, is inapplicable to the word itself in Greek. There are, no doubt, words and mythological names peculiar to Greece, and framed in Greece after the separation of the Aryan tribes. *Κρονίων*, for instance, is a Greek word, and a Greek idea, and Professor Welcker was right in explaining it from Greek sources only. But wherever the same mythological name exists in Greek and Sanskrit, no etymology can be admitted which would be applicable to the Greek only, without being applicable to the Sanskrit word. There is no such being as *Κρόνος* in Sanskrit. *Κρόνος* did not exist till long after *Ζεύς* in Greece. *Ζεύς* was called by the Greeks the son of time. This is a simple and very common form of mythological expression. It meant originally, not that time was the origin or the source of Zeus, but *Κρονίων* or *Κρονίδης* was used in the sense of 'connected with time, representing time, existing through all time.' Derivatives in *ιων* and *ιδης* took, in later times, the more exclusive meaning of patronymics, but originally they had a more general qualifying sense, such as we find still in our own, originally Semitic, expressions, 'son of pride,' 'sons of light,' 'son of Belial.' *Κρονίων* is the most frequent epithet of *Ζεύς* in Homer; it frequently stands by itself instead of *Ζεύς*. It was a name fully applicable to the supreme God, the God of time, the eternal God. Who does not think of the Ancient of

Days? When this ceased to be understood, particularly as in the current word for time the κ had become aspirated (*κρόνος* had become *χρόνος*), people asked themselves the question, why is *Ζεύς* called *Κρονίδης*? And the natural and almost inevitable answer was, because he is the son, the offspring of a more ancient god, *Κρόνος*. This may be a very old myth in Greece; but the misunderstanding which gave rise to it, could have happened in Greece only. We cannot expect, therefore, a god *Κρόνος* in the Veda. When this myth of *Κρόνος* had once been started, it would roll on irresistibly. If *Ζεύς* had once a father called *Κρόνος*, *Κρόνος* must have a wife. Yet it should be remembered as a significant fact, that in Homer *Ζεύς* is not yet called the son of Rhea, and that the name of *Κρονίδης* belongs originally to *Ζεύς* only, and not to his later brothers, Poseidon and Hades. Myths of this kind can be analysed by Greek mythologists, as all the verbs in *έω*, *άω*, and *όω* can be explained by Greek etymologists. But most other names, such as Hermes, Eos, Eros, Erinys require more powerful tests; and Professor Welcker has frequently failed to discover their primitive character, because he was satisfied with a merely Greek etymology. He derives Erinys, or Erinnys, from a verb *ἐριννύειν*, to be angry, and gives to her the original meaning of Conscience. Others have derived it from the same root as *ἔρις*, strife: others again from *ἐρεείνω*, to ask. But Erinys is too old a god for so modern a conception. Erinys is the Vedic Saran*y*û, the dawn; and even in Greek she is still called *ἠεροφοῖτις*, hovering in the gloom. There is no word expressive of any abstract quality, which had not originally a

material meaning; nor is there in the ancient language of mythology any abstract deity which does not cling with its roots to the soil of nature. Professor Welcker is not the man to whom we need address this remark. He knows the German proverb:

> 'Kein Faden ist so fein gesponnen
> Er kommt doch endlich an der Sonnen.'

He also knows how the sun is frequently represented as the avenger of dark crimes. The same idea is expressed by the myth of Erinys. Instead of our lifeless and abstract expression, 'a crime is sure to be discovered,' the old proverbial and poetical expression was, the Dawn, the Erinys, will bring it to light. Crime itself was called, in the later mythologising language, the daughter of Night, and her avenger therefore could only be the Dawn. Was not the same Dawn called the bloodhound? Could she not find the track of the cattle stolen from the gods? She had a thousand names in ancient language, because she called forth a thousand different feelings in ancient hearts. A few only of these names became current appellatives; others remained as proper names, unintelligible in their etymological meaning and their poetical conception. The Greeks knew as little that Erinys meant the Dawn, as Shakespeare knew the meaning of the Weird Sisters. Weird, however, was originally one of the three Nornes, the German Parcæ. They were called *Vurdh*, *Verdhandi*, and *Skuld*—Past, Present, and Future; and the same idea is expressed more graphically by the thread that is spun, the thread passing through the fingers, and

the thread which is still on the distaff; or by Lachesis singing the past (*τὰ γεγονότα*), Klotho singing the present (*τὰ ὄντα*), and Atropos singing the future (*τὰ μέλλοντα*). The most natural expression for to-morrow was the morn; for the future, the dawn. Thus Sara*n*yû, as one of the names of the dawn, became the name of the future, more especially of the coming avenger, the inevitable light. Homer speaks of the Erinys in the plural, and so do the poets of the Veda. Neither of them, however, know as yet their names and parentage. Hesiod calls them the daughters of the Earth, conceived of the drops of the blood of Uranos. Sophokles claims the same freedom as Hesiod, he calls them the daughters of Skotos, or Darkness. Thus a mere proverb would supply in time a whole chapter of mythology, and furnish an Æschylus and Plato with subjects for the deepest thought and the most powerful poetry.

Into these, the earliest strata of mythological language and thought, no shaft can reach from the surface of Greece or Italy, and we cannot blame Professor Welcker for having failed in extricating the last roots and fibres of every mythological name. He has done his work; he has opened a mine, and, after bringing to light the treasures he was in search of, he has pointed out the direction in which that mine may be worked with safety. If new light is to be thrown on the most ancient and the most interesting period in the history of the human mind, the period in which names were given and myths were formed, that light must come from the Vedas; and we trust that Professor Welcker's book, by its weak as well as by its strong points, will impress on every

classical scholar what Otfried Müller perceived many years ago, 'that matters have come to such a point that classical philology must either resign altogether the historical understanding of the growth of language, as well as all etymological researches into the shape of roots and the organism of grammatical forms, or trust itself on these points entirely to the guidance and counsel of comparative philology.'

VII.

GREEK LEGENDS.[1]

If the stories of the Greek gods and heroes, as told by Mr. Cox in his 'Tales from Greek Mythology,' the 'Tales of Gods and Heroes,' and the 'Tales of Thebes and Argos,' do not quite possess in the eyes of our children the homely charm of Grimm's Mährchen or Dasent's Norse Tales, we must bear in mind that at heart our children are all Goths or Northmen, not Greeks or Romans; and that, however far we may be removed from the times which gave birth to the stories of Dornröschen, Schneewittchen, and Rumpelstilzchen, there is a chord within us that answers spontaneously to the pathos and humour of those tales, while our sympathy for Hecuba is acquired, and more or less artificial. If the choice were left to children whether they would rather have a story about the Norse trolls read out to them or the tale of the Trojan war as told by Mr. Cox, we fully believe—in fact we know—that they would all clamour for Dasent or Grimm. But if children are told that they cannot always be treated to trolls and fairies, and that they must learn something about the Greek gods and goddesses, we like-

[1] *A Manual of Mythology, in the Form of Question and Answer.* By the Rev. G. W. Cox. London: Longmans and Co. 1867.

wise know that they will rather listen to Mr. Cox's tales from Greek fairyland than to any other book that is used at lessons.

The 'Manual of Mythology' which Mr. Cox has just published is meant as a lesson-book, more so than any of his former publications. If we add that the whole of Greek and Roman mythology is told in two hundred pages, in the somewhat cumbrous form of question and answer, we need not say that we have only a meagre abstract of classical mythology, a minimum, a stepping-stone, a primer, a skeleton, or whatever unpleasant name we like to apply to it. We wish indeed that Mr. Cox had allowed himself more ample scope, yet we feel bound to acknowledge that, having undertaken to tell what can be told, in two hundred pages, of classical mythology, he has chosen the most important, the most instructive, and the most attractive portions of his subject. Though necessarily leaving large pieces of his canvas mere blanks or covered with the faintest outlines, he has given to some of his sketches more life and expression than can be found in many a lengthy article contributed to cyclopædias and other works of reference.

But while Mr. Cox has thus stinted himself in telling the tales of Greek and Roman mythology, he has made room for what is an entirely new feature in his Manual—namely, the explanations of Greek and Roman myths, supplied by the researches of comparative mythologists. From the earliest philosophers of Greece down to Creuzer, Schelling, and Welcker, everybody who has ever thought or written on mythology has freely admitted that mythology

requires an explanation. All are agreed that a myth does not mean what it seems to mean; and this agreement is at all events important, in spite of the divergent explanations which have been proposed by different scholars and philosophers in their endeavours to find sense either in single myths or in the whole system of ancient mythology.

There is also one other point on which of late years a general agreement has been arrived at among most students of mythology, and this is that all mythological explanations must rest on a sound etymological basis. Comparative philology, after working a complete reform in the grammar and etymology of the classical languages, has supplied this new foundation for the proper study of classical mythology, and no explanation of any myth can henceforth be taken into account which is not based on an accurate analysis of the names of the principal actors. If we read in Greek mythology that Helios was the brother of Eos and Selene, this needs no commentary. Helios means the sun, Eos the dawn, Selene the moon; nor does it require any great stretch of poetical imagination to understand how these three heavenly apparitions came to be called brothers and sisters.

But if we read that Apollo loved Daphne, that Daphne fled before him and was changed into a laurel-tree, we have here a legend before us which yields no sense till we know the original meaning of Apollo and Daphne. Now Apollo was a solar deity, and although comparative philologists have not yet succeeded in finding the true etymology of Apollo, no doubt can exist as to his original character. The

name of Daphne, however, could not have been interpreted without the aid of comparative philology, and it is not till we know that Daphne was originally a name of the dawn, that we begin to understand the meaning of her story. It was by analysing myths which were still half intelligible, like those of Apollo and Daphne, Selene and Endymion, Eos and Tithonos, that the first advance was made towards a right interpretation of Greek and Roman legends.

If we read that Pan was wooing Pitys, and that Boreas, jealous of Pan, cast Pitys from a rock, and that in her fall she was changed into a pine-tree, we need but walk with our eyes open along the cliffs of Bournemouth in order to see the meaning of that legend. Boreas is the Greek for north-wind, Pitys for pine-tree. But what is Pan? Clearly another deity representing the wind in its less destructive character. The same Pan is called the lover of the nymph Echo, and of Syrinx. Why Pan, the wind, should be called the lover of Echo, requires no explanation. As to the nymph Syrinx—a name which means, in Greek, the shepherd's pipe—she is further fabled to have thrown herself into the river Ladon in order to escape from Pan, and to have been changed into a reed. Here mythology has simply inverted history; and while, in an account of the invention of musical instruments, we should probably be told that the wind whistling through the river reeds led to the invention of the shepherd's pipe, the poet tells us that Pan, the wind, played with Syrinx, and that Syrinx was changed into a reed. The name of Pan is connected with the Sanskrit name for wind—namely, pavana. The root from which it is derived

means, in Sanskrit, to purify; and as from the root dyu, to shine, we have in Greek *Zên*, *Zénós*, corresponding to a supposed Sanskrit derivative, dyav-an, the bright god, we have from pû, to purify, the Greek *Pân*, *Pânos*, the purifying or sweeping wind, strictly corresponding to a possible Sanskrit form pav-an. If there was anywhere in Greece a sea-shore covered with pine-forests, like the coast of Dorset, any Greek poet who had ears to hear the sweet and plaintive converse of the wind and the trembling pine-trees, and eyes to see the havoc wrought by a fierce north-easter, would tell his children of the wonders of the forest, and of poor Pitys, the pine-tree wooed by Pan, the gentle wind, and struck down by jealous Boreas, the north-wind.

It is thus that mythology arose, and thus that it must be interpreted if it is to be more than a mere conglomerate of meaningless or absurd stories. This has been felt by Mr. Cox; and feeling convinced that, particularly for educational purposes, mythology would be useless—nay, worse than useless—unless it were possible to impart to it some kind of rational meaning, he has endeavoured to supply for nearly every important name of the Greek and Roman pantheon an etymological explanation and a rational interpretation. In this manner, as he says in his preface, mythology can be proved to be 'simply a collection of the sayings by which men once upon a time described whatever they saw and heard in countries where they lived. These sayings were all perfectly natural, and marvellously beautiful and true. We see the lovely evening twilight die out before the coming night, but when they saw this,

they said that the beautiful Eurydike had been stung by the serpent of darkness, and that Orpheus was gone to fetch her back from the land of the dead. We see the light which had vanished in the west reappear in the east; but they said that Eurydike was now returning to the earth. And as this tender light is seen no more when the sun himself is risen, they said that Orpheus had turned round too soon to look at her, and so was parted from the wife whom he loved so dearly.' And not only do meaningless legends receive by this process a meaning and a beauty of their own, but some of the most revolting features of classical mythology are removed, and their true purport discovered. Thus Mr. Cox remarks:—

'And as it is with this sad and beautiful tale of Orpheus and Eurydike, so it is with all those which may seem to you coarse or dull or ugly. They are so only because the real meaning of the names has been half-forgotten or wholly lost. Œdipus and Perseus, we are told, killed their parents, but it is only because the sun was said to kill the darkness from which it seems to spring. So, again, it was said that the sun was united in the evening to the light from which he rose in the morning; but in the later story it was said that Œdipus became the husband of his mother Iocaste, and a terrible history was built upon this notion. But none of these fearful stories were ever made on purpose. No one ever sat down to describe gods and great heroes as doing things which all decent men would be ashamed to think of. There can scarcely be a greater mistake than to suppose that whole nations were suddenly

seized with a strange madness which drove them to invent all sorts of ridiculous and contemptible tales, and that every nation has at some time or other gone mad in this way.'

That the researches of comparative mythologists, so well summed up in Mr. Cox's 'Manual of Mythology,' are in the main tending in the right direction, is, we believe, admitted by all whose opinion on such matters carries much weight. It has been fully proved that mythology is simply a phase, and an inevitable phase, in the growth of language; language being taken in its proper sense, not as the mere outward symbol, but as the only possible embodiment of thought. Everything, while language passes through that peculiar phase, may become mythology. Not only the ideas of men as to the origin of the world, the government of the universe, the phenomena of nature, and the yearnings and misgivings of the heart, are apt to lose their natural and straightforward expression, and to be repeated in a more or less distorted form, but even historical events, the exploits of a powerful man, the destruction of wild animals, the conquest of a new country, the death of a beloved leader, may be spoken of and handed down to later ages in a form decidedly mythological. After the laws that regulate the growth and decay of words have once been clearly established, instead of being any longer surprised at the breaking out of mythological phraseology, we almost wonder how any language could have escaped what may really be called an infantine disease, through which even the healthiest constitution ought to pass sooner or later. The origin of mytho-

logical phraseology, whatever outward aspects it may assume, is always the same; it is language forgetting herself. Nor is there anything strange in that self-forgetfulness, if we bear in mind how large a number of names ancient languages possessed for one and the same thing, and how frequently the same word was applied to totally different subjects. If we take the sun, or the dawn, or the moon, or the stars, we find that even in Greek every one of them is still polyonymous, *i.e.* has different names, and is known under various *aliases*. Still more is this the case in Sanskrit, though Sanskrit too is a language which, to judge from its innumerable rings, must have passed through many summers and winters before it grew into that mighty stem which fills us with awe and admiration, even in the earliest relics of its literature. Now, after a time, one out of many names of the same subject necessarily gains a preponderance; it becomes the current and recognised name, while the other names are employed less and less frequently, and at last become obsolete and unintelligible. Yet it frequently happens that, either in proverbs, or in idiomatic phrases, or in popular poetry, some of these obsolete names are kept up, and in that case mythological decay at once sets in. It requires a certain effort to see this quite clearly, because in our modern languages, where everything has its proper name, and where each name is properly defined, a mythological misunderstanding is almost impossible.

But suppose that the exact meaning of the word 'gloaming' had been forgotten, and that a proverbial expression such as 'The gloaming sings the sun to

sleep' had been preserved, would not the gloaming very soon require an explanation? and would nurses long hesitate to tell their children that the gloaming was a good old woman who came every night to put the sun into his bed, and who would be very angry if she found any little children still awake? The children would soon talk among themselves about Nurse Gloaming, and as they grew up would tell their children again of the same wonderful old nurse. It was in this and in similar ways that in the childhood of the world many a story grew up which, when once repeated and sanctioned by a popular poet, became part and parcel of what we are accustomed to call the mythology of ancient nations.

The mistake most commonly committed is to suppose that mythology has necessarily a religious character, and that it forms a whole or a system, taught in ancient times and believed in as we believe in our Articles, or even as the Roman Catholics believe in the legends of their saints. Religion, no doubt, suffered most from mythological phraseology, but it did not suffer alone. The stories of the Argonauts, or of the Trojan war, or of the Calydonian boar-hunt had very little to do with religion, except that some of the heroes engaged in them were called either the sons or the favourites of some of the so-called gods of Greece. No doubt we call them all gods, Vulcan and Venus, as well as Jupiter and Minerva; but even the more thoughtful among the Greeks would hardly allow the name of gods to all the inhabitants of Olympus, at least not in that pregnant sense in which Zeus and Apollo and Athene may fairly claim it. If children asked

who was the good Nurse Gloaming that sang the sun to sleep, the answer would be easy enough, that she was the daughter of the sky or of the sea, in Greek the daughter of Zeus or of Nereus; but this relationship, though it might give rise to further genealogical complications, would by no means raise the nurse to the rank of a deity. We speak of days and years as perfectly intelligible objects, and we do not hesitate to say that a man has wasted a day or a year, or that he has killed the time. To the ancient world days and nights were still more of a problem; they were strangers that came and went, brothers, or brother and sister, who brought light and darkness, joy and sorrow, who might be called the parents of all living things, or themselves the children of heaven and earth. One poetical image, if poetical it can be called, which occurs very frequently in the ancient language of India, is to represent the days as the herd of the sun, so that the coming and going of each day might be likened to the stepping forth of a cow, leaving its stable in the morning, crossing the heavenly meadows by its appointed path, and returning to its stable in the evening. The number of this solar herd would vary according to the number of days ascribed to each year. In Greek that simple metaphor was no longer present to the mind of Homer; but if we find in Homer that Helios had seven herds of oxen, fifty in each herd, and that their number never grows and never decreases, surely we can easily discover in these 350 oxen the 350 days of the primitive year.[1] And if

[1] In the Veda 720 twins are mentioned, *i.e.* 360 days and 360 nights. Rv. I., 164, 11.

we read again, that the foolish companions of Ulysses did not return to their homes because they had killed the oxen of Helios, may we not here too recognise an old proverbial or mythological expression, too literally interpreted even by Homer, and therefore turned into mythology? If the original phrase ran, that while Ulysses, by never-ceasing toil, succeeded in reaching his home, his companions wasted their time, or killed the days, *i.e.* the cattle of Helios, and were therefore punished, nothing would be more natural than that after a time their punishment should have been ascribed to their actually devouring the oxen in the island of Thrinakia; just as St. Patrick, because he converted the Irish and drove out the venomous brood of heresy and heathenism, was soon believed to have destroyed every serpent in that island, or as St. Christopher was represented as actually having carried on his shoulders the infant Christ.

All mythology of this character must yield to that treatment to which Mr. Cox has subjected the whole Greek and Roman pantheon. But there is one point that seems to us to deserve more consideration than it has hitherto received at the hands of comparative mythologists. We see that, for instance, in the very case of St. Patrick, mythological phraseology infected the perfectly historical character of an Irish missionary. The same may have taken place—in fact, we need not hesitate to say the same has constantly taken place—in the ancient stories of Greece and Rome, as well as in the legends of the Middle Ages. Those who analyse ancient myths ought, therefore, to be prepared for this historical

or irrational element, and ought not to suppose that everything which has a mythical appearance is thoroughly mythical or purely ideal. Mr. Cox has well delineated the general character of the most popular heroes of ancient mythology :—

'In a very large number of legends [he says], the parents, warned that their own offspring will destroy them, expose their children, who are saved by some wild beast and brought up by some herdsman. The children so recovered always grow up beautiful, brave, strong and generous; but, either unconsciously or against their will, they fulfil the warnings given before their birth, and become the destroyers of their parents. Perseus, Œdipus, Cyrus, Romulus, Paris, are all exposed as infants, are all saved from death, and discovered by the splendour of their countenances and the dignity of their bearing. Either consciously or unconsciously Perseus kills Akrisios, Œdipus kills Laios, Cyrus kills Astyages, Romulus kills Amulius, and Paris brings about the ruin of Priam and the city of Troy.'

Mr. Cox supposes that all these names are solar names, and that the mythical history of every one of these heroes is but a disguise of language. Originally there must have existed in ancient languages a large number of names for the sun, and the sky, and the dawn, and the earth. The vernal sun returning with fresh vigour after the deathlike repose of winter had a different name from the sun of summer and autumn; and the setting sun with its fading brilliancy was addressed differently from the 'bridegroom coming forth out of his chamber,' or 'the giant rejoicing to run his course.' Certain names,

expressions, and phrases sprang up, originally intended to describe the changes of the day and the seasons of the year; after a time these phrases became traditional, idiomatic, proverbial; they ceased to be literally understood, and were misunderstood and misinterpreted into mythical phraseology. At first the phrase 'Perseus will kill Akrisios' meant no more than that light will conquer darkness, that the sun will annihilate the night, that the morn is coming. If each day was called the child of the night, it might be truly said that the young child was destined to kill its parents, that Œdipus must kill Laios.[1] And if the violet twilight, Iokaste, was

[1] Professor Comparetti, in his Essay *Edipo e la Mitologia Comparata* (Pisa, 1867), has endeavoured to combat M. Bréal's explanation of the myth of Œdipus. His arguments are most carefully chosen, and supported by much learning and ingenuity which even those, who are not convinced by his able pleading, cannot fail to appreciate. It is not for me to defend the whole theory proposed by M. Bréal in his *Mythe d'Œdipe* (Paris, 1863). But as Professor Comparetti, in controverting the identification of *Laios* with the Sanskrit dâsa or dâsya, denies the possibility of an Aryan d appearing in Greek as l, I may, in defence of my own identification of dâsahantâ with λεωφόντης (Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. v. p. 152), be allowed to remark that I had supported the change of d into l in Greek by instances taken from Ahrens, *De Dialecto Dorica*, p. 85, such as λάφυη = δάφνη, 'Ολυσσεύς = 'Οδυσσεύς, and λίσκος = δίσκος. If in any of the local dialects of Greece the dental media could assume the sound of l, the admission of the change of a Greek d into a Greek l was justified for the purpose of explaining the name of one or two among the local heroes of ancient Greece, though I grant that it might be open to objections if admitted in the explanation of ordinary Greek words, such as λαός or μελεταω. If therefore Professor Curtius (*Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie*, p. 325) calls the transition of d into l unheard of in Greek, he could only have meant the classical Greek, and not the Greek dialects, which are nevertheless of the greatest importance in the interpretation of the names of local gods and heroes, and in the explanation of local legends. See also p. 497.

called the wife of the nocturnal Laios, the same name of Iokaste, as the violet dawn, might be given to the wife of Œdipus. Hence that strangely entangled skein of mythological sayings which poets and philosophers sought to disentangle as well as they could, and which at last was woven into that extraordinary veil of horrors which covers the sanctuary of Greek religion.

But if this be so—and, strange as it may sound at first, the evidence brought in support of this interpretation of mythology is irresistible—it would seem to follow that Perseus, and Œdipus, and Paris, and Romulus could none of them claim any historical reality. Most historians might be prepared to give up Perseus, Œdipus, and Paris, perhaps even Romulus and Remus; but what about Cyrus? Cyrus, like the other solar heroes, is known to be a fatal child; he is exposed, he is saved, and suckled, and recognised, and restored to his royal dignity, and by slaying Astyages he fulfils the solar prophecy as completely as any one of his compeers. Yet, for all that, Cyrus was a real man, an historical character, whose flesh and bone no sublimating process will destroy. Here then we see that mythology does not always create its own heroes, but that it lays hold of real history, and coils itself round it so closely that it is difficult, nay, almost impossible, to separate the ivy from the oak, or the lichen from the granite to which it clings. And here is a lesson which comparative mythologists ought not to neglect. They are naturally bent on explaining everything that can be explained; but they should bear in mind that there may be elements in every mythological riddle which resist etymological analysis, for the simple reason that their origin was not etymological, but historical.

The name of Cyrus or Koresh has been supposed to have some affinity with the Persian name of the sun, khvar or khor; and, though this is wrong, it can hardly be doubted that the name of Astyages, the Median king, the enemy of Cyrus, doomed to destruction by a solar prophecy, is but a corruption of the Zend name Azhi dahâka,[1] the destructive serpent, the offspring of Ahriman, who was chained by Thraêtaona, and is to be killed at the end of days by Keresâspa. Mr. Cox refers several times to this Azhi dahâka and his conqueror Thraêtaona, and he mentions the brilliant discovery of Eugène Burnouf, who recognised in the struggle between Thraêtaona and Azhi dahâka the more famous struggle celebrated by Firdusi in the Shahnameh between Feridun and Zohak. If, then, the Vedic Ahi, the serpent of darkness destroyed by Trita, Indra, and other solar heroes, is but a mythological name, and if the same applies to Azhi dahâka, conquered by Thraêtaona, and to the Echidna slain by Phœbus, and to Fafnir slain by Sigurd, what shall we say of Astyages killed by Cyrus? We refer those who take an interest in these questions to a posthumous work of one of the most learned dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church, the 'Zoroastrische Studien' of F. Windischmann. The historical character of Cyrus can hardly be doubted by any one, but the question whether Astyages was assigned to him as his grandfather

[1] See 'Essay on the Zend-Avesta,' *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. i. p. 98. If Istuvegu, the name of Astyages in the Non-Aryan inscriptions, could be proved to have been his original name, the identification with Azhi dahâka would have to be surrendered. But, as yet, not only th name of Astyages, but those of Cyrus and Cambyses also, admit of a better etymology from Aryan than from Non-Aryan sources. See Spiegel, *Beiträge zur vergl. Sprachforschung*, i. p. 32; Sayce, *Academy*, October 1880.

merely by the agency of popular songs, or whether Astyages too was a real king, involves very important issues, particularly as, according to Windischmann, there can be no doubt as to the identity of Darius, the Median, of the Book of Daniel, and Astyages. What is called the history of Media before the time of Cyrus is most likely nothing but the echo of ancient mythology repeated by popular ballads. Moses of Khorene distinctly appeals to popular songs which told of Ajdahak, the serpent,[1] and, with regard to the changes of the name, Modjmil[2] says that the Persians gave to Zohak the name of Dehak, *i.e.* ten evils, because he introduced ten evils into the world. In Arabic his name is said to have been Dechak, the laugher, while his other name Azdehak is explained as referring to the disease of his shoulders, where two serpents grew up which destroyed men.[3] All this is popular mythology, arising from a misunderstanding of the old name, Azhi dahâka; and we should probably not be wrong in supposing that even Dejoces was a corruption of Dehak, another ancestor in that Median dynasty which came to an end in Astyages the reputed grandfather of Cyrus. We can here only point to the problem as a warning to comparative mythologists, and remind them, in parting, that as many of the old German legends were transferred to the Apostles, as some of the ancient heathen prophecies were applied to the emperor Barbarossa, as tricks performed by solar archers were told again of a William Tell, and Robin

[1] Windischmann, *Zoroastrische Studien*, p. 138.
[2] *Journal Asiatique*, vol. xi. p. 156.
[3] Windischmann, *l. c.* p. 37.

Hood, and Friar Tuck—nay, as certain ancient legends are now told in Germany of Frederick the Great—it does not always follow that heroes of old who performed what may be called solar feats are therefore nothing but myths. We ought to be prepared, even in the legends of Herakles or Meleagros or Theseus, to find some grains of local history on which the sharpest tools of comparative mythology must bend or break.

VIII.

BELLEROPHON.

WHAT was the original intention of the name of *Bellerophon*? That *bellero*, the first part of the word, represents some power of darkness, drought, cold, winter, or of moral evil, is easy to guess. The Greeks say that there was a word τὰ ἔλλερα, which signified anything evil or hateful,[1] and was used in that sense by Kallimachos.[2] Nay Bellerophon or Bellerophontes is said to have been called also Ellerophontes. That the Greeks in general, however, were no longer conscious of the appellative power of Belleros, is best proved by the fact that, in order to explain the myth of Bellerophon, they invented, very late, it would seem, a legend, according to which Bellerophon had killed a distinguished Corinthian, of the name of Belleros, and had fled to Argos or Tyrins to be purified by Prœtos from the stain of that murder. Nothing, however, is known about this Belleros, and as the ordinary accounts represent Bellerophon as flying to Argos after having killed his brother Deliades, or, as he is also called, Peiren or Alkimenes, there can be little doubt that the Corinthian nobleman of the name of Belleros

[1] Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*, vol. ii. p. 55.

[2] Eustath. ad Il. p. 635; Naeke, *Opusc.* vol. ii. p. 167.

owes his origin entirely to a desire of later mythologists, who felt bound to explain the no longer intelligible name of Bellerophon or Bellerophontes.

Such a name, it is quite clear, was not originally without some meaning, and without attempting to unravel the whole tragedy of Hipponoos, who afterwards monopolised the name of Bellerophon, it may be possible to discover by a strict observance of etymological laws, the original form and the original purport of this peculiar name.

With regard to the second half of the name, there can be little doubt that in Bellerophon and Bellerophontes, *phón* and *phontés* had one and the same meaning. Now *phon-tés* at the end of compounds means the killer, the Sanskrit han-tâ, killer; and therefore *phón* can, in our name, hardly mean anything else, and would correspond exactly with the Sanskrit han, nom. hâ, killing.

From the reported change in the initial letter of Bellerophon, it is easy to see that it represents a labial liquid, and is in fact the well-known digamma Æolicum. But it is more difficult to determine what letters we ought to look for as corresponding in other languages to the λλ of the Greek word *bellero*. In many cases Greek λλ represents a single l, followed originally by a sibilant or a liquid.[1] In this manner we can account for the single l in πολύς and the double l in πολλοί. Πολύς corresponds to the Sanskrit pulú (Rv. I. 179, 5), or purú, gen. puros, whereas the oblique cases would represent a Sanskrit adjective pŭrvá, gen. pŭrvásya. As πολλοί points to a Sanskrit purvé, ὅλοι points to the Sanskrit sárve.

[1] See Ahrens, *Dial. Dor.* p. 60.

In Latin, too, a double l owes its origin not unfrequently to an original single l or r followed by v.[1] Thus the double l in *mellis*, the gen. of *mel*, honey, is explained by the Sanskrit madhu, raised to madhv-i, and regularly changed to madv-i, malv-i, mall-i. *Fel*, gen. *fellis*, is explained by *haru* in *haru-spex*,[2] raised to *harv-i*, *halv-i*, *hall-i*, *fall-i*.[3] *Mollis* corresponds to Sanskrit mṛidu, through the intermediate links, mardv-i, maldv-i, malv-i, mall-i;[4] nay, if we consider the Vedic word for bee, ṛidu-pā (Rv. VIII. 77, 11), *mel*, *mellis*, too, might be derived from mṛidu (which does not occur in the Rig-Veda), and not from madhu. According to these analogies, then, the Greek *βέλλερο* would lead us back to a Sanskrit word varvara. This word actually occurs in the Sanskrit language, and means hairy, woolly, shaggy, rough. It is applied to the negro-like aboriginal inhabitants of India who were conquered and driven back by Aryan conquerors, and it has been identified with the Greek *βάρβαρος*. Sandal-wood, for instance, which grows chiefly on the Malabar coast, is called in Sanskrit barbarottha, sprung up among Barbaras, because that coast was always held by Tamulian or non-Aryan people. Professor Kuhn, identifying barbara and *βάρβαρος*, refers the meaning of both words, not to the shaggy or woolly hair, but to the confused speech (*balbutire*) of non-Aryan tribes. It will be difficult to prove with what intent the Greeks and the Hindus

[1] Corssen, *Kritische Beiträge*, p. 385.

[2] Aufrecht, in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. iii. p. 198.

[3] As to the interchange of h and f in Latin, see Corssen, *Kritische Beiträge*, p. 208; as to the etymology of *fel*, ibid., p. 318.

[4] Corssen, *Kritische Beiträge*, p. 323.

first applied βάρβαρος and barbara to tribes differing from themselves both in speech and aspect. It is true that in Greek the word occurs for the first time in Homer with a special reference to language ('Iliad,' ii. 876, Κᾶρες βαρβαρόφωνοι); and in Sanskrit also the earliest passage in which barbara is found, refers to speech (Rig-Veda Prâtisâkhya, Sûtra 784; XIV. 6). But the barbaratâ there mentioned as a fault of pronunciation, is explained by the same word (asaukumâryam) which in Sûtra 778 serves as an explanation of lomasya; and this lomasya, meaning shagginess, is, like the Greek δασύτης, clearly transferred from the shagginess of hair (loman, hair) to the shagginess of pronunciation, so that after all, in Sanskrit at least, the original conception of the adjective barbara seems to have been shaggy or rough.

However that may be, it is clear that many words for wool are derived from the same root var which yielded varvara or barbara. This root means originally to cover, and it yielded in Sanskrit ura in ura-bhra, ram, *i.e. laniger*; in Greek εἶρος and ἔρ-ιον. In the Veda we have likewise the feminine úrâ, sheep, Rv. VIII. 34, 3,

úrâm ná dhûnute vṛ́kaḥ,

'(the stone tears the Soma plant) as the wolf tears the sheep,' or, it may be, 'the wool.' The wolf is called urâmathi (Rv. VIII. 66, 8), literally the sheep-shaker, or sheep-lifter.

From the same root are formed, by means of the suffix na, the Sanskrit ûrnâ, wool, particularly of sheep; afterwards ûrnâyu, a goat, and a spider; the

one from wearing, growing, or supplying wool; the other from, as it were, spinning or weaving it. Thus the spider is also called in Sanskrit ûrna-nâbhi and ûrna-vâbhi, literally the wool-weaver; and one of the enemies killed by Indra is Aurnavâbha, which seems to mean a ram rather, a wool-provider, than a spider. This ûrnâ, as Bopp has shown, appears again in Russian as *vòlna*, in Gothic as *vulla*, r having been changed to l, and ln into ll. The same assimilation is found in Latin *villus*, gen. *villi*, and *vellus*, gen. *velleris*. It might be difficult to convince a classical scholar that *vellus* was not derived from the Latin *vellere*, particularly as Varro himself gives that etymology; but it would be equally difficult to establish such an etymology by any analogies. It is curious, however, to remark—for reasons to be explained hereafter—that *vellera* in Latin signifies light, fleecy clouds. (Virg. 'Georg.' i. 397; Luc. iv. 124.)

Ura, therefore, from a root var, to cover, meant originally cover, then skin, fleece, wool. In its derivatives, too, these various meanings of the root var appear again and again. Thus úranah means ram, uranî, sheep; but urânáh, quite a different formation, means protector. For instance, with the genitive:—

Rv. I. 173, 7. samátsu tvâ śûra satâm urânám prapathíntamam,

'Thee, O hero, in battles the protector of the brave, the best guide!'

Rv. VII. 73, 3. áhema yagñám pathâm urânâh,

'Let us speed the sacrifice, as keepers of the (old) ways!'

With the accusative:—

Rv. III. 19, 2. (Agni*h*) devá-tâtim urâ*náh*,
'Agni, who protects the gods.'
Rv. IX. 109, 9. índu*h* punânâ*h* pra*gâ*m urâ*náh*,
'The purified Soma, protecting the people.'

Without any case:—

Rv. IV. 6, 4. (Agni*h*) pra-díva*h* urâná*h*,
'Agni, the old guardian.' See also Rv. IV. 7, 3; VI. 63, 4.

Now, if ur*n*â, wool, meant originally a covering, var-*n*a also, which now means colour, would seem to have started from the same conception. Colour might naturally be conceived as the covering, the outside, as χρώς and χρῶμα in Greek combine the meanings of skin and colour. From var*n*a, colour (brightness), we have in Sanskrit var*n*i, gold, as from rûpa, form (beauty), we have rûpya, silver, from which *Rupee*; for we can on no account derive the name of silver, the metal, from the figure (rûpa) that was stamped on a silver coin.

In the Veda var*n*a appears in the sense of colour, of bright colour or light, and of race.

In the sense of colour in general, var*n*a occurs,

Rv. I. 73, 7. k*rish*nám *ka* vár*n*am aru*n*ám *ka* sám dhu*h*,
'They placed together the dark and the bright colour (of night and day).'
Rv. I. 113, 2. dyâvâ vár*n*am *ka*ratha*h* â-minâné,
'Day and night move on destroying their colour.'

Frequently var*n*a is used in the Veda as implying bright colour or light:—

Rv. II. 34, 13. ni-méghamânâ*h* átyena pâ*g*asâ su-s*k*andrám vár*n*am dadhire su-pésasam,

'They (the Rudras) strongly showering down on their horse, made shining, beautiful light.' (On *pâgas* and its supposed connection with Pegasos, see Kuhn, in his 'Zeitschrift,' vol. i. p. 461; and Sonne, ibid. vol. x. p. 174 *seq.*)

Rv. II. 1, 12. táva spârhé várne,
'In thy sparkling light, O Agni.'

Rv. III. 34, 5. prá imám várnam atirat sukrám âsâm,
'He, Indra, spread out the bright light of the dawn.'

In the ninth Mandala the colour (varna) of the Soma juice is frequently mentioned, as hári, rúsat, súki, also as asúrya:—

Rv. X. 3, 3. Agníh vi-tísthan rúsadbhih várnaih,
'Agni far-striding with shining colours.'

Even without determining adjectives, várna has occasionally the sense of light:—

Rv. I. 92, 10. samânám várnam abhí sumbhamânâ,
'The old Dawn that clothes herself in the same light.'

Rv. X. 124, 7. tâh asya várnam súkayah bharibharati,
'They (the dawns), the bright ones, carry always the light of the sun.' See also Rv. II. 4, 5; II. 5, 5; IV. 15, 3.

Hence we may take varna in the same sense in another passage, where the commentator explains it as Indra, the protector:—

Rv. I. 104, 2. devâsah manyúm dâsasya skamnan
té nah â vakshan suvitâya várnam,
'The gods broke the pride of Dâsa (the enemy); may they bring to us light for the sacrifice.'

Lastly, varna means colour, or tribe, or caste, the difference in colour being undoubtedly one of the principal causes of that feeling of strangeness and

heterogeneousness which found expression in the name of tribe, and, in India, of caste.[1] The commentators generally take varṇa in the technical sense of caste, and refer it to the three highest castes (traivarṇika) in opposition to the fourth, the Śûdras.

Rv. III. 34, 9. hatvî dásyûn prá âryam várṇam âvaḥ,
'Indra, killing the Dasyus (the enemies), has protected the Aryan colour.'
Rv. II. 12, 4. yáḥ dâsam várṇam ádharam gúhâ ákar,
'Indra, who brought the colour of the Dâsas low in secret.'
Rv. II. 3, 5. várṇam punânâḥ yasásam su-vîram,
'(The heavenly gates) which illuminate the glorious colour (race), rich in heroes.'

But to return to varvara, to which on etymological grounds we should assign the meaning of shaggy, hairy, *villosus*, it need hardly be said that such a word, though it supplies an intelligible meaning of the Greek myth of Belleros, as slain by Bellerophon, does not occur in the Veda among the numerous names of the demons slain by Indra, Agni, and other bright gods. The same happens very frequently, viz. that Sanskrit supplies us with the etymological meaning of a term used in Greek mythology, although the corresponding word does not occur in the actual or mythological language of India. Thus the Greek *Hérâ* is easily explained by Svârâ, or, according to Sonne (Kuhn, 'Zeitschrift,' vol. x. p. 366, vol. ix. p. 202), by Vasrâ; but neither of these words occurs in the mythological phraseology of the Veda. There remains, however, a question

[1] See my letter to Chevalier Bunsen, 'On the Turanian Languages,' p. 84.

which has still to be answered, viz. Do we find among the demons slain by solar deities, one to whom the name of varvara,[1] in the sense of shaggy, would be applicable? and this question we may answer with a decided Yes.

One of the principal enemies or dâsas conquered by Indra is the black cloud. This black cloud contains the rain or the fertilising waters which Indra is asked to send down upon the earth, and this he can only do by slaying the black demon that keeps them in prison. This black cloud itself is sometimes spoken of in the Veda as the black skin:—

Rv. IX. 41, 1. ghnántaḥ kṛíshṇām ápa tvákam,
'Pushing away the black skin, *i.e.* cloud.'

In other places the cloud is called the rain-giving and fertilising skin:—

Rv. I. 129, 3. dasmáḥ hí sma vṛishanam pínvasi tvákam,
'For thou, the strong one, fillest the rainy skin.'

While thus the cloud itself is spoken of as a black skin, the demon of the cloud, or the cloud personified, appears in the Veda as a ram, *i.e.* as a shaggy, hairy, animal, in fact, as a Βέλλερος.

Thus Urana, which, as we saw before, meant ram or *laniger*, is a name of a demon, slain by Indra:—

Rv. II. 14. Ye priests, bring hither Soma for Indra, pour from the bowls the delicious food! The hero

[1] Βέλλερος may either be simply identified with varvara, in the sense of shaggy, or by taking ϝελλος as representing the Latin *villus*, an adjective ϝελλερος might have been formed, like φθονε-ρός from φθόνος. The transition into λλ appears also in μάλλος, sheep's-wool, where the μ represents the labial liquid. See Lobeck, *De Prothesi et Aphæresi*, p. 111 *seq.*; and Curtius, in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. iii. p. 410: μαρπ = vṛik; μέλδων = ϝέλδων; μάτην = vṛithâ.

truly always loves to drink of it; sacrifice to the strong, for he desires it!

Ye priests, he who struck down *Vritra*, when he had hid the waters, as a tree is struck by lightning—to him who desires this Soma, offer it; for that Indra desires to drink it!

Ye priests, he who slew *Dribhîka*, who drove out the cows, for he had opened the stable, to him offer this Soma! Cover him with Somas as the wind in the sky, as an old woman covers herself with clothes!

Ye priests, he who slew *Urana*, who had shown his ninety-nine arms,—he who slew down to the ground Arbuda, that Indra call hither to the offering of Soma!

Here *Urana* is no doubt a proper name, but the idea which it suggested originally, could only have been that of u r *a* n *a*, meaning ram or some other shaggy animal. And the same applies to the Greek Βέλλερος. Though in Greek it has become a mere proper name, its original meaning was clearly that of the shaggy ram as the symbol of the shaggy cloud, a *monstrum villosum*, this being the very adjective which Roman poets like to apply to monsters of the same kith and kin, such as Gorgo or Cacus; e.g. Ov. 'Met.' x. 21:

> Nec uti villosa colubris
> Terna Medusæi vincirem guttura monstri.

'Æn.' viii. 266 (of Cacus):

> Terribiles oculos, vultum, villosaque setis
> Pectora semiferi . . . .

We cannot therefore claim the name of Belleros or Bellerophon for that period of mythology which preceded the Aryan separation, a period during

which such names as Dyaus = Ζεύς, Varuna = Οὐρανός, Ushas = Ἠώς, Saranyû = Ἐρινύς, Ahanâ = Δάφνη and Ἀθήνη, Ribhu = Ὀρφεύς, Haritas = Χάριτες were current among the ancient worshippers of the Devas or bright gods. But we can see at least this, that Bellerophontes had an intelligible meaning, and a meaning analogous to that of other names of solar heroes, the enemies of the dark powers of nature, whether in the shape of night, or dark clouds, or winter. In the Veda one of the principal representatives of that class of demons is Vritra, literally the coverer, the hider, whether of light or rain. Indra, the great solar deity of the Veda, is emphatically called Vritrahan, the killer of Vritra. It is well known that the name of Indra, as the supreme deity of the Vedic pantheon, is a name of Indian growth. Derived from the same root as indu, drop, it represents the Jupiter *pluvius*, whose supremacy among the gods of India is fully accounted for by the climatic character of that country. Dyaus, *i.e.* Ζεύς, the god of the bright sky, the original supreme deity of the undivided Aryans, was replaced in India by Indra, who is sometimes called the son of Dyaus, so that in India the prophecy of Prometheus may be said to have been fulfilled, even before it was uttered under a Greek sky.

But though we must not look in Greek mythology for traces of a name like Indra, which did not spring into existence before the separation of the Aryans, it is not impossible that some of the names of Indra's enemies may have been preserved in other countries. These enemies were the enemies of Dyaus and other gods as well as of Indra; and as they belong to an

earlier period, the appearance of their names in the new homes of the Aryan emigrants could have nothing to surprise us.

One of the names belonging to this class of beings, hostile to men and the bright gods, and common to India and Greece, I observed many years ago, and having communicated my observation to several of my friends, it was mentioned by them even before I found an opportunity of laying it before the public, and supporting it by sufficient proof. My excellent friend, Professor Trithen, whose early death has deprived Sanskrit scholarship of a man of real genius and high promise, mentioned my identification of Kerberos with the Sanskrit *s a r v a r a* in a Paper read in April 1848,[1] and published in the 'Transactions of the Philological Society;' and another learned friend of mine referred to it with approval a few years later, though neither of them represented correctly the steps by which I had arrived at my conclusion.

My first point was that, as *sárvarî* in the Veda

[1] See Benfey, *Nachrichten der K. G. d. W. zu Göttingen*, January 17, 1877, p. 8; and particularly February 7, 1877, p. 66, where he recognises that the identification of Kerberos with *s a b a l a* was first proposed by me, and afterwards adopted by others. Honour, however, to whom honour is due. Wilford in his essay on 'Egypt and the Nile,' *Asiat. Researches*, iii. p. 405 (1792) has anticipated us all. 'Yama,' he writes, 'the regent of hell, has two dogs, according to the Purâṇas, one of them named Kerbura and *S*abala, or varied; the other *Sy*âma, or black; the first of whom is also called Trisiras, or with three heads, and has the additional epithet of Kalmâsha, *K*itra, and *K*irmîra, all signifying stained or spotted: in Pliny the words Cimmerium and Cerberian seem used as synonymous; but however that may be, the Cerbura of the Hindus is indubitably the Cerberus of the Greeks. The Dragon of Serapis I suppose to be the *S*esharâga, which is described as in the infernal regions by the author of the Bhâgavat.'

means the night, sarvara[1] must have had the original sense of dark or pale:—

Rv. V. 52, 3. té syandrâso ná ukshánaḥ áti skandanti sárvarîḥ,

'These (the Storm-gods), like powerful bulls, rise over the dark nights (or the dark clouds?).'

My second point was that the r in sarvara may be dropt, and this I proved by comparing sarvarîka, a low, vile man, with savara, a barbarian; or sârvara,[2] mischievous, nocturnal, with sâvara, low, vile. I thus arrived at savara, as a modified form of sarvara, in the sense of dark, pale, or nocturnal. Lastly, by admitting the frequent change of r into l, I connected sabála, the Vedic epithet of the dog of Yama, the son of Saramâ, with Kérberos, though I drew attention to the difference in the accent as a point that still required explanation. Kerberos, therefore, in Greek, would have meant originally the dark one, the dog of night, watching the path to the lower world. In the Veda we find two such dogs, but they have not yet received any proper names, and are without that individuality which was imparted to them by later legends. All we learn of them from the Veda is that they have four eyes and broad snouts, that their colour is dark or tawny, that they guard the road to the abode of Yama, the king of the departed, and that the dead must pass by them before they can come to Yama and the Fathers. They are also said to move about among men, as the

[1] *Cf.* Rv. III. 9, 7; VIII. 1, 29, apisarvare, by night.

[2] Durga, in his Commentary on the Nirukta (MS. E. I. H. 357, p. 223), says of the Dawn: 'sârvarena tamasâ digdhâni sarvadravyâni prakâsodakena dhautânîva karoti.'

messengers of Yama, to feast on the life of men, so that Yama is implored to protect men from their fury, while, in other places, they themselves are invoked, like Yama and Mrityu, to grant a long life to man. As the offspring of Saramâ, they are called Sârameya; but they have, as yet, no real proper names. The same applies to Kerberos. His proper name does not occur in Homer, but the dog of Hades in Erebos is mentioned by him without further particulars. Hesiod is the first who mentions the name and genealogy of Kerberos, and with him he is already fifty-headed, brazen-voiced, and furious. Later poets speak of him as three-headed, with serpents for his tail and mane; and at last he becomes hundred-headed. This Kerberos, as we know, is seized by Herakles and brought up to the daylight, though thrown back again into Hades.

But, besides Kerberos, there is another dog conquered by Herakles, and as he, like Kerberos, is born of Typhaon and Echidna, we may well look upon him as the brother or ditto of Kerberos. He is the dog of Geryones, sometimes called Kerberos himself (Palæph. 40); and as Herakles, before conquering Kerberos, has first to struggle with Menœtios, the cow-herd, we find that in his eighth labour, too, Herakles has to struggle with the cow-herd Eurytion and his dog; nay, according to some authorities, Menœtios himself takes part again in this struggle. This second dog is known by the name of Orthros, the exact copy, I believe, of the Vedic Vritra. That the Vedic Vritra should appear in Greece in the shape of a dog, need not surprise us, particularly as there are traces to show that in Greek mythology also he was originally a

monster of a less definite character. We find him, in Hesiod's 'Theogony,' v. 308 *seq.*, among the children of Echidna and Typhaon:

> ἡ δ' ὑποκυσαμένη τέκετο κρατερόφρονα τέκνα,
> Ὄρθρον μὲν πρῶτον κύνα γείνατο Γηρυονῆϊ.
> δεύτερον αὖτις ἔτικτεν ἀμήχανον, οὔτι φατειόν
> Κέρβερον, ὠμηστήν, Ἀΐδεω κύνα χαλκεόφωνον,
> πεντηκοντακάρηνον, ἀναιδέα τε κρατερόν τε.

Soon after, Ὄρθρος, for this is, no doubt, the right reading, instead of Ὄρθος, is called the parent of the Nemæan lion. And what indicates still more the original meaning of Ὄρθρος as a representative of darkness struggling with light, is the idiomatic use of ὄρθρος as signifying the time before sunrise. Thus we read in Hesiod, 'O. D.' 575, ὄρθρου ἀνιστάμενος, rising early, *i.e.* while the darkness still reigns, and while the last portion of the night is not yet driven away by the dawn (*entre chien et loup*). The swallow, too, is called ὀρθρογόη (568), literally the early wailing; the cock ὀρθροβόας, the early caller. Thus we read in Hom. 'Hymn. Merc.' 98,

> ὀρφναίη δ' ἐπίκουρος ἐπαύετο δαιμονίη νύξ,
> ἡ πλείων, τάχα δ' ὄρθρος ἐγίγνετο δημιοεργός,

where ὄρθρος might simply be translated by Vritra, if we consider how, in Vedic phraseology, Vritra is the thief who keeps the cows or the rays of the morning shut up in his stable, and how the first peep of day is expressed by Saramâ discovering the dark stables of Vritra and the Panis. Of Hermês (the Sârameya) it is said (v. 145) that he comes ὄρθριος, *i.e.* with Vritra, at the time of the final

discomfiture of Vritra,[1] and that he comes silently, so that not even the dogs bark at him, *οὔτε κύνες λελάκοντο.*

Thus we discover in Herakles, the victor of Orthros, a real Vritrahan, what might have been in Greek an *Ὀρθροφῶι* or *Ὀρθροφόντης*; and, though the names may differ, we now see in *Βελλεροφῶν* or *Βελλεροφόντης*, who killed, if not a he-goat (Urana), at least a she-goat, *i.e.* *Χίμαιρα*, a mere variation of the same solar hero, and a reflection of the Vedic Indra Vritrahan. Chimæra, like Orthros and Kerberos, is a being with three heads or three bodies (*τρικέφαλος* and *τρισώματος*); nay, like Orthros and Kerberos, Chimæra, too, is the offspring of Typhaon and Echidna.

Nay, further, although the name of *Ὀρθροφῶν* or *Ὀρθροφόντης* has not been preserved in Greek mythology, it is possible, I think, to discover in Greek traces of another name, having the same import in Sanskrit, and frequently used as a synonyme of vritrahan. This is dasyuhan, the killer of Dasyu. Dasyu or dâsa is in the Veda the general name of the enemies of the bright gods, as well as of their worshippers, the Aryan settlers of India. Dasyu-hantâ or dâsa-hantâ would in Greek assume the form of *δεωφόντης*, or, as in some places of ancient Greece δ was pronounced like λ,[2] this might assume

[1] The same place where Vritra lies (i. 52, 6, rágasaḥ budhnám) is also called the birth-place of Indra, iv. 1, 11.

[2] That d and l are interchangeable letters is perfectly true, but this general rule is liable to many limitations as applied to different languages. An original l, for instance, is hardly ever changed to d, and hence the derivation of *lingua* from lih, to lick, is very doubtful; for *dingua*, which is mentioned as the older form of *lingua*, could well have been changed to *lingua*, but not *vice versâ*. On the same ground I doubt whether in *adeps* the d represents an origi-

the form of λεωφόντης. Now this Leophontes occurs in Greek mythology as another name of Bellerophon, and it is clear that the meaning of that name could not have been lion-killer, for that would have been Leontophontes, but that it could only signify killer of whatever is expressed by λεω or δεω.

It is perfectly true that the change of d into l is in Greek restricted to certain dialects, and that it cannot be admitted as a general rule, unless there be some new evidence to that effect. Were it not so, one might feel inclined to trace even the common Greek word for people, λαός, back to the same source as the Sanskrit dâsa. For dasyu, meaning originally enemies, *hostes*, assumed in Zend danhu and daqyu, the sense of province—a transition of meaning which is rendered intelligible by the use of dahyu in the cuneiform inscriptions, where Darius calls himself king of Persia and king of the Dahyus, *i.e.* of the conquered people or provinces.[1] The same transition of meaning must be admitted in Greek, if, as Pro-

nal Aryan l, although the Greek ἄλειφα or ἄλειφαρ, ointment, λίπα, fat, and Sanskrit lip, to anoint, would seem to support this view. My former identification of μελετάω and *meditor* is equally untenable. All we can say for certain is that an original or Aryan d may become l in Latin: *e.g.* Sansk. devara, Greek δάηρ = Lat. *levir*; Sansk. dih, Goth. *deiga* = Lat. *pol-lingo*; Greek δάκρυ, Goth. *tagr* = Lat. *lacru-ma*; Greek Ὀδυσσεύς = Lat. *Ulyxes*. In Latin itself an original d changes dialectically with l, as in *odor* and *olfacit*; *impedimenta* and *impelimenta*; *sedere* and *solium*; *præsidium* and *præsilium*, and *sul* in *præsul*, &c.; *dautia* and *lautia*; *dingua* (*tuggô* Goth.) and *lingua*; *Medicæ* and *Melicæ*; *redivia* and *reluvium*, if from *reduo*, like *induviæ*, and not from *luo*, as proposed by Festus; *Diumpais* (Osc.) and *lymphis*; *Akudunnia* (Osk.) and *Aquilonia*, of unknown origin, but with original d, as proved even by the modern name *Lacedogna*. In Greek the same dialectic change is recorded in λάφνη = δάφνη, λίσκος = δίσκος, Ὀλυσσεύς = Ὀδυσσεύς.

[1] Lassen, *Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vol. vi. p. 12.

fessor Pott suggests, the Greek δεσ-πότης and δέσ-ποινα correspond to Sanskrit dâsa-pati and dâsá-patnî, in the sense of lord of subjects. The only difficulty here would be the retention of the s of dâsá, which, according to general practice, would have been dropt between two vowels. The true form of dâsá in Greek would be δᾱός or δεώς. Δᾱός is well known as a name of slaves, but it admits of a different explanation.[1] The adjective δάϊος, however, or δήϊος, hostile, is clearly derived from the same source, the root being das, to perish; though it is true that in its frequent application to fire, the adjective δάϊος might also be referred to the root du, to burn.[2] After we have once discovered on Greek soil the traces of dâsa in the sense of enemy, we see clearly that Leophontes, as the name of Bellerophon, could not have meant originally the killer of the people, but only the killer of enemies. And if Leophontes meant the killer of enemies or fiends, it can only be explained as corresponding to the Sanskrit dâsahantâ, the destroyer of enemies, these enemies being the very Dâsas or demons of the Veda, such as Vritra (Ὄρθρος), Namuki (Ἀμυκός),[3] Sambara,[4] and others.[5]

[1] See Niebuhr, *Kleinere Schriften*, vol. i. p. 377.

[2] See Aufrecht, in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. vii. p. 312; Pott, *ibid.* vol. viii. p. 428.

[3] A. Fick, in Benfey's *Orient und Occident*, vol. iii. p. 126.

[4] Sambara, a very common name of a demon slain by Indra, invites comparison with sabara and sarbara, the Sanskrit original of Kerberos. In the Zend-Avesta, too, srvara occurs as the name of a serpent (azhi).

[5] Some critical remarks on the subject of this article may be seen in Professor Pott's *Etymologische Forschungen*, second edition, vol. ii. p. 744.

IX.

ON

THE MIGRATION OF FABLES.

A Lecture Delivered at the Royal Institution, on Friday, June 3, 1870.

'COUNT not your chickens before they be hatched,' is a well-known proverb in English, and most people, if asked what was its origin, would probably appeal to La Fontaine's delightful fable, 'La Laitière et le Pot au Lait.'[1] We all know Perrette, lightly stepping along from her village to the town, carrying the milk-pail on her head, and in her day-dreams selling her milk for a good sum, then buying a hundred eggs, then selling the chickens, then buying a pig, fattening it, selling it again, and buying a cow with a calf. The calf frolics about, and kicks up his legs —so does Perrette, and, alas! the pail falls down, the milk is spilt, her riches gone, and she only hopes when she comes home that she may escape a flogging from her husband.

Did La Fontaine invent this fable? or did he merely follow the example of Sokrates, who, as we know from the Phædon,[2] occupied himself in prison,

[1] La Fontaine, *Fables*, livre vii. fable 10.

[2] Phædon, 61, 5: *μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας, ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὗς προχείρους εἶχον καὶ ἠπιστάμην μύθους τοὺς Αἰτώπου, τούτων ἐποίησα οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.*

during the last days of his life, with turning into verse some of the fables, or, as he calls them, the myths of Æsop.

La Fontaine published the first six books of his fables in 1668,[1] and it is well known that the subjects of most of these early fables were taken from Æsop, Phædrus, Horace, and other classical fabulists, if we may adopt this word *fabuliste*, which La Fontaine was the first to introduce into French.

In 1678 a second edition of these six books was published, enriched by five books of new fables, and in 1694 a new edition appeared, containing one additional book, thus completing the collection of his charming poems.

The fable of Perrette stands in the seventh book, and was published, therefore, for the first time in the edition of 1678. In the preface to that edition La Fontaine says: 'It is not necessary that I should say whence I have taken the subjects of these new fables. I shall only say, from a sense of gratitude, that I owe the largest portion of them to Pilpay, the Indian sage.'

If, then, La Fontaine tells us himself that he borrowed the subjects of most of his new fables from Pilpay, the Indian sage, we have clearly a right to look to India in order to see whether, in the ancient literature of that country, any traces can be discovered of Perrette with the milk-pail.

Sanskrit literature is very rich in fables and stories; no other literature can vie with it in that respect; nay, it is extremely likely that fables, in

[1] Robert, *Fables Inédites*, des XIIe, XIIIe, et XIVe, Siècles: Paris, 1825; vol. i. p. ccxxvii.

particular animal fables, had their principal source in India. In the sacred literature of the Buddhists, fables held a most prominent place. The Buddhist preachers, addressing themselves chiefly to the people, to the untaught, the uncared for, the outcast, spoke to them, as we still speak to children, in fables, in proverbs and parables. Many of these fables and parables must have existed before the rise of the Buddhist religion; others, no doubt, were added on the spur of the moment, just as Sokrates would invent a myth or fable whenever that form of argument seemed to him most likely to impress and convince his hearers. But Buddhism gave a new and permanent sanction to this whole branch of moral mythology, and in the sacred canon, as it was settled in the third century before Christ, many a fable received, and holds to the present day, its recognised place. After the fall of Buddhism in India, and even during its decline, the Brahmans claimed the inheritance of their enemies, and used their popular fables for educational purposes, removing, however, anything that was too decidedly opposed to the spirit of a revived Brahmanism. The best known of these collections of fables in Sanskrit is the Pañkatantra, literally the Pentateuch, or the Pentamerone. From it and from other sources another collection was made, well known to all Sanskrit scholars by the name of the Hitopadesa, *i.e.* Salutary Advice. Both being mere collections intended partly for instruction, partly for amusement, they were treated very freely by different editors or copyists, no one hesitating to add or omit whatever seemed good to him. Hence the texts vary consi-

derably in different MSS. and in different parts of India, so much so, that it is impossible to restore what might be called the original text either of the Pañkatantra or of the Hitopadesa. With regard to the Pañkatantra, besides the usual text current in the north, there is what may be called a southern text, MSS. of which have been discovered by Dr. Burnell. It is that text which served as the foundation of the modern Tamil, Telugu, and Canarese translations, and which became first known to scholars in Europe through the French translation by Dubois, 'Le Panchatantra ou les cinq ruses,' Paris, 1826. Both the Pañkatantra and the Hitopadesa have been published again and again in India and Europe, and there are translations of them in English, German, French, and other languages.[1]

The first question which we have to answer refers to the date of these collections, and dates in the history of Sanskrit literature are always difficult points. Fortunately, as we shall see, we can in this case fix the date, if not of the Pañkatantra in its present form, at least, by means of a translation into Pehlevi or ancient Persian, of the original work on which the Pañkatantra was founded. This,

[1] *Pantschatantrum sive Quinquepartitum*, edidit I. G. L. Kosegarten. Bonnæ, 1848–1859; in Bombay series, by Kielhorn and Bühler, 1868.

Pantschatantra. Fünf Bücher indischer Fabeln, aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt. Von Th. Benfey. Leipzig, 1859.

Hitopadesa, with interlinear translation, grammatical analysis, and English translation, in Max Müller's Handbooks for the study of Sanskrit. London, 1854.

Hitopadesa, eine alte indische Fabelsammlung aus dem Sanskrit zum ersten Mal in das Deutsche übersetzt. Von Max Müller. Leipzig, 1844.

translation was made about 550 years after Christ. At that time a collection somewhat like the Pañka-tantra, though much more extensive, must have existed, but we do not even know what its title may have been.

If we look for La Fontaine's fable in the Sanskrit stories of the Pañkatantra, we do not find, indeed, the milkmaid counting her chickens before they are hatched, but we meet with the following story:—

'There lived in a certain place a Brâhman, whose name was Svabhâvakṛipaṇa, which means "a born miser." He had collected a quantity of rice by begging (this reminds us somewhat of the Buddhist mendicants), and after having dined off it, he filled a pot with what was left over. He hung the pot on a peg on the wall, placed his couch beneath, and looking intently at it all the night, he thought, "Ah, that pot is indeed brimful of rice. Now, if there should be a famine, I should certainly make a hundred rupees by it. With this I shall buy a couple of goats. They will have young ones every six months, and thus I shall have a whole herd of goats. Then, with the goats, I shall buy cows. As soon as they have calved, I shall sell the calves. Then, with the calves, I shall buy buffaloes; with the buffaloes, mares. When the mares have foaled, I shall have plenty of horses; and when I sell them, plenty of gold. With that gold I shall get a house with four wings. And then a Brâhman will come to my house, and will give me his beautiful daughter, with a large dowry. She will have a son, and I shall call him Somaśarman. When he is old enough to be danced on his father's knee, I shall sit with a book at the back of the stable, and while I am reading, the boy will see me, jump from his mother's lap, and run towards me to be danced on my knee. He will come too near the horse's hoof, and, full of anger, I shall call to my wife, 'Take the baby; take him!' But she,

distracted by some domestic work, does not hear me. Then I get up, and give her such a kick with my foot." While he thought this, he gave a kick with his foot, and broke the pot. All the rice fell over him, and made him quite white. Therefore, I say, "He who makes foolish plans for the future will be white all over, like the father of Somaśarman."[1]

I shall at once proceed to read you the same story, though slightly modified, from the Hitopadeśa.[2] The Hitopadeśa professes to be taken from the Pañkatantra and some other book; and in this case it would seem as if some other authority had been followed. You will see, at all events, how much freedom there was in telling the old story of the man who built castles in the air.

'In the town of Devîkoṭṭa there lived a Brâhman of the name of Devaśarman. At the feast of the great equinox he received a plate full of rice. He took it, went into a potter's shop, which was full of crockery, and, overcome by the heat, he lay down in a corner and began to doze. In order to protect his plate of rice, he kept a stick in his hand, and began to think, "Now, if I sell this plate of rice, I shall receive ten cowries (kapardaka). I shall then, on the spot, buy pots and plates, and after having increased my capital again and again, I shall buy and sell betel nuts and dresses till I grow enormously rich. Then I shall marry four wives, and the youngest and prettiest of the four I shall make a great pet of. Then the other wives will be so angry, and begin to quarrel. But I shall be in a great rage, and take a stick, and give them a good flogging." . . . While he said this, he flung his stick away; the plate of rice was smashed to pieces,

[1] *Pañkatantra*, v. 10.

[2] *Hitopadeśa*, ed. Max Müller, p. 120; German translation, p. 159. Stokes, *Indian Fairy Tales*, p. 31.

and many of the pots in the shop were broken. The potter, hearing the noise, ran into the shop, and when he saw his pots broken, he gave the Brâhman a good scolding, and drove him out of his shop. Therefore I say, "He who rejoices over plans for the future will come to grief, like the Brâhman who broke the pots."'

In spite of the change of a Brahman into a milk-maid, no one, I suppose, will doubt that we have here in the stories of the Pañkatantra and Hitopadesa the first germs of La Fontaine's fable.[1] But how did that fable travel all the way from India to France? How did it doff its Sanskrit garment and don the light dress of modern French? How was the stupid Brahman born again as the brisk milk-maid, '*cotillon simple et souliers plats*?'

It seems a startling case of longevity that while languages have changed, while works of art have perished, while empires have risen and vanished again, this simple child's story should have lived on, and maintained its place of honour and its undisputed sway in every schoolroom of the East and every nursery of the West. And yet it is a case of longevity so well attested that even the most sceptical would hardly venture to question it. We have the passport of these stories *viséd* at every place through which they have passed, and, as far as I can judge, *parfaitement en règle*. The story of the migration of these Indian fables from East to West is indeed wonderful; more wonderful and more instructive than many of these fables themselves. Will it be believed that we, in this Christian country and in the nineteenth century,

[1] Note A, p. 560.

teach our children the first, the most important lessons of wordly wisdom, nay, of a more than worldly wisdom, from books borrowed from Buddhists and Brahmans, from heretics and idolaters, and that wise words, spoken a thousand, nay, two thousand years ago, in a lonely village of India, like precious seed scattered broadcast all over the world, still bear fruit a hundred and a thousand fold in that soil which is the most precious before God and man, the soul of a child? No lawgiver, no philosopher, has made his influence felt so widely, so deeply, and so permanently as the author of these children's fables. But who was he? We do not know. His name, like the name of many a benefactor of the human race, is forgotten. We only know he was an Indian—a nigger, as some people would call him—and that he lived at least two thousand years ago.

No doubt, when we first hear of the Indian origin of these fables, and of their migration from India to Europe, we wonder whether it can be so; but the fact is, that the story of this Indo-European migration is not, like the migration of the Indo-European languages, myths, and legends, a matter of theory, but of history, and that it was never quite forgotten either in the East or in the West. Each translator, as he handed on his treasure, seems to have been anxious to show how he came by it.

Several writers who have treated of the origin and spreading of Indo-European stories and fables, have mixed up two or three questions which ought to be treated each on its own merits.

The first question is, whether the Aryans, when

they broke up their pro-ethnic community, carried away with them, not only their common grammar and dictionary, but likewise some myths and legends which we find that Indians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Celts, Germans, Slaves, when they emerge into the light of history, share in common? That certain deities occur in India, Greece, and Germany, having the same names and the same character, is a fact that can no longer be denied. That certain heroes, too, known to Indians, Greeks, and Romans, point to one and the same origin, both by their name and by their history, is a fact by this time admitted by all whose admission is of real value. As heroes are in most cases gods in disguise, there is nothing very startling in the fact that nations, who had worshipped the same gods, should also have preserved some common legends of demi-gods or heroes, nay, even in a later phase of thought, of fairies and ghosts. The case, however, becomes much more problematical when we ask, whether stories also, fables told with a decided moral purpose, formed part of that earliest Aryan inheritance? This is still doubted by many who have no doubts whatever as to common Aryan myths and legends, and even those who, like myself, have tried to establish by tentative arguments the existence of common Aryan fables, dating from before the Aryan separation, have done so only by showing a possible connection between ancient popular saws and mythological ideas, capable of a moral application. To any one, for instance, who knows how in the poetical mythology of the Aryan tribes, the golden splendour of the rising sun leads to conceptions of the wealth

of the Dawn in gold and jewels and her readiness to shower them upon her worshippers, the modern German proverb, *Morgenstunde hat Gold im Munde*, seems to have a kind of mythological ring, and the stories of benign fairies, changing everything into gold, sound likewise like an echo from the long-forgotten forest of our common Aryan home. If we know how the trick of dragging stolen cattle backwards into their place of hiding, so that their foot-prints might not lead to the discovery of the thief, appears again and again in the mythology of different Aryan nations, then the pointing of the same trick as a kind of proverb, intended to convey a moral lesson, and illustrated by fables of the same or a very similar character in India and Greece, makes one feel inclined to suspect that here too the roots of these fables may reach to a pro-ethnic period. *Vestigia nulla retrorsum* is clearly an ancient proverb, dating from a nomadic period, and when we see how Plato ('Alcibiades,' i. 123) was perfectly familiar with the Æsopian myth or fable—*κατὰ τὸν Αἰσώπου μῦθον*, he says—of the fox declining to enter the lion's cave, because all footsteps went into it and none came out, and how the Sanskrit Pañkatantra (III. 14) tells of a jackall hesitating to enter his own cave, because he sees the footsteps of a lion going in, but not coming out, we feel strongly inclined to admit a common origin for both fables. Here, however, the idea that the Greeks, like La Fontaine, had borrowed their fable from the Pañkatantra would be simply absurd, and it would be much more rational, if the process must be one of borrowing, to admit, as Benfey (Pantschatantra, i. 381) does, that the

Hindus, after Alexander's discovery of India, borrowed this story from the Greeks. But if we consider that each of the two fables has its own peculiar tendency, the one deriving its lesson from the absence of backward footprints of the victims, the other from the absence of backward footprints of the lion himself, the admission of a common Aryan proverb, such as '*vestigia nulla retrorsum*,' would far better explain the facts such as we find them. I am not ignorant of the difficulties of this explanation, and I would myself point to the fact that among the Hottentots, too, Dr. Bleek has found a fable of the jackal declining to visit the sick lion, 'because the traces of the animals who went to see him did not turn back.'[1]

Without, however, pronouncing at present any decided opinion on this vexed question, what I wish to place clearly before you is this, that the spreading of Aryan myths, legends, and fables, dating from a pro-ethnic period, has nothing whatever to do with the spreading of fables taking place in strictly historical times from India to Arabia, to Greece and the rest of Europe, not by means of oral tradition, but through more or less faithful translations of literary works. Those who like may doubt whether *Zeus* was Dyaus, whether *Daphne* was Ahanâ, whether *La Belle au Bois* was the mother of two children, called *L'Aurore* and *Le Jour*,[2] but the fact that a collection of fables was, in the sixth century of our era, brought from India to Persia, and by means

[1] *Hottentot Fables and Tales*, by Dr. W. H. I. Bleek, London, 1864, p. 19.

[2] *Academy*, vol. v. p. 548. (See note B, p. 563.)

of various translations naturalised among Persians, Syrians, Arabs, Greeks, Jews, and all the rest, admits of no doubt or cavil. Several thousand years have passed between those two migrations, and to mix them up together, to suppose that Comparative Mythology has anything to do with the migration of such fables as that of Perrette, would be an anachronism of a portentous character.

There is a third question, viz. whether besides the two channels just mentioned, there were others through which Eastern fables could have reached Europe, or Æsopian and other European fables have been transferred to the East. There are such channels, no doubt. Persian and Arab stories, of Indian origin, were through the crusaders brought back to Constantinople, Italy, and France; Buddhist fables were through Mongolian[1] conquerors (13th century) carried to Russia and the eastern parts of Europe. Greek stories may have reached Persia and India at the time of Alexander's conquests and during the reigns of the Diadochi, and even Christian legends may have found their way to the East through missionaries, travellers, or slaves.

Lastly, there comes the question, how far our common human nature is sufficient to account for coincidences in beliefs, customs, proverbs and fables,

[1] *Die Märchen des Siddhi-kür*, or *Tales of an Enchanted Corpse*, translated from Kalmuk into German by B. Jülg, 1866. (This is based on the Vetâlapañkavimsati.) *Die Geschichte des Ardschi-Bord hi Chan*, translated from Mongolian by Dr. B. Jülg, 1868. (This is based on the Simhâsanadvâtrimsati.) A Mongolian translation of the *Kalila and Dimnah* is ascribed to Mélik Said Iftikhar eddin Mohammed ben Abou Nasr, who died A.D. 1280. See Barbier de Meynard, 'Description de la Ville de Kazvin,' *Journal Asiatique*, 1857, p. 284, Lancereau, *Pantchatantra*, p. xxv.

which, at first sight, seem to require an historical explanation. I shall mention but one instance. Professor Wilson ('Essays on Sanskrit Literature,' i. p. 201) pointed out that the story of the Trojan horse occurs in a Hindu tale, only that instead of the horse we have an elephant. But he rightly remarked that the coincidence was accidental. In the one case, after a siege of nine years, the principal heroes of the Greek army are concealed in a wooden horse, dragged into Troy by a stratagem, and the story ends by their falling upon the Trojans and conquering the city of Priam. In the other story a king, bent on securing a son-in-law, had an elephant constructed by able artists, and filled with armed men. The elephant was placed in a forest, and when the young prince came to hunt, the armed men sprang out, overpowered the prince and brought him to the king, whose daughter he was to marry. However striking the similarity may seem to one unaccustomed to deal with ancient legends, I doubt whether any comparative mythologist would postulate a common Aryan origin for these two stories. They feel that, as far as the mere construction of a wooden animal is concerned, all that was necessary to explain the origin of the idea in one place was present also in the other, and that while the Trojan horse forms an essential part of a mythological cycle, there is nothing truly mythological or legendary in the Indian story. The idea of a hunter disguising himself in the skin of an animal, or even of one animal assuming the disguise of another,[1] are

[1] Plato's expression, 'As I have put on the lion's skin' (Kratylos, 411), seems to show that he knew the fable of an animal or a

familiar in every part of the world, and if that is so, then the step from hiding under the skin of a large animal to that of hiding in a wooden animal is not very great.

Every one of these questions, as I said before, must be treated on its own merits, and while the traces of the first migration of Aryan fables can be rediscovered only by the most minute and complex inductive processes, the documents of the latter are to be found in the library of every intelligent collector of books. Thus, to return to Perrette and the fables of Bilpay, Huet, the learned bishop of Avranches, the friend of La Fontaine, had only to examine the prefaces of the principal translations of the Indian fables in order to track their wanderings, as he did in his famous 'Taité de l'Origine des Romans,' published at Paris in 1670, two years

man having assumed the lion's skin without the lion's courage. The proverb ὄνος παρὰ Κυμαίους seems to be applied to men boasting before people who have no means of judging. It presupposes the story of a donkey appearing in a lion's skin.

A similar idea is expressed in a fable of the *Pañkatantra* (IV. 8), where a dyer, not being rich enough to feed his donkey, puts a tiger's skin on him. In this disguise the donkey is allowed to roam through all the cornfields without being molested, till one day he sees a female donkey and begins to bray. Thereupon the owners of the field kill him.

In the *Hitopadesa* (III. 3) the same fable occurs, only that there it is the keeper of the field who on purpose disguises himself as a she-donkey, and when he hears the tiger bray, kills him.

In the Chinese *Avadânas*, translated by Stanislas Julien (vol. ii. p. 59) the donkey takes a lion's skin and frightens everybody, till he begins to bray and is recognised as a donkey.

In this case it is again quite clear that the Greeks did not borrow their fable and proverb from the *Pañkatantra*; but it is not so easy to determine positively whether the fable was carried from the Greeks to the East, or whether it arose independently in two places.

after the appearance of the first collection of La Fontaine's fables. Since his time the evidence has become more plentiful, and the whole subject has been more fully and more profoundly treated by Sylvestre de Sacy,[1] Loiseleur Deslongchamps,[2] and Professor Benfey.[3] But though we have a more accurate knowledge of the stations by which the Eastern fables reached their last home in the West, Bishop Huet knew as well as we do that they came originally from India through Persia by way of Bagdad and Constantinople.

In order to gain a commanding view of the countries traversed by these fables, let us take our position at Bagdad in the middle of the eighth century, and watch from that central point the movements of our literary caravan in its progress from the far East to the far West. In the middle of the eighth century, during the reign of the great Khalif Almansur (754–775), Abdallah ibn Almokaffa wrote his famous collection of fables, the 'Kalilah and Dimnah,' which we still possess. The Arabic text of these fables has been published by Sylvestre de Sacy, and there is an English translation of it by Mr. Knatchbull, formerly Professor of Arabic at Oxford. Abdallah ibn Almokaffa was a Persian by birth, who after the fall of the Omeyyades became a convert to Mohammedanism, and rose to high office

[1] *Calilah et Dimnah, ou, Fables de Bidpai, en Arabe, précédées d'un Mémoire sur l'origine de ce livre.* Par Sylvestre de Sacy. Paris, 1816.

[2] Loiseleur Deslongchamps, *Essai sur les Fables Indiennes, et sur leur introduction en Europe.* Paris, 1838.

[3] *Pantschatantra, Fünf Bücher indischer Fabeln, Märchen und Erzählungen, mit Einleitung.* Von Th. Benfey. Leipzig, 1859.

at the court of the Khalifs. Being in possession of important secrets of state, he became dangerous in the eyes of the Khalif Almansur, and was foully murdered.[1] In the preface, Abdallah ibn Almokaffa tells us that he translated these fables from Pehlevi, the ancient language of Persia; and that they had been translated into Pehlevi (about two hundred years before his time) by Barzôî (commonly called Barzûyeh, in Greek Περζωέ), the physician of Khosru Nushirvan, the king of Persia, the contemporary of the Emperor Justinian. The king of Persia had heard that there existed in India a book full of wisdom, and he had commanded his Vezier, Buzurjmihr, to find a man acquainted with the languages both of Persia and India. The man chosen was Barzûyeh. He travelled to India, got possession of the book, translated it into Persian, and brought it back to the court of Khosru. Declining all rewards beyond a dress of honour, he only stipulated that an account of his own life and opinions should be added to the book. This account, probably written by himself, is extremely curious. It is a kind of *Religio Medici* of the sixth century, and shows us a soul dissatisfied with traditions and formularies, striving after truth, and finding rest only where many other seekers after truth have found rest before and after him, in a life devoted to alleviating the sufferings of mankind.

There is another account of the journey of this Persian physician to India. It has the sanction of Firdûsi, in the great Persian epic, the Shah Nâmeh,

[1] See Weil, *Geschichte der Chalifen*, vol. ii. p. 84.

and it is considered by some[1] as more original than the one just quoted. According to it, the Persian physician read in a book that there existed in India trees or herbs supplying a medicine with which the dead could be restored to life. At the command of the king he went to India in search of those trees and herbs; but, after spending a year in vain researches, he consulted some wise people on the subject. They told him that the medicine of which he had read as having the power of restoring men to life had to be understood in a higher and more spiritual sense, and that what was really meant by it were ancient books of wisdom preserved in India, which imparted life to those who were dead in their folly and sins.[2] Thereupon the physician translated these books, and one of them was the collection of fables, the 'Kalilah and Dimnah.'

It is possible that both these stories were later inventions; the preface also by Ali, the son of Alshah Farési (Behnûd), in which the names of Bidpai, and King Dabshelim are mentioned for the first time, is of later date. But the fact remains that Abdallah ibn Almokaffa, the author of the oldest Arabic collection of our fables, translated them from Pehlevi, the language of Persia at the time of Khosru Nushirvan, and that the Pehlevi text which he translated was believed to be a translation of a book brought from India in the middle of the sixth century. That Indian book could not have been the *Pañkatantra*, as we now possess it, but must have been a much larger collection of fables, for the Arabic translation,

[1] Benfey, p. 60.

[2] Cf. *Barlaam et Joasaph*, ed. Boissonade, p. 37.

the 'Kalilah and Dimnah,' contains eighteen chapters instead of the five of the Pañkatantra, and it is only in the fifth, the seventh, the eighth, the ninth and the tenth chapters that we find the same stories which form the five books of the Pañkatantra in the *textus ornatior*. Even in these chapters the Arabic translator omits stories which we find in the Sanskrit text, and adds others which are not to be found there.

In this Arabic translation the story of the Brahman and the pot of rice runs as follows :—

'A religious man was in the habit of receiving every day from the house of a merchant a certain quantity of butter (oil) and honey, of which, having eaten as much as he wanted, he put the rest into a jar, which he hung on a nail in a corner of the room, hoping that the jar would in time be filled. Now, as he was leaning back one day on his couch, with a stick in his hand, and the jar suspended over his head, he thought of the high price of butter and honey, and said to himself, "I will sell what is in the jar, and buy with the money which I obtain for it ten goats, which, producing each of them a young one every five months, in addition to the produce of the kids as soon as they begin to bear, it will not be long before there is a large flock." He continued to make his calculations, and found that he should at this rate, in the course of two years, have more than four hundred goats. "At the expiration of this term I will buy," said he, "a hundred black cattle, in the proportion of a bull or a cow for every four goats. I will then purchase land, and hire workmen to plough it with the beasts, and put it into tillage, so that before five years are over I shall, no doubt, have realised a great fortune by the sale of the milk which the cows will give, and of the produce of my land. My next business will be to build a magnificent house, and engage a number of servants, both male and female; and, when my establishment is

completed, I will marry the handsomest woman I can find, who, in due time becoming a mother, will present me with an heir to my possessions, who, as he advances in age, shall receive the best masters that can be procured; and, if the progress which he makes in learning is equal to my reasonable expectations, I shall be amply repaid for the pains and expense which I have bestowed upon him; but if, on the other hand, he disappoints my hopes, the rod which I have here shall be the instrument with which I will make him feel the displeasure of a justly-offended parent." At these words he suddenly raised the hand which held the stick towards the jar, and broke it, and the contents ran down upon his head and face. . . .'[1]

You will have observed the coincidences between the Arabic and the Sanskrit versions, but also a considerable divergence, particularly in the winding up of the story. The Brahman and the holy man both build their castles in the air; but, while the former kicks his wife, the latter only chastises his son. How this change came to pass we cannot tell. But as we know now that the Arabic translation agrees in the main points with the Syriac,[2] we must accept the chas-

[1] *Kalila and Dimna; or, the Fables of Bidpai, translated from the Arabic.* By the Rev. Wyndham Knatchbull, A.M. Oxford, 1819.

[2] The story as told in the old Syriac translation (p. 53) is this: 'There was once a Magian who for his support received from the house of a rich man the remains of honey and oil, and also barley gruel. What was left he took to his house and poured it into a vessel which he hung on a peg above the place where he slept. When the vessel had become full, he, while lying in bed, lifted up his eyes and rejoiced in his heart, saying: "I shall sell this vessel dearly, for, according to my calculation, I shall get a denar for it. With that denar I shall get ten she-goats. They will have young ones at the right time, so that, after a lapse of five (two) years, I shall possess with them and their young ones more than one (four) hundred goats. Then I shall sell them, getting one cow for four goats, and thus I shall gradually become possessed of one hundred

tisement of the son as having been originally the cause of the mischief, while the changes introduced in the Pañkatantra and the Hitopadesa must be explained as intended to please the vulgar taste of a later age.

We have thus traced our story from Sanskrit to Pehlevi, and from Pehlevi to Arabic; we have followed it in its migrations from the hermitages of Indian sages to the court of the kings of Persia, and from thence to the residence of the powerful Khalifs at Bagdad. Let us recollect that the Khalif Al Mansur, for whom the Arabic translation was made, was the contemporary of Abderrhaman, who ruled in Spain, and that both were but little anterior to Harun al Rashid and Charlemagne. At that time, therefore, the way was perfectly open for these Eastern fables, after they had once reached Bagdad, to penetrate into the seats of Western learning, and to spread to every part of the new empire of Charlemagne. They may have done so, for all we know; but nearly three hundred years pass before these fables meet us again in the literature of Europe. The Carlovingian empire had fallen to pieces, Spain had been rescued from the Mohammedans, William

cows and bulls. I shall sell some of them and buy land, water, and seed. Of the other oxen I shall use some for agriculture, and the cows for breeding. In this way I shall sell in ten (five) years for high prices the produce of my land and water, and the calves of my cows, and buy instead servants and maids, a house and furniture. Having become a rich man, I shall marry a wife of a noble family; she will bear me a son who will be prosperous, favoured by Providence, and will become the head of the family. I shall call him Mahpia, educate him in doctrine and study, and make him perfect. But if Mahpia should be disobedient and recalcitrant, I shall beat him on the head with my stick." With these words he raised his stick and hit the pot so that it broke, and honey and oil poured down on his head, while the rest was wasted.'

the Conqueror had landed in England, and the Crusades had begun to turn the thoughts of Europe towards the East, when, about the year 1080, we hear of a Jew, of the name of Symeon, the son of Seth, who translated these fables from Arabic into Greek.[x] He states in his preface that the book came originally from India, that it was brought to the King Chosroes of Persia, and then translated into Arabic. His own translation into Greek must have been made from an Arabic MS. of the 'Kalilah and Dimnah,' in many places more perfect, in some less perfect, than the one published by De Sacy. The Greek text has been published, though very imperfectly, under the title of 'Stephanites and Ichnelates.'[1] Here our fable is told as follows (p. 337):—

'It is said that a beggar kept some honey and butter in a jar close to where he slept. One night he thus thought within himself: "I shall sell this honey and butter for however small a sum; with it I shall buy ten goats, and these in five months will produce as many again. In five years they will become four hundred. With them I shall buy one hundred cows, and with them I shall cultivate some land. And what with their calves and the harvests, I shall become rich in five years, and build a house with four wings,[2] ornamented with gold, and buy all kinds of servants,

[1] 'Specimen Sapientiæ Indorum Veterum, id est Liber Ethico Politicus pervetustus, dictus Arabice Kalîlah ve Dimnah, Græce Stephanites et Ichnelates, nunc primum Græce ex MS. Cod. Holsteiniano prodit cum versione Latina, opera S. G. Starkii.' Berolini, 1697; also Athens, 1851.

[2] This expression, a four-winged house, occurs also in the *Pañkatantra*. As it does not occur in the Arabic text published by De Sacy, it is clear that Symeon must have followed another Arabic text in which this adjective, belonging to the Sanskrit, and no doubt to the Pehlevi text also, had been preserved. It does not occur in the old Syriac translation, p. 54.

and marry a wife. She will give me a child, and I shall call him Beauty. It will be a boy, and I shall educate him properly; and if I see him lazy, I shall give him such a flogging with this stick. . . ." With these words he took a stick that was near him, struck the jar, and broke it, so that the honey and milk ran down on his beard.'

This Greek translation might, no doubt, have reached La Fontaine; but as the French poet was not a great scholar, least of all a reader of Greek MSS., and as the fables of Symeôn Seth were not published till 1697, we must look for other channels through which the old fable was carried along from East to West.

There is, first of all, an Italian translation of the 'Stephanites and Ichnelates,' which was published at Ferrara in 1583.[1] The title is, 'Del governo de' regni. Sotto morali esempi di animali ragionanti tra loro. Tratti prima di lingua Indiana in Agarena da Lelo Demno Saraceno. Et poi dall' Agarena nella Greca da Simeone Setto, philosopho Antiocheno. Et hora tradotti di Greco in Italiano.'[2] This translation is supposed to have been the work of Giulio Nuti.

There is, besides, a Latin translation, or rather a free rendering of the Greek translation, after a MS. of Leo Allatius, by the learned Jesuit, Petrus Possinus, which was published at Rome in 1666.[3] This may have been, and, according to some authorities, has really been one of the sources from which La Fontaine drew his inspirations. But though La Fontaine may

[1] Note C, p. 567.

[2] This Italian translation has been edited by Teza, Bologna, 1872.

[3] Note D, p. 568.

have consulted this work for other fables, I do not think that he took from it the fable of Perrette and the milk-pail.

The fact is, these fables had found several other channels through which, as early as the thirteenth century, they reached the literary market of Europe, and became familiar as household words, at least among the higher and educated classes. We shall follow the course of some of these channels. First, then, a learned Jew, whose name seems to have been Joel, translated our fables from Arabic into Hebrew (1250?). His work has been preserved in one MS. at Paris, but has not yet been published, except the tenth book, which was communicated by Dr. Neubauer to Benfey's journal, 'Orient und Occident' (vol. i. p. 658). This Hebrew translation was translated by another converted Jew, Johannes of Capua, into Latin. His translation was finished between 1263–1278, and, under the title of 'Directorium humanæ vitæ,' it became very soon a popular work with the select reading public of the thirteenth century.[1] In the 'Directorium,' and in Joel's translation, the name of Sendebar is substituted for that of Bidpay. The 'Directorium' was translated (though not from the printed edition)[2] into German at the command of Eberhard, the great Duke of Würtemberg,[3] and both the Latin text and the German translation occur, in repeated editions, among the rare books printed between 1480 and the end of the

[1] Note E, p. 569.

[2] Benfey, *Orient und Occident*, vol. i. p. 150, 161 seq., and *Einleitung*, p. L, note.

[3] Note F, p. 570.

fifteenth century.[1] A Spanish translation, founded both on the German and the Latin texts, appeared at Burgos in 1493;[2] and from these different sources flowed in the sixteenth century the Italian renderings of Firenzuola (1548)[3] and Doni (1552).[4] As these Italian translations were repeated in French[5] and English, before the end of the sixteenth century, they might no doubt have supplied La Fontaine with subjects for his fables.

But, as far as we know, it was a third channel that really brought the Indian fable to the immediate notice of the French poet. A Persian poet, of the name of Nasr Allah, translated the work of Abdallah ibn Almokaffa into Persian about 1150.

[1] Benfey, *Orient und Occident*, vol. i. p. 138. The German translation has been published by Holland, Stuttgart, 1860.

[2] Benfey, *Orient und Occident*, vol. i. p. 501. Its title is: 'Exemplario contra los engaños y peligros del mundo,' ibid. pp. 167, 168.

[3] *Discorsi degli animali, di Messer Agnolo Firenzuola, in Prose di M. A. F.* (Fiorenza, 1548.)

[4] *La Moral Filosophia del Doni, tratta da gli antichi scrittori.* Vinegia, 1552.

Trattati diversi di Sendebar Indiano, filosopho morale. Vinegia, 1552.

P. 65. *Trattato Quarto.*

A woman tells her husband to wait till her son is born, and says: 'Stava uno Romito domestico ne i monti di Brianza a far penitenza e teneva alcune cassette d' api per suo spasso, e di quelle a suoi tempi ne cavava il *Mele*, e di quello ne vendeva alcuna parte tal volta per i suoi besogni. Avenne che un' anno ne fu una gran carestia, e egli attendeva a conservarlo, e ogni giorno lo guardava mille volte, e gli pareva cent' anni ogni hora, che egli indugiava a empierlo di Mele,' etc.

[5] 'Le plaisant et facétieux discours des animaux, novellement traduict de tuscan en françois,' Lyon, 1556, par Gabriel Cottier.

'Deux livres de filosofie fabuleuse, le premier pris des discours de M. Ange Firenzuola, le second extraict dés traictez de Sandebar indien, par Pierre de La Rivey.' Lyon, 1579.

The second book is a translation of the second part of Doni's *Filosofia morale.*

This Persian translation was enlarged in the fifteenth century by another Persian poet, Husain ben Ali called el Vaez, under the title of 'Anvári Suhaili.'[1] This name will be familiar to many members of the Indian Civil Service, as being one of the old Haileybury class-books which had to be construed by all who wished to gain high honours in Persian. This work, or at least the first books of it, were translated into French by David Sahid of Ispahan, and published at Paris in 1644, under the title of 'Livre des Lumières, ou, la Conduite des Rois, composé par le Sage Pilpay, Indien.' This translation, we know, fell into the hands of La Fontaine; and a number of his most charming fables were certainly borrowed from it.

But Perrette with the milk-pail has not yet arrived at the end of her journey, for if we look at the 'Livre des Lumières,' as published at Paris, we find neither the milkmaid nor her prototype, the Brahman who kicks his wife, or the religious man who flogs his boy. That story occurs in the later chapters, which were left out in the French translation; and La Fontaine, therefore, must have met with his model elsewhere.

Remember that in all our wanderings we have not yet found the milkmaid, but only the Brahman or the religious man. What we want to know is who first brought about this metamorphosis.

No doubt La Fontaine was quite the man to seize

[1] The *Anvar-i Suhaili*, or the *Lights of Canopus*, being the Persian version of the Fables of Pilpay, or the Book, *Kalilah and Damnah*, rendered into Persian by Husain Vá'iz U'l-Káshifi, literally translated by E. B. Eastwick. Hertford, 1854.

on any jewel which was contained in the Oriental fables, to remove the cumbersome and foreign-looking setting, and then to place the principal figure in that pretty frame in which most of us have first become acquainted with it. But in this case the charmer's wand did not belong to La Fontaine, but to some forgotten worthy, whose very name it will be difficult to fix upon with certainty.

We have, as yet, traced three streams only, all starting from the Arabic translation of Abdallah ibn Almokaffa, one in the eleventh, another in the twelfth, a third in the thirteenth century, all reaching Europe, some touching the very steps of the throne of Louis XIV., yet none of them carrying the leaf which contained the story of 'Perrette,' or of the 'Brahman,' to the threshold of La Fontaine's home. We must, therefore, try again.

After the conquest of Spain by the Mohammedans, Arabic literature had found a new home in Western Europe, and among the numerous works translated from Arabic into Latin or Spanish, we find towards the end of the thirteenth century (1289) a Spanish translation of our fables, called 'Calila é Dymna,'[1] sometimes ascribed to King Alfonso the Wise. In this the name of the philosopher is changed from Bidpai to Bundobel. This, or another translation from Arabic, was turned into Latin verse by Raimond de Béziers in 1313 (not published).

Lastly, we find in the same century another translation from Arabic straight into Latin verse, by Baldo, which became known under the name of 'Æsopus alter.'[2]

[1] Note G, p. 571. [2] Note H, p. 572.

From these frequent translations, and translations of translations, in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, we see quite clearly that these Indian fables were extremely popular, and were, in fact, more widely read in Europe than the Bible, or any other book. They were not only read in translations, but having been introduced into sermons,[1] homilies, and works on morality, they were improved upon, acclimatised, localised, moralised, till at last it is almost impossible to recognise their Oriental features under their homely disguises.

I shall give you one instance only.

Rabelais, in his 'Gargantua,' gives a long description how a man might conquer the whole world. At the end of this dialogue, which was meant as a satire on Charles V., we read:—

'There was there present at that time an old gentleman well experienced in the wars, a stern soldier, and who had been in many great hazards, named Echephron, who, hearing this discourse, said: "J'ay grand peur que toute ceste enterprise sera semblable à la farce *du pot au laict* duquel un cordavanier se faisoit riche par resverie, puis le pot cassé, n'eut de quoy disner."'

This is clearly our story, only the Brahman has, as yet, been changed into a shoemaker only, and the pot of rice or the jar of butter and honey into a pitcher of milk. Now it is perfectly true that if a writer of the fifteenth century changed the Brahman into a shoemaker, La Fontaine might, with the same right, have replaced the Brahman by his milkmaid. Knowing that the story was current, was, in fact, common property in the fifteenth century, nay, even

[1] Note I, p. 574.

at a much earlier date, we might really be satisfied after having brought the germs of Perrette within easy reach of La Fontaine. But, fortunately, we can make at least one step further, a step of about two centuries. This step backwards brings us to the thirteenth century, and there we find our old Indian friend again, and this time really changed into a milkmaid. The book I refer to is written in Latin, and called '*Dialogus Creaturarum optime moralizatus*;' in English, the 'Dialogue of Creatures moralised.' It was a book intended to teach the principles of Christian morality by examples taken from ancient fables. It was evidently a most successful book, and was translated into several modern languages. There is an old translation of it in English, first printed by Rastell,[1] and afterwards repeated in 1816. I shall read you from it the fable in which, as far as I can find, the milkmaid appears for the first time on the stage, surrounded already by much of that scenery which, four hundred years later, received its last touches at the hand of La Fontaine.

'DIALOGO C. (p. ccxxiii.) For as it is but madnesse to trust to moche in surete, so it is but foly to hope to moche of vanyteys, for vayne be all erthly thinges longynge to men, as sayth Davyd, Psal. xciiii: Wher of it is tolde in fablys that a lady uppon a tyme delyvered to her mayden a *galon of mylke* to sell at a cite, and by the way, as she sate and restid her by a dyche side, she began to thinke that with the money of the mylke she wold bye an henne,

[1] '*Dialogues of Creatures moralysed*, sm. 4to, circ. 1517. It is generally attributed to the press of John Rastell, but the opinion of Mr. Haslewood, in his preface to the reprint of 1816, that the book was printed on the Continent, is perhaps the correct one.' (Quaritch's *Catalogue*, July 1870.)

OLD COLLECTION OF INDIAN FABLES

A.D.

500—600 531—579. Khosru Nushirvan, King of Persia; his physician, Barzôi, translates the Indian fables into *Pehlevi*, s.t. 'Qalilag and Damnag' (lost).

700—800 570. Translation of the 'Qalilag and Damnag,' from Pehlevi into *Syriac*, by Bud Periodeutes (Benfey, Bickell, and Socin).

754—775. Khalif Al-Mansur. Abdallah ibn Almokaffa (d. 760) translates the Pehlevi into *Arabic* (ed. de Sacy, 1816).

900—1000

1000—1100 Poetical Persian versions by Rudegi (d. 914).

1100—1200 1118–53. Into *Persian*, by Abul Maali Nasr Allah (prose).

1080. Into *Greek*, by Symeon Seth, s.t. 'Ichnelates et Stephanites,' ed. Starkius, 1679; Athens, 1851.

1200—1300 Into *Latin*, by Baldo, s.t. Alter Æsopus (ed. du Méril).

1289. Into *Spanish*, by order of the Infante Don Alfonso, s.t. 'Calila é Dymna' (ed. de Gayangos).

1250. Into *Hebrew*, by Rabbi Joel.

1263–78. Into *Latin*, by Johannes of Capua, s.t. 'Directorium humanæ vitæ' (print. 1480).

1300—1400 1313. Into *Latin*, by Raimond de Béziers, s.t. 'Calila et Dimna.'

Into *German*, under Eberhard, Duke of Würtemberg (d. 1325), printed before 1483 (ed. Holland, 1860).

1400—1500 1494. Modernised in *Persian*, by Husain ben Ali, el Vaez, s.t. 'Anvari Suhaili.'

1493. Into *Spanish*, s.t. 'Exemplario contra los engaños.'

1500—1600 1590. New, by Abulfazl, for Akbar, 'Ayari Danish.'

Translated into *Hindustani*, s.t. 'Khirud Ufroz,' the Illuminator of the Understanding. 1803

1540. Into *Turkish*, by Ali Tchelebi, s.t. 'Homayun Nameh.'

1548. Into *Italian*, by Ange Firenzuola, s.t. 'Discorsi degli animali.'

1552. Into *Italian*, by Doni, s.t. 'La filosofia morale.'

1556. Into *French*, by Gabr. Cottier, s.t. 'Le plaisant discours des animaux.'

1583. Into *Italian*, by G. Nuti, s.t. 'Governo de' regni' (ed. Teza, Bologna, 1872).

1600—1700 1570. Into *English*, by North.

1579. Into *French*, by Pierre de La Rivey, s.t. 'Deux livres de filosofie fabuleuse.'

1668—1694 LA FONTAINE 1644. Into *French*, by David Sahid d'Ispahan (Gaulmin), s.t. 'Livre des Lumières, ou la Conduite des Rois, composé par le sage Pilpay, Indien (4 cap. only).

—Into *Spanish*, by Brattuti, 'Espejo politico,' 1654.

1666. Into *Latin*, by Petrus Possinus.

1724. Into *French*, by Galland, s.t. 'Les Contes et Fables Indi...

the which shulde bringe forth chekyns, and when they were growyn to hennys she wolde sell them and by piggis, and eschaunge them in to shepe, and the shepe in to oxen, and so whan she was come to richesse she sholde be maried right worshipfully unto some worthy man, and thus she reioycid. And whan she was thus mervelously comfortid and ravisshed inwardly in her secrete solace, thinkynge with howe greate ioye she shuld be ledde towarde the chirche with her husbond on horsebacke, she sayde to her self: "Goo we, goo we." Sodaynlye she smote the ground with her fote, myndynge to spurre the horse, but her fote slypped, and she fell in the dyche, and there lay all her mylke, and so she was farre from her purpose, and never had that she hopid to have.'[1]

Here we have arrived at the end of our journey. It has been a long journey across fifteen or twenty centuries, and I am afraid our following Perrette from country to country, and from language to language, may have tired some of my hearers. I shall, therefore, not attempt to fill the gap that divides the fable of the thirteenth century from La Fontaine. Suffice it to say, that the milkmaid, having once taken the place of the Brahman, main-

[1] The Latin text is more simple: 'Unde cum quedam domina dedisset ancille sue lac ut venderet et lac portaret ad urbem juxta fossatum cogitare cepit quod de p̃cio lactis emerit gallinam quae faceret pullos quos auctos in gallinas venderet et porcellos emeret eosque mutaret in oves et ipsas in boves. Sic que ditata contraheret cum aliquo nobili et sic gloriabatur Et cum sic gloriaretur et cogitaret cum quanta gloria duceretur ad illum virum super equum dicendo gio gio cepit pede percutere terram quasi pungeret equum calcaribus. Sed tunc lubricatus est pes ejus et cecidit in fossatum effundendo lac. Sic enim non habuit quod se adepturam sperabat.'—*Dialogus Creaturarum optime moralizatus* (ascribed to Nicolaus Pergaminus, supposed to have lived in the thirteenth century). He quotes Elynandus, in *Gestis Romanorum*. First edition, per Gerardum leeu in oppido Goudensi inceptum; munere Dei finitus est, Anno Domini, 1480.

tained it against all comers. We find her as Dona Truhana, in the famous 'Conde Lucanor,' the work of the Infante Don Juan Manuel,[1] who died in 1347, the grandson of St. Ferdinand, the nephew of Alfonso the Wise, though himself not a king, yet more powerful than a king; renowned both by his sword and by his pen, and possibly not ignorant of Arabic, the language of his enemies. We find her again in the 'Contes et Nouvelles of Bonaventure des Periers,'[2] published in the sixteenth century, a book which we know that La Fontaine was well acquainted with. We find her after La Fontaine in all the languages of Europe.[3]

"You see now before your eyes the bridge on which our fables came to us from East to West. The same bridge which brought us Perrette brought us hundreds of fables, all originally sprung up in India, many of them carefully collected by Buddhist priests, and preserved in their sacred canon, afterwards handed on to the Brahmanic writers of a later age, carried by Barzôî from India to the court of Persia, then to the courts of the Khalifs at Bagdad and Cordova, and of the emperors at Constantinople. Some of them, no doubt, perished on their journey, others were mixed up together, others were changed till we should hardly know them again. Still, if you once know the eventful journey of Perrette, you

[1] Note K, p. 575. [2] Note L, p. 575.

[3] My learned German translator, Dr. Felix Liebrecht, says in a note: 'Other books in which our story appears before La Fontaine are *Esopus*, by Burkhard Waldis, ed. H. Kurz, Leipzig, 1862; ii. 177; Note to *Des Bettlers Kaufmannschaft*; and Oesterley in Kirchoff's *Wendunmuth*, v. 44, note to i. 171, 'Vergebene Anschlag reich zu werden' (*Bibl. des liter. Vereins zu Stuttg.* No. 99).

know the journey of all the other fables that belong to this Indian cycle. Few of them have gone through so many changes, few of them have found so many friends, whether in the courts of kings or in the huts of beggars. Few of them have been to places where Perrette has not also been. This is why I selected her and her passage through the world as the best illustration of a subject which otherwise would require a whole course of lectures to do it justice.

But though our fable represents one large class or cluster of fables, it does not represent all. There were several collections, besides the Buddhist original of the Pañkatantra, which found their way from India to Europe. The most important among them is the 'Book of the Seven Wise Masters, or the Book of Sindbad,' the history of which has lately been written, with great learning and ingenuity, by Signor Comparetti.[1]

These large collections of fables and stories mark what may be called the high roads on which the literary products of the East were carried to the West. But there are, besides these high roads, some smaller, less trodden paths on which single fables, sometimes mere proverbs, similes, or metaphors, have come to us from India, from Persepolis, from Damascus and Bagdad. I have already alluded to the powerful influence which Arabic literature exercised on Western Europe through Spain. Again, a most active interchange of Eastern and Western ideas took place at a later time during the progress of the Crusades. Even the inroads of Mongolian

[1] *Ricerche intorno al Libro di Sindibad.* Milano, 1869.

tribes into Russia and the East of Europe kept up a literary bartering between Oriental and Occidental nations.

But few would have suspected a Father of the Church as an importer of Eastern fables. Yet so it is.

At the court of the same Khalif Almansur, where Abdallah ibn Almokaffa translated the fables of Kalilah and Dimnah from Persian into Arabic, there lived a Christian of the name of Sergius, who for many years held the high office of treasurer to the Khalif. He had a son to whom he gave the best education that could then be given, his chief tutor being one Cosmas, an Italian monk, who had been taken prisoner by the Saracens, and sold as a slave at Bagdad. After the death of Sergius, his son succeeded him for some time as chief councillor (πρωτοσύμβουλος) to the Khalif Almansur. Such, however, had been the influence of the Italian monk on his pupil's mind, that he suddenly resolved to retire from the world, and to devote himself to study, meditation, and pious works. From the monastery of St. Saba, near Jerusalem, this former minister of the Khalif issued the most learned works on theology, particularly his 'Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.' He soon became the highest authority on matters of dogma in the Eastern Church, and he still holds his place among the saints both of the Eastern and Western Churches. His name was Joannes, and from being born at Damascus, the former capital of the Khalifs, he is best known in history as Joannes Damascenus, or St. John of Damascus. He must have known Arabic, and probably Persian; but his

mastery of Greek earned him, later in life, the name of Chrysorrhoas, or Gold-flowing. He became famous as the defender of the sacred images, and as the determined opponent of the Emperor Leo the Isaurian, about 726. It is difficult in his life to distinguish between legend and history, but that he had held high office at the court of the Khalif Almansur, that he boldly opposed the iconoclastic policy of the Emperor Leo, and that he wrote the most learned theological works of his time, cannot be easily questioned.

Among the works ascribed to him is a story called 'Barlaam and Joasaph.'[1] There has been a fierce controversy as to whether he was the author of it or not. Though for our own immediate purposes it would be of little consequence whether the book was written by Joannes Damascenus or by some less distinguished ecclesiastic, I must confess that the arguments hitherto adduced against his authorship seem to me very weak.

[1] The Greek text was first published in 1832, by Boissonade, in his *Anecdota Græca*, vol. iv. The title as given in some MSS. is: *ἱστορία ψυχωφελὴς ἐκ τῆς ἐνδοτέρας τῶν Αἰθιόπων χώρας, τῆς Ἰνδῶν λεγομένης, πρὸς τὴν ἁγίαν πόλιν μετενεχθεῖσα διὰ Ἰωάννου τοῦ μοναχοῦ* [other MSS. read, *συγγραφεῖσα παρὰ τοῦ ἁγίου πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἰωάννου τοῦ Δαμασκηνοῦ*], *ἀνδρὸς τιμίου καὶ ἐναρέτου μονῆς τοῦ ἁγίου Σάβα· ἐν ᾗ ὁ βίος Βαρλαὰμ καὶ Ἰωάσαφ τῶν ἁοσιδίμων καὶ μακαρίων.* Joannes Monachus occurs as the name of the author in other works of Joannes Damascenus. See Leo Allatius, Prolegomena, p. L., in *Damasceni Opera Omnia*. Ed. Lequien, 1748. Venice.

At the end the author says: *Ἕως ὧδε τὸ πέρας τοῦ παρόντος λόγου, ὃν κατὰ δύναμιν ἐμὴν γεγράφηκα, καθὼς ἀκήκοα παρὰ τῶν ἀψευδῶς παραδεδωκότων μοι τιμίων ἀνδρῶν. Γένοιτο δὲ ἡμᾶς, τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας τὴν ψυχωφελῆ διήγησιν ταύτην, τῆς μερίδος ἀξιωθῆναι τῶν εὐαρεστησάντων τῷ κυρίῳ εὐχαῖς καὶ πρεσβείαις Βαρλαὰμ καὶ Ἰωάσαφ τῶν μακαρίων περὶ ὧν ἡ διήγησις.* See also Wiener, *Jahrbücher*, vol. lxiii. pp. 44–83; vol. lxxii. pp. 274–288; vol. lxxiii. pp. 176–202.

The Jesuits did not like the book, because it was a religious novel. They pointed to a passage in which the Holy Ghost is represented as proceeding from the Father 'and the Son,' as incompatible with the creed of an Eastern ecclesiastic. That very passage, however, has now been proved to be spurious; and it should be borne in mind, besides, that the controversy on the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, or from the Father through the Son, dates a century later than Joannes. The fact, again, that the author does not mention Mohammedanism,[1] proves nothing against the authorship of Joannes, because, as he places Barlaam and Joasaph in the early centuries of Christianity, he would have ruined his story by any allusion to Mohammed's religion, then only a hundred years old. Besides, he had written a separate work, in which the relative merits of Christianity and Mohammedanism were discussed. The prominence given to the question of the worship of images shows that the story could not have been written much before the time of Joannes Damascenus, and there is nothing in the style of our author that could be pointed out as incompatible with the style of the great theologian. On the contrary, the author of 'Barlaam and Joasaph' quotes the same authors whom Joannes Damascenus quotes most frequently—*e.g.* Basilius and Gregorius Nazianzenus. And no one but Joannes could have taken long passages from his own works without saying where he borrowed them.[2]

[1] Littré, *Journal des Savants*, 1865, p. 337.

[2] The *Martyrologium Romanum* (1583 A.D.), whatever its authority may be, states distinctly that the acts of Barlaam and Josaphat were

The story of 'Barlaam and Joasaph'—or, as he is more commonly called, Josaphat—may be told in a few words: 'A king in India, an enemy and persecutor of the Christians, has an only son. The astrologers have predicted that he would embrace the new doctrine. His father, therefore, tries by all means in his power to keep him ignorant of the miseries of the world, and to create in him a taste for pleasure and enjoyment. A Christian hermit, however, gains access to the prince, and instructs him in the doctrines of the Christian religion. The young prince is not only baptized, but resolves to give up all his earthly riches; and, after having converted his own father and many of his subjects, he follows his teacher into the desert.'

The real object of the book is to give a simple exposition of the principal doctrines of the Christian religion. It also contains a first attempt at comparative theology, for in the course of the story there is a disputation on the merits of the principal religions of the world—the Chaldæan, the Egyptian, the Greek, the Jewish, and the Christian. But one of the chief attractions of this manual of Christian theology consisted in a number of fables and parables with which it is enlivened. Most of them have been

written by Sanctus Joannes Damascenus. 'Apud Indos Persis finitimos sanctorum Barlaam et Josaphat, quorum actus mirandos sanctus Joannes Damascenus conscripsit.' See Leonis Allatii Prolegomena, in *Joannis Damasceni Opera*, ed. Lequien, vol. i. p. xxvi. He adds: Et Gennadius Patriarcha per Concil. Florent. cap. 5: οὐχ ἧττον δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἰωάννης ὁ μέγας τοῦ Δαμασκοῦ ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν τῷ βίῳ Βαρλαὰμ καὶ Ἰωσάφατ τῶν Ἰνδῶν μαρτυρεῖ λέγων. Arguments against his authority are given in Zotenberg and P. Meyer's edition of B. and J., by Gui de Cambrai (*Bibliothek des Lit. Vereins in Stuttgart*, lxxv. pp. 312–314; see also *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenl. Gesellschaft*, 1878, p. 584.

traced to an Indian source. I shall mention one only which has found its way into almost every literature of the world:[1]—

'A man was pursued by a unicorn, and while he tried to flee from it, he fell into a pit. In falling, he stretched out both his arms, and laid hold of a small tree that was growing on one side of the pit. Having gained a firm footing, and holding to the tree, he fancied he was safe, when he saw two mice, a black and a white one, busy gnawing the root of the tree to which he was clinging. Looking down into the pit, he perceived a horrid dragon with his mouth wide open, ready to devour him, and when examining the place on which his feet rested, the heads of four serpents glared at him. Then he looked up, and observed drops of honey falling down from the tree to which he clung. Suddenly the unicorn, the dragon, the mice, and the serpents were all forgotten, and his mind was intent only on catching the drops of sweet honey trickling down from the tree.'

An explanation is hardly required. The unicorn is Death, always chasing man; the pit is the world; the small tree is man's life, constantly gnawed by the black and the white mouse—*i.e.* by night and day; the four serpents are the four elements which compose the human body; the dragon below is meant for the jaws of hell. Surrounded by all these horrors, man is yet able to forget them all, and to think only of the pleasures of life, which, like a few drops of honey, fall into his mouth from the tree of life.[2]

[1] The story of the caskets, well known from the 'Merchant of Venice,' occurs in *Barlaam and Josaphat*, though it is used there for a different purpose.

[2] Cf. Benfey, *Pantschatantra*, vol. i. p. 80; vol. ii. p. 528; *Les Avadanas, Contes et Apologues indiens*, par Stanislas Julien, i.

But what is still more curious is, that the author of 'Barlaam and Josaphat' has evidently taken his very hero, the Indian Prince Josaphat, from an Indian source. In the 'Lalita Vistara'—the life, though no doubt the legendary life, of Buddha—the father of Buddha is a king. When his son is born, the Brahman Asita predicts that he will rise to great glory, and become either a powerful king, or, renouncing the throne and embracing the life of a hermit, become a Buddha.[1] The great object of his father is to prevent this. He therefore keeps the young prince, when he grows up, in his garden and palaces, surrounded by all pleasures which might turn his mind from contemplation to enjoyment. More especially he is to know nothing of illness, old age, and death, which might open his eyes to the misery and unreality of life. After a time, however, the prince receives permission to drive out; and then follow the four drives,[2] so famous in Buddhist history. The places where these drives took place were commemorated by towers still standing in the time of Fa Hian's visit to India, early in the fifth century after Christ, and even in the time of Hiouen Thsang, in the seventh century. I shall read you a short account of the three drives:[3]—

'One day when the prince with a large retinue was driving through the eastern gate of the city, on the way to one of his parks, he met on the road an old man, broken

pp. 132, 191; *Gesta Romanorum*, cap. 168; *Homâyun Nameh*, cap. iv.; Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, pp. 758–759; Liebrecht, *Jahrbücher für Rom. und Engl. Literatur*, 1860.

[1] *Lalita Vistara*, ed. Calcutt. p. 126.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 225.

[3] See *Selected Essays*, vol. ii. p. 197.

and decrepit. One could see the veins and muscles over the whole of his body, his teeth chattered, he was covered with wrinkles, bald, and hardly able to utter hollow and unmelodious sounds. He was bent on his stick, and all his limbs and joints trembled. "Who is that man?" said the prince to his coachman. "He is small and weak, his flesh and his blood are dried up, his muscles stick to his skin, his head is white, his teeth chatter, his body is wasted away; leaning on his stick, he is hardly able to walk, stumbling at every step. Is there something peculiar in his family, or is this the common lot of all created beings?"

'"Sir," replied the coachman, "that man is sinking under old age, his senses have become obtuse, suffering has destroyed his strength, and he is despised by his relations. He is without support, and useless; and people have abandoned him, like a dead tree in a forest. But this is not peculiar to his family. In every creature youth is defeated by old age. Your father, your mother, all your relations, all your friends, will come to the same state; this is the appointed end of all creatures."

'"Alas!" replied the prince, "are creatures so ignorant, so weak, and foolish as to be proud of the youth by which they are intoxicated, not seeing the old age which awaits them? As for me, I go away. Coachman, turn my chariot quickly. What have I, the future prey of old age—what have I to do with pleasure?" And the young prince returned to the city without going to the park.

'Another time the prince was driving through the southern gate to his pleasure-garden, when he perceived on the road a man suffering from illness, parched with fever, his body wasted, covered with mud, without a friend, without a home, hardly able to breathe, and frightened at the sight of himself, and the approach of death. Having questioned his coachman, and received from him the answer which he expected, the young prince said, "Alas! health is but the sport of a dream, and the fear of suffering must take this frightful form. Where is the wise man who, after

having seen what he is, could any longer think of joy and pleasure?" The prince turned his chariot, and returned to the city.

'A third time he was driving to his pleasure-garden through the western gate, when he saw a dead body on the road, lying on a bier and covered with a cloth. The friends stood about crying, sobbing, tearing their hair, covering their heads with dust, striking their breasts, and uttering wild cries. The prince, again, calling his coachman to witness this painful scene, exclaimed, "Oh, woe to youth, which must be destroyed by old age! Woe to health, which must be destroyed by so many diseases! Woe to this life, where a man remains so short a time! If there were no old age, no disease, no death; if these could be made captive for ever!" Then, betraying for the first time his intentions, the young prince said, "Let us turn back; I must think how to accomplish deliverance."

'A last meeting put an end to his hesitation. He was driving through the northern gate on the way to his pleasure-gardens, when he saw a mendicant, who appeared outwardly calm, subdued, looking downwards, wearing with an air of dignity his religious vestment, and carrying an alms-bowl.

'"Who is that man?" asked the prince.

'"Sir," replied the coachman, "this man is one of those who are called Bhikshus, or mendicants. He has renounced all pleasures, all desires, and leads a life of austerity. He tries to conquer himself. He has become a devotee. Without passion, without envy, he walks about asking for alms."

'"This is good and well said," replied the prince. "The life of a devotee has always been praised by the wise. It will be my refuge, and the refuge of other creatures; it will lead us to a real life, to happiness and immortality."

'With these words the young prince turned his chariot, and returned to the city.'

If now we compare the story of Joannes of Damas-

cus, we find that the early life of Josaphat is exactly the same as that of Buddha. His father is a king, and after the birth of his son, an astrologer predicts that he will rise to glory; not, however, in his own kingdom, but in a higher and better one; in fact, that he will embrace the new and persecuted religion of the Christians. Everything is done to prevent this. He is kept in a beautiful palace, surrounded by all that is enjoyable; and great care is taken to keep him in ignorance of sickness, old age, and death. After a time, however, his father gives him leave to drive out. On one of his drives he sees two men, one maimed, the other blind. He asks what they are, and is told that they are suffering from disease. He then inquires whether all men are liable to disease, and whether it is known beforehand who will suffer from disease and who will be free; and when he hears the truth, he becomes sad, and returns home. Another time, when he drives out, he meets an old man with wrinkled face and shaking legs, bent down, with white hair, his teeth gone, and his voice faltering. He asks again what all this means, and is told that this is what happens to all men; and that no one can escape old age, and that in the end all men must die. Thereupon he returns home to meditate on death, till at last a hermit appears,[1]

[1] Minayeff, *Mélanges Asiatiques*, vi. 5, p. 584, remarks: 'According to a legend in the *Mahávastu* of Yasas or Yasoda (in a less complete form to be found in Schiefner, *Eine tibetische Lebensbeschreibung Sákyamunis*, p. 247; Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 187; Bigandet, *The Life or Legend of Gaudama*, p. 113), a merchant appears in Yasoda's house, the night before he has the dream which induces him to leave his paternal house, and proclaims to him the true doctrine.'

and opens before his eyes a higher view of life, as contained in the Gospel of Christ.

No one, I believe, can read these two stories without feeling convinced that one was borrowed from the other; and as Fa Hian, three hundred years before John of Damascus, saw the towers which commemorated the three drives of Buddha still standing among the ruins of the royal city of Kapilavastu, it follows that the Greek father borrowed his subject from the Buddhist scriptures. Were it necessary, it would be easy to point out still more minute coincidences between the life of Josaphat and of Buddha, the founder of the Buddhist religion. Both in the end convert their royal fathers, both fight manfully against the assaults of the flesh and the devil, both are regarded as saints before they die. Possibly even a proper name may have been transferred from the sacred canon of the Buddhists to the pages of the Greek writer. The driver who conducts Buddha when he flees by night from his palace where he leaves his wife, his only son, and all his treasures, in order to devote himself to a contemplative life, is called Chandaka, in Burmese Sanna.[1] The friend and companion of Barlaam is called Zardan.[2] Reinaud

[1] *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. iii. p. 21.

[2] In some places one might almost believe that Joannes Damascenus did not only hear the story of Buddha, as he says, from the mouth of people who had brought it to him from India, but that he had before him the very text of the *Lalita Vistara*. Thus in the account of the three or four drives we find indeed that the Buddhist canon represents Buddha as seeing on three successive drives, first an old, then a sick, and at last a dying man; while Joannes makes Joasaph meet two men on his first drive, one maimed, the other blind, and an old man, who is nearly dying, on his second drive. So far there is a difference which might best be explained by ad-

in his 'Mémoire sur l'Inde,' p. 91 (1849), was the first, it seems, to point out that Youdasf, mentioned by Massoudi as the founder of the Sabæan religion, and Youasaf, mentioned as the founder of Buddhism by the author of the 'Kitáb-al-Fihrist,' are both meant for Bodhisattva, a corruption quite intelligible with the system of transcribing that name with Persian letters. Professor Benfey has identified Theudas, the sorcerer in 'Barlaam and Joasaph,' with the Devadatta of the Buddhist scriptures.[1]

How palpable these coincidences are between the two stories is best shown by the fact that they were pointed out, independently of each other, by scholars in France, Germany, and England. I place France first, because in point of time M. Laboulaye was the first who called attention to it in one of his charming articles in the 'Débats.'[2] A more detailed comparison was given by Dr. Liebrecht.[3] And, lastly, Mr. Beal,

mitting the account given by Joannes Damascenus himself, viz. that the story was brought from India, and that it was simply told him by worthy and truthful men. But, if it was so, we have here another instance of the tenacity with which oral tradition is able to preserve the most minute points of the story. The old man is described by a long string of adjectives both in Greek and in Sanskrit, and many of them are strangely alike. The Greek *γέρων*, old, corresponds to the Sanskrit *gîrna*; *πεπαλαιώμενος*, aged, is Sanskrit *vriddha*; *ἐρρικνώμενος τὸ πρόσωπον*, shrivelled in his face, is balînikitakâya, the body covered with wrinkles; *παρειμένος τὰς κνήμας*, weak in his knees, is pravedhayamânaḥ sarvâṅgapratyaṅgaiḥ, trembling in all his limbs; *συγκεκυφώς*, bent, is kubga; *πεπολιώμενος*, grey, is palitakesa; *ἐστερήμενος τοὺς ὀδόντας*, toothless, is khandadanta; *ἐγκεκομένα λαλῶν*, stammering, is khurakhurâvasaktakantha.

[1] *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, vol. xxiv. p. 480.

[2] *Débats*, 1859, 21 and 26 Juillet.

[3] *Die Quellen des Barlaam und Josaphat, in Jahrbuch für roman. und engl. Litteratur*, vol. ii. p. 314, 1860.

in his translation of the 'travels of Fa Hian,'[1] called attention to the same fact—viz. that the story of Josaphat was borrowed from the 'Life of Buddha.' I could mention the names of two or three scholars besides who happened to read the two books, and who could not help seeing, what was as clear as day-light, that Joannes Damascenus took the principal character of his religious novel from the 'Lalita Vistara,' one of the sacred books of the Buddhists; but the merit of having been the first belongs to M. Laboulaye.

This fact is, no doubt, extremely curious in the history of literature; but there is another fact connected with it which is more than curious, and I wonder that it has never been pointed out before. It is well known that the story of 'Barlaam and Josaphat' became a most popular book during the Middle Ages. In the East it was translated into Syriac (?), Arabic, Ethiopic, Armenian,[2] and Hebrew; in the West it exists in Latin, French,[3] Italian, German (Rudolf von Ems), English, Spanish, Bohemian, and Polish. As early as 1204, a King of Norway translated it into Icelandic, and at a later time it was translated by a Jesuit missionary into Tagala, the classical language of the Philippine Islands. But this is not all. Barlaam and Josaphat have actually risen to the rank of Saints, both in the Eastern and in the Western Churches. In the Eastern Church August 26 is the saint's day of Josaphat; in the Roman

[1] *Travels of Fah-hian and Sung-Yun, Buddhist Pilgrims, from China to India.* (400 A.D. and 518 A.D.) Translated from the Chinese by Samuel Beal. London, Trübner and Co. 1869.

[2] See Brosset, *Mélanges Asiatiques*, tom. viii. p. 538. Petersburg, 1879.

[3] Published by Zotenberg and P. Meyer, Stuttgart, 1864; see p. 535.

Martyrologium, November 27 is assigned to Barlaam and Josaphat.[1]

There have been from time to time misgivings about the historical character of these two saints. Leo Allatius, in his 'Prolegomena,' ventured to ask the question, whether the story of 'Barlaam and Josaphat' was more real than the 'Cyropaedia' of Xenophon, or the 'Utopia' of Thomas More; but, *en bon Catholique*, he replied, that as Barlaam and Josaphat were mentioned, not only in the Menæa of the Greek, but also in the Martyrologium of the Roman Church, he could not bring himself to believe that their history was imaginary. Billius thought that to doubt the concluding words of the author, who says that he received the story of 'Barlaam and Josaphat' from men incapable of falsehood, would be to trust more in one's own suspicions than in Christian charity, which believeth all things. Bellarminus thought he could prove the truth of the story by the fact that, at the end of it, the author himself invokes the two saints, Barlaam and Josaphat! Leo Allatius admitted, indeed, that some of the speeches and conversations occurring in the story might be the work of Joannes Damascenus, because Josaphat, having but recently been converted, could not have

[1] Mr. Brosset, in the *Mélanges Asiatiques* (tom. viii. p. 535), states that in the Greek Church November 19 is devoted to Varlaam and Joasaph. Since 1866 the Russian Almanacs, published by the Academy, call S. Varlaam a martyr, while formerly he was designated simply as *Très-saint*. St. Ioasaph is in some almanacs called King of India; in one at the end of the Georgian Bible, 'Son of the great King of India.' A learned account of the introduction of Barlaam and Josaphat into the Matyrologia and Menologia of the Western and Eastern Churches has lately been published by M. E. Cosquin, *La Légende des Saints Barlaam et Josaphat*, Paris, 1880.

quoted so many passages from the Bible. But he implies that even this could be explained, because the Holy Ghost might have taught St. Josaphat what to say. At all events, Leo has no mercy for those 'quibus omnia sub sanctorum nomine prodita male olent, quemadmodum de sanctis Georgio, Christophoro, Hippolyto, Catarina, aliisque nusquam eos in rerum natura extitisse impudentissime nugantur.' The Bishop of Avranches had likewise his doubts; but he calmed them by saying: 'Non pas que je veuille soustenir que tout en soit supposé: il y auroit de la témérité à desavouer qu'il y ait jamais eû de Barlaam ni de Josaphat. Le témoignage du Martyrologe, qui les met au nombre des Saints, et leur intercession que Saint Jean Damascene reclame à la fin de cette histoire ne permettent pas d'en douter.' [1]

With us the question as to the historical or purely imaginary character of Josaphat has assumed a new and totally different aspect. We willingly accept the statement of Joannes Damascenus that the story of 'Barlaam and Josaphat' was told him by men who came from India. We know that in India a story was current of a prince who lived in the sixth century B.C., a prince of whom it was predicted that he would resign the throne, and devote his life to meditation, in order to rise to the rank of a Buddha. The story tells us that his father did everything to prevent this; that he kept him in a palace secluded from the world, surrounded by all that makes life enjoyable; and that he tried to keep him in ignorance of sickness, old age, and death. We know from the same story that at last the young prince obtained

[1] Littré, *Journal des Savants*, 1865, p. 337.

permission to drive into the country, and that, by meeting an old man, a sick man, and a corpse, his eyes were opened to the unreality of life, and the vanity of this life's pleasures; that he escaped from his palace, and, after defeating the assaults of all adversaries, became the founder of a new religion. This is the story, it may be the legendary story, but at all events the recognised story of Gautama Sâkyamuni, best known to us under the name of the Buddha.

If, then, Joannes Damascenus tells the same story, only putting the name of Joasaph or Josaphat, *i.e.* Bodhisattva, in the place of Buddha; if all that is human and personal in the life of St. Josaphat is taken from the 'Lalita Vistara'—what follows? It follows that, in the same sense in which La Fontaine's Perrette is the Brahman of the Pañkatantra, St. Josaphat is the Buddha of the Buddhist canon. It follows that Buddha has become a Saint in the Roman Church; it follows that, though under a different name, the sage of Kapilavastu, the founder of a religion which, whatever we may think of its dogma, is, in the purity of its morals, nearer to Christianity than any other religion, and which counts even now, after an existence of 2,400 years, more believers than any other creed, has received the highest honours that the Christian Church can bestow. And whatever we may think of the sanctity of saints, let those who doubt the right of Buddha to a place among them read the story of his life, as it is told in the Buddhist canon. If he lived the life which is there described, few saints have a better claim to the title than Buddha; and no one either

in the Greek or in the Roman Church need be ashamed of having paid to Buddha's memory the honour that was intended for St. Josaphat, the prince, the hermit, and the saint.

History, here as elsewhere, is stranger than fiction; and a kind fairy, whom men call Chance, has here, as elsewhere, remedied the ingratitude and injustice of the world.

APPENDIX.

I AM enabled to add here a short account of an important discovery made by Professor Benfey with regard to the Syriac translation of our Collection of Fables. Doubts had been expressed by Sylvestre de Sacy and others, as to the existence of this translation, which was mentioned for the first time in Ebedjesu's[1] catalogue of Syriac writers, published by Abraham Ecchellensis, and again (1725) by Assemani ('Biblioth. Orient.' tom. iii. part i. p. 219). M. Renan,[2] on the contrary, had shown that the title of this translation, as transmitted to us, 'Kalilag and Damnag,' was a guarantee of its historical authenticity. As a final k in Pehlvi becomes h in modern Persian, a title such as 'Kalilag and Damnag,' answering to 'Kalilak and Damnak' in Pehlvi,[3] in Sanskrit 'Karaṭaka and Damanaka,' could only have been borrowed from the Persian, before the Mohammedan era. Now that the interesting researches of Professor Benfey on this subject have been rewarded by the happy discovery of a Syriac translation, there remains but one point to be cleared up, viz. whether this is really the translation made by Bud Periodeutes (Visitator), and whether this same translation was made, as Ebedjesu affirms, from the Indian text, or, as M. Renan supposes, from a Pehlvi version. I insert the account which Pro-

[1] Ebedjesu was Bishop of Soba or Nisibis, and died 1318.

[2] See Benfey, *Kalilag und Damnag*, Einleitung, p. xiii; *Journal Asiatique*, 1856, p. 250.

[3] Haug, *Essay on Pahlavî*, p. 117, in *An old Pahlavî-Pazand Glossary*, Bombay, 1870.

fessor Benfey himself gave of his discovery in the Supplement to the 'Allgemeine Zeitung' of July 12, 1871, and I may add that both text and translation are nearly ready for publication (1875).

The oldest MS. of the Pañkatantra.

Göttingen, July 6, 1871.

The account I am about to give will recall the novel of our celebrated compatriot Freytag ('Die verlorene Handschrift,' or 'The Lost MS.'), but with this essential difference, that we are not here treating of a creation of the imagination, but of a real fact; not of the MS. of a work of which many other copies exist, but of an unique specimen; in short, of the MS. of a work which, on the faith of one single mention, was believed to have been composed thirteen centuries ago. This mention, however, appeared to many critical scholars so untrustworthy, that they looked upon it as the mere result of confusion. Another most important difference is, that this search, which has lasted three years, has been followed by the happiest results: it has brought to light a MS. which, even in this century, rich in important discoveries, deserves to be ranked as of the highest value. We have acquired in this MS. the oldest specimen preserved to our days of a work, which, as translated into various languages, has been more widely disseminated and has had a greater influence on the development of civilisation than any other work, excepting the Bible.

But to the point.

Through the researches, which I have published in my edition of the Pañkatantra,[1] it is known that, about the

[1] *Pañkatantra*; 'Fünf Bücher indischer Fabeln, Märchen und Erzählungen. Aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt mit Einleitung und Anmerkungen,' 2 Theile, Leipzig, 1859; and particularly in the first part the introduction called 'Ueber das Indische Grundwerk, und

sixth century of our era, a work existed in India, which treated of deep political questions under the form of fables, in which the actors were animals. It contained various chapters, but these subdivisions were not, as had been hitherto believed, eleven to thirteen in number, but, as the MS. just found shows most clearly, there were at least twelve, perhaps thirteen or fourteen.[1] This work was afterwards entirely altered in India; five of its divisions were separated, and much enlarged, whilst the remaining ones were entirely set aside. This apparently curtailed but really enlarged edition of the old work, is the Sanskrit book so well known as the Pañkatantra, 'The Five Books.' It soon took the place, on its native soil, of the old work, causing the irreparable loss of the latter in India.

But before this change of the old work had been effected in its own land, it had, in the first half of the sixth century, been carried to Persia, and translated into Pehlevi under King Khosru Nushirvan (531–579). According to the researches which I have described in my book already quoted, the results of which are fully confirmed by the newly discovered MS., it cannot be doubted that, if this translation had been preserved, we should have in it, a faithful reproduction of the original Indian work, from which, by various modifications, the Pañkatantra is derived. But unfortunately this Pehlevi translation, like its Indian original, is irretrievably lost.

But it is known to have been translated into Arabic in the eighth century by a native of Persia, by name Abdallah ibn Almokaffa (d. 760), who had embraced Islamism, and it acquired, partly in this language, partly in translations and retranslations from it (apart from the recensions in India, which penetrated to East, North, and South Asia),

dessen Ausflüsse, so wie über die Quellen und die Verbreitung des Inhalts derselben.'

[1] Professor Benfey has since shown that the Buddhist original consisted of thirteen divisions.

that extensive circulation which has caused it to exercise the greatest influence on civilisation in Western Asia, and throughout Europe.

Besides this translation into Pehlevi, there was, according to one account, another, also of the sixth century, into Syriac. This account we owe to a Nestorian writer, who lived in the thirteenth century. He mentions in his catalogue of authors[1] a certain Bud Periodeutes, who probably about 570 had to inspect the Nestorian communities in Persia and India, and who says that, in addition to other books which he names, 'he translated the book "Kalîlag and Damnag" from the Indian.'

Until three years ago, not the faintest trace of this old Syrian translation was to be found, and the celebrated orientalist, Silvestre de Sacy, in the historical memoir which he prefixed to his edition of the Arabic translation, 'Kalilah and Dimnah' (Paris, 1816), thought himself justified in seeing in this mention a mere confusion between Barzôî, the Pehlevi translator, and a Nestorian monk.

The first trace of this Syriac version was found in May, 1868. On the sixth of that month, Professor Bickell of Münster, the diligent promoter of Syrian philology, wrote to tell me that he had heard from a Syrian Archdeacon from Urumia, Jochannân bar Bâbisch, who had visited Münster in the spring to collect alms, and had returned there again in May, that, sometime previously, several Chaldean priests who had been visiting the Christians of St. Thomas in India, had brought back with them some copies of this Syriac translation, and had given them to the catholic patriarch in Elkosh (near Mossul). He had received one of these.

Though the news appeared so unbelievable, and the character of the Syrian priest little calculated to inspire confidence in his statements, it still seemed to me of suf-

[1] Cf. Assemani, *Biblioth. Orient.* iii. 1. 220, and Renan, in the *Journal Asiatique*, Cinq. Série, t. vii. 1856, p. 251.

ficient importance for me to ask my friends to make further inquiries in India, where other copies might be supposed to be still in existence. Even were the result but a decided negative, it would be a gain to science. These inquiries had no effect in proving the truth of the Archdeacon's assertions; but, at the same time, they did not disprove them. It would of course have been more natural to make inquiries among the Syrians. But from want of friends and from other causes, which I shall mention further on, I could hardly hope for any certain results, and least of all, that if the MS. really existed, I could obtain it, or a copy of it.

The track thus appeared to be lost, and not possible to be followed up, when, after the lapse of nearly two years, Professor Bickell, in a letter of February 22, 1870, drew my attention to the fact that the Chaldean Patriarch, Jussuf Audo, who, according to Jochannân bar Bâbisch, was in possession of that translation, was now in Rome, as member of the Council summoned by the Pope.

Through Dr. Schöll of Weimar, then in Rome, and an Italian savant, Signor Ignazio Guidi, I was put into communication with the Patriarch, and with another Chaldean priest, Bishop Qajjât, and received communications, the latest of June 11, 1870, which indeed proved the information of Jochannân bar Bâbisch to be entirely untrustworthy; but at the same time pointed to the probable existence of a MS. of the Syriac translation of Mardîn.

I did not wait for the last letters, which might have saved the discoverer much trouble, but might also have frustrated the whole inquiry; but, as soon as I had learnt the place where the MS. might be, I wrote, May 6, 1870, exactly two years after the first trace of the MS. had been brought to light, to my former pupil and friend, Dr. Albert Socin of Basle, who was then in Asia on a scientific expedition, begging him to make the most careful inquiries in Mardîn about this MS., and especially to satisfy himself

whether it had been derived from the Arabic translation, or was independent of and older than the latter. We will let Dr. Socin, the discoverer of the MS., tell us himself of his efforts and their results. 'I received your letter of May 6, 1870, a few days ago, by Bagdad and Mossul, at Yacho on the Chabôras. You say that you had heard that the book was in the library at Mardîn. I must own that I doubted seriously the truth of the information, for oriental Christians always say that they possess every possible book; whilst in reality they have but few. I found this on my journey through the "Christian Mountain," the Tûr el' 'Abedîn, where I visited many places and monasteries but little known. I only saw Bibles in Estrangelo character, which were of value, nowhere profane books; but the people are so fanatical, and watch their books so closely, that it is very difficult to get sight of anything; and one has to keep them in good humour. Except after a long sojourn, and with the aid of bribery, there can never be any thought of buying anything from a monastic library. Arrived in Mardîn, I set myself to discover the book. I naturally passed by all Moslem libraries, as Syriac books only exist among the Christians. I settled at first that the library in question could only be the Jacobite Cloister, "Der ez Zâferân," the most important centre of the Christians of Mardîn. I therefore sent to the Patriarch of Diarbekir for most particular introductions, and started for "Der ez Zâferân," which lies in the mountains, five and a half hours from Mardîn. The recommendations opened the library to me. I looked through 400 volumes, without finding anything; there was not much of any value. On my return to Mardîn, I questioned people right and left; no one knew anything about it. At length I summoned up courage one day, and went to the Chaldean monastery. The different sects in Mardîn are most bitter against each other, and as I unfortunately lodged in the house of an American mis-

sionary, it was very difficult for me to gain access to these Catholics, who were unknown to me. Luckily my servant was a Catholic, and could state that I had no proselytising schemes. After a time I asked about their books. Missals and Gospels were placed before me. I asked if they had any books of fables. "Yes, there was one there." After a long search in the dust, it was found and brought to me. I opened it, and saw at the first glance, in red letters, "Kalîlag and Damnag," with the old termination g, which proved to me that the work was not translated from the Arabic "Kalilah ve Dimnah." You may be certain that I did not show what I felt. I soon laid the book quietly down. I had indeed before asked the monk specially for "Kalilah and Dimnah," and with some persistency, before I inquired generally for books of fables; but he had not the faintest suspicion that the book before him was the one so eagerly sought after. After about a week or ten days, in order to arouse no suspicion, I sent a trustworthy man to borrow the book; but he was asked at once if it were for the "Frengi den Prot" (Protestant), and my confidant was so good as to deny it, "No, it was for himself." I then examined the book more carefully. Having it safely in my possession, I was not alarmed at the idea of a little hubbub. I therefore made inquiries, but in all secrecy, whether they would sell it. "No, never," was the answer I expected and received, and the idea that I had borrowed it for myself was revived. I therefore began to have a copy made. But I was obliged to leave Mardîn and even the neighbouring Diarbekir, before I received the copy. In Mardîn itself the return of the book was loudly demanded, as soon as they knew I was having it copied. I was indeed delighted when, through the kindness of friends, *post tot discrimina rerum* I received the book at Aleppo.'

So far writes my friend, the fortunate discoverer, who, as early as the nineteenth of August 1870, announced in a

letter the happy recovery of the book. On April 20, 1871, he kindly sent it to me from Basle.

This is not the place to descant on the high importance of this discovery. It is only necessary to add that there is not the least doubt that it has put us in possession of the old Syriac translation, of which Ebedjesu speaks. There is only one question still to be settled, whether it is derived direct from the Indian, or through the Pehlvi translation? In either case it is the oldest preserved rendering of the original, now lost in India, and therefore of priceless value.

The fuller treatment of this and other questions, which spring from this discovery, will find a place in the edition of the text, with translation and commentary, which Professor Bickell is preparing in concert with Dr. Hoffmann and myself.

THEODOR BENFEY.

SECOND APPENDIX.

(Sept. 1880.)

BOTH the old Syriac text and a German translation of it have since been published by Professor Bickell (s.t. 'Kalilag und Damnag,' Leipzig, 1876), and Professor Benfey, in an elaborate Introduction to this work, has again most fully shown the importance of this Syriac translation in its bearing on the early migration of Buddhist fables from India to Europe. He holds, however, that the Syriac translation was not made direct from Sanskrit, or, as the Syriac catalogue stated, from the Indian, but from the Pehlevi translation, and he produces strong evidence in support of that opinion (pp. xxxi *seq.*). He believes that the Pehlevi was a faithful rendering of the Sanskrit original, and that the Syriac translation from the Pehlevi was likewise, in its original form, a close imitation of Barzôi's work, but that it

suffered many changes before it reached us in the form in which we now have it. He therefore concludes that the Syriac, both when it stands alone and when it agrees with the Arabic translation or any of its descendants, represents the Pehlevi, and most likely also the Sanskrit original, while whenever the Arabic translation and its descendants differ from the Syriac, they may be supposed to have been influenced by Abdallah ibn Almokaffa, or later translators, unless the contrary can be distinctly proved by a reference to Sanskrit or Pali stories which we still possess (p. cv). He has pointed out that several alterations in the Arabic translation may be attributed to the religious scruples of Abdallah ibn Almokaffa, who was a Persian by birth, and anxious to avoid anything that could give offence to his zealous and suspicious co-religionists. In the same manner in which the traces of the strongly marked Buddhist character of the original vanished under the hands of the Brahmanic compilers of the Pañkatantra, many features of the original stories that might seem objectionable or unintelligible to Mohammedan readers, were silently removed by Abdallah ibn Almokaffa and his various copyists, editors, and translators. But there are other changes, too, which can only be attributed to the literary tastes of the various translators. We shall give one instance.[1] In the Pañkatantra, v. 109, we read :—

'A mouse, though born in the house, must be killed, because it does mischief.

'A cat is asked for from elsewhere, and paid for, because it is useful.'

In the Arabic translation (Guidi's Codd. F. and V.), instead of the *cat* we find the *falcon*; in the *Directorium*, *nisus*, sparrow-hawk; in the *Stephanites*, ἱέραξ; in the Old Spanish translation, *azor*. It was natural to suppose that, as the cat occurred in the Pañkatantra, the Arabic translator had changed the cat into a falcon, particularly as falconry

[1] Benfey, *Einleitung*, p. cviii.

was a favourite amusement among Persians and Arabs. But the Syriac translation gives an entirely new aspect to the matter. The old Syriac version has:—

'Mice, though bred in the house, are killed on account of their mischievousness, but falcons are caught on account of their usefulness, and carried on the hand.'

This leaves no doubt that, in the Buddhist original, the falcon, not the cat, was the simile used—a simile far more appropriate, as Professor Benfey shows, to the purpose than that of the cat. For what has to be illustrated is that the son of an old minister is not favoured by a king simply on account of his birth, but only if he prove himself useful, a stranger being quite as welcome, if his services should be more efficient. The enmity, therefore, between the mouse and the cat was nothing to the point, nay, the simile was actually spoiled by the cat, for, like the mice, most cats also are born and bred in the house, while a falcon has first to be caught, and may therefore well be represented as a stranger. The cat, therefore, was a later thought, and by no means an improvement. Nay, it would be curious to inquire whether, at the time when the Buddhist original was compiled, cats, as the enemies of mice, were known in India, while falconry is well attested in India as early as Pa*n*ini, iv. 2, 58; vi. 3, 71.

The state of the case, therefore, so far as we know at present, is this: A Buddhist work in thirteen chapters was translated into Pehlevi by Barzôî, in the sixth century.

This translation, now lost, was a very few years later turned into Syriac. This translation has lately been discovered, and represents the earliest form of the original now within our reach.

Two hundred years later the Pehlevi text was again translated into Arabic by Abdullah ibn Almokaffa, *s. t.* 'Kalilah ve Dimnah,' which became in turn the fountain from which all other Oriental and European renderings were derived, with the exception of the Sanskrit text, the

Pañkatantra. This was an arrangement of the original Buddhist work in thirteen chapters, carried out by Brahmanic writers, who, after removing what seemed to them objectionable, produced a work in five books, the Pañkatantra, which became widely spread in India. The relation of these three principal texts, the Syriac 'Kalîlag and Damnag,' the Arabic 'Kalîlah and Dimnah,' and the Sanskrit Pañkatantra may be seen from the following table:—

Kalîlah and Dimnah.	Pañkatantra.	Kalîlag and Damnag.
1 (Life of Burzuyeh)		
2–4 (Introduction)		
5	I.	I.
6 (addition)		
7	II.	II.
8	III.	VI.
9	IV.	III.
10	V.	IV.
11	Mahâbh. XII. 4930	V.
12	*ibid.* XII. 5133	VII.
13	*ibid.* XII. 4084	VIII.
14	Kandjur (Tibet)	IX.
15		Deest.
16 (addition)		
17	Pañkat. cod. Berol. cap. I.	Deest.
18		Deest.
Kal. and Dim. cod. V. cap. 8. Greek trans. cap. 14		X.

We can now only hope that the Buddhist original in thirteen chapters may still be recovered, if not in Sanskrit or Pâli, at least in one of the numerous translations of Buddhist books preserved in Tibetan, Chinese, Mongolian, Mandshu, or even Japanese. One chapter, the fourteenth in the Arabic translation, the ninth in Syriac, has been traced by the late Professor Schiefner in the Kandjur, the Tibetan translation of Buddhist texts. In the tenth and eleventh volumes of that collection, as published in the monastery of Narthang (vol. x. fol. 270–310; vol. xi. fol. 1–27), a number of stories are found, belonging to the Vinaya-

Kshudraka, relating the events which happened at the time when Mahâkâtyâyana was sent by Buddha to convert the king of Uggayinî, called *Kaṇḍa*-Pradyota.[1] The identical stories form the subject of the fourteenth chapter of the 'Kalilah and Dimnah' and the Syriac 'Kalîlag and Damnag,' and allow us to see most clearly what kind of influence was exercised both by the Syriac and Arabic translators on the original, and what further changes the Arabic text had to undergo on passing on through the four principal channels—the Greek, eleventh century, the Persian, twelfth century, the Hebrew, 1250, the Old Spanish, 1289.

[1] *Bhuratæ Responsa Tibetice cum Versione Latina*, ab A. Schiefnero edita, Petropoli, 1875; and *Mahâkâtyâyana und König Tchaṇḍa-Pradyota, ein Cyklus Buddhistischer Erzählungen*, mitgetheilt von A. Schiefner, St. Petersburg, 1875.

NOTES.

NOTE A.

In modern times, too, each poet or fabulist tells the story as seems best to him. I give three recensions of the story of Perrette, copied from English schoolbooks.

The Milkmaid.

A milkmaid who poised a full pail on her head,
Thus mused on her prospects in life, it is said:—
Let me see, I should think that this milk will procure
One hundred good eggs or fourscore, to be sure.
Well, then, stop a bit, it must not be forgotten,
Some of these may be broken, and some may be rotten;
But if twenty for accident should be detached,
It will leave me just sixty sound eggs to be hatched.
Well, sixty sound eggs—no, sound chickens I mean:
Of these some may die—we'll suppose seventeen;
Seventeen, not so many!—say ten at the most,
Which will leave fifty chickens to boil or to roast.
But then there's their barley, how much will they need?
Why, they take but one grain at a time when they feed,
So that's a mere trifle;—now then, let me see,
At a fair market price how much money there'll be.
Six shillings a pair, five, four, three-and-six,
To prevent all mistakes that low price I will fix;
Now what will that make? Fifty chickens I said;
Fifty times three-and-six?—I'll ask brother Ned.

Oh! but stop, three-and-sixpence a pair I must sell them!
Well, a pair is a couple; now then let us tell them.
A couple in fifty will go (my poor brain),
Why just a score times, and five pairs will remain.
Twenty-five pairs of fowls, now how tiresome it is
That I can't reckon up such money as this.
Well there's no use in trying, so let's give a guess—
I'll say twenty pounds, and it can be no less.
Twenty pounds I am certain will buy me a cow,
Thirty geese and two turkeys, eight pigs and a sow;
Now if these turn out well, at the end of the year
I shall fill both my pockets with guineas, 'tis clear.
Forgetting her burden when this she had said,
The maid superciliously tossed up her head,
When, alas for her prospects! her milkpail descended,
And so all her schemes for the future were ended.
This moral, I think, may be safely attached—
'Reckon not on your chickens before they are hatched

JEFFREYS TAYLOR.

FABLE.

A country maid was walking with a pail of milk upon her head, when she fell into the following train of thoughts: 'The money for which I shall sell this milk will enable me to increase my stock of eggs to three hundred. These eggs will bring at least two hundred and fifty chickens. The chickens will be fit to carry to market about Christmas, when poultry always bear a good price; so that by May-day I shall have money enough to buy me a new gown. Green?—let me consider—yes, green becomes my complexion best, and green it shall be. In this dress I will go to the fair, where all the young fellows will strive to have me for a partner; but I shall perhaps refuse every one of them, and with an air of disdain toss from them.' Charmed with this thought, she could not forbear acting with her

head what thus passed in her mind, when down came the pail of milk, and with it all her fancied happiness.—From Guy's 'British Spelling Book.'

Alnasker.

Alnasker was a very idle fellow, that would never set his hand to work during his father's life. When his father died he left him to the value of a hundred pounds in Persian money. In order to make the best of it he laid it out in glasses and bottles, and the finest china. These he piled up in a large open basket at his feet, and leaned his back upon the wall of his shop, in the hope that many people would come in to buy. As he sat in this posture, with his eyes upon the basket, he fell into an amusing train of thought, and talked thus to himself: 'This basket,' says he, 'cost me a hundred pounds, which is all I had in the world. I shall quickly make two hundred of it by selling in retail. These two hundred shall in course of trade rise to ten thousand, when I will lay aside my trade of a glass-man, and turn a dealer in pearls and diamonds, and all sorts of rich stones. When I have got as much wealth as I can desire, I will purchase the finest house I can find, with lands, slaves and horses. Then I shall set myself on the footing of a prince, and will ask the Grand Vizier's daughter to be my wife. As soon as I have married her, I will buy her ten black servants, the youngest and best that can be got for money. When I have brought this princess to my house, I shall take care to breed her in due respect for me. To this end I shall confine her to her own rooms, make her a short visit, and talk but little to her. Her mother will then come and bring her daughter to me, as I am seated on a sofa. The daughter, with tears in her eyes, will fling herself at my feet, and beg me to take her into my favour. Then will I, to impress her with a proper respect for my person, draw up my leg, and spurn her from me with my foot in such a manner that she shall fall down several paces

from the sofa.' Alnasker was entirely absorbed with his ideas, and could not forbear acting with his foot what he had in his thoughts; so that, striking his basket of brittle ware, which was the foundation of all his grand hopes, he kicked his glasses to a great distance into the street, and broke them into a thousand pieces.—'Spectator.' (From the Sixth Book, published by the Scottish School Book Association, W. Collins and Co., Edinburgh.)

NOTE B.

L'Aurore et le Jour.[1]

To look for fragments of ancient mythology in modern folk-lore is like looking for Sanskrit or Greek in English or French. We now and then meet with a modern word which seems hardly to have suffered at all from the wear and tear of centuries, and looks as fresh and sharp as if it had just been issued from the mint; but such cases are rare, and frequently they are deceptive. Lolling may be the Sanskrit lal, roi is the Sanskrit râgan, *daughter* is the Sanskrit duhitar; but *to call* is certainly not καλεῖν, nor can *Wodan* be identified with *Buddha*, or *Paradise* with the Sanskrit Paradesa. Then come all the doubts as to whether what we find so strangely like in English and Sanskrit comes direct from the primeval Aryan inheritance, or whether it was borrowed at a later time by one heir from the other. *Sugar* sounds very much like Sanskrit sarkara, grit, pebbles; it is in fact the same word. But the Sanskrit sarkara passed through Persian and Arabic before it reached Europe, where it appears as σάκχαρον, *saccharum*, *zucchero*, granulated sugar. In English the word has reached the very point from which it started,

[1] *La Chaîne Traditionelle: Contes et Légendes au point de vue Mythique.* Par Hyacinthe Husson. (Paris, 1874.)

for cabmen now speak of the sharp stones on newly macadamised roads as *sugar*, Sanskrit *sarkara*.

There is but one safe path to follow in these researches into the origin of words or stories. We must trace the modern words back to their most ancient forms in their own language, and the modern stories back to their most ancient version in their own country, before we attempt any comparison. Without this process all combinations are guesswork, sometimes very attractive and almost irresistible, but always dangerous, and never of any really scientific value.

M. Husson, in a small volume just published, called 'La Chaîne Traditionelle,' has selected some well-known popular stories, and has pointed out in them fragments of ancient mythology, such as we find in the Vedas and elsewhere. His analysis is always clever and ingenious, but the conviction which it carries must greatly depend on the disposition of the readers. It may be or it may not be, is what many will say after reading his book, though few will put it down without feeling that some of the coincidences discovered by the author are very strange and very startling.

He begins with the story of Little Red Riding-Hood, and he points out that, like her, the Dawn in the Veda is represented as a young maiden, as carrying messages, as bringing food, as travelling along to join the old Dawn, and as intercepted and swallowed by the Wolf, whether as the representative of the sun, or of the night. All this is true, and might be supported by ample evidence. Even the fact that the dawn was rescued from the mouth of the wolf may be matched by the German story which represents Rothkäppchen as cut out of the wolf's stomach. But in spite of all this, it would be a bold assertion to say that the story of Red Riding-Hood was really a metamorphosis of an ancient story of the rosy-fingered Eos or the Vedic Ushas with her red horses, and that the two ends, Ushas

and Rothkäppchen, are really held together by an unbroken traditional chain.

Everything is changed as soon as, in addition to the coincidences in characteristic events, we have the evidence of language. Names are stubborn things, and those who imagine they can dispute away their evidence by joking on Mr. John *Bright* as a solar hero, forget that in ancient times, to say nothing of mythological periods, names were not what they are with us, inherited, accidental, and meaningless, but real *cognomina*, given with a purpose, which purpose it is for us to discover. We read, for instance, in the Veda that the being swallowed by the wolf is called Vârtikâ. Now, Vârtikâ has a meaning; it means a quail, *i.e.* the returning bird. But as a being delivered by the Asvins, the representatives of Day and Night, Vârtikâ can only be the returning dawn, delivered from the mouth of the wolf, *i.e.* the dark night, or, in a different application, the returning year, *Vertumnus*, delivered from the prison of the winter. The Greek word for quail is the same, it is ὄρτυξ; and when we read that Apollo and Artemis, the children of Latona, the night, were born in Ortygia, which is an old name of Delos, we see that there is here a real traditional chain between Vârtikâ, the Dawn, and Ortygia, the Dawnland; we feel we have arrived at a living mythological germ, which was afterwards developed independently in Greece and India.

M. Husson's identification of Cendrillon and Sodewa-Bai with the Dawn that 'stands tiptoe on the misty mountain tops' is again very ingenious; but will it convince the unbelievers who see nothing but human elements in all these stories, and shake their head at everything short of the positive proof afforded by identity of name? M. Husson has himself, with reference to Mr. Fergusson's work, 'Tree and Serpent Worship,' pointed out *qu'il y a serpent et serpent*, that the serpent occurs in different parts of the world as a symbol of various and totally independent conceptions.

Sometimes the serpent represents darkness and evil, sometimes he is the Agathodæmon, the *genius loci*, sometimes he is the symbol of an autochthonous race. In one myth the serpent represents the sun, in another lightning and the thunderbolt, in another the serpents are meant for serpentine rivers. In India, as in Europe, serpents are the guardians of treasures; though poisonous, they are supposed to possess the art of healing, the gift of wisdom, the power of prophecy. The serpent with seven heads exists in India and Babylon, in the steppes of Russia, and in the ruins of Cambodia. There is an Aryan, there is a Semitic, there is a Turanian, there is an African serpent; and who but an evolutionist would dare to say that all these conceptions came from one and the same original germ, that they are all held together by one traditional chain?

But although we doubt whether M. Husson will convert those who do not like to be converted, his book can hardly fail to make them feel a little uneasy.

M. Husson is very successful in unravelling one of the stories found in the 'Contes de ma Mère l'Oie,' published by Perrault, and there called *La Belle au Bois*. It is the world-wide story of the maiden who receives a wound, falls into a deep sleep, and can only be delivered by a truly solar hero. Perrault, who wrote in 1697, knew nothing as yet of solar theories, yet in the simplicity of his heart he tells us that the children born of the marriage between *La Belle au Bois* and the young prince who called her back to life were called *L'Aurore* and *Le Jour*, while in a Breton story (Luzel, 'Rapport,' p. 8) *La Belle au Bois* herself goes by the name of *La Princesse Tourne-sol*. Another strange coincidence is that *La Belle au Bois* has a little dog, called *Poufle*. In a Norse story, the heroine who pines away in the kitchen, sitting on the ashes (Cendrillon), has a little dog called *Flo*. She says to him: 'Run along, little dog Flo, and see whether it will soon be day!' This is repeated three times; and at the very moment when the dog looked

out for the third time, the dawn began to rise. It is impossible to read this, as M. Husson points out, without thinking of the well-known Vedic Story of Saramâ, the dog of Indra, and most likely a name of the morning. ('Lectures on the Science of Language,' vol. ii. p. 506.)

There are many comparisons of the same character in M. Husson's book, all of them very ingenious and suggestive, but few supported by strong and irresistible evidence. In his comparisons of names, M. Husson is less successful; and such comparisons as Ahriman and the Vedic Aryaman, or the tree *Ash* in Egyptian, and the Teutonic *Ask*, will certainly be quoted against him and against the system of mythological interpretation which he follows. Nothing but the strictest adherence to the rules of comparative philology can lead to solid results in comparative mythology, and silence the objections of those who seem to think that there is nothing irrational in mythology that requires explanation.

NOTE C.

Pertsch, in Benfey's 'Orient und Occident,' vol. ii. p. 261. Here the story is told as follows: 'Perche si conta che un certo pouer huomo hauea uicino a doue dormiua, un mulino & del buturo, & una notte tra se pensando disse, io uenderò questo mulino, & questo butturo tanto per il meno, che io comprerò diece capre. Le quali mi figliaranno in cinque mesi altre tante, & in cinque anni multiplicheranno fino a quattro cento; Le quali barattero in cento buoi, & con essi seminarò una cãpagna, & insieme da figliuoli loro, & dal frutto della terra in altri cinque anni, sarò oltre modo ricco, & farò un palagio *quadro*, adorato, & comprerò schiaui una infinità, & prenderò moglie, la quale mi farà un figliuolo, & lo nominerò Pancalo, & lo farò ammaestrare come bisogna. Et se vedrò che non si curi con questa bacchetta

cosi il percoterò. Con che prendendo la bacchetta che gli era uicina, & battendo di essa il vaso doue era il buturo, e lo ruppe, & fuse il buturo.' [1] (P. 516.)

NOTE D.

This and some other extracts, from books not to be found at Oxford, were kindly copied for me by my late friend, E. Deutsch, of the British Museum.

'Georgii Pachymeris Michael Palæologus, sive Historia rerum a M. P. gestarum,' ed. Petr. Possinus. Romæ, 1666.

Appendix ad observationes Pachymerianas, Specimen Sapientiæ Indorum veterum liber olim ex lingua Indica in Persicam a Perzoe Medico; ex Persica in Arabicam ab Anonymo: ex Arabica in Græcam a Symeone Seth, a Petro Possino Societ. Iesu, novissime e Græca in Latinam translatus.

'Huic talia serio nuganti haud paulo cordatior mulier. Mihi videris, Sponse, inquit, nostri cujusdam famuli egentissimi hominis similis ista inani provisione nimis remotarum et incerto eventu pendentium rerum. Is diurnis mercedibus mellis ac butyri non magna copia collectâ duobus ista vasis e terra coctili condiderat. Mox secum ita ratiocinans nocte quadam dicebat: Mel ego istud ac butyrum quindecim minimum vendam denariis. Ex his decem Capras emam. Hæ mihi quinto mense totidem alias parient. Quinque annis gregem Caprarum facile quadringentarum confecero. Has commutare tunc placet cum bobus centum, quibus exarabo vim terræ magnam et numerum tritici maximum congeram. Ex fructibus hisce quinquennio multiplicatis, pecuniæ scilicet tantus existet modus, ut facile in locupletissimis numerer. Accedit dos uxoris quam istis opibus ditissimam nanciscar. Nascetur mihi filius quem jam nunc decerno

[1] Italian translation of the Greek translation, first published at Ferrara, 1583; edited by Teza, Bologna, 1872.

nominare Pancalum. Hunc educabo liberalissime, ut nobilium nulli concedat. Qui si ubi adoleverit, ut juventus solet, contumacem se mihi præbeat, haud feret impune. Baculo enim hoc illum hoc modo feriam. Arreptum inter hæc dicendum lecto vicinum baculum per tenebras jactavit, casuque incurrens in dolia mellis et butyri juxta posita, confregit utrumque, ita ut in ejus etiam os barbamque stillæ liquoris prosilirent; cætera effusa et mixta pulveri prorsus corrumperentur; ac fundamentum spei tantæ, inopem et multum gementem momento destitueret.' (P. 602.)

NOTE E.

'Directorium Humanæ Vitæ alias Parabolæ Antiquorum Sapientum,' fol. s. l. e. a. k. 4 (circ. 1480?): 'Dicitque olim quidam fuit heremita apud quendam regem Cui rex providerat quolibet die pro sua vita. Scilicet provisionem de sua coquina et vasculum de melle. Ille vero comedebat decocta, et reservabat mel in quodam vase suspenso super suum caput donec esset plenum. Erat autem mel percarum in illis diebus. Quadam vero die: dum jaceret in suo lecto elevato capite, respexit vas mellis quod super caput ei pendebat. Et recordatus quoniam mel de die in diem vendebatur pluris solito seu carius, et dixit in corde suo. Quum fuerit hoc vas plenum: vendam ipsum uno talento auri: de quo mihi emam decem oves, et successu temporis he oves facient filios et filias et erunt viginti. Postea vero ipsis multiplicatis cum filiis et filiabus in quatuor annis erunt quatuor centum. Tunc de quibuslibet quatuor ovibus emam vaccam et bovem et terram. Et vaccæ multiplicabuntur in filiis, quorum masculos accipiam mihi in culturam terre, præter id quod percipiam de eis de lacte et lana, donec non consummatis aliis quinque annis multiplicabuntur in tantum quod habebo mihi magnas substantias et divitias, et ero a cunctis reputatus dives et honestus. Et edificabo mihi tunc grandia et excellentia edificia pre

omnibus meis vicinis et consanguinibus, itaque omnes de meis divitiis loquantur, nonne erit mihi illud jocundum, cum omnes homines mihi reverentiam in omnibus locis exhibeant. Accipiam postea uxorem de nobilibus terre. Cumque eam cognovero, concipiet et pariet mihi filium nobilem et delectabilem cum bona fortuna et dei beneplacito qui crescet in scientia virtute, et relinquam mihi per ipsum bonam memoriam post mei obitum et castigabo ipsum dietim: si mee recalcitraverit doctrine; ac mihi in omnibus erit obediens, et si non: percutiam eum isto baclo et erecto baculo ad percutiendum percussit vas mellis et fregit ipsum et defluxit mel super caput ejus.'

NOTE F.

'Das Buch der Weisheit der alter Weisen,' Ulm, 1415. Here the story is given as follows:—

'Man sagt es wohnet eins mals ein brůder der dritten regel der got fast dienet, bei eins künigs hof, den versach der künig alle tag zů auff enthalt seines lebens ein kuchen speiss und ein fleschlein mit honig. diser ass alle tag die speiss von der kuchen und den honig behielt er in ein irden fleschlein das hieng ob seiner petstat so lang biss es voll ward. Nun kam bald eine grosse teür in den honig und eins morgens früe lag er in seinem pett und sach das honig in dem fleschlein ob seinem haubt hangen do fiel ym in sein gedanck die teüre des honigs und fieng an mit ihm selbs ze reden. wann diss fleschlein gantz vol honigs wirt so verkauff ich das umb fünff güldin, darum̃ kauff ich mir zehen gůter schaff und die machen alle des jahrs lember. und dann werden eins jahrs zweintzig und die und das von yn kummen mag in zehen jaren werden tausent. dann kauff ich umb fier schaff ein ků und kauff dobei ochsen und ertrich die meren sich mit iren früchten und do nimb ich dann die frücht zů arbeit der äcker. von den andern küen und schaffen nimb

ich milich und woll ee das andre fünff jar fürkommen so wird es sich allso meren das ich ein grosse hab und reichtumb überkumen wird dann will ich mir selbs knecht und kellerin kauffen und hohe und hübsche bäw ton. und darnach so nimm ich mir ein hübsch weib von einem edeln geschlecht die beschlaff ich mit kurtzweiliger lieb. so enpfecht sie und gebirt mir ein schön glückseligten sun und gottförchtigen. und der wirt wachsen in lere und künsten und in weissheit. durch den lass ich mir einen gůten leümde nach meinem tod. aber wird er nit fölgig sein und męiner straff nit achten so wolt ich yn mit meinem stecken über sein rucken on erbermde gar hart schlahen. und nam sein stecken da mit man pflag das pet ze machen ym selbs ze zeigen wie frefelich er sein sun schlagen wölt. und schlůg das irden fass das ob seinem haubt hieng zů stücken das ym das honig under sein antlit und in das pet troff und ward ym von allen sein gedencken nit dann das er sein antlit und pet weschen můst.'

NOTE G.

This translation has lately been published by Don Pascual de Gayangos in the 'Biblioteca de Autores Españoles,' Madrid, 1860, vol. li. Here the story runs as follows (p. 57):

'Del religioso que vertió la miel et la manteca sobre su cabeza.

'Dijo la mujer:—"Dicen que un religioso habia cada dia limosna de casa de un mercader rico, pan é manteca é miel é otras cosas, et comia el pan é lo ál condesaba, et ponia la miel é la manteca en un jarra, fasta quel a finchó, et tenia la jarra colgada á la cabecera de su cama. Et vino tiempo que encareció la miel é la manteca, et el religioso fabló un dia consigo mismo, estando asentado en su cama, et dijo así: Venderé cuanto está en esta jarra por tantos maravedís, é comparé con ellos diez cabras, et empreñarse-

han, é parirán á cabo de cinco meses; et fizo cuenta de esta guisa, et falló que en cinco años montarian bien cuatrocientas cabras. Desí dijo: Venderlas-he todas, et con el precio dellas compraré cien vacas, por cada cuatro cabezas una vaca, é haberé simiente é sembraré con los bueyes, et aprovecharme-he de los becerros et de las fembras é de la leche é manteca, é de las mieses habré grant haber, et labraré muy nobles casas, é compraré siervos é siervas, et esto fecho casarme-he con una mujer muy rica, é fermosa, é de grant logar, é empreñarla-he de fijo varon, é nacerá complido de sus miembros, et criarlo-he como á fijo de rey, é castigarlo-he con esta vara, si non quisiere ser bueno é obediente," E él deciendo esto, alzó la vara que tenia en la mano, et ferió en la olla que estaba colgada encima dél, é quebróla, é cayóle la miel é la manteca sobre su cabeza,' etc.

NOTE H.

See 'Poésies inédites du moyen âge,' par M. Edélstand Du Méril. Paris 1854. XVI. De viro et vase olei (p. 239):—

'Uxor ab antiquo fuit infecunda marito.
Mesticiam (l. mœstitiam) cujus cupiens lenire vix (l. vir) hujus,
His blandimentis solatur tristi[ti]a mentis:
Cur sic tristaris? Dolor est tuus omnis inanis:
Pulchræ prolis eris satis amodo munere felix.
Pro nihilo ducens conjunx hæc verbula prudens,
His verbis plane quod ait vir monstrat inane:
Rebus inops quidam . . . (bone vir, tibi dicam)
Vas oleo plenum, longum quod retro per ævum
Legerat orando, loca per diversa vagando,
Fune ligans ar(c)to, tecto[que] suspendit ab alto.
Sic præstolatur tempus quo pluris ematur[atur]
Qua locupletari se sperat et arte beari.

Talia dum captat, hæc stultus inania jactat:
Ecce potens factus, fuero cum talia nactus,
Vinciar uxori quantum queo nobiliori:
Tunc sobolem gignam, se meque per omnia dignam,
Cujus opus morum genus omne præibit avorum.
Cui nisi tot vitæ fuerint insignia rite,
Fustis hic absque mora feriet caput ejus et [h]ora.
Quod dum narraret, dextramque minando levaret,
Ut percussisset puerum quasi præsto fuisset
Vas in prædictum manus ejus dirigit ictum
Servatumque sibi vas il[l]ico fregit olivi.'

I owe the following extract to the kindness of M. Paul Meyer:—

'Apologi Phædrii ex ludicris I. Regnerii Belnensis doct. Medici, Divione, apud Petrum Palliot, 1643 in 12, 126 pages et de plus un index.'

(Le recueil se divise en deux partis, pars I., pars II. La fable en question est à la page 32, pars I., fab. xxv.)

XXV.

Pagana et eius mercis emptor.

Pagana mulier, lac in olla fictili,
Ova in canistro, rustici mercem penus,
Ad civitatem proximam ibat venditum.
In eius aditu factus huic quidam obvius
Quanti rogavit ista quæ fers vis emi?
Et illa tanti. Tantin'? hoc fuerit nimis.
Numerare num me vis quod est æquum? vide
Hac merce quod sit nunc opus mihi plus dabo
Quam præstet illam cede, et hos nummos cape,
Ea quam superbe fœde rusticitas agit,
Hominem reliquit additis conviciis,
Quasi æstimasset vilius mercem optimam.

Aversa primos inde vix tulerat gradus,
Cum lubricato corruit strato viæ:
Lac olla fundit quassa, gallinaceæ
Testæ vitellos congerunt cœno suos
Caput cruorem mittit impingens petræ
Luxata nec fert coxa surgentem solo:
Ridetur ejus non malum, sed mens procax,
Qua merx et ipsa mercis et pretium perit;
Seque illa deflens tot pati infortunia
Nulli imputare quam sibi hanc sortem potest
Dolor sed omnis sæviter recruduit
Curationis danda cum merces fuit.

In re minori cum quis et fragili tumet
Hunc sartis ingens sternit indignatio.

NOTE I.

HULSBACH, 'Sylva Sermonum,' Basileæ, 1568, p. 28: 'In sylva quadam morabatur heremicola jam satis provectæ ætatis, qui quaque die accedebat civitatem, afferens inde mensuram mellis, qua donabatur. Hoc recondebat in vase terreo, quod pependerat supra lectum suum. Uno dierum jacens in lecto, et habens baculum in manu sua, hæc apud se dicebat: Quotidie mihi datur vasculum mellis, quod dum indies recondo, fiet tandem summa aliqua. Jam valet mensura staterem unum. Corraso autem ita floreno uno aut altero, emam mihi oves, quæ fœnerabunt mihi plures: quibus divenditis coëmam mihi elegantem uxorculam, cum qua transigam vitam meam lætanter: ex ea suscitabo mihi puellam, quam instituam honeste. Si vero mihi noluerit obedire, hoc baculo eam ita comminuam: atque levato baculo confregit suum vasculum, et effusum est mel, quare cassatum est suum propositum, et manendum adhuc in suo statu.'

NOTE K.

'El Conde Lucanor, compuesto por el excelentissimo Principe don Iuan Manuel, hijo del Infante don Manuel, y nieto del Santo Rey don Fernando,' Madrid, 1642; cap. 29, p. 96. He tells the story as follows: 'There was a woman called Dona Truhana (Gertrude), rather poor than rich. One day she went to the market carrying a pot of honey on her head. On her way she began to think that she would sell the pot of honey, and buy a quantity of eggs, that from those eggs she would have chickens, that she would sell them and buy sheep; that the sheep would give her lambs, and thus calculating all her gains, she began to think herself much richer than her neighbours. With the riches which she imagined she possessed, she thought how she would marry her sons and daughters, and how she would walk in the street surrounded by her sons and daughters-in-law; and how people would consider her very happy for having amassed so large a fortune, though she had been so poor. While she was thinking over all this, she began to laugh for joy, and struck her head and forehead with her hand. The pot of honey fell down, was broken, and she shed hot tears because she had lost all that she would have possessed if the pot of honey had not been broken.'

NOTE L.

Bonaventure des Periers, 'Les Contes ou les Nouvelles.' Amsterdam, 1735. Nouvelle XIV. (vol. i. p. 141). (*First* edition, Lyon, 1558): 'Et ne les (les Alquemistes) sçauroit-on mieux comparer qu'à une bonne femme qui portoit une potée de laict au marché, faisant son compte ainsi: qu'elle la vendroit deux liards: de ces deux liards elle en achepteroit une douzaine d'œufs, lesquelz elle mettroit couver,

et en auroit une douzaine de poussins : ces poussins deviendroient grands, et les feroit chaponner : ces chapons vaudroient cinq solz la piece, ce seroit un escu et plus, dont elle achepteroit deux cochons, masle et femelle : qui deviendroient grands et en feroient une douzaine d'autres, qu'elle vendroit vingt solz la piece ; apres les avoir nourris quelque temps, ce seroient douze francs, dont elle achepteroit une iument, qui porteroit un beau poulain, lequel croistroit et deviendroit tant gentil : il sauteroit et feroit *Hin.* Et en disant *Hin*, la bonne femme, de l'aise qu'elle avoit en son compte, se print à faire la ruade que feroit son poulain : et en ce faisant sa potée de laict va tomber, et se respandit toute. Et voila ses œufs, ses poussins, ses chappons, ses cochons, sa jument, et son poulain, tous par terre.'

ON THE

PHILOSOPHY OF MYTHOLOGY.

A Lecture Delivered at the Royal Institution in 1871.

WHAT can be in our days the interest of mythology? What is it to us that Kronos was the son of Uranos and Gaia, and that he swallowed his children, Hestia, Demeter, Hera, Pluton, and Poseidon, as soon as they were born? What have we to do with the stories of Rhea, the wife of Kronos, who, in order to save her youngest son from being swallowed by his father, gave her husband a stone to swallow instead? And why should we be asked to admire the exploits of this youngest son, who, when he had grown up, made his father drink a draught, and thus helped to deliver the stone and his five brothers and sisters from their paternal prison? What shall we think if we read in the most admired of classic poets that these escaped prisoners became afterwards the great gods of Greece, gods believed in by Homer, worshipped by Sokrates, immortalised by Pheidias? Why should we listen to such horrors as that Tantalos killed his own son, boiled him, and placed him before the gods to eat? or that the gods collected his limbs, threw them into a caldron, and thus restored Pelops to life, *minus*, however, his shoulder, which Demeter had eaten in a

fit of absence, and which had therefore to be replaced by a shoulder made of ivory?

Can we imagine anything more silly, more savage, more senseless, anything more unworthy to engage our thoughts, even for a single moment? We may pity our children that, in order to know how to construe and understand the master-works of Homer and Virgil, they have to fill their memory with such idle tales; but we might justly suppose that men who have serious work to do in this world, would banish such subjects for ever from their thoughts.

And yet, how strange, from the very childhood of philosophy, from the first faintly-whispered Why? to our own time of matured thought and fearless inquiry, mythology has been the ever-recurrent subject of anxious wonder and careful study. The ancient philosophers, who could pass by the petrified shells on mountain-tops and the fossil trees buried in their quarries without ever asking the question how they came to be there, or what they signified, were ever ready with doubts and surmises when they came to listen to ancient stories of their gods and heroes. And, more curious still, even modern philosophers cannot resist the attraction of these ancient problems. That stream of philosophic thought which, springing from Descartes (1596–1650), rolled on through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in two beds—the *idealistic*, marked by the names of Malebranche (1638–1715), Spinoza (1632–1677), and Leibniz (1646–1716); and the *sensualistic*, marked by the names of Locke (1632–1704), David Hume (1711–1776), and Condillac (1715–1780), till the two arms united again in Kant (1724–1804), and the full stream was carried

on by Schelling (1775–1854), and Hegel (1770–1831), —this stream of modern philosophic thought has ended where ancient philosophy began—in a Philosophy of Mythology, which, as you know, forms the most important part of Schelling's final system, of what he called himself his *Positive Philosophy*, given to the world after the death of that great thinker and poet, in the year 1854.

I do not mean to say that Schelling and Aristotle looked upon mythology in the same light, or that they found in it exactly the same problems; yet there is this common feature in all who have thought or written on mythology, that they look upon it as something which, whatever it may mean, does certainly not mean what it seems to mean; as something that requires an explanation, whether it be a system of religion, or a phase in the development of the human mind, or an inevitable catastrophe in the life of language.

According to some, mythology is history changed into fable; according to others, fable changed into history. Some discover in it the precepts of moral philosophy enunciated in the poetical language of antiquity; others see in it a picture of the great forms and forces of nature, particularly the sun, the moon, and the stars, the changes of day and night, the succession of the seasons, the return of the years —all this reflected by the vivid imagination of ancient poets and sages.

Epicharmos, for instance, the pupil of Pythagoras, declared that the gods of Greece were not what, from the poems of Homer, we might suppose them to be—personal beings, endowed with superhuman powers,

but liable to many of the passions and frailties of human nature. He maintained that these gods were really the Wind, the Water, the Earth, the Sun, the Fire, and the Stars. Not long after his time, another philosopher, Empedokles, holding that the whole of nature consisted in the mixture and separation of the four elements, declared that Zeus was the element of Fire, Here the element of Air, Aidoneus or Pluton the element of Earth, and Nestis the element of Water. In fact, whatever the free thinkers of Greece discovered successively as the first principles of Being and Thought, whether the air of Anaximenes, or the fire of Herakleitos, or the Nous or Mind of Anaxagoras, was readily identified with Zeus and the other divine persons of Olympian mythology. Metrodoros, the contemporary of Anaxagoras, went even further. While Anaxagoras would have been satisfied with looking upon Zeus as but another name of his Nous, the highest intellect, the mover, the disposer, the governor of all things, Metrodorus resolved not only the persons of Zeus, Here, and Athene, but likewise those of human kings and heroes—such as Agamemnon, Achilles, and Hektor—into various combinations and physical agencies, and treated the adventures ascribed to them as natural facts hidden under a thin veil of allegory.

Sokrates, it is well known, looked upon such attempts at explaining all fables allegorically as too arduous and unprofitable: yet he, too, as well as Plato, pointed frequently to what they called the *hypónoia*, the under-current, or if I may say so, the under-meaning of ancient mythology.

Aristotle speaks more explicitly:—

'It has been handed down,' he says, 'by early and very ancient people, and left to those who came after, in the form of myths, that these (the first principles of the world) are the gods, and that the divine embraces the whole of nature. The rest has been added mythically, in order to persuade the many, and in order to be used in support of laws and other interests. Thus they say that the gods have a human form, and that they are like to some of the other living beings, and other things consequent on this, and similar to what has been said. If one separated out of these fables, and took only that first point, viz. that they believed the first essences to be gods, one would think that it had been divinely said, and that while every art and every philosophy was probably invented ever so many times and lost again, these opinions had, like fragments of them, been preserved until now. So far only is the opinion of our fathers, and that received from our first ancestors, clear to us.'

I have quoted the opinions of these Greek philosophers, to which many more might have been added, partly in order to show how many of the most distinguished minds of ancient Greece agreed in demanding an interpretation, whether physical or metaphysical, of Greek mythology, partly in order to satisfy those classical scholars, who, forgetful of their own classics, forgetful of their own Plato and Aristotle, seem to imagine that the idea of seeing in the gods and heroes of Greece anything beyond what they appear to be in the songs of Homer, was a mere fancy and invention of the students of Comparative Mythology.

There were, no doubt, Greeks, and eminent

Greeks too, who took the legends of their gods and heroes in their literal sense. But what do these say of Homer and Hesiod? Xenophanes, the contemporary of Pythagoras, holds Homer and Hesiod responsible for the popular superstitions of Greece. In this he agrees with Herodotus, when he declares that these two poets made the theogony for the Greeks, and gave to the gods their names, and assigned to them their honours and their arts, and described their appearances. But he then continues in a very different strain from the pious historian.[1] 'Homer,' he says,[2] 'and Hesiod ascribed to the gods whatever is disgraceful and scandalous among men, yea, they declared that the gods had committed nearly all unlawful acts, such as theft, adultery, and fraud.' 'Men seem to have created their gods, and to have given to them their own mind, voice, and figure. The Ethiopians made their gods black and

[1] Her. ii. 53, *οὗτοι δέ εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἕλλησι, καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες καὶ τιμάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες, καὶ εἴδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες.*

Πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ' Ἡσίοδός τε
ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισι ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν.
ἁς πλεῖστ' ἐφθέγξαντο θεῶν ἀθεμίστια ἔργα,
κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

Sext. Emp. *adv. Math.* 1,289; ix. 193.

δοκέουσι θεοὺς γεγενῆσθαι
τὴν σφετέρην τ' αἴσθησιν ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε.—
Ἀλλ' εἴτοι χεῖράς γ' εἶχον βόες ἠὲ λέοντες
ἢ γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες,
καί κε θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουν
τοιαῦθ' οἷόν περ καὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ὁμοῖον,
ἵπποι μέν θ' ἵπποισι, βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοῖα.

Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 601, c.

Ὡς φησιν Ξενοφάνης· Αἰθίοπές τε μέλανας σιμούς τε, Θρᾷκές τε πυῤῥοὺς καὶ γλαυκούς.'—Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. p. 711, B. Historia Philosophiæ, ed. Ritter et Preller, cap. iii.

flat-nosed; the Thracians red-haired and blue-eyed.' This was spoken about 500 B.C. Herakleitos, about 460 B.C., one of the boldest thinkers of ancient Greece, declared that Homer deserved to be ejected from public assemblies and flogged; and a story is told that Pythagoras (about 540 B.C.) saw the soul of Homer in Hades, hanging on a tree and surrounded by serpents, as a punishment for what he had said of the gods. And what can be stronger than the condemnation passed on Homer by Plato? I shall read an extract from the 'Republic,' from the excellent translation lately published by Professor Jowett:—

'But what fault do you find with Homer and Hesiod, and the other great story-tellers of mankind?'

'A fault which is most serious,' I said: 'the fault of telling a lie, and a bad lie.'

'But when is this fault committed?'

'Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes—like the drawing of a limner which has not the shadow of a likeness to the truth.'

'"Yes," he said, "that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are the stories which you mean?"

'"First of all," I said, "there was that greatest of all lies in high places, which the poet told about Uranos, and which was an immoral lie too—I mean what Hesiod says that Uranos did, and what Kronos did to him. The fact is that the doings of Kronos, and the sufferings which his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought not to be lightly told

to young and simple persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a very few might hear them in a mystery, and then let them sacrifice not a common (Eleusinian) pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; this would have the effect of very greatly reducing the number of the hearers."

'"Why, yes," said he, "these stories are certainly objectionable."

'"Yes, Adeimantos, they are stories not to be narrated in our State; the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous, and that he may chastise his father when he does wrong in any manner that he likes, and in this will only be following the example of the first and greatest of the gods."

'"I quite agree with you," he said; "in my opinion those stories are *not fit to be repeated.*"

'"Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling as dishonourable, should anything be said of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, which are quite untrue. Far be it from us to tell them of the battles of the giants, and embroider them on garments; or of all the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relations. If they would only believe us, we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children, and the same when they grow up. And these are the sort of fictions which the poets should be required to com-

pose. But the narrative of Hephaestos binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion, Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten—such tales must not be admitted in our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For the young man cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal, and anything that he receives into his mind at that age is apt to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore the tales which they first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts."'

To those who look upon mythology as an ancient form of religion, such freedom of language as is here used by Xenophanes and Plato, must seem startling. If the Iliad were really the Bible of the Greeks, as it has not unfrequently been called, such violent invectives would have been impossible. For let us bear in mind that Xenophanes, though he boldly denied the existence of all the mythological deities, and declared his belief in One God, 'neither in form nor in thought like unto mortals,'[1] was not therefore considered a heretic. He never suffered for uttering his honest convictions: on the contrary, as far as we know, he was honoured by the people among whom he lived and taught. Nor was Plato ever punished on account of his unbelief, and though he, as well as his master, Sokrates, became obnoxious to the dominant party at Athens, this was due to political far more than to theological motives. At all events, Plato, the pupil, the friend, the apologist of Sokrates,

> Εἷς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
> οὔ τι δέμας θνητοῖσι ὁμοίιος οὐδὲ νόημα.
>
> Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 601, c.

was allowed to teach at Athens to the end of his life, and few men commanded greater respect in the best ranks of Greek society.

But, although mythology was not religion in our sense of the word, and although the Iliad certainly never enjoyed among Greeks the authority either of the Bible, or even of the Veda among the Brahmans, or the Zend Avesta among the Parsis, yet I would not deny altogether that in a certain sense the mythology of the Greeks belonged to their religion. We must only be on our guard, here as everywhere else, against the misleading influence of words. The word Religion has, like most words, had its history; it has grown and changed with each century, and it cannot, therefore, have meant with the Greeks and Brahmans what it means with us. Religions have sometimes been divided into *national* or *traditional*, as distinguished from *individual* or *statutable* religion. The former are, like languages, home-grown, autochthonic, without an historical beginning, generally without any recognised founder, or even an authorised code; the latter have been founded by historical persons, generally in antagonism to traditional systems, and they always rest on the authority of a written code. I do not consider this division as very useful[1] for a scientific study of religion, because in many cases it is extremely difficult, and sometimes impossible, to draw a sharp line of demarcation, and to determine whether a given religion should be considered as the work of one man, or as the combined work of those who came before him, who lived with him, nay, even of those who came after him. For

[1] See *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, p. 139.

our present purpose, however, for showing at once the salient difference between what the Greeks and what we ourselves should mean by Religion, this division is very serviceable. The Greek religion was clearly a national and traditional religion, and, as such, it shared both the advantages and disadvantages of this form of religious belief; the Christian religion is an historical and, to a great extent, an individual religion, and it possesses the advantage of an authorised code and of a settled system of faith. Let it not be supposed, however, that between traditional and individual religions the advantages are all on one, the disadvantages on the other side. As long as the immemorial religions of the different branches of the human race remained in their natural state, and were not pressed into the service of political parties or an ambitious priesthood, they allowed great freedom of thought and a healthy growth of real piety, and they were seldom disgraced by an intolerant or persecuting spirit. They were generally either honestly believed, or, as we have just seen, honestly attacked, and a high tone of intellectual morality was preserved, untainted by hypocrisy, equivocation, or unreasoning dogmatism. The marvellous development of philosophy in Greece, particularly in ancient Greece, was chiefly due, I believe, to the absence of an established religion and an influential priesthood; and it is impossible to overrate the blessing which the fresh, pure, invigorating, and elevating air of that ancient Greek philosophy has conferred on all ages, not excepting our own. I shudder at the thought of what the world would have been without Plato and Aristotle, and I tremble

at the idea that the youth of the future should ever be deprived of the teaching and the example of these true prophets of the absolute freedom of thought. Unfortunately, we know but little of the earliest fathers of Greek philosophy; we have but fragments, and those not always trustworthy, nor easily intelligible, of what they taught on the highest questions that can stir the heart of man. We have been accustomed to call the oracular sayings of men like Thales, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, or Herakleitos, philosophy, but there was in them as much of religion as in the songs of Homer and Hesiod. Homer and Hesiod were great powers, but their poems were not the only feeders of the religious life of Greece. The stream of ancient wisdom and philosophy flowed parallel with the stream of legend and poetry; and both were meant to support the religious cravings of the soul. We have only to attend without prejudice to the utterances of these ancient prophets, such as Xenophanes and Herakleitos, in order to convince ourselves that these men spoke with authority to the people,[1] that they considered themselves the equals of Homer and Hesiod, nay, their betters, and in no way fettered by the popular legends about gods and goddesses. While modern religions assume in general a hostile attitude towards philosophy, ancient religions have either included philosophy as an integral part, or they have at least tolerated its growth in the very precincts of their temples.

[1] Empedokles, Carmina, v. 411 (*Fragm. Philos. Græc.* vol. i. p 12):—

ὦ φίλοι, οἶδα μὲν οὖν ὅτ' ἀληθείη παρὰ μύθοις
οὓς ἐγὼ ἐξερέω· μάλα δ' ἀργαλέη γὲ τέτυκται
ἀνδράσι καὶ δύσζηλος ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὁρμή.

After we have thus seen what limitations we must place on the meaning of the word Religion, if we call mythology the religion of the ancient world, we may now advance another step.

We have glanced at the principal interpretations which have been proposed by the ancients themselves of the original purpose and meaning of mythology. But there is one question which none, either of the ancient or of the modern interpreters of mythology, has answered, or even asked, and on which, nevertheless, the whole problem of mythology seems to turn. If mythology is history changed into fable, why was it so changed? If it is fable represented as history, why were such fables invented? If it contains precepts of moral philosophy, whence their immoral disguise? If it is a picture of the great forms and forces of nature, the same question still returns, why were these forms and forces represented as heroes and heroines, as nymphs and shepherds, as gods and goddesses? It is easy enough to call the sun a god, or the dawn a goddess, after these predicates have once been framed. But how were these predicates framed? How did people come to know of gods and goddesses, heroes and nymphs, and what meaning did they originally connect with these terms? In fact, the real question which a philosophy of mythology has to answer is this—Is the whole of mythology an invention, the fanciful poetry of a Homer or Hesiod, or is it a growth? Or, to speak more definitely, Was mythology a mere accident, or was it inevitable? Was it only a false step, or was it a step that could not have been left out in the historical progress of the human mind?

The study of the history of language, which is only a part of the study of the history of thought, has enabled us to give a decisive answer to this question. Mythology is inevitable, it is natural, it is an inherent necessity of language, if we recognise in language the outward form and manifestation of thought: it is, in fact, the dark shadow which language throws on thought, and which can never disappear till language becomes altogether commensurate with thought, which it never will. Mythology, no doubt, breaks out more fiercely during the early periods of the history of human thought, but it never disappears altogether. Depend upon it, there is mythology now as there was in the time of Homer, only we do not perceive it, because we ourselves live in the very shadow of it, and because we all shrink from the full meridian light of truth. We are ready enough to see that if the ancients called their kings and heroes Διογενεῖς, sprung of Zeus, that expression, intended originally to convey the highest praise which man can bestow on man, was apt to lapse into mythology. We easily perceive how such a conception, compatible in its origin with the highest reverence for the gods, led almost inevitably to the growth of fables, which transferred to divine beings the incidents of human paternity and sonship. But we are not so ready to see that it is our fate, too, to move in allegories which illustrate things intellectual by visions exhibited to the fancy. In our religion, too, the conceptions of paternity and sonship have not always been free from all that is human, nor are we always aware that nearly every note that belongs to human paternity and sonship must be taken out of

these terms, before they can be pronounced safe against mythological infection. Papal decisions on immaculate conception are of no avail against that mythology. The mind must become immaculate and rise superior to itself; or it must close its eyes and shut its lips in the presence of the Divine.

If then we want to understand mythology, in the ordinary and restricted sense of the word, we must discover the larger circle of mental phenomena to which it belongs. Greek mythology is but a small segment of mythology; the religious mythologies of all the races of mankind are again but a small segment of mythology. Mythology, in the highest sense, is the power exercised by language on thought in every possible sphere of mental activity; and I do not hesitate to call the whole history of philosophy, from Thales down to Hegel, an uninterrupted battle against mythology, a constant protest of thought against language. This will require some explanation.

Ever since the time of Wilhelm von Humboldt, all who have seriously grappled with the highest problems of the Science of Language, have come to the conviction that thought and language are inseparable, that language is as impossible without thought as thought is without language; that they stand to each other somewhat like soul and body, like power and function, like substance and form. The objections which have been raised against this view arise generally from a mere misunderstanding. If we speak of language as the outward realisation of thought, we do not mean language as deposited in a dictionary, or sketched in a grammar, we mean language as an

act, language as being spoken, language as living and dying with every word that is uttered. We might perhaps call this speech, as distinguished from language.

Secondly, though if we speak of language, we mean chiefly phonetic articulate language, we do not exclude the less perfect symbols of thought, such as gestures, signs, or pictures. They, too, are language in a certain sense, and they must be included in language before we are justified in saying that discursive thought can be realised in language only. One instance will make this clear. We hold that we cannot think without language. But can we not count without language? We certainly can. We can form the conception of *three* without any spoken word, by simply holding up three fingers. In the same manner, the hand might stand for five, both hands for ten, hands and feet for twenty.[1] This is how people who possessed no organs of speech would speak; this is how the deaf and dumb *do* speak. Three fingers are as good as three strokes, three strokes are as good as three clicks of the tongue, three clicks of the tongue are as good as the sound *three*, or *trois*, or *drei*, or *shalosh* in Hebrew, or *san* in Chinese. All these are signs, more or less perfect, but being signs, they fall under the category of language; and all we maintain is, that without some kind of sign, discursive thought is impossible, and that in that sense, language, or λόγος, is the only possible realisation of human thought.

Another very common misunderstanding is this:

[1] *Daily Life and Origin of the Tasmanians*, by J. Bonwick, 1870, p. 143.

people imagine that, if it be impossible to think, except in language, language and thought must be one and the same thing. But a true philosophy of language leads to the very opposite result. Every philosopher would say that matter cannot exist without form, nor form without matter, but no philosopher would say that therefore it is impossible to distinguish between form and matter. In the same way, though we maintain that thought cannot exist without language nor language without thought, we do distinguish between thought and language, between the inward and the outward λόγος, between the substance and the form. Nay, we go a step beyond. We admit that language necessarily reacts on thought, and we see in this reaction, in this refraction of the rays of language, the real solution of the old riddle of mythology.

You will now see why these somewhat abstruse disquisitions were necessary for our immediate purpose, and I can promise those who have hitherto followed me on this rather barren and rugged track, that they will now be able to rest, and command, from the point of view which we have reached, the whole panorama of the mythology of the human mind.

We saw just now that the names of numbers may most easily be replaced by signs. Numbers are simple analytical conceptions, and for that very reason they are not liable to mythology: name and conception being here commensurate, no misunderstanding is possible. But as soon as we leave this department of thought, mythology begins. I shall try by at least one example to show how mythology

not only pervades the sphere of religion or religious tradition, but infects more or less the whole realm of thought.

When man wished for the first time to grasp and express a distinction between the body, and something else within him distinct from the body, an easy name that suggested itself was *breath*. The breath seemed something immaterial and almost invisible, and it was connected with the life that pervaded the body, for as soon as the breath ceased, the life of the body became extinct. Hence the Greek name ψυχή,[1] which originally meant breath,

[1] The word ψυχή is clearly connected in Greek with ψύχω, which meant originally blowing, and was used either in the sense of cooling by blowing, or breathing by blowing. In the former acceptation it produced ψύχος, coldness; ψυχρός, cold; ψυχάω, I cool; in the latter ψυχή, breath, then life, then soul. So far the purely Greek growth of words derived from ψύχω is clear. But ψύχω itself is difficult. It seems to point to a root *spu*, meaning to blow out, to spit; Lat. *spuo*, and *spuma*, foam; Goth. *speivan*; Gr. πτύω, supposed to stand for σπιύω. Hesychius mentions ψύττει = πτύει, ψυττόν = πτύελον. (Pott, *Etym. Forsch.* No. 355.) Curtius connects this root with Gr. φυ, in φῦσα, blowing, bellows, φυσάω, to blow, φυσιάω, to snort, ποι-φύσσω, to blow, and with Lat. *spirare* (i.e. spoisare). See E. B. Tylor, 'The Religion of Savages,' *Fortnightly Review*, 1866, p. 73.

Stahl, who rejected the division of life and mind adopted by Bacon, and returned to the Aristotelian doctrine, falls back on Plato's etymology of ψυχή as φυσέχη, from φύσιν ἔχειν or ὀχεῖν, *Crat.* 400 B. In a passage of his *Theoria Medica Vera* (Halæ, 1708), pointed out to me by Dr. Rolleston, Stahl says:—'Invenio in lexico græco antiquiore post alios, et Budæum imprimis, iterum iterumque reviso, nomenclaturam nimis quam fugitive allegatam; φυσέχη, poetice, pro ψυχή. Incidit animo suspicari, an non verum primum nomen animæ antiquissimis Græcis fuerit hoc φυσέχη, quasi ἔχων τὸ φύειν, e cuius vocis pronunciatione deflectente, uti vere familiariter solet vocalium, inprimis sub accentibus, fugitiva enunciatione, sensim natum sit φυσ-χή φσυχή, denique ad faciliorem pronunciationem in locum φσυχή, ψυχή. Quam suspicionem fovere mihi videtur illud, quod vocabuli ψυχῆς, pro anima, nulla idonea analogia in lingua

was chosen to express at first the principle of life, as distinguished from the decaying body, afterwards the incorporeal, the immaterial, the undecaying, the immortal part of man—his soul, his mind, his Self. All this was very natural. When a person dies, we too say that he has given up the ghost, and ghost, too, meant originally spirit, and spirit meant breath.

A very instructive analogous case is quoted by Mr. E. B. Tylor from a compendium of the theology of the Indians of Nicaragua, the record of question and answer in an inquest held by Father Francisco de Bobadilla in the early days of the Spanish conquest. Asked, among other things, concerning death, the Indians said: 'Those who die in their houses go underground, but those who are killed in war go to serve the gods (*teotes*). When men die, there comes forth from their mouth something which resembles a person, and is called *julio* (Aztec *yuli*, "to live") This being is like a person, but does not die, and the corpse remains here.' The Spanish ecclesiastics inquired whether those who go on high keep the same body, features, and limbs as here below; to which the Indians answered, 'No, there is only the heart.' 'But,' said the Spaniards, 'as the hearts are torn out' (they meant in the case of warriors who fell into the hands of the enemy), 'what happens then?' Hereupon the Indians replied: 'It is not precisely the heart, but that which is in them, and makes them live, and which quits the body when they die;' and again they said, 'It is not their heart which

græca occurrat; nam quæ a ψύχω ducitur, cum verus huius et directus significatus notorie sit refrigero, indirectus autem magis, spiro, nihil certe hæc ad animam puto.' (P. 44.)

goes up on high, but that which makes them live, that is, the breath coming out from their mouth, which is called *julio*.' 'Then,' asked the Spaniards, 'does this heart, *julio* or soul, die with the body?' 'When the deceased has lived well,' replied the Indians, 'the *julio* goes up on high with our gods; but when he has lived ill, the *julio* perishes with the body, and there is an end of it.'

The Greeks expressed the same idea by saying that the ψυχή had left the body,[1] had fled through the mouth, or even through a bleeding wound,[2] and had gone into Hades, which meant literally no more than the place of the Invisible (Ἀΐδης). That the breath had become invisible was matter of fact; that it had gone to the house of Hades, was mythology springing spontaneously from the fertile soil of language.

The primitive mythology was by no means necessarily religious. In the very case which we have chosen, philosophical mythology sprang up by the side of religious mythology. The religious mythology consisted in speaking of the spirits of the departed as ghosts, as mere breath and air, as fluttering about the gates of Hades, or ferried across the Styx in the boat of Charon.[3]

ἀνδρὸς δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἐλθεῖν οὔτε λεϊστὴ,
οὔθ' ἑλετὴ, ἐπεὶ ἄρ κεν ἀμείψεται ἕρκος ὀδόντων.

Il. ix. 408.

διὰ δ' ἔντερα χαλκὸς ἄφυσσεν
δηώσας· ψυχὴ δὲ κατ' οὐταμένην ὠτειλὴν
ἔσσυτ' ἐπειγομένη.

Il. xiv. 517.

'Ter frustra compressâ manu effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.'

Virg. *Æn.* ii. 792.

The philosophical mythology, however, that sprang from this name was much more important. We saw that *Psyche*, meaning originally the breathing of the body, was gradually used in the sense of vital breath, and as something independent of the body; and that at last, when it had assumed the meaning of the immortal part of man, it retained that character of something independent of the body, thus giving rise to the conception of a soul, not only as a being without a body, but in its very nature opposed to body. As soon as that opposition had been established in language and thought, philosophy began its work in order to explain how two such heterogeneous powers could act on each other—how the soul could influence the body, and how the body could determine the soul. Spiritualistic and materialistic system of philosophy arose, and all this in order to remove a self-created difficulty, in order to join together again what language had severed, the living body and the living soul. The question whether there is a soul or spirit, whether there is in man something different from the mere body, is not at all affected by this mythological phraseology. We certainly can distinguish between body and soul, but as long as we keep within the limits of human knowledge, we have no right to speak of the living soul as a breath, or of spirits and ghosts as fluttering about like birds or fairies. The poet of the nineteenth century says:—

> 'The spirit does but mean the breath,
> I know no more.'

And the same thought was expressed by Cicero two thousand years ago: 'Whether the soul is air or fire,

I do not know.' As men, we only know of embodied spirits, however ethereal their bodies may be conceived to be, but of spirits, separate from body, without form or frame, we know as little as we know of thought without language, or of the Dawn as a goddess, or of the Night as the mother of the Day.

Though breath, or spirit, or ghost are the most common names that were assigned through the metaphorical nature of language to the vital, and afterwards to the intellectual, principle in man, they were by no means the only possible names. We speak, for instance, of the *shades* of the departed, which meant originally their shadows. Those who first introduced this expression—and we find it in the most distant parts of the world[1]—evidently took the shadow as the nearest approach to what they wished to express; something that should be incorporeal, yet closely connected with the body. The Greek *εἴδωλον*, too, is not much more than the shadow, while the Latin *manes* meant probably in the beginning no more than the Little Ones, the Small Folk.[2] But the curious part, as showing again the influence of language on thought, an influence more powerful even than the evidence of the senses, is this, that people who speak of the life or soul as the shadow of the body, have brought themselves to believe that a dead body casts no shadow, because the shadow has departed from it; that it becomes, in fact, a kind of Peter Schlemihl.[3]

[1] See E. B. Tylor, *Fortnightly Review*, 1866, p. 74.

[2] *Im-manis*, originally 'not small,' came to mean enormous or monstrous.—See Preller, *Römische Mythologie*, p. 72 *seq.*

[3] *Unkulunkulu; or the Tradition of Creation as existing among*

Let us now return to mythology in the narrower sense of the word. One of the earliest objects that would strike and stir the mind of man and for which a sign or a name would soon be wanted is surely the Sun. It is very hard for us to realise the feelings with which the first dwellers on the earth looked upon the sun, or to understand fully what they meant by a morning prayer, or a morning sacrifice. Perhaps there are few people here present who have watched a sunrise more than once or twice in their lives; few people who have ever known the true meaning of a morning prayer, or a morning sacrifice. But think of man at the very dawn of time: forget for a moment, if you can, after having read the fascinating pages of Mr. Darwin, forget what man is supposed to have been before he was man; forget it, because it does not concern us here whether his bodily form and frame were developed once for all in the mind of a Creator, or gradually in the creation itself, which from the first monad or protoplasm to the last of the primates, or man, is not, I suppose, to be looked on, as altogether causeless, meaningless, purposeless; think of him only as man (and man means the thinker), with his mind yet lying fallow, though full of germs—germs of which I hold as strongly as ever no trace has ever, no trace will ever, be discovered anywhere but in man; think of the Sun awakening the eyes of man from sleep, and his mind from slumber! Was not the Sunrise to him the first wonder, the first beginning of all reflection, all thought, all philosophy? was it not to

the Amazulu and other Tribes of South Africa; by the Rev. J. Callaway, M.D. Natal, 1868. Part I. p. 91.

him the first revelation, the first beginning of all trust, of all religion? To us that wonder of wonders has ceased to exist, and few men now would even venture to speak of the sun as Sir John Herschel has spoken, calling him 'the Almoner of the Almighty, the delegated dispenser to us of light and warmth, as well as the centre of attraction, and as such, the immediate source of all our comforts, and, indeed, of the very possibility of our existence on earth.'[1]

Man is a creature of habit, and wherever we can watch him, we find that before a few generations have passed, he has lost the power of admiring what is regular, and that he can see signs and wonders only in what is irregular. Few nations only have preserved in their ancient poetry some remnants of the natural awe with which the earliest dwellers on the earth saw that brilliant being slowly rising from out the darkness of the night, raising itself by its own might higher and higher, till it stood triumphant on the arch of heaven, and then descended and sank down in its fiery glory into the dark abyss of the heaving and hissing sea. In the hymns of the Veda the poet still wonders whether the sun will rise again; he asks how he can climb the vault of heaven? why he does not fall back? why there is no dust on his path? And when the rays of the morning rouse him from sleep and call him back to new life; when he sees the sun, as he says, stretching out his golden arms to bless the world and rescue it from the terrors of darkness, he exclaims, 'Arise, our life, our spirit has come back! the darkness is gone, the light approaches!'

[1] See J. Samuelson, *Views of the Deity, Traditional and Scientific*, p. 144. Williams and Norgate, 1871.

For so prominent an object in the primeval picture-gallery of the human mind, a sign or a name must have been wanted at a very early period. But how was this to be achieved? As a mere sign, a circle would have been sufficient, such as we find in the hieroglyphics of Egypt, in the graphic system of China, or even in our own astronomical tables. If such a sign was fixed upon, we have a beginning of language in the widest sense of the word, for we have brought the Sun under the general concept of roundness, and we have found a sign for this concept which is made up of a large number of single sensuous impressions. With such definite signs mythology has little chance; yet the mere fact that the sun was represented as a circle would favour the idea that the sun was round; or, as ancient people, who had no adjective as yet for round or *rotundus*,[1] would say, that the sun was a wheel, a *rota*. If, on the contrary, the round sign reminded the people of an eye, then the sign of the sun would soon become the eye of heaven, and germs of mythology would spring up even from the barren soil of such hieroglyphic language.

But now, suppose that a real name was wanted for the sun, how could that be achieved?

[1] 'It has already been implied that the Aborigines of Tasmania had acquired very limited powers of abstraction or generalisation. They possessed no words representing abstract ideas; for each variety of gum-tree and wattle-tree, &c., &c., they had a name, but they had no equivalent for the expression, "a tree;" neither could they express abstract qualities, such as hard, soft, warm, cold, long, short, round, &c.; for "hard" they would say "like a stone;" for "tall" they would say "long legs," &c.; for "round" they said "like a ball," "like the moon," and so on, usually suiting the action to the word, and confirming by some sign the meaning to be understood.'—Milligan, *Vocabulary of the Dialects of some of the Aboriginal Tribes of Tasmania*, p. 34. Hobart Town, 1866.

We know that all words are derived from roots, that these roots express general concepts, and that, with few exceptions, every name is founded on a general concept under which the object that has to be named can be ranged. How these roots came to be, is a question into which we need not enter at present. Their origin and growth form a problem of psychology rather than of philology, and each science must keep within its proper bounds. If a name was wanted for snow, the early framers of language singled out one of the general predicates of snow, its whiteness, its coldness, or its liquidity, and called the snow the white, the cold, or the liquid, by means of roots conveying the general idea of whiteness, coldness, or liquidity. Not only Nix, nivis, but Niobe[1] too, was a name of the snow, and meant the

[1] If Signor Ascoli blames me for deriving *Niobe* with other names for snow from the root *snu*, instead of from the root *snigh*, this can only be due to an oversight. I am responsible for the derivation of Niobe, and for the admission of a secondary root *snyu* or *nyu*, and so far I may be either right or wrong. But Signor Ascoli ought to have known that the derivation of Gothic *snáiv-s*, Old High-German *snêo*, or *snê*, gen. *snêwe-s*, Lithuanian *snéga-s*, Slav. *snjeg*, Hib. *sneachd*, from the root *snu*, rests on the authority of Bopp (*Glossarium*, 1847, s. v. snu; see also Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, ii. p. 700). He ought likewise to have known that in 1852 Professor Schweizer-Siedler, in his review of Bötticher's *Arica* (Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, i. p. 479), had pointed out that *snigh* may be considered as a secondary root by the side of *snu* and *snâ* (cf. σμάω, σμήχω; ψάω, ψήχω; νάω, νήχω). The real relation of *snu* to *snigh* had been explained as early as 1842 by Benfey, *Wurzellexicon*, ii. p. 54; and Signor Ascoli was no doubt aware of what Professor Curtius had written on the relation of *snigh* to *snu* (*Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie*, p. 297). Signor Ascoli has certainly shown with greater minuteness than his predecessors that not only Zend *snizh* and Lithuanian *snêga-s*, but likewise Gothic *snaiv-s*, Greek νίφει, Latin nix, nĭv-is, and ninguis, may be derived from *snigh*; but if from *snigh*, a secondary development of the root *snu*, we can arrive at *νίφ-α*, and at *νίβα*, the other steps that lead on to Niobe will remain just the same.

melting; the death of her beautiful children by the arrows of Apollon and Artemis represents the destruction of winter by the rays of the sun. If the sun itself was to be named, it might be called the brilliant, the awakener, the runner, the ruler, the father, the giver of warmth, of fertility, of life, the scorcher, the destroyer, the messenger of death, and many other names; but there was no possibility of naming it, except by laying hold of one of its characteristic features, and expressing that feature by means of one of the conceptual or predicative roots.

Let us trace the history of at least one of these names. Before the Aryan nations separated, before there was a Latin, a Greek, or a Sanskrit language, there existed a root *svar* or *sval*, which meant to beam, to glitter, to warm. It exists in Greek, *σέλας*, splendour; *σελήνη*, moon; in Anglo-Saxon, as *swélan*, to burn, to sweal; in modern German, *schwül*, oppressively hot. From it we have in Sanskrit the noun *svar*, meaning sometimes the sky, sometimes the sun; and exactly the same word has been preserved in Latin, as *sol*; in Gothic as *sauil*; in Anglo-Saxon, as *sol*. A secondary form of *svar* is the Sanskrit *súrya* for *svárya*, the sun, which is the same word as the Greek *ἥλιος*.

All these names were originally mere predicates; they meant, bright, brilliant, warm. But as soon as the name *svar* or *súrya* was formed, it became, through the irresistible influence of language, the name, not only of a living, but of a male being. Every noun in Sanskrit must be either a masculine or a feminine (for the neuter gender was originally confined to the nominative case), and as *súryas* had been formed as a

masculine, language stamped it once for all as the sign of a male being, as much as if it had been the name of a warrior or a king. In other languages where the name for sun is a feminine, and the sun is accordingly conceived as a woman, as a queen, as the bride of the moon, the whole mythology of the love-making of the heavenly bodies is changed.

You may say that all this shows, not so much the influence of language on thought, as of thought on language; and that the sexual character of all words reflects only the peculiarities of a child's mind, which can conceive of nothing except as living, as male or female. If a child hurts itself against a chair, it beats and scolds the chair. The chair is looked upon not as *it*, but as *he*; it is the naughty chair, quite as much as a boy is a naughty boy. There is some truth in this, but it only serves to confirm the right view of the influence of language on thought; for this tendency, though in its origin intentional, and therefore the result of thought, became soon a mere rule of tradition in language, and it then reacted on the mind with irresistible power. As soon, in fact, as *sûryas* or ἥλιος appears as a masculine, we are in the very thick of mythology. We have not yet arrived at Helios as a god—that is a much later stage of thought, which we might describe almost in the words of Plato at the beginning of the seventh book of the 'Republic,' 'And after this, he will reason that the sun is he who gives the seasons and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold.' We have not yet advanced so far, but we have

reached at least the first germs of a myth. In the Homeric hymn to Helios, Helios is not yet called an immortal, but only ἐπιείκελος ἀθανάτοισι, like unto immortals, yet he is called the child of Euryphaessa, the son of Hyperion, the grandson of Uranos and Gæa.[1]

All this is mythology; it is ancient language going beyond its first intention.

Nor is there much difficulty in interpreting this myth. Helios, the sun, is called the son of Hyperīon, sometimes Hyperīon himself. This name Hyperīon is derived from the preposition ὑπέρ, the Latin *super*, which means above. It is derived by means of the suffix -ιων, which originally was not a patronymic, but simply expressed belonging to. So if Helios was called Hyperion, this simply meant he who dwells on high, and corresponds to Latin *Summanus* or *Superior*, or *Excelsior*. If, on the contrary, Helios is called Hyperionides, this, too, which meant originally no more than he who comes from, or belongs to those who dwell on high,[2] led to the myth that he was the descendant of Hyperion; so that in this case, as in the case of Zeus Kronīon, the son really led to the conception of his father. Zeus Kronīon meant originally no more than Zeus the eternal, the god of ages, the ancient of days; but -ίων becoming usual as a patronymic suffix, Kronion was supposed

[1] At the end of the hymn the poet says :—

χαῖρε, ἄναξ, πρόφρων δὲ βίον θυμήρε' ὄπαζε·
ἐκ σέο δ' ἀρξάμενος κλήσω μερόπων γένος ἀνδρῶν
ἡμιθέων, οὓς ἔργα θεοὶ θνητοῖσιν ἔδειξαν.

This would seem to imply that the poet looked upon Helios as a half-god, almost as a hero, who had once lived on earth.

[2] Corssen, *Ueber Steigerungsendungen*, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, iii. p. 299.

to mean the son of Kronos. Kronos, the father, was created in order to account for the existence of the name Kronion. If Hyperīon is called the son of Euryphaëssa, the wide-shining, this requires no commentary; for even at present a poet might say that the sun is born of the wide-shining dawn. You see the spontaneous generation of mythology with every new name that is formed. As not only the sun, but also the moon and the dawn could be called dwellers on high, they, too, took the name of Hyperionis or Hyperionides; and hence Homer called Selenè, the Moon, and Eos, the Dawn, sisters of Helios, and daughters of Hyperion and Euryphaessa, the Dawn doing service twice, both as mother, Euryphaessa, and as daughter, Eos. Nay, according to Homer, Euryphaessa, the Dawn, is not only the wife, but also the sister of Helios. All this is perfectly intelligible, if we watch the growth of language and mythology; but it leads, of course, to the most tragic catastrophes as soon as it is all taken in a literal sense.

Helios is called *ἀκάμας*, the never-tiring; *παν-δερκής*, the all-seeing; *φαέθων*, the shining; and also *φοῖβος*, the brilliant. This last epithet *φοῖβος* has grown into an independent deity Phœbus, and it is particularly known as a name of Apollon, Phoibos Apollon; thus showing what is also known from other sources that in Apollo, too, we have one of the many mythic disguises of the sun.

So far all is clear, because all the names which we have to deal with are intelligible, or, at all events, yield to the softest etymological pressure. But now if we hear the story of Phoibos Apollon falling in

love with Daphne, and Daphne praying to her mother, the Earth, to save her from Phoibos; and if we read how either the earth received her in her lap, and then a laurel tree sprang up where she had disappeared, or how she herself was changed into a laurel tree, what shall we think of this? It is a mere story, it might be said, and why should there be any meaning in it? My answer is, because people do not tell such stories of their gods and heroes, unless there is some sense in them. Besides, if Phoibos means the sun, why should not Daphne have a meaning too? Before, therefore, we can decide whether the story of Phoibos and Daphne is a mere invention, we must try to find out what can have been the meaning of the word Daphne.

In Greek it means a laurel,[1] and this would explain the purely Greek legend that Daphne was changed into a laurel tree. But who was Daphne? In order to answer this question, we must have recourse to etymology, or, in other words, we must examine the history of the word. Etymology, as you know, is no longer what it used to be; and though there may still be a classical scholar here and there who crosses himself at the idea of a Greek word being explained by a reference to Sanskrit, we naturally look to Sanskrit as the master-key to many a lock which no Greek key will open. Now Daphne, as I have shown, can be traced back to Sanskrit Ahanâ, and Ahanâ in Sanskrit means the dawn. As soon as we know this, everything becomes clear. The story of Phoibos and Daphne is no more than a description of what every one may see every day;

[1] See *Selected Essays*, vol. i. p. 399.

first, the appearance of the Dawn in the eastern sky, then the rising of the Sun as if hurrying after his bride, then the gradual fading away of the bright Dawn at the touch of the fiery rays of the sun, and at last her death or disappearance in the lap of her mother, the Earth. All this seems to me as clear as daylight, and the only objection that could be raised against this reading of the ancient myth would be, if it could be proved that Ahanâ does not mean Dawn, and that Daphne cannot be traced back to Ahanâ, or that *Helios* does not mean the Sun.

I know there is another objection, but it seems to me so groundless as hardly to deserve an answer. Why, it is asked, should the ancient nations have told these endless stories about the Sun and the Dawn, and why should they have preserved them in their mythology? We might as well ask why the ancient nations should have invented so many irregular verbs, and why they should have preserved them in their grammar. A fact does not cease to be a fact, because we cannot at once explain it. As far as our knowledge goes at present, we are justified in stating that the Aryan nations preserved not only their grammatical structure, and a large portion of their dictionary, from the time which preceded their separation, but that they likewise retained the names of some of their deities, some legends about their gods, some popular sayings and proverbs, and in these, it may be, the seeds of parables, as part of their common Aryan heirloom. Their mythological lore fills in fact a period in the history of Aryan thought, half-way between the period of language and the period of literature, and it is this discovery

which gives to mythology its importance in the eyes of the student of the most ancient history and psychology of mankind.

And do not suppose that the Greeks, or the Hindús, or the Aryan nations in general were the only people who possessed such tales. Wherever we look, in every part of the world, among uncivilised as well as a civilised people, we find the same kind of stories, the same traditions, the same myths.

I shall give one story from the extreme North, another from the extreme South.

Among the Esquimaux of Repulse Bay, on the West side of Hudson's Bay, on the Arctic Circle, Mr. John Rae picked up the following story :—

'Many years ago, a great Esquimaux Conqueror gained so much power that he was able to rise unto the heavens, taking with him on one occasion a sister, a very beautiful girl, and some fire. He added much fuel to the fire, and thus formed the Sun. For some time he and his sister lived in great harmony, but after a time he became very cruel, and ill-treated his sister in many ways. She bore it at first with great patience, until at last he threw fire at her, and scorched one side of her face. This spoiling of her beauty was beyond endurance; she therefore ran away from him, and formed the Moon. Her brother then began, and still continues to chase her; but although he sometimes got near, he has not yet overtaken her, nor ever will.

'When it is New Moon, the burnt side of the face is towards us; at Full Moon it is the reverse.'

There are dialectic varieties in the Mythology of the Esquimaux as of the Greeks and Hindus, and,

with a change of gender between Sun and Moon, the same story occurs among other tribes in the following form :—

'There was a girl at a party, and some one told his love for her by shaking her shoulders, after the manner of the country. She could not see who it was in the dark hut, so she smeared her hands with soot, and when he came back she blackened his cheek with her hand. When a light was brought she saw that it was her brother and fled. He ran after her, followed her, and as she came to the end of the earth, he sprang out into the sky. Then she became the sun, and he the moon, and this is why the moon is always chasing the sun through the heavens, and why the moon is sometimes dark as he turns his blackened cheek towards the earth.'[1]

We now turn to the South, and here, among the lowest of the low, among the Hottentots, who are despised even by their black neighbours, the Zulus, we find the following gem of a fable, beaming with mingled rays of religion and philosophy :—

'The Moon, it is said, sent once an insect to men, saying, "Go thou to men, and tell them, As I die, and dying live, so ye shall also die, and dying live." The insect started with the message, but whilst on his way, was overtaken by the hare, who asked: "On what errand art thou bound?" The insect answered, "I am sent by the Moon to men, to tell them that as she dies and dying lives, they also shall die and dying live." The hare said, "As thou art an awkward runner, let me go" (to take the message). With these words he ran off, and when he reached men, he said, "I am sent by the Moon

[1] *The Childhood of the World*, by E. Clodd, p. 62.

to tell you, As I die, and dying perish, in the same manner ye also shall die and come wholly to an end." Then the hare returned to the Moon, and told her what he had said to men. The Moon reproached him angrily, saying, "Darest thou tell the people a thing which I have not said?" With these words she took up a piece of wood, and struck him on the nose. Since that day the hare's nose is slit.'

Of this story, too, there are various versions, and in one of them the end is as follows:—

'The hare, having returned to the Moon, was questioned as to the message delivered, and the Moon, having heard the true state of the case, became so enraged with him that she took up a hatchet to split his head; falling short, however, of that, the hatchet fell upon the upper lip of the hare, and cut it severely. Hence it is that we see the "hare-lip." The hare, being duly incensed at having received such treatment, raised his claws, and scratched the Moon's face; and the dark parts which we now see on the surface of the Moon are the scars which she received on that occasion.'[1]

[1] *Reynard the Fox in South Africa, or Hottentot Fables and Tales*, by W. H. I. Bleek, 1864, p. 69. Dr. Theophilus Hahn, *Die Sprache der Nama*, 1870, p. 59. As a curious coincidence it may be mentioned that in Sanskrit, too, the Moon is called *sasānka*, *i.e.* 'having the marks of a hare,' the black marks in the moon being taken for the likeness of the hare. Another coincidence is that the Namaqua Hottentots will not touch hare's flesh (see Sir James E. Alexander's *Expedition of Discovery into the Interior of Africa*, vol. i. p. 169), because the hare deceived men, while the Jews abstain from it, because the hare is supposed to chew the cud (Lev. xi. 6).

A similar tradition on the meaning of death occurs among the Zulus, but as they do not know of the Moon as a deity, the message that men are not to die, or that they are to die, is sent there by Unkulunkulu, the ancestor of the human race, and thus the whole

The Finns, Lapps, and Esthonians do not seem a very poetical race, yet there is poetry even in their smoky huts, poetry surrounded with all the splendour of an arctic night, and fragrant with the perfume of moss and wild flowers. Here is one of their legends :—

'Wanna Issi had two servants, Koit and Ämmarik, and he gave them a torch which Koit should light every morning, and Ämmarik should extinguish in the evening. In order to reward their faithful services, Wanna Issi told them they might be man and wife, but they asked Wanna Issi that he would allow them to remain for ever bride and bridegroom. Wanna Issi assented, and henceforth Koit handed the torch every evening to Ämmarik, and Ämmarik took it and extinguished it. Only during four weeks in summer they remain together at midnight; Koit hands the dying torch to Ämmarik, but Ämmarik does not let it die, but lights it again with her breath. Then their hands are stretched out, and their lips meet, and the blush of the face of Ämmarik colours the midnight sky.'

This myth requires hardly any commentary; yet, as long as it is impossible to explain the names, Wanna Issi, Koit, and Ämmarik, it might be said that the story was but a love story, invented by an idle Lapp, or Finn, or Esthonian. But what if Wanna Issi in Esthonian means the Old Father, and if Koit means the Dawn? Can we then doubt any longer that Ämmarik[1] must be the Gloaming, and that their

story loses its point. See Dr. Callaway, *Unkulunkulu*, p. 4; and Gray, *Polynesian Mythology*, pp. 16–58.

[1] According to a letter just received from an Esthonian lady,

meeting in the summer reflects those summer evenings when, particularly in the North, the torch of the sun seems never to die, and when the Gloaming is seen kissing the Dawn?

I wish I could tell you some more of these stories which have been gathered from all parts of the world, and which, though they may be pronounced childish and tedious by some critics, seem to me to glitter with the brightest dew of nature's own poetry, and to contain those very touches that make us feel akin, not only with Homer or Shakespeare, but even with Lapps, and Finns, and Kaffirs.

I cannot resist, however, the temptation of inserting here a poetical rendering of the story of Koit and Ämmarik, sent to me from the New World, remarking only that instead of Lapland, Esthonia is really the country that may claim the original story.

A Legend of Lapland.

'Two servants were in Wanna Issi's pay;
A blazing torch their care;
Each morning Koit must light it till its ray
Flamed through the air;

'And every evening Ämmarik's fair hand
Must quench the waning light;
Then over all the weary, waiting land
Fell the still night.

ämmarik does mean the gloaming in the language of the common people of Esthonia. Bertram (*Ilmatar*, Dorpat, 1870, p. 265) remarks that *Koit* is the dawn, *Koido täht*, the morning-star, also called *eha täht*. *Ämarik*, the ordinary name for the dawn, is used as the name for the evening twilight, or the gloaming in the well-known story, published by Fählmann (*Verhandlungen der gelehrten Estnischen Gesellschaft zu Dorpat*, vol. i.). In Finnish *hämära* is twilight in general.

'So passed the time; then Wanna Issi said,
"For faithful service done,
Lo, here reward! To-morrow shall ye wed,
And so be one."

'"Not so," said Koit; "for sweeter far to me
The joy that neareth still;
Then grant us ever fast bethrothed to be."
They had their will.

'And now the blazing lustre to transfer
Himself, is all his claim;
Warm from her lover's hand it comes to her,
To quench the flame.

'Only for four times seven lengthening days,
At midnight, do they stand
Together, while Koit gives the dying blaze
To Ämmarik's hand.

'O wonder then! She lets it not expire,
But lights it with her breath—
The breath of love, that, warm with quickening fire,
Wakes life from death.

'Then hands stretch out, and touch, and clasp on high,
Then lip to lip is pressed,
And Ämmarik's blushes tinge the midnight sky
From east to west.'

ANNA C. BRACKETT.

If people cannot bring themselves to believe in solar and celestial myths among the Hindus and Greeks, let them study the folklore of the Semitic and Turanian races. I know there is, on the part of some of our most distinguished scholars, the same objection against comparing Aryan to non-Aryan myths, as there is against any attempt to explain

the features of Sanskrit or Greek by a reference to Finnish or Bask. In one sense that objection is well founded, for nothing would create greater confusion than to ignore the genealogical principle as the only safe one in a scientific classification of languages, of myths, and even of customs. We must first classify our myths and legends, as we classify our languages and dialects. We must first of all endeavour to explain what wants explanation in one member of a family by a reference to other members of the same family, before we allow ourselves to glance beyond. But there is in a comparative study of languages and myths not only a philological, but also a philosophical, and more particularly, a psychological interest, and though even in this more general study of mankind, the frontiers of language and race ought never to disappear, yet they can no longer be allowed to narrow or intercept our view. How much the student of Aryan mythology and ethnology may gain for his own progress by allowing himself a wider survey over the traditions and customs of the whole human race, is best known to those who have studied the works of Klemm, Waitz, Bastian, Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Tylor, and Dr. Callaway. What is prehistoric in language among the Aryan nations, is frequently found as still historic among Turanian races. The same applies with regard to religions, myths, legends, and customs. Among Finns and Lapps, among Zulus and Maoris, among Khonds and Karens, we sometimes find the most startling analogies to Aryan traditions, and we certainly learn, again and again, this one important lesson, that as in language, so in mythology, there is nothing which

had not originally a meaning, that every name of the gods and heroes had a beginning, a purpose, and a history.

Jupiter was no more called Jupiter by accident, than the Polynesian *Maui*, the Samoyede *Num*, or the Chinese *Tien*.[1] If we can discover the original meaning of these names, we have reached the first ground of their later growth. I do not say that, if we can explain the first purpose of the mythological names, we have solved the whole riddle of mythology, but I maintain that we have gained firm ground. I maintain that every true etymology gives us an historical fact, because the first giving of a name was an historical fact, and an historical fact of the greatest importance for the later development of ancient ideas. Think only of this one fact, which no one would now venture to doubt, that the supreme deity of the Greeks, the Romans, the Germans, is called by the same name as the supreme deity of the earliest Aryan settlers in India. Does not this one fact draw away the curtain from the dark ages of antiquity, and open before our eyes an horizon which we can hardly measure by years? The Greek *Zeus* is the same word as the Latin *Ju* in *Jupiter*, as the German *Tiu*; and all these were merely dialectic varieties of the Vedic *Dyaus*.[2] Now *dyaus* in Sanskrit is the name of the sky, if used as a feminine; if used as a masculine, as it is still in the Veda, it is the sky as a man or as a god—it is Zeus, the father of gods and men. You know, of course, that the whole language of ancient India is but a sister dialect of Greek, Latin,

[1] See *Lectures on the Science of Religion*, pp. 194, 200.

[2] See my *Lectures on the Science of Language* (10th ed.), vol. ii. p. 468.

of German, Celtic, and Slavonic, and that if the Greek says *es-ti*, he is, if the Roman says *est*, the German *ist*, the Slave *yesté*, the Hindu, three thousand years ago, said *as-ti*, he is. This *as-ti* is a compound of a root *as* to be, and the pronoun *ti*. The root meant originally *to breathe*, and dwindled down after a time to the meaning of *to be*. All this must have happened before a single Greek or German reached the shores of Europe, and before a single Brahman descended into the plains of India. At that distant time we must place the gradual growth of language and ideas, of a language which we are still speaking, of ideas which we are still thinking; and at the same time only can we explain the framing of those names which were the first attempts at grasping supernatural powers, which became in time the names of the deities of the ancient world, the heroes of mythology, the chief actors in many a legend, nay, some of which have survived in the nursery tales of our own time.[1]

My time, I see, is nearly over, but before I finish, I feel that I have a duty to perform from which I ought not to shrink. Some of those who have honoured me with their presence to-night may recollect that about a year ago a lecture was delivered in this very room by Professor Blackie, in which he tried to throw discredit on the scientific method of the interpretation of popular myths, or on what I call Comparative Mythology. Had he confined his remarks to the subject itself, I should have felt most grateful for his criticisms, little minding the manner

[1] See a most interesting essay, *Le Petit Poucet* (Tom Thumb), by Gaston Paris.

in which they were conveyed—for a student of language knows what words are made of. Nor, had his personal reflections concerned myself alone, should I have felt called upon to reply to them thus publicly, for it has always seemed to me that unless we protest against unmerited praise, we have no right to protest against unmerited abuse. I believe I can appeal to all here present, that during the many years I have had the honour to lecture in this Institution, I have *not once* allowed myself to indulge in any personal remarks, or attacked those who, being absent, cannot defend themselves. Even when I had to answer objections, or to refute false theories, I have always most carefully avoided mentioning the names of living writers. But as Professor Blackie has directed his random blows, not against myself, but against a friend of mine, Mr. Cox, the author of a work on Aryan Mythology, I feel that I must for once try to get angry, and return blow for blow. Professor Blackie speaks of Mr. Cox as if he had done nothing beyond repeating what I had said before. Nothing can be more unfair. My own work in Comparative Mythology has consisted chiefly in laying down some of the general principles of that science, and in the etymological interpretation of some of the ancient names of gods, goddesses, and heroes. In fact, I have made it a rule never to interpret or to compare the legends of India, Greece, Italy, or Germany, except in cases where it was possible, first of all, to show an identity or similarity in the Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, or German names of the principal actors. Mr. Cox having convinced himself that the method which I have followed in mythology

rests on sound and truly scientific principles, has adopted most, though by no means all, of my etymological interpretations. Professor Blackie, on the contrary, without attempting any explanation of the identity of mythological names in Greek and Sanskrit which must be either disproved or explained, thunders forth the following sentence of condemnation:—'Even under the scientific guidance of a Bopp, a Pott, a Grimm, and a Müller, a sober man may sometimes, even in the full blaze of the new sun of comparative philology, allow himself to drink deep draughts, if not of *maundering madness*, at least of *manifest hallucination*.'

If such words are thrown at my head, I pick them up chiefly as etymological curiosities, and as striking illustrations of what Mr. Tylor calls 'survivals in culture,' showing how the most primitive implements of warfare, rude stones and unpolished flints, which an ethnologist would suppose to be confined to prehistoric races, to the red Indians of America or the wild Picts of Caledonia, turn up again most unexpectedly at the present day in the very centre of civilised life. All I can say is, that if, as a student of Comparative Mythology, I have been drinking deep draughts of maundering madness, I have been drinking in good company. In this respect Mr. Cox has certainly given me far more credit than I deserve. I am but one out of many labourers in this rich field of scientific research, and he ought to have given far greater prominence to the labours of Grimm, Burnouf, Bopp, and, before all, of my learned friend, Professor Kuhn.

But while, with regard to etymology, Mr. Cox

contents himself with reporting the results of other scholars, he stands quite independent in his own treatment of Comparative Mythology. Of this Professor Blackie seems to have no suspicion whatever. The plan which Mr. Cox follows is to collect the coincidences in the legends themselves, and to show how in different myths the same story with slight variations is told again and again of different gods and heroes. In this respect his work is entirely original and very useful; for although these coincidences may be explained in different ways, and do not afford a proof of a common historical origin of the mythologies of India, Greece, Italy, and Germany, they are all the more interesting from a purely psychological point of view, and supply important material for further researches. Mr. Tylor has lately worked with great success in the same rich mine; extending the limits of mythological research far beyond the precincts of the Aryan world, and showing that there are solar myths wherever the sun shines. I differ from Mr. Cox on many points, as he differs from me. I shall certainly keep to my own method of never attempting an interpretation or a comparison, except where the ground has first been cleared of all uncertainty by etymological research, and where the names of different gods and heroes have been traced back to a common source. I call this the *nominalistic* as opposed to the *realistic* method of Comparative Mythology, and it is the former only that concerns the student of the Science of Language. I gratefully acknowledge, however, the help which I have received from Mr. Cox's work,

particularly as suggesting new clusters of myths that might be disentangled by etymological analysis.

But not only has Professor Blackie failed to perceive the real character of Mr. Cox's researches, but he has actually charged him with holding opinions which both Mr. Cox and myself have repeatedly disavowed, and most strenuously opposed. Again and again have we warned the students of Comparative Mythology that they must not expect to be able to explain everything. Again and again have we pointed out that there are irrational elements in mythology, and that we must be prepared to find grains of local history on which, as I said,[1] the sharpest tools of Comparative Mythology must bend or break. Again and again have we shown that historical persons[2]—not only Cyrus and Charlemagne, but Frederick Barbarossa and even Frederick the Great—have been drawn into the vortex of popular mythology. Yet these are the words of Professor Blackie: 'The cool way in which Max Müller and his English disciple, Mr. Cox, assume that there are no human figures and historical characters in the whole gallery of heroes and demi-gods in the Greek Mythology, is something very remarkable.'

[1] *Selected Essays*, vol. i. p. 478:—'Here then we see that mythology does not always create its own heroes, but that it lays hold of real history, and coils itself round it so closely that it is difficult, nay, almost impossible, to separate the ivy from the oak, the lichen from the granite to which it clings. And here is a lesson which comparative mythologists ought not to neglect. They are naturally bent on explaining everything that can be explained; but they should bear in mind that there may be elements in every mythological riddle which resist etymological analysis, for the simple reason that their origin was not etymological, but historical.'

[2] *Lectures on the Science of Language*, vol. ii. p. 581.

I readily admit that some of the etymologies which I have proposed of mythological names are open to criticism; and if, like other scholars, Professor Blackie had pointed out to me any cases where I might seem to him to have offended against Grimm's law or other phonetic rules, I should have felt most grateful; but if he tells me that the Greek Erinys should not be derived from the Sanskrit Saranyû, but from the Greek verb ἐριννύειν, to be angry, he might as well derive *critic* from *to criticise*;[1] and if he maintains that a name may have two or three legitimate etymologies, I can only answer that we might as well say that a child could have two or three legitimate mothers.

I have most reluctantly entered upon these somewhat personal explanations, and I should not have done so if I alone had been concerned in Professor Blackie's onslaught. I hope, however, that I have avoided anything that could give just offence to Professor Blackie, even if he should be present here to-night. Though he abuses me as a German, and laughs at the instinctive aversion to external facts and the extravagant passion for self-evolved ideas as national failings of all Germans (I only wonder that the story of the camel and the inner consciousness did not come

[1] Professor Blackie quotes Pausanias in support of this etymology. He says: 'The account of Pausanias (viii. 25, 26), according to which the terrible impersonation of conscience, or the violated moral law, is derived from ἐριννύειν, an old Greek verb originally signifying to be angry, has sufficient probability, not to mention the obvious analogy of Ἀραί, another name sometimes given to the awful maids (σεμναί), from ἀρά, an imprecation.' If Professor Blackie will refer to Pausanias himself, he will find that the Arcadians assigned a very different cause to the anger of Demeter, which is supposed to have led to the formation of her new name Erinys.

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